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Notes
1 For instance, Michael Clarke, Preliminary RUSI briefing: ‘Has the Defence Review secured Britain’s place in the world?’, 20 Oct. 2010, at <www.rusi.org
2 Jeremy Black, Defence: Policy Issues for a New Government (London: Social Affairs Unit 2009).
3 Richard Little and Mark Wickham Jones (eds.), New Labour’s Foreign Policy (Manchester UP 2000).
4 Etienne de Durand, RUSI Future Defence Review, working paper no. 8, Entente or Oblivion: Prospects and Pitfalls of Franco-British Co-operation on Defence (Sept. 2010).
5 Warren Chin, ‘The United Kingdom and the War on Terror: The Breakdown of National and Military Strategy’, Contemporary Security Policy 30/1 (Jan. 2009) pp.125–46.
6 Jeremy Blackham and Gwyn Prins, ‘Why Things Don’t Happen: Silent Principles of National Security’, RUSI Journal 155/4 (Aug. 2010) pp.14–22.
7 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.20 (emphasis added).
8 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government (2010), David Miliband, oral evidence, 15 Dec. 2010, question 91.
9 ‘“A World Full of Terror to the British Mind”: The Blair Doctrine and British Defence Policy’, in David Brown (ed.), The Development of British Defence Policy: Blair, Brown, and Beyond (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 2010) pp.63–80, at 67.
10 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).
11 James Arbuthnot MP, Chair of the Defence Select Committee, in correspondence with one of the authors, 13 Oct. 2010; William Hague MP lecture to the RUSI, ‘The Foreign Policy Framework of a new Conservative Government’, 10 March 2010, available at podcasts.rusi.org, accessed 23 March 2010.
12 Confidential Whitehall source, in conversation with one of the authors.
13 Confidential FCO source, in conversation with one of the authors.
14 See Defence Select Committee, The Comprehensive Approach (2010), oral evidence p.10, for one exception: specifically, the fact that when ‘DfID and FCO and MoD get into a room … they barely understand the language they use together’.
15 See Public Administration Select Committee, Who Does UK National Strategy? (2010), especially the oral evidence section.
16 Best described in James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (London: Penguin 2004).
17 James Arbuthnot MP in conversation with one of the authors, 13 Jan. 2011; Defence Select Committee press release, 13 Jan. 2011.
18 Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, ‘A UK National Security Strategy: Institutional and Cultural Challenges’, Defence Studies 8/1 (March 2008) pp.4–25, at 7, 21.
19 Stuart Gordon, ‘Defence Policy and the “Joined-Up Government” Agenda: Defining the Limits of the “Comprehensive Approach” ‘, in Brown, British Defence Policy pp.121–38.
20 David Brown, ‘Britain and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: the 2002 New Chapter and Beyond’, in Brown, British Defence Policy pp.81–106.
21 Brown, ‘Britain and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism’, in Brown, British Defence Policy p. 81.
22 William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Allen & Unwin 1975) p.128.
23 The Future Strategic Context for Defence (2001) p.18.
24 Strategic Trends Programme: Future Character of Conflict (2010) p.27.
25 For instance, MoD Annual Report (2007–8) p.61.
26 The Future Strategic Context for Defence (2001) pp.18–19.
27 The Ministry of Defence Policy papers: Number two, Multinational defence co-operation (2001) p. 3.
28 For instance, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper (2003) pp. 7-8.
29 Ibid.
30 Consult the tables examining the content of MoD policy material in James Sperling, ‘Permanent Allies or Friends with Benefits?’ in Brown, British Defence Policy pp.15–37, at 28–30.
31 The Future Strategic Context for Defence (2001) p.18.
32 The Ministry of Defence Policy papers: Number three, European defence (2001) p.8.
33 Ibid.
34 MoD Policy papers, European defence (2001) p.2.
35 Strategic Defence Review (1998) pp.15–16.
36 MoD Policy papers: Multinational defence cooperation (2001).
37 Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review (2010) p.32.
38 Robert Dover, Europeanization of British Defence Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate 2007) p.21.
39 MOD Annual Report (2007–8) p.59.
40 Ibid.
41 For instance, MOD Annual Report (2008–9) pp.9, 49–50.
42 Adaptability and Partnership (2010) p.8.
43 Missile Defence: A Public Discussion Paper (2002) pp. 6, 16 (emphasis added).
44 Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003) p.8. See similar assertions in Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities (2004).
45 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York: Cornell UP 1987).
46 FCO Annual Report: Better World, Better Britain (2007–8) p.7.
47 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) p.5.
48 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government (2010), memorandum by Dr Scott James.
49 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities (2006) pp.22–3.
50 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World (2006) pp.28, 32.
51 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) p.38.
52 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World (2006) p.22-3.
53 MoD Annual Report (2007–8) especially pp.58–69.
54 FCO Strategic Programme Fund (2008–9) pp.66–7.
55 UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO (2003) p.26.
56 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) p.28.
57 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) pp.54–61.
58 Ibid. p.55.
59 FCO Annual Report: Better World, Better Britain (2008–9) pp.45–50.
60 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Global Security: US-UK Relations. Government response (2010) p.4.
61 The Times, 16 Nov. 2007.
62 David Miliband, ‘Strong Britain in a Strong Europe’ – speech by the Foreign Secretary to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 26 Oct. 2009 (London 2009).
63 Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 (2010) pp.44, 48.
64 UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO (2003) p.1.
65 FCO Annual Report (2008–9) pp.xvii–xxii.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. p.38.
68 Ibid. See also the Report on Wilton Park conference, ‘How can the Lisbon Treaty Help the European Union Implement the Responsibility to Protect?’, 26–28 July 2010.
69 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World (2006) p.4.
70 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) p.55.
71 Active Diplomacy for a Changing World (2006) p.4.
72 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) pp.64–8.
73 FCO Annual Report (2006–7) p.16.
74 FCO Annual Report (2007–8) p.77.
75 Ibid.
76 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government (2010), David Miliband, oral evidence, 15 Dec. 2010, question 90.
77 Daniel Korski, ‘British Civil-Military Integration’, RUSI Journal 154/6 (Dec. 2009) pp. 14–24, at 22.
78 FCO Annual Report (2008–9) p.26.
79 Gordon, ‘Defence Policy and the “Joined-Up Government” Agenda’, in Brown, British Defence Policy p.129.
80 FCO Annual Report (2008–9) p.vii.
81 FCO Annual Report (2008-9), p. 26.
82 Strategic Defence Review (1998), p. 8.
83 Ibid. p.9.
84 Strategic Defence Review (1998), supporting essay four.
85 The Ministry of Defence Policy papers: Paper One, Defence Diplomacy (2001) p.2.
86 MoD Policy papers, Defence Diplomacy (2001) p.2, and then p.5 onwards for more detail.
87 MoD Annual Report (2007–8) p.10.
88 Report on Wilton Park conference, ‘Global Governance: Future Trends and Challenges’, pp.11–13 Jan. 2010, p.11.
89 MoD Policy papers, Defence Diplomacy (2001) p.18.
90 Robert J. Art, ‘American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force’, Security Studies5/4 (Summer 1996) pp.7–43.
91 Dover, Europeanization p.33.
92 Fitz-Gerald, ‘A UK National Security Strategy’ p.4.
93 UK International Priorities (2003), pp.2–3.
94 Ibid. p.24.
95 Ibid. p.25.
96 Confidential FCO source no.1, in conversation with one of the authors.
97 Report on Wilton Park conference ‘Global Governance’ p.12.
98 Ibid. pp.1–2.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. p.6.
103 FCO Annual Report (2008–9) p.38.
104 Ibid. p.32.
105 Strategic Defence Review (1998) pp.8–9.
106 The Future Strategic Context for Defence (2001) p.5.
107 Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003) p.6.
108 Adaptability and Partnership (2010) p.14.
109 Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 (2010) p.15.
110 Future Character of Conflict (2010) p.4.
111 Ibid. pp.2–3, 7–-8.
112 Ibid. p.30.
113 British Defence Doctrine (2008), para. 118.
114 Adaptability and Partnership (2010) p.5.
115 Julian Lindley-Finch, British Strategic Leadership: Food for Thought (Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 2006).
116 Confidential Whitehall source, in conversation with one of the authors.
117 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government (2010), memorandum by Dr Oliver Daddow.
118 Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003) p.10.
119 For example, United States Department of State and US Aid, Joint Summary of Performance and Financial Information: Fiscal Year 2009 (Washington DC 2010).
120 Ibid. p.20.
121 US Department of State, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007–-2012: Transformational Diplomacy (Washington DC 2007) p.56.
122 Ibid. pp.4, 10–11.
123 Ibid. pp.43–55.
124 Department of State, Joint Summary pp.22–51.
125 Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003) p.5;
126 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010), pp.60–1.
127 Fitz-Gerald, ‘A UK National Security Strategy’ p.12.
128 Ibid. p.11 for hints.
129 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World (2008) p.3.
130 Ibid. p.7.
131 Ibid.
132 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (2010) p.19.
133 Chin, ‘The United Kingdom and the War on Terror’, p. 132.
134 A 97- point statement of remonstrance was drawn up by the Young Turks which astonished senior officials, including demands for faster promotion, better access to ministers, and the freedom to form their own working groups. See John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (London: I.B. Tauris 2004).
135 Public Administration Select Committee, Who Does UK National Strategy? (2010) p.9.
136 At the time of writing, there is no clear basis for judgement on the NSC created in 2010. Regular meetings of officials from across Government represent an obvious improvement, but the innovation did not prevent the SDSR from being a rushed, Treasury-driven process. Although tentative, it is perhaps also worth bearing in mind that there as is no mechanism to scrutinise or otherwise press the NSC itself, success is reliant upon the effective chairmanship, attentiveness, and strategic vision of individual Prime Ministers.
137 British Defence Doctrine, paras. 134–5.
138 Public Administration Select Committee, Who Does UK National Strategy? (2010) p.16.