Organising for War: Strategic Culture and the Organisation of High Command in Britain and Germany, 1850–1945: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Since the 1990s, the concept of strategic culture has (re‐)gained scholarly attention in International Relations theory, offering a supplementary or alternative explanation for state behaviour. Using this concept as an analytical tool and drawing on International Relations theory, military history and organisational theory literature, this article examines the organisation of High Command in Britain and Germany between 1850 and 1945 from a comparative perspective. It demonstrates the explanatory power of strategic culture by identifying the enduring character of key attributes in the way both nations organised their strategic decision‐making bodies and processes. With the next theatre of war unclear, Britain as an island nation preferred flexible and adoptable High Command structures in which the incontestable primacy of political control was key. On the contrary, the organisational choice of Germany was driven by its precarious geographical setting in the centre of the European continent and the idealisation of a personalised unification of political leadership and military command which contributed to the narrowed a‐politicised, technical and operational focus of the German High Command.

Notes

1 Halik Kochanski, ‘Planning for War in the Final Years of Pax Britannica, 1889–1903’ in David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds.), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890–1939 (London: Frank Cass 2002) p.12.

2 Ulrich de Maizière, In der Pflicht: Lebensbericht eines deutschen Soldaten im 20. Jahrhundert (Bonn: Herford 1989) p.74.

3 Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber 1932) p.7 (italic emphases by Freuding).

4 Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War. The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (London: Macdonald & Jane’s 1977) pp.11, 301–7.

5 Eliot Cohen, ‘Supreme Command in the 21st Century,’ Joint Forces Quarterly 4, no.31 (2002) p.49; alternative definition: Gary Sheffield, ‘The Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century,’ in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), The Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century: The British Experience (London: Palgrave 2003) pp.1–4.

6 The term ‘strategy’ is used in a Clausewitzian meaning as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’ and its formulation is understood as an iterative process, a dialogue between political and military leadership ‘where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a compromise between ends of policy and the military means available to implement it’ [Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Mi‐chael Howard and Peter Paret (London: David Campbell 1993) p.146].

7 Liddell Hart (note 3).

8 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1977) p.8.

9 Michael Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security 23/1 (Summer 1998) pp.141–70; Alastair Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995) pp.32–64. Different view: Colin Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as a Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies 25/1 (Spring 1999) p.55.

10 John Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, International Organization 53/4 (1999) p.767.

11 Gray (note 9) p.53. Alternative definitions, see: Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (London: Routledge 2006) pp.124–5.

12 Kerry Longhurst, ‘The Concept of Strategic Culture’, in Gerhard Kümmel and Andres Prüfert (eds.), Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline (Baden‐Baden: Nomos 2000) p.306.

13 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003 (Manchester UP 2004) p.22; Duffield (note 10) pp.778, 794.

14 Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review 51/2 (1986) pp.273–86.

15 Duffield (note 10) p.773.

16 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia UP 1996) p.60.

17 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton UP 1997) p.28; Duffield (note 10) p.771.

18 Duffield (note 10) p.770.

19 Yitzhak Klein, ‘A Theory of Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy 10/1 (1991) p.13 of pp.3–23.

20 Michael Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History,’ RUSI Journal 107/1 (Feb. 1962) pp.4–10.

21 Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP 1998) pp.11–12.

22 Theo Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (Autumn 1998) p.410 of pp.407–16.

23 Kier (note 17) pp.28–32; Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2005) pp.93–8.

24 John Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford UP 1994) p.29.

25 According to the French thinker Raymond Aron the term ‘strategic thought’ ‘embraces theory or abstract and scientific study, doctrine, relative courses for action, and finally the historical or political study of theories and doctrines’ [’The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought,’ in Alastair Buchan (ed.), Problems of Modern Strategy (London: Chatto & Windus 1970) p.14].

26 The influence of the ‘givens’ (e.g. developments within the international system) underlines this author’s view that constructivism and (neo‐)realism are rather supplementary than mutually exclusive concepts (further: Desch (note 9) p.141; Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’, International Studies Review 4/1 (Spring 2002) p.70.

27 Kenneth Waltz, quoted by: Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’ (note 22) p.412.

28 Liddell Hart (note 3) pp.13–41.

29 Michael Howard, ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in idem (ed.) The Causes of War and Other Essays (London: Unwin 1984) pp.189–207; Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Smith 1972); Alan Macmillan, ‘Strategic Culture and National Ways in Warfare: The British Case’, RUSI Journal 140/5 (Oct. 1995) pp.34–5.

30 Hew Strachan, ‘The British Way in Warfare’, in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds.),The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford: OUP 1994) pp.428–9; Liddell Hart (note 3) p.14.

31 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Alliance and the British Way in Warfare’, Review of International Studies 21/2 (Summer 1995) p.157.

32 Strachan (note 30) p.430.

33 David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000 (London: Unwin Hyman 1990) p.232.

34 Robert Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2005) pp.306–11.

35 Martin Kitchen, ‘The Traditions of German Strategic Thought’, International History Review 1/2 (1979) pp.168–78.

36 Dennis Showalter, ‘Total War for Limited Objectives: An Interpretation of German Grand Strategy’, in Paul Kennedy (ed.) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1991) p.107.

37 Christian Millotat, Das preußisch‐deutsche Generalstabssystem: Wurzeln, Entwicklung, Fortwirken (Zürich: Hochschulverlag 2000) pp.56–8.

38 Citino (note 34) p.308.

39 Williamson Murray, ‘Does Military Culture Matter?’, Orbis 43/3 (1999) pp.31–2.

40 Rolf‐Dieter Müller, An der Seite der Wehrmacht: Hitler ausländische Helfer beim ‘Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus’ 1941–1945 (Berlin: Links 2007).

41 According to Walter Görlitz, Bismarck created this nickname for the General Staff officers, Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes von 1650–1945 (Augsburg: Weltbild 1997 [1950]) p.90.

42 Graham, quoted in Andrew Lambert, ‘“Good, While It Lasts”: Great Britain and the Crimean War Coalition, 1854–1856’, in Dennis Showalter (ed.), Future Wars: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy (Chicago: Imprint Publications 2002) p.33.

43 Andrew Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia, 1853–56 (Manchester UP 1990) pp.25–99.

44 David Gates, ‘Coalition Warfare and Multi‐National Operations in the Crimean War’, RUSI Journal 139/4 (Aug. 1994) pp.40–6.

45 When the Emperor had resolved to take command by early 1855, he was invited for an official state visit to London, thereby preventing him from steaming into theatre, Lambert, “Good, While It Lasts” (note 42) pp.41–2.

46 Lambert, Crimean War (note 43) pp.111–45.

47 Lambert, “Good, While It Lasts” (note 42) pp.41–2.

48 Paul Smith, ‘Ruling the Waves: Government, the Service and the Cost of Naval Supremacy, 1885–99’, in idem (ed.), Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856–1990 (London: Hambledon Press 1996).

49 French (note 33) pp.120–45.

50 French (note 33) p.134.

51 Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland, 4 vols. (Munich: Oldenburg 1965), I, p.226.

52 Lt. Gen. Gerhard von Scharnhorst, quoted in Görlitz (note 41) p.62.

53 Friedrich Hossbach, Die Entwicklung des Oberbefehls über das Heer in Brandenburg, Preußen und im Deutschen Reich von 1655–1945 (Würzburg: Holzner 1957) pp.22–44; Lothar Burchardt, ‘Helmuth von Moltke, Wilhelm I. und der Aufstieg des preußischen Generalstab’, in Roland Foerster (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke: Bedeutung und Wirkung (Munich: Oldenbourg 1992) pp.19–20.

54 Manfred Görtemaker, Bismarck und Moltke: Der preußische Generalstab und die deutsche Einigung (Friedrichsruh: Otto‐von‐Bismarck‐Stiftung 2004) pp.29–30.

55 Burchardt (note 53) pp.25–6.

56 Heinz Stübig, ‘Die Entwicklung des preußisch‐deutschen Generalstabs im 19. Jahrhundert’, in Peter Baumgart, Bernhard Kroener, Heinz Stübig (eds.), Die preussische Armee zwischen Ancien Regime und Reichsgründung (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh 2008) p.258.

57 Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (New York: Berg 1991) pp.165–79.

58 For Moltke’s disregard for alliances, see: Helmuth Graf von Moltke, On the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed. Daniel Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio 1993) pp.37, 45.

59 Werner Hahlweg, ‘Das Clausewitzbild Einst und Jetzt. Vorrede’, in Carl von. Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19th ed. (Bonn: Dümmler 1980 [1832]) pp.70–2.

60 Burchardt (note 53) pp.25–6.

61 In 1875 against France; 1887/88 against Russia. See Wiegand Schmidt‐Richberg, Die Generalstäbe in Deutschland 1871–1945. Aufgaben in der Armee und Stellung im Staate (Stuttgart: DVA 1962) pp.28–9.

62 Stig Förster, ‘Facing “People’s War”: Moltke the Elder and Germany’s Military Options after 1871’, Journal of Strategic Studies 10/2 (June 1987) pp.209–30.

63 E.g. see his last speech in the Reichstag in May 1890, quoted in Robert Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun (Cambridge: CUP 2005) p.23.

64 Stig Förster, ‘Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871–1914: Metakritik eines Mythos’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 54 (1995) pp.68–95.

65 Dupuy (note 4) pp.123–4.

66 Förster, ‘Der deutsche Generalstab’ (note 64) p.80.

67 Dennis Showalter, ‘From Deterrent to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1871–1914’, Journal of Military History 64/3 (Autumn 2000) p.697.

68 Hossbach (note 53) pp.40–2.

69 Wilhlem Deist, Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft: Studien zur preußisch‐deutschen Militärgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg 1991) p.10.

70 Different view: Holger Afflerbach, ‘Wilhelm II as Supreme Warlord in the First World War’, War in History 5/4 (1998) pp.427–49.

71 Hew Strachan, ‘Germany in the First World War: The Problem of Strategy’, German History 12/2 (1994) pp.128–9; Holger Herwig, ‘Estranged Bedfellows: Germany and Austria‐Hungary, 1914–1918’, in Showalter, Future Wars: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy (note 42) p.53.

72 Deist (note 69) p.14.

73 John Röhl, ‘Der militärpolitische Entscheidungsprozeß in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges’, in idem (ed.), Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. und die deutsche Politik (Munich: Beck 1988) pp.188–95.

74 Förster,’Der deutsche Generalstab’ (note 64) pp.83–95; Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: CUP 2001) pp.283–9.

75 Foley (note 63) pp.181–258.

76 Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986) pp.171‐182.

77 Strachan, ‘Germany in the First World War’ (note 71) p.241.

78 See Hindenburg’s letter to the Chancellor, dated 14 Jan. 1918 [reprinted in Schmidt‐Richberg (note 61) pp.44–5].

79 Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s 1992) pp.1–17, p.28.

80 Franklin Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885–1959 (London: OUP 1960) pp.48–81.

81 See John Gooch, The Plans for War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy 1900–1916 (London: Routledge 1974) pp.32–61.

82 Jackson and Bramall (note 79) p.39.

83 Gooch, Plans for War (note 81) pp.290–2.

84 John Gooch, ‘The Creation of the British General Staff 1904–1914’, RUSI Journal 116/2 (June 1971) p.51.

85 Details: Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914–1918 (Woking, UK: Allen & Unwin 1961), I, pp.165–243.

86 ‘Jackie’ Fisher had been re‐mobilized in October 1914 after Prince Louis of Battenberg’s resignation, not least due to the increasing public outcry about the latter’s German ancestry [Jackson and Bramall (note 79) p.58–9].

87 David French, ‘“A One‐Man Show”? Civil‐Military Relations in Britain during the First World War’, in Paul Smith (ed.), Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856–1990 (London: Hambledon Press 1996) p.83.

88 David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen & Unwin 1986) pp.68–95, 148–52.

89 David Woodward, ‘Britain in Continental War: The Civil‐Military Debate over the Strategic Direction of the Great War of 1914–1918’, Albion 12/1 (1980) pp.39–41.

90 David Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press 1983) p.75.

91 Hew Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904–14,’ in French and Holden Reid, The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890–1939 (note 1) pp.85–9.

92 Alternative view: Gary Sheffield, ‘British High Command in the First World War: An Overview’, in Sheffield and Till, The Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century (note 5) p.18.

93 Woodward, ‘Britain in Continental War’ (note 89) p.42.

94 Jackson and Bramall (note 79) p.103.

95 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1997) p.135.

96 Woodward, ‘Britain in Continental War’ (note 89) p.51.

97 Quoted in ibid. p.59.

98 Strachan, Politics of theBritish Army (note 95) pp.136–8.

99 Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (note 90) pp.282–309.

100 Strachan, Politics of the British Army (note 95) pp.149–51.

101 William Philpott, ‘The Campaign for a Ministry of Defence, 1919–36’, in Smith, Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856–1990 (note 48) p.112.

102 John Gooch, ‘The Chiefs of Staff and the Higher Organization for Defence in Britain, 1904–1984’, US Naval War College Review 39/1 (1986) p.56.

103 Ibid. p.57.

104 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: OUP 1980) pp.214–36.

105 Paul Harris, ‘The British General Staff and the Coming War, 1933–1945’, in French and Holden Reid, The British General Staff (note 1) pp.175–6, 186–91; John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (London: Brassey’s 1988) pp.167–77.

106 Jackson and Bramall (note 89) pp.170–3.

107 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell 1949) pp.12–21.

108 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command. Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Anchor Books 2003) p.105.

109 Michael Howard, ‘The High Command in Britain during the Second World War’, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 47/3 (1980) p.67.

110 Gooch, ‘The Chiefs of Staff and the Higher Organization for Defence in Britain, 1904–1984’ (note 102) p.58.

111 The COSC composition remained unchanged after John Dill had been replaced by Alan Brooke as CIGS, apart from Andrew Cunningham taking over as First Sea Lord after Dudley Pound’s death in Oct. 1943 [Jackson and Bramall (note 89) pp.192–216].

112 Alan Wilt, War from the Top: German and British Military Decision Making during World War II (London: I.B. Tauris 1990) p.37 offers the following numbers: 1941: 441; 1944: 414.

113 Howard, ‘The High Command in Britain during the Second World War’ (note 109) pp.67–8.

114 Cohen (note 108) pp.116–18.

115 Alex Danchev, ‘Being Friends: the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Making of Allied Strategy in the Second World War’, in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and Robert O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992) pp.195–210.

116 Jackson and Bramall (note 79) pp.221–2.

117 French, British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000 (note 33) pp.199–201.

118 Details: Keith Sainsbury, ‘“Second Front in 1942” – a Strategic Controversy Revisited’, British Journal of International Studies 4 (1978) pp.47–58.

119 Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945. Grundlagen, Formen, Gestalten (Frankfurt: Bernhard & Graefe 1962) p.541.

120 Wolfram Pyta, Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler (Munich: Siedler 2007) pp.541–75.

121 Görlitz (note 41) pp.235–8.

122 Hahlweg (note 59) p.82.

123 Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik 1929) pp.55–70, 103–16.

124 Gordon Craig, Die preußisch‐deutsche Armee 1640–1945: Staat im Staate (Düsseldorf: Athenäum/Droste 1960) pp.432–5.

125 Görlitz (note 41) p.196.

126 Pyta (note 120) pp.521–38.

127 Deist (note 69) p.16.

128 Geoffrey Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2000) p.61.

129 Schmidt‐Richberg (note 61) pp.76–8, 87–8.

130 Ernst Klink, ‘The Organization of the German Military High Command in World War II’, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 47/3 (1980) p.135.

131 Wilt (note 112) p.26.

132 Jost Dülffer, ‘Überlegungen von Kriegsmarine und Heer zur Wehrmachtsspitzengliederung und zur Führung der Wehrmacht im Krieg im Februar‐März 1938’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 9 (1971) pp.145–71.

133 Detailed view on Beck’s motives: Klaus‐Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh 2008) pp.115–32. Further: Ludwig Beck, Studien, ed. Hans Speidel (Köhler: Stuttgart 1955) pp.33–6.

134 Megargee (note 128) p.180.

135 Quoted in Horst Boog, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935–1945: Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung (Stuttgart: DVA 1982) p.342.

136 Megargee (note 128) pp.34–5.

137 Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn: Athenäum 1959) pp.524–5, 572–3. Remis means a draw in chess.

138 Megargee (note 128) p.72.

139 Howard, ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’ (note 29) p.193.

140 Macmillan (note 29) pp.35–6.

141 Holger Herwig, ‘Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation‐State: Prussia‐Germany 1871–1918’, in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, (Cambridge: CUP 1994) p.251.

142 Clausewitz (note 6) p.608.

143 Hossbach (note 53) pp.119–20.

144 Alfred Count von Schlieffen, Military Writings, transl.and ed. by Robert Foley (Cass. London 2003), p.221.

145 Wilt (note 112) p.287.

146 John Gooch, ‘ “A Particularly Anglo‐Saxon Institution”: The British General Staff in the Era of Two World Wars’, in French and Holden Reid, The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890–1939 (note 91) p.193.

147 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil‐Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard UP 1985 [1957]) pp.456–66.

148 Similar view: Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy: Civil‐Military Relations after Iraq’, Survival 48/3 (Autumn 2006) pp.70–80.

149 Jackson and Bramall (note 79) p.451.

150 Clausewitz (note 6) p.607.