David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy

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Notes

1 S.S. Zhil’tsov, I.S. Zoni and A.M. Ushkov, Geopolitika Kaspiiskogo Regiona (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnayie Otnosheniya 2003) p.110.

2 Russian successes in the region, such as the subsea Blue Stream gas pipeline, are considered to be the result of the ‘failure of American pipeline strategy in the Caucasus and Central Asia as a whole’. Ibid., p.131.

3 Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been far less vocal about their desire to integrate with Western security structures such as the EU and NATO than neighbouring Georgia. Nevertheless, continuing integration with NATO is a key strategic goal of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and the government has welcomed the Euro‐Atlantic alliance’s growing interest in the South Caucasus. Armenia is Russia’s closest ally in the region and Yerevan has sought a close relationship with Moscow to counterbalance what it perceives to be its vulnerable position between two countries that are antagonistic towards it: a militarily powerful Turkey and increasingly strong Azerbaijan.

4 For example, the EU flag is displayed next to the Georgian flag in all official buildings in Georgia.

5 Georgia has witnessed a veritable flood of assistance from the US: financial support for Georgia to date totals over US$1 billion, making Georgians the second biggest per capita recipients of American aid after the Israelis. The US$64 million ‘Train and Equip’ (GTEP) programme, which ran from 2002 to 2004,was replaced by a 16‐month, US$64 million Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) launched in 2005.

6 Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 25 April 2005, the Kremlin, Moscow, 〈www.kremlin.ru〉. The democratic ‘revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine were viewed as part of a Western conspiracy to usurp Russian influence, an opinion expressed in the government‐controlled newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in Dec. 2004, which argued that ‘Russia cannot afford to allow defeat in the battle for Ukraine’ as it ‘would mean velvet revolutions…in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly Armenia’. Rossiskaya Gazeta, 2 Dec. 2004,〈www.rg.ru〉. Quoted in Graeme P. Herd, ‘The “Orange Revolution”: Implications for Stability in the CIS’, Conflict Studies Research Centre (Camberley, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Jan. 2005).

7 Izvestiya, 31 March 2008, 〈www.izvestiya.ru〉.

8 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding a Media Question Concerning Ukrainian Leadership’s Letter Requesting NATO Membership Action Plan, 22 Jan. 2008, 〈www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/a3e83d7fcb17f27ac32573db002818d8?OpenDocument〉.

9 Vladimir Socor, The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro‐Atlantic Interests, report prepared by the George C. Marshall Fund of the United States, on the occasion of the 2004 NATO Summit on ‘A New Euro‐Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region’.

10 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Commentary on the Speech of British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in Kyiv on 27 Aug. 2008, 〈www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/9eef4de1d8fddd4bc32574b4001e8521?OpenDocument〉.

11 In Feb. 2006 the Georgian parliament voted unanimously (179–0) in support of a non‐binding resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia and calling upon the government to review the 1992 Dagomys peace agreement; this forms the legal basis for the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), which comprises ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia.

12 Quoted in ‘Russian threats alarm Georgia’, BBC News (online), 14 Sept. 2004, 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk〉.

13 ‘Russia targets Borjomi in trade war with Georgia’, Civil Georgia, 5 May 2006, 〈www.civil.ge〉.

14 In Nov. 2001 Putin said that its southern neighbour was home to ‘international terrorist camps’. Agence France Presse, 30 Nov. 2001, Moscow. His allegations were apparently corroborated at the beginning of 2002, when several mercenaries from Saudi Arabia and Jordan were arrested in Georgia and accused of trying to establish ‘an illegal guerrilla group in the Pankisi Gorge’. The arrested men allegedly had links with Khattab. Agence France Presse, 9 Feb. 2002, Tbilisi.

15 The 40‐mile long Gorge became a notorious centre of crime, no longer under the control of the Georgian authorities. Russia believed that the lawlessness of the area provided rebel fighters with an ideal base in which to regroup and rearm before returning across the border to continue their battle. According to the Russian special services in mid‐2002, over 2,000 armed men, including Ruslan Gelayev and fighters from Shamil Basayev’s group, were concentrated in the Gorge. Izvestiya, 26 Aug. 2002, p.1. For an in‐depth historical and ethnographic survey of the Gorge see Shorena Kurtsikidze and Vakhtang Chikovani, ‘Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey’, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post‐Soviet Studies Working Paper Series (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 2002).

16 Agence France Presse, 30 July 2002, Tbilisi. Furthermore, the commander of Russia’s paratroopers, Gen. Georgy Shpak, was quoted as saying that the military was prepared to attack suspected rebel bases in Pankisi if ordered to: ‘We are military people, and if such a command is issued, then we will execute the task at hand.’ Agence France Presse, 1 Aug. 2002, Tbilisi.

17 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 Aug. 2002, p.1. This rationale followed the arrival of US military trainers in Georgia in May 2002 to assist the Georgian military in bringing the Pankisi Gorge region under control. The move was seen as a new front in the global war on terrorism and appeared to bolster Russia’s defence of its brutal military operation.

18 Izvestiya, 12 Sept. 2002, p.3. There were reports that a plan for military operations in the Gorge had already been drawn up by Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, the Chief of General Staff. According to this plan, a motorised rifle regiment from the 42nd Division based in Ingushetia would be deployed, together with border guards from the Itum‐Kalinskiy detachment and GRU special forces. There were reports that several units had already been moved to the border area and strike aircraft, equipped with precision weapons, would play a key role. BBC Monitoring Select SU/4640, 13 Sept. 2002, p.14, Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow, 0900GMT, 12 Sept. 2002.

19 Izvestiya, 12 Sept. 2002, p. 3. Article 51 of the UN Charter guarantees every UN member the right to individual or collective self‐defence. Putin also accused Georgia of violating UN Security Resolution 1373, an anti‐terrorist resolution adopted on 28 Sept. 2001 and mandatory for all countries, by failing to tackle raids by ‘bandits’ and incursions into Russian territory. According to Resolution 1373 it is the duty of all countries to prevent terrorists acting against other states from their territory.

20 BBC Monitoring Select, SWB SU/4625, 29 Aug. 2002, pp.24–5, NTV Mir, Moscow, 1000GMT 28 Aug. 2002. Even George W. Bush has drawn a link between Afghanistan and Chechnya, stating that Russian troops in Chechnya could learn a lesson from the US‐led war in Afghanistan where, according to the US President, the rights of the people were being respected while fighting terror. He went on to state ‘I understand full well that the people of Russia have suffered at the hands of terrorism as we have’. Agence France Presse, 24 May 2002, Moscow.

21 The rebellious region of Ajaria was brought back into the fold with the removal of its former leader Aslan Abashidze and the success of the pro‐Saakashvili political bloc in local elections there in June 2004.

22 BBC Monitoring (online version), 9 Sept. 2005, Imedi TV, Tbilisi.

23 Novyie Izvestiya, 4 Feb. 2004, pp.1–4.

24 BBC Monitoring (online version), 15 Sept. 2005, Alia Newspaper, Tbilisi, 15 Sept. 2005. According to Saakashvili, in 2005 the ‘de‐facto defence minister of South Ossetia [wa]s an active Russian military officer’ from Siberia, while the security minister was the acting head of the security service in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan. BBC Monitoring (online version), 9 July 2005, Imedi TV, Tbilisi, 1100GMT, 9 July 2005.

25 BBC Monitoring (online version), 11 Jan. 2005, NTV Mir, Moscow, 1000GMT, 11 Jan. 2005.

26 BBC Monitoring (online version), 19 Aug. 2005, ITAR‐TASS News Agency, Moscow, 1015GMT, 19 Aug. 2005.

27 These peoples are keen to acquire Russian passports, as their refusal to acknowledge Georgian statehood means they do not hold Georgian passports and hence are unable to travel beyond the country’s borders. Abkhazians and South Ossetians are also excluded from the visa regime Russia imposed on Georgian citizens in Dec. 2000, a move described by the European parliament as the ‘de facto annexation of Georgian territory’. ‘Visa requirements between Russia and Georgia’, text adopted by European Parliament 18 Jan. 2001, 〈www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-0037+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X〉.

28 Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘V svyazi s obostreniem situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’, 9 July 2004, 〈www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/3C8799FB6DC16167C3256ECC0045352E〉 and BBC Monitoring (online version), 4 Aug. 2005, RTR Russia TV, Moscow, 4 Aug. 2005.

29 Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs On the Situation in the Georgian‐Ossetian Zone of Conflict, 14 Sept. 2007, 〈ww.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/fd30396df64db2c9c3257356005ad343?OpenDocument〉.

30 According to the statement, Tbilisi’s actions devalued ‘the Georgian leadership’s recent statements about its intention to settle conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia by political means, through negotiations…These issues are of fundamental importance to Russia because it concerns security on the country’s southern border.’ Statement ‘O situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’, 31 May 2004, 〈www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/ED7353724F649D15C3256EA50057951C〉.

31 Statement ‘O situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’, 1 June 2004, 〈www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/E389EB4B3E33A4EFC3256EA6005C1C61〉. The Foreign Ministry was also highly critical of Tbilisi for apparently using troops trained under the US GTEP programme in South Ossetia. This statement was followed on 2 June by a statement from the Russian Duma, condemning the Georgian build‐up of force in South Ossetia, describing it as a ‘demonstration of force’ and a week later Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, also issued a statement expressing concern over rising tension in the region and calling for restraint, stating ‘there is no alternative to a peaceful resolution of the Georgian–Ossetian conflict’.

32 BBC Monitoring Select Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 2 June 2004, p.19, Kavkazia‐Press News Agency, Tbilisi, 0929GMT, 2 June 2004. When asked for his reaction to the Russian statements, Saakashvili advised that little attention be paid to ‘a statement drafted by some clerk. Relations between the [two] states are at a high level. Relations between Russia and Georgia are improving but it takes time for this machine to turn around. This entire machine was geared towards bad relations with Georgia. Time is needed for this machine to be reset.’ BBC Monitoring Select Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 2 June 2004, p. 18, Imedi TV, Tbilisi, 1403GMT, 2 June 2004.

33 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 〈www.mid.ru〉. The Russian position is at odds with its stance over Chechnya, a self‐proclaimed republic that is seeking independence from the Russian Federation, and Moscow’s anger if other states engage with Chechen separatists.

34 In May 2008, 400 Russian Ministry of Defence Railway troops moved into Abkhazia without Georgian permission. At the same time, a battalion of nearly 500 soldiers of the mechanised brigade based in Maikop (Russia) was redeployed to Abkhazia. ‘Polish think‐tank sees possible “local war” in Georgia’s rebel region in autumn’, Text of Report in English by Warsaw Eastern Studies Centre, BBC Monitoring Online, 4 June 2008, BBC Mon EU1 EuroPol FS1 FsuPol 060608 nn/osc.

35 Speaking at a press conference after hostilities began, Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin described the Russian action as a ‘peace‐coercion operation’. Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs/State Secretary Grigory Karasin at Press Conference at RIA Novosti News Agency, Moscow, 10 Aug. 2008, 〈www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/44465c679531114bc32574a300346f ce?OpenDocument〉.

36 BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 16 July 2004, pp.35–6, Imedi TV, Tbilisi.

37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding the Situation in Georgia, 15 Nov. 2007, 〈www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/4f70dc747ac9fa56c3257395002056e8?OpenDocument〉.

38 During a live question‐and‐answer session on the state‐owned Russian TV channel, Putin did not deny that he had promised to ‘hang Saakashvili by the balls’ during a telephone conversation with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Rossiya TV, 4 Dec. 2008.