Re‐fashioning Risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian Security and Intelligence Efforts against Terrorism

Abstract

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international ‘firefighting’ against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide‐ranging ‘broad risk management’ approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international ‘firefighting’ against terrorism, conceived of as counter‐insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower ‘risk prevention’ approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in ‘firefighting’ activities, enabling them to adopt more of a ‘risk pre‐emption’ approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK.

Notes

1 In this article, distinction is drawn between prevention and pre‐emption – see, for example, C.S. Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute/US Army War College July 2007).

2 See, e.g., for some of Sir David Omand's more recent contributions, A. Brahimi, ‘Learning from Jihadist Terrorism’, Report on a lunchtime discussion group with Prof. Sir David Omand, former Cabinet Office Security & Intelligence Coordinator, Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War, Tues. 13 Nov. 2007.

3 The term ‘kinetic’ in this article is defined as involving a spectrum of associated activities, including, but not exclusively meaning, ‘killing’, to moving quickly and firmly against targets/suspects, not least during their disruption and interdiction. Proportionality and breadth/extent of response questions also figure in the overall equation.

4 For the ‘bludgeon’ and ‘rapier’ terminology, see, for example, D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript, London, 20 Oct. 2005.

5 On this issue, see, e.g., S. Aftergood, ‘DoD issues new doctrine on information operations’, FAS Secrecy News, Vol. 2006, Issue 42, 3 April 2006; see also R.F. Perl, ‘Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends’, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 9 March 2006, p.1; T. Skinner, ‘Information Operations – Shaping Influence’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 Aug. 2006; C. Wilson, ‘Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues’, CRS Report for Congress, updated 20 March 2007. For more on the information operations dimension, see also, e.g., F. Webster, ‘Information Warfare, Surveillance and Human Rights’, in K. Ball and F. Webster (eds.), The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press 2003), Ch. 6, pp.90–111; see also PDF by Maj. Joseph L. Cox, US Army, ‘Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?’, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas (25 May 2006). For more background on PSYOPs, see US Army, ‘Psychological Operations’, Field Manual FM 3‐05.30, April 2005 – via URL ⟨www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf⟩, accessed 6 Feb. 2007; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations’, Joint Publication 3‐53, 5 Sept. 2003, document via the National Security Archive, based at The George Washington Univ. (GWU), Washington, DC via URL ⟨www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/02_psyop-jp-3-53.pdf⟩, accessed 8 June 2007.

6 See, for instance, W. Wark, ‘Learning lessons (and how) in the War on Terror: The Canadian Experience’, International Journal 60/1 (Winter 2004–2005) pp.71–90.

7 See, e.g., ‘Widening perspectives’ in [Shell] Global Business Environment, ‘Scenarios: An Explorer's Guide’, Exploring the Future (London: Shell International 2003) p.16 – ( PDF via URL ⟨www.shell.com/static/aboutshell-en/downloads/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/scenario_explorersguide.pdf⟩ accessed 3 Feb.2007) – particularly where it is noted: ‘Unlike forecasting, scenarios do not demand consensus, but rather respect and accommodate differences, seeking only to define them clearly.’; see also ibid., p.18, where it notes: ‘Scenarios can help in such situations. They can bring greater clarity to difficult areas of decision‐making because they acknowledge and focus on what we don't know, encouraging us to explore the nature of uncertainties and helping us to understand where the need for judgement lies.’ See also A. Rolington, ‘Keeping intelligence objective’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Dec. 2005.

8 See, e.g., D. Casciani, ‘Can radicalism be tackled?’, BBC News Online, 10 Nov. 2006.

9 See, e.g., J. Burke, Al‐Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Tauris 2003) p.240; see also C.M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’, CRS Report for Congress, updated: 24 Jan. 2007.

10 Eliza Manningham‐Buller quoted in IISS, Strategic Survey 2007 (London: IISS/Routledge 2007) p.169; see also P. Anderson, ‘Pakistan confirms UK bomber trips’, BBC News Online, 14 July 2005; for Al‐Qaeda camps being established just inside Pakistan, see also M. Mazzetti and D. Rohde, ‘Al‐ Qaeda Chiefs Are Seen to Regain Power’, New York Times, 19 Feb. 2007; see also B. Riedel, ‘The Return of the Knights: Al‐Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle East Disorder’, Survival 49/3 (Autumn 2007) pp.107–20.

11 See ‘UK terror threat now “critical”: The UK's national terrorism threat level has been raised to “critical” after attacks in Glasgow and London’, BBC News Online, 30 June 2007; see also A. Cowell and R. Bonner, ‘In Hunt for Bomb Plotters, Britain Sees a Qaeda Link’, New York Times, 2 July 2007.

12 See, e.g., D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Subversion and Counter‐subversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30/8 (Aug. 2007) pp.647–66.

13 See S. Bell, ‘The UK's Risk Management Approach to National Security’, RUSI Journal 152/3 ( June 2007) pp.18–22; see also S.D. Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re‐imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’, Risk Management: An International Journal 7/4 (2005) pp.23–41.

14 ‘Paper 2: International Terrorism: The Government's Strategy’, UK Government's Strategic Objective (22 Feb. 2005) p.3 – PDF ‘220205.pdf’ via URL ⟨www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page256.html⟩, accessed 7 Aug. 2005.

15 Ibid.; see also D. Omand, ‘Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy’, Survival 47/4 (Winter 2005–06) pp.107–16.

16 See A. Travis, ‘Struggling Home Office split up to combat terrorism; Security role expanded for home secretary; New ministry to run criminal justice system’, The Guardian, 30 March 2007; see also A. Travis, ‘Analysis: Security, continental style’, The Guardian, 30 March 2007.

17 John Reid, speech to Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington Univ., 18 June 2007, via URL ⟨www.gwumc.edu/hspi/news/index.cfm?d=4307⟩, accessed 7 Dec. 2007; see also R. Norton‐Taylor, ‘Counter‐terrorism officials rethink stance on Muslims’, The Guardian, 20 Nov. 2007.

18 Quoted in UK House of Commons, Hansard, col.681 (2 July 2007).

19 On the IRD, see, e.g., D. Leigh, ‘Death of the department that never was’, The Guardian, 27 Jan. 1978, see reproduced via URL ⟨www.cambridgeclarion.org/e/fo_deceit_unit_graun_27jan1978.html⟩, accessed 19 Nov. 2007; see also ‘RICU – the new IRD?’, Salaam.co.uk, 20 Nov. 2007.

20 See, e.g., ‘Opportunities for placement fellowships in the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU)’, ESRC Society Today, 11 Oct. 2007, via URL ⟨www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/opportunities/current_funding_opportunities/pfs_ricu07.aspx?ComponentId=24171&SourcePageId=5964⟩, accessed 8 Dec. 2007.

21 See also M. Evans and R. Ford, ‘New anti‐terror chief is building elite team’, The Times, 30 Aug. 2007.

22 For an analysis of the ‘CONTEST’ strategy, see, e.g., the essays in W.Q. Bowen and A. Stewart (eds.), Terrorism in the UK: Broadening the Government's Counter‐Terrorist Response – CONTEST, The Airey Neave Papers (Shrivenham, UK: Stategic and Combat Studies Institute, JSCSC, Defence Academy of the UK 2005).

23 See, e.g., D. Leppard, ‘MI5 wants 800 more spies to take on Islamic threat’, The Times, 13 Nov. 2005.

24 See, e.g., G. Corera, ‘MI5 expanding outside London’, BBC News Online, 11 Dec. 2007; see also G. Corera, ‘Real spooks with new role after 9/11’, BBC News Online, 4 Dec. 2007.

25 J. Stevenson, Counter‐terrorism: Containment and Beyond, Adelphi Paper 367 ( London: OUP for IISS Oct. 2004) p.55; see also M. Hunt, ‘Bleed to bankruptcy – Economic targeting tactics in the global jihad’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Jan. 2007.

26 G. Corera, ‘The reality of MI5's work’, BBC News Online, 10 Nov. 2006.

27 D. McGrory, ‘US “issued alert” on 7/7 bomber in 2003’, The Times, 19 June 2006; see also ‘How a turf war among the spies tipped off the Tube bombing mastermind: A new book claims that bureau infighting between the FBI and the CIA let leader of the 7/7 gang slip through their fingers’, The Times, 19 June 2006; see also R. Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11 (London: Simon & Schuster 2006) pp.198–203. From the debates surrounding the UK and US official challenges made in relation to Suskind's claims regarding Khan, it appears most likely that the ‘wrong’ Khan may have been flagged‐up in the claims, due to ‘confusion’ on behalf of Suskind's original source – see follow‐up reports, e.g., M. Hosenball, ‘Which Khan? US and UK officials dispute a claim in a new book that the Americans had warned the British about a London subway bomber before the July 2005 attacks’, Newsweek, 21 June 2006; see also R. Norton‐Taylor, ‘An intelligence failure. An explosive exclusive. But was it the wrong Khan?: Claims on bomber may be case of mistaken identity; FBI source could have confused two suspects’, The Guardian, 20 June 2006. From other well‐placed, non‐attributable sources consulted while researching, it appears most likely that there was a mix‐up in the Khan identified in the claims. Investigating different individuals with the same name is a challenging issue on a day‐to‐day basis for intelligence agencies, aside from for those journalists and researchers following their activities. The name ‘Khan’ in relation to several different individuals surfaces many times. However, it is worth highlighting that several unanswered questions still surround how much MI5 exactly knew about the perpetrators of the London bombings, with some of the information reportedly being legally blocked from being disseminated to the public by the media, also suggesting perhaps the presence of a ‘DA‐Notice’ [Defence Advisory Notices – formerly D‐Notices – see URL ⟨www.dnotice.org.uk/⟩, accessed 5 Jan. 2007)] – see, e.g., D. Leppard, ‘New MI5 boss is top expert on Al‐Qaeda’, Sunday Times, 17 Dec. 2006 – particularly where he notes that: ‘The sources said that the agency [MI5] was bracing itself for detailed disclosures about its intelligence on Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer, the two leading bombers who killed 52 people [during the 7 July 2005 London bomb attacks]. The Sunday Times and other media are prevented by court orders from making this evidence public.’

28 Corera (note 26).

29 ISC, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (May 2006) p.8, para. 24; see also ibid., p.39, para. 143, where it is noted that: ‘The story of what was known about the 7 July group prior to July indicates that if more resources had been in place sooner the chances of preventing the July attacks could have increased. Greater coverage in Pakistan, or more resources generally in the UK, might have alerted the Agencies to the intentions of the 7 July group.’; see also ‘MI5 under fire over 7/7 bombers’, BBC News Online, 1 May 2007; ‘Pressure grows for a 7/7 inquiry’, BBC News Online, 1 May 2007; J. Perlez and E. Sciolino, ‘5 Britons Guilty; Tied to 2005 London Bombers’, New York Times, 1 May 2007 ; ‘Islamist terrorism in the UK: Foiled plots prompt new responses’, IISS Strategic Comments 13/ 4 (June 2007) pp.1–2; see also J. Perlez, ‘US Seeks Closing of Visa Loophole for Britons’, New York Times, 2 May 2007. See also on 7/7 more generally, N.M. Ahmed, The London Bombings (London: Duckworth 2006) and C. Black, 7‐7: The London Bombings (London: Gibson Square Books 2006).

30 ‘“Thousands” pose UK terror threat’, BBC News Online, 5 Nov. 2007.

31 See, e.g., M. Freeman, Freedom Or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (London: Praeger/Greenwood 2003) p.65.

32 As note 30.

33 See, e.g., ‘Ex‐chiefs demand more forces cash’, BBC News Online, 8 Nov. 2007.

34 See, e.g., M. Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Doubleday 2005); D. Held and A. McGrew, ‘Global Insecurities: Military Threats and Environmental Catastrophe’, in idem, Globalization/Anti‐Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity 2007) Chapter 4, pp.43–72.

35 Dame Eliza Manningham‐Buller, ‘The International Terrorist Threat and the Dilemmas in Countering It’, speech by the Director General of the Security Service, at the Ridderzaal, Binnenhof, The Hague, Netherlands, 1 Sept. 2005, via URL ⟨www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page387.html⟩, accessed 10 Sept. 2005.

36 J. Burns and D. Sevastopulo, ‘British and US intelligence chiefs meet’, Financial Times, 21 July 2005; see also R. Blitz et al., ‘The politics of policing’, Financial Times, 17 Aug. 2005; see also R. Cox, ‘Law and terrorism: US and British responses compared’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Oct. 2005.

37 See P. Taylor, ‘Double tragedy of Stockwell shooting’, BBC Panorama, 8 March 2006.

38 See also see also P. Kennison and A. Loumansky, ‘Shoot to Kill – Understanding Police Use of Force in Combatting Suicide Terrorism’, Crime Law and Social Change 47/3 (2007) pp.151–68.

39 Press Association, ‘MI5 chief warns on civil liberties’, The Guardian, 10 Sept. 2005; see also the original speech: Manningham‐Buller (note 35).

40 R. Cowan, ‘Terrorism threat has increased: Met chief – Intelligence on suspects received daily since 7/7; Three conspiracies foiled since London attacks’, The Guardian, 13 Dec. 2005.

41 ISC, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks (note 29) p.39, para.143; see also M. Hosenball, ‘The UK Threat: British authorities say they've disrupted at least three terror attacks in the last year. Could some of these suspects have easily entered the United States?’, Newsweek, 5 July 2006.

42 See, for further information, URL ⟨www.met.police.uk/terrorism/⟩, accessed 4 Oct. 2006.

43 See, e.g., ‘MI5's “torture” evidence revealed’, BBC News Online, 21 Oct. 2005.

44 HM Government, Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report 2005–2006 (London: TSO July 2006) p.5, para.G.

45 An historical example of the British ‘emergency’ counter‐terrorism and counter‐insurgency approaches was witnessed during the ‘Malayan Emergency’ in the 1950s – see R.J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001) pp.494–518.

46 E. Alden et al., ‘Inquiry exposes rift between UK and US intelligence agencies’, Financial Times, 1 Aug. 2005.

47 See, e.g., the arguments in D. Pipes, ‘Weak Brits, Tough French’, New York Sun, 12 July 2005; see also Alden et al. (note 46); Blitz et al. (note 36); J. Burns et al., ‘Intelligence agencies' different approach to tackling terrorism exposed’, Financial Times, 13 July 2005.

48 D. Cole and J.X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security, 3rd ed. (New York: The New Press 2006) p.ix.

49 See for official US evaluations, e.g., J.D. Negroponte, ‘Yes, We Are Better Prepared’, Washington Post, 10 Sept. 2006, reproduced in ‘US Intelligence Chief Outlines Improvements Since 9/11 Attacks’, The Washington File/USINFO, 14 Sept. 2006, via URL ⟨http://london.usembassy.gov/terror706.html⟩, accessed 9 April 2007.

50 E. Kaplan, ‘Shoring Up the Home Front’, Council on Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, 20 Feb. 2007.

51 See M. Crenshaw, ‘Foreword’ to M.M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington DC: USIP Press Books 2007) p.xi.

52 See P. Rogers, ‘Reconsidering the War on Terror’, RUSI Journal 152/4 (Aug. 2007) pp.32–5.

53 See also L. Freedman, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, Government and Opposition 42/3 (2007) pp.314– 39.

54 See, by way of illustration, ‘Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long‐Term Challenges with a Long‐Term Strategy’, testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, Porter J. Goss, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 Feb. 2005.

55 See, e.g., ‘“Airlines terror plot” disrupted’, BBC News Online, 10 Aug. 2006; see also D. Eggen, ‘Air Plot Said to Target Cities’, Washington Post, 2 Nov. 2006.

56 See, e.g., ‘Four indicted for JFK “bomb plot”: Four men have been charged with trying to blow up fuel tanks and pipelines at John F Kennedy airport’, BBC News Online, 30 June 2007.

57 For increased US dependence on intelligence liaison, see, for instance, ‘Secretary Rice Interview with James Rosen of Fox News Channel’, States News Service (information released by the US Dept. of State), 10 July 2005; see also Director of National Intelligence (DNI), United States Intelligence Community: 500 Day Plan – Integration and Collaboration, 10 Oct. 2007.

58 Pipes (note 47).

59 Quoted in ibid.

60 ‘US visa waiver worries grow’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 8 Dec. 2006; see also J. Perlez (note 29).

61 See, e.g., E. Lichtblau and M. Mazzetti, ‘Military Is Expanding Its US Intelligence Role’, New York Times, 14 Jan. 2007 and K. DeYoung, ‘Officials: Pentagon Probed Finances: Citizens’ Records Culled in Expanded Intelligence Efforts’, Washington Post, 14 Jan. 2007; ‘US military's use of domestic intelligence’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 16 Feb. 2007.

62 See, for instance, G. Corera, ‘Special Operations Forces take care of War on Terror’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Jan. 2003; M. Johnson, ‘The Growing Relevance of Special Operations Forces in US Military Strategy’, Comparative Strategy 25 (2006) pp.273–96; T.E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane 2006), pp.432–3; S. Aftergood, ‘Spotlight on Special Forces and Intelligence’, FAS Secrecy News, Vol. 2007, 62, 18 June 2007.

63 This trend also helps to explain the nature of the US terror watch list – see, e.g., K. DeYoung, ‘Terror Database Has Quadrupled In Four Years: US Watch Lists Are Drawn From Massive Clearinghouse’, Washington Post, 25 March 2007; see also ‘Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti‐Terror Campaign’, A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 15 Dec. 2006.

64 See, e.g., for a ‘homegrown’ group in the US, J. Coomarasamy, ‘Home front fears in war on terror’, BBC News Online, 24 June 2006.

65 L. Wiley Jr, ‘The Enemy Within – Tuesday, Oct. 10 at 9pm on PBS’, PBS Frontline, 8 Oct. 2006; see also J. Mueller, ‘Is there still a terrorist threat?’, Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2006.

66 See, e.g., D. Russakoff and D. Eggen, ‘Six Charged in Plot To Attack Fort Dix: “Jihadists” Said to Have No Ties to Al‐Qaeda’, Washington Post, 9 May 2007; A. Faiola and S. Mufson, ‘NY Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say: 3 Held in Alleged Plan to Bomb JFK’, Washington Post, 2 June 2007; C. Buckley and W.K. Rashbaum, ‘4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines’, New York Times, 3 June 2007.

67 ‘Arrests over US army base “plot”’, BBC News Online, 9 May 2007.

68 See, e.g., J. Fisher‐Thompson, ‘Intelligence Chief Nominee Warns of Internal Terrorist Threat’, The Washington File/USINFO, 6 Feb. 2007, via URL ⟨http://london.usembassy.gov/terror722.html⟩, accessed 9 April 2007. On the issue of domestic extremism in the US, see also, e.g., ‘Muslim radicals enlisting US inmates’, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 Dec. 2006.

69 See, e.g., D. Eggen, ‘Justice Department Database Stirs Privacy Fears: Size and Scope of the Interagency Investigative Tool Worry Civil Libertarians’, Washington Post, 26 Dec. 2006; see also M.B. Sheridan and S.S. Hsu, ‘Localities Operate Intelligence Centers To Pool Terror Data: “Fusion” Facilities Raise Privacy Worries As Wide Range of Information Is Collected’, Washington Post, 31 Dec. 2006.

70 See, e.g., ‘US secretly tracked bank records’, BBC News Online, 23 June 2006 and E. Lichtblau and J. Risen, ‘Bank data is sifted by US in secret to block terror’, New York Times, 23 June 2006; M. Rasch, SecurityFocus, ‘Protection from prying NSA eyes’, The Register, 17 May 2006, via URL ⟨www.theregister.co.uk/2006/05/17/protection_from_nsa/⟩, accessed 22 July 2006; L. Cauley, ‘NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls’, USA Today, 11 May 2006; L. Wiley Jr, ‘FRONTLINE – Spying on the Home Front’, PBS FRONTLINE Bulletin, 13 May 2007.

71 See, e.g., R.J. Smith and J. Solomon, ‘Amid Concerns, FBI Lapses Went On: Records Collection Brought Internal Questions but Little Scrutiny’, Washington Post, 18 March 2007; see also J. Solomon, ‘FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in Collecting Data’, Washington Post, 14 June 2007.

72 Quoted in ‘INTERVIEW: With Michael Scheuer’, PBS Frontline (30 Jan. 2007), via URL ⟨www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/interview_scheuer.html⟩, accessed 8 Nov. 2007

73 See, e.g., S.E. Flynn, ‘The Department of Homeland Security: The Way Ahead After a Rocky Start’, written testimony before a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 Jan. 2005.

74 For a further critique of the FBI, see, e.g., A.G. Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2004).

75 J. Fallows, ‘Foreword’, in J. Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2007) p.vi.

76 Quoted in ibid.

77 See also, e.g., Secretary James Baker III, ‘The Whitehead Lecture – The West and the World: A Question of Confidence’, Chatham House meeting transcript, 29 Oct. 2007.

78 See, e.g., E. Kaplan, ‘Hometown Security’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Jan. 2007; E. Kaplan, ‘Backgrounder: New York Spurs Counterterrorism Efforts’, Council on Foreign Relations, 28 Dec. 2006; see also B. Hope, ‘Police Counterterror Official Touts Importance of Local Role’, New York Sun, 18 Aug. 2006, via URL ⟨www.nysun.com/article/38151⟩, accessed 20 June 2007.

79 ‘Comment & Analysis: A lot of countries are learning from the Met’, Financial Times, 17 Aug. 2005.

80 ‘Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Homeland Security’, The White House website, 9 Oct. 2007.

81 See, e.g., A.K. Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, International Security 27/3 (Winter 2002/03) pp.30–58.

82 See also, e.g., W.K. Wark, ‘National Security and Human Rights Concerns in Canada: A Survey of Eight Critical Issues in the Post‐9/11 Environment’, Report for Canadian Human Rights Commission, Oct. 2006.

83 For an example of ‘success’, see the thwarting of the ‘Toronto Cell’ case, outlined below.

84 See, e.g., the Canadian International Development Agency website, via URL ⟨www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/index-e.htm⟩, accessed 24 June 2007, particularly where it highlights its mission of: ‘Supporting sustainable development, reducing poverty and providing humanitarian assistance in order to promote a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.’

85 J. Bennion, ‘The Radical Informant’, PBS Frontline/World website, 30 Jan. 2007, via URL ⟨www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/shaikh.html⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007. For more on the Toronto Cell, see ‘Story Synopsis & Video Canada: The Cell Next Door’, PBS Frontline, 30 Jan. 2007, via URL: ⟨http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/⟩, accessed: 22 Feb. 2007; see also ‘The plot against Canada’, Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor, 12 July 2006.

86 See, for instance, A. Rogers, ‘Canada targets biker gangs in crackdown on organised crime’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Dec. 2005; while in 2006, ‘Intelligence Pointers – Canada plans Chinese [economic] “espionage” crackdown’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 21 April 2006.

87 See, e.g., M. Rudner, ‘The globalization of terrorism: Canada's intelligence response to the post‐ Sept. 11 threat environment’, Canadian Issues, Sept. 2002; see also, for an official Canadian perspective towards the end of 2002, ‘Speeches and Presentations: Speaking Notes for W.P.D. Elcock Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to the Vancouver Board of Trade’, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) website, 7 Nov. 2002, via URL ⟨www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech07112002.asp⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007; for an overview in 2003, see ‘Archive: An overview of Canada's counter‐terrorism arrangements’, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 19 Feb. 2003; see also L.J. Leggat, ‘Science and Technology: A Key Component of Counter‐Terrorism Strategy’, Canadian Military Journal 4/2 (Summer 2003) pp.13–18; see also M. Rudner, ‘Challenge and Response: Canada's Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism’, Canadian Foreign Policy 11/2 (Winter 2004) pp.17–39.

88 For background on the Arar case, see, for instance, ‘In Depth: Maher Arar – Timeline’, CBC News Online, updated 26 Jan. 2007, via URL ⟨http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007; see also D. Struck, ‘Inquiry Exposes Canada's Role in “Renditions”: Hearings Suggest Cooperation with US in Sending Arab Canadian Citizen to Syria for Interrogation’, Washington Post, 26 June 2005; L. Carter, ‘Canada clears “Al‐Qaeda suspect”: A public inquiry in Canada has strongly criticised the country's authorities for wrongly accusing a Syrian‐born Canadian of terrorism’, BBC News Online, 19 Sept. 2006; ‘Canada compensates deported man: Canada has apologised to a man deported by US authorities to Syria, where he was imprisoned and allegedly tortured.’, BBC News Online, 26 Jan. 2007. The Arar case is not resolved in US eyes, however. See, for instance, ‘US officials: Canadian should stay on terror list’, CNN.com, 22 Jan. 2007, via URL ⟨http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/01/22/terror.list/index.html⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007); S. Shane, ‘Canadian to remain on US terror watch list’, International Herald Tribune, 23 Jan. 2007; see also on the Arar case, A. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge: CUP 2006) pp.136–8. On Operation ‘Thread’, see ‘The plot against Canada’ (note 85) where: ‘In another public relations disaster, Canadian authorities detained 22 Pakistani nationals and one Indian as suspected terrorists … All were subsequently released once it became apparent that the evidence against them was highly circumstantial, according to a report prepared for the UN by the Canadian Council for Refugees.’

89 See, for instance, UK Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Appendix 5: Oversight and Accountability Issues – Country Comparisons’, Annual Report, 1997–98 via URL ⟨www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm40/4073/appndx-5.htm⟩, accessed 14 Oct. 2007.

90 Quoted in ‘RCMP shared intelligence with Syria, Arar inquiry told’, CBC News, Thu. 30 June 2005.

91 See, for instance, S. Hewitt, Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917–1997 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2002).

92 See, e.g., ‘Appendix A: 3. Stuart Farson – Institute for Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University’, in T. Gabor, ‘The Views of Canadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti‐Terrorism Act’, Draft Final Report (31 March 2004), via URL ⟨www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2005/rr05-1/a_03.html⟩ (accessed 8 Nov. 2007) particularly where Farson notes: ‘The amount of Canada's trade that Canadians ship to the US provides the US Government with substantial leverage.’

93 See, e.g., A.G. Sens, ‘Canada focuses on continental security’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Dec. 2002; for more on US‐Canadian relations, see ‘DIPLOMACY: CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: A STRATEGY FOR OUR NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP’, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, updated 15 Sept. 2006, via URL ⟨http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/IPS/IPS-Diplomacy5-en.asp⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

94 See, for instance, S. Alberts, ‘US – Terror born at home: Bush: Canada named in speech about new threats’, CanWest News Service, 6 Sept. 2006, via URL ⟨www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/CMS/printpage.cfm?ID=50037⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

95 ‘INDEPTH: TORONTO BOMB PLOT – Overview’, CBC News Online, updated 22 Oct. 2007, via URL ⟨www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/index.html⟩, accessed 1 Nov. 2007.

96 See, e.g., the Arar Commission. The Commission website can be found via URL ⟨www.ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

97 ‘Press release, Arar Commission recommends a new review agency for the RCMP's national security activities, and a new review process for five other agencies’, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 12 Dec. 2006, p.1 – PDF via Commission website; see also Carter, ‘Canada clears “Al‐Qaeda suspect”’ (note 88).

98 ‘RCMP spent $5 million on Arar affair, says report’, CBC News Online, 3 Jan. 2007, via URL ⟨www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/03/arar-cost.html⟩, accessed 23 June 2007.

99 See, e.g., ‘A Look at Canada: What Does Canadian Citizenship Mean?’, Citizenship and Immigration, Canada, 2007, via URL ⟨www.cic.gc.ca/EnGLIsh/resources/publications/look/look-03.asp⟩, accessed 14 Oct. 2007.

100 For more on the Toronto Cell (June 2006) and its subsequent prosecution, see ‘Story Synopsis & Video Canada’ (note 85); see also ‘Canada charges 17 terror suspects: Police in Canada have arrested and charged 12 men who they say were planning an “Al‐Qaeda‐inspired” bombing campaign in and around Toronto’, BBC News Online, 4 June 2006.

101 Bennion (note 85).

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 See ‘Government's Role in Public Safety’, Public Safety Canada, via URL ⟨www.safecanada.ca/role_e.asp?DeptID=35⟩, accessed 23 June 2007.

105 ‘Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website, via URL ⟨www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/internationalcrime/terrorism-en.asp⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

106 Securing an Open Society: One Year Later (April 2005): Executive summary, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, updated 10 March 2006, via URL ⟨http://www.psepc.gc.ca/pol/ns/secpol05-en.asp⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

107 A. Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in ‘Message from Deputy Prime Minister’ (note 106).

108 For the Canadian Communications Security Establishment (CSE) role, see, e.g., M. Rudner, ‘Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and Counter‐terrorism’, Intelligence and National Security 22/4 (Aug. 2007) pp.473–90.

109 ‘Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website, via URL ⟨www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/internationalcrime/terrorism-en.asp⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

110 ‘An Emergency Management Framework for Canada’, Public Safety Canada website, 18 Sept. 2007, via URL ⟨http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/emfrmwrk-eng.aspx⟩, accessed 7 Nov. 2007.

111 See, for instance, the consultations with Canada revealed in UK Parliament, ‘4. Other matters’, Twenty‐Fourth Report – Joint Committee on Human Rights, Prepared 1 Aug. 2006, via URL ⟨http://www.publications.parliament.uk/⟩, accessed 22 Feb. 2007.

112 See, e.g., UK Government, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World (London: Cabinet Office March 2008).

113 See also arguments in C. Black, ‘Comment: Smugness, not substance: Brown's security strategy fails to address genuine public concerns. Frankly I wouldn't have bothered’, The Guardian, 20 March 2008, via URL ⟨www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/20/terrorism.gordonbrown⟩, accessed 21 March 2008.

114 See also, for instance, C.S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy 26/1 (Jan. 2007) pp.1–20; see also M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty‐First Century (Cambridge: CUP 2006) p.206, esp. where he notes: ‘We have stopped believing in lasting peace, what is left is only strategy – we had better be good at it.’

115 On these types of issues, see, e.g., for the ‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see W.K. Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to Live with Intelligence”’, Intelligence and National Security 18/4 (Winter 2003) pp.1–14 ; for more on the importance of knowing history in the intelligence context, see C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking forward’, History & Policy, June 2004; see also R. Popplewell, ‘“Lacking Intelligence”: Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter‐Insurgency, 1900–1960’, Intelligence and National Security 10/4 (Oct. 1995) pp.336–52; see also B. Hoffman, ‘We Can't Win If We Don't Know the Enemy’, Washington Post, 25 March 2007.

116 See also, e.g., C. Secrett, Director, Friends of the Earth, ‘What Steps should Governments be taking in Communicating with and Engaging the Public More Effectively on the Range of Complex Risks that We all Face?’, PIU Presentation (14 Dec. 2001), via URL ⟨www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/secrett.pdf⟩, accessed 13 Dec. 2007.

117 Quoted in Fallows, ‘Foreword’ (note 75) p.vi.