Modelling the Duration of Conflicts Between Contiguous Antagonists: Reassessing the Role of Salient Borders and Political Regimes

Abstract

Several studies have devoted considerable energy toward explaining the occurrence of international conflicts between contiguous states. Despite the well-developed multidisciplinary approaches analyzing militarized disputes, which have predominately focused on studying the geographical dimension as an additional explanatory predictor of rivalry disputes, only very few research papers have considered modelling the duration of conflicts between neighbouring states. Using the event history analysis, we propose, rather than investigating the standard theoretical questions of why neighbouring states do fight each other, or alternatively, what factors commonly influence the dispute outcomes between those rival countries, instead to answer the question: Once it breaks out, what role does the geographic proximity of opponent states play when interacting with other factors, extending or conversely shortening the crisis period? One of the most relevant insights of the present work is that disputes that occur between adjacent countries tend to be shorter when joint democracies are involved, and when countries are dependent economically on each other. The presence of a territorial issue at stake or a long history of hostility over disputed areas tends to prolong the tension period as those disputes often include nationalism dimensions that increase the difficulty of reconciling the divergent views on the issues at stake. On the contrary, the present research does not provide strong support for some of the theoretical suggestions formulated by certain scholars regarding the positive correlation between the nature of opposing powers and the duration of conflict between neighbours.

Notes

1 S. Bennett, ‘Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816–1992’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/2 (1997) pp.227–54; V. Krustev, ‘Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 43/3 (2006) pp.243--60.

2 H. Ben-Yehuda, ‘Territoriality and War in International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918–2001’, International Studies Review 6/4 (2004) pp.85–105; Bennett (note 1); G. Chiozza, and A. Choi, ‘Guess Who Did What: Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950–1990’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 47/3 (2003) pp. 251–78; P. Diehl and G. Goertz, ‘Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 32/1 (1988) pp.103--12.

3 A. Braithwaite, ‘The Geographic Spread of Militarized Disputes’, Journal of Peace Research 43/5 (2006) pp.507–22; H. Buhaug, ‘Dangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May not be That Peaceful after all’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (2005) pp.95–111; J. Vasquez, ‘Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality’, Journal of Peace Research 32/3 (1995) pp.277--93.

4 Vasquez, ‘Why Do Neighbors Fight?’ (note 3) p.279.

5 P. Senese and L. Vasquez, ‘A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919--1992’, International Studies Quarterly 47/2 (2003) pp.275--98.

6 Bennett (note 1) identifies, for instance, 25 disputes of the 34 studied MIDs that are centred over border or homeland security salient issues.

7 J. Tir, and P. Diehl, ‘The Political Geography of Enduring Rivalries’, Paper presented at the New Methodologies for the Social Sciences, Colorado, USA, 10--12 March 2000; B. Walter, ‘Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflicts’, International Studies Review 5/4 (2003) pp.137–53; Vasquez, ‘Why Do Neighbors Fight?’ (note 3).

8 M. Kornprobst, ‘The Management of Border disputes in African Regional Sub-Systems: Comparing West Africa and the Horn of Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40/3 (2002) p.373) defines a border dispute as: ‘Conflict between two states arising from the claim of at least one of these states to a part of the territory or, in extreme cases, to the entire territory that is administered by the other state.’

9 P. Hensel, M. Allison, and A. Khanani. 2004. ‘The Colonial Legacy and Border Stability: Uti Possidetis and Territorial Claims in the Americas.’ Paper presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 2004.

10 S. Kocs, ‘Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945--1987’, Journal of Politics 57/1 (1995) pp.159–75; D. Lake, and A. O’Mahony, ‘The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the Territorial Size of Countries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/5 (2004) pp.699--722.

11 K. DeRouen and J. Bercovitch, ‘Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War’, Journal of Peace research 45/1 (2008) pp.55--74.

12 Lake and O’Mahoney (note 10); R. Mandel, ‘Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24/3 (1980) pp.427--54.

13 Chiozza and Choi (note 2); D. Gibler, ‘Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly 51 (2007) pp.509--32.

14 K. Gleditsch, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 44/3 (2007) pp.293--309.

15 Scholars such as M. Caprioli and F. Trumbore, ‘Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior’, Journal of Peace Research 40/1 (2003) pp.5–23, who have studied the connection between domestic violence and international conflicts, assert that domestic factors such as social inequality, nationalism, and discrimination against ethnic minorities are found to significantly influence the international behaviour of states and the outbreak of long-term violence between neighbouring countries.

16 D. Woodwell, ‘Unwelcome Neighbors:Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict During the Cold War’, International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004) pp.197–223.

17 H. Buhaug and S. Gates,‘The Geography of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 (2002) pp.417--33.

18 Chiozza and Choi (note 2); D. Cunningham, K. Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan, ‘Dyadic Interactions and Civil War Duration’, Paper presented at the 47th Annual International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, CA, 22--25 March 2006.

19 D. Carter, and H. Goemans, ‘The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict’, International Organization 65 (2) (2011) p.280.

20 P. Senese, ‘Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation’, American Journal of Political Science 49/4 (2005) pp.769--79.

21 R. Mandel, ‘Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24/3 (1980) p.435.

22 Tir and Diehl (note 7).

23 Kocs (note 10).

24 Buhaug and Gates (note 17).

25 A. Boaz, ‘When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict’, International Security 31/3 (2006) pp.139–73.

26 Braithwaite (note 3).

27 Gibler (note 13).

28 M. Benson, ‘The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (2005) pp.113–33; H. Hegre, ‘Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to Be a Trading State’, Journal of Peace Research 37/1 (2000) pp.5–30; H. Hegre, ‘Size Asymmetry, Trade, and Militarized Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/3 (2004) pp.403–29; H. Hegre,., J. Oneal, and B. Russett, ‘Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflicts’, Journal of Peace Research 47/6 (2010) pp.763–74.

29 H. Starr and D. Thomas, ‘The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypothesis on Territory’, International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005) pp.123--39.

30 J. Robst, S. Polachek, and Y. Chang, ‘Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation’, IZA DP Discussion Paper No. 1988, 2006.

31 B. Simmons, ‘Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institution’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/6 (2005) pp.823--48.

32 Krustev (note 1).

33 Gleditsch (note 14).

34 Chiozza and Choi (note 2).

35 B. Walter, ‘Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflicts’, International Studies Review 5/4 (2003) pp.137--53.

36 J. Clare, ‘Democratization and International Conflict: The Impact of Institutional Legacies’, Journal of Peace Research 44/3 (2007) pp.259--76.

37 Buhaug (note 3); Caprioli and Trumbore (note 15); Gibler (note 13); Hegre 2000 (note 28); P. Senese, and S. Quackenbush, ‘Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace’, Journal of Politics 65/3 (2003) pp.696--717.

38 M. Koch, ‘Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Dispute Duration’, Journal of Peace Research 46/6 (2009) pp.799--817.

39 S. Miller and D. Gibler, ‘Democracies, Territory and Negotiated Compromises’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28/3 (2011) pp.261--79.

40 Clare (note 36); Gibler (note 13) argues that such a constitutional constraint in democratic regimes only can be lifted in rare cases of security emergencies.

41 Koch (note 38).

42 K. Rasler and S. Thompson, ‘Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem’, International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000) pp.503--30.

43 Gibler (note 13).

44 W. Dixon, ‘Democracy and the Peaceful Settlements of International Conflict’, American Political Science Review 88/1 (1994) pp.14--32.

45 Chiozza and Choi (note 2).

46 J. Crescenzi, ‘Reputation and Interstate Conflict’, American Journal of Political Science 51/2 (2007) p.388.

47 DeRouen and Bercovitch (note 10).

48 Chiozza and Choi (note 2).

49 A. Enterline, ‘Regime Changes, Neighborhoods, and Interstate Conflict, 1816--1992’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/6 (1998) pp.804--29.

50 Gleditsch (note 14).

51 Ibid.

52 G. Schrock-Jacobson, ‘The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56/5 (2012) pp.824–851. Caprioli and Trumbore (note 15).

53 Boaz (note 125) p.148.

54 K. Wiegand, “Militarized Territorial Disputes: States’ Attempts to Transfer Reputation for Resolve,” Journal of Peace studies 48/1 (2011) pp. 101–113.

55 The timeframe used for the present empirical study remains an artifact of the data and the information available at the time of writing the present research.

56 The construction of the dataset was facilitated greatly by the use of the EUGENE programme created by S. Bennett and A. Stam. ‘EU Gene: A Conceptual Manual’, International Interactions 26 (2000) pp.179–204.

57 F. Ghosn, G. Palmer, and S. Bremer, ‘The MID3 Data Set, 1993--2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 21/2 (2004) pp.133--54.

58 Caprioli and Trumbore (note 15); Diehl and Goertz (note 2); Robst et al. (note 30).

59 The termination date of conflict is measured here by the end of any notable hostilities or military actions for an extended period of time.

60 M.G. Marshall and K. Jaggers. ‘Polity IV Project: Political Regim Characteristics and Transitions, 1800--1999’ (2007). Available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity>.

61 K. Barbieri, ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? ‘ Journal of Peace Research 33/1 (1996) pp.29–49. For a thorough explanation of the rationale behind the use of this indicator and a comparative analysis with other alternative indices, please refer to Benson (note 28, Hegre (note 28 and E. Gartzke and Q. Li, ‘Measure for measure: Concept operationalization and the trade interdependence-conflict debate’, Journal of Peace Research, 40/5 (2003) pp. 553–571.).

62 J. Tir,  S. Philip, P. Diehl and G. Goertz,‘Territorial Changes, 1816--1996: Procedures and Data’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 16/1 (1998) pp.89--97.

63 D. Carter, and H. Goemans, ‘The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict’, International Organization 65/2 (2011) pp.275--309.

64 Cunningham et al. (note 18).

65 Mandel (note 21) p.434

66 Benson (note 28).

67 Bennett (note 1).

68 D. Singer, S. Bremer and J. Stuckey, ‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major War, 1820--1965’, in Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972].

69 According to Senese and Quackenbush (note 37), the use of a natural log captures the declining marginal effect expected at increasingly disparate capability levels.

70 J. Vasquez, ‘Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those That do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the two Paths to War’, International Studies Quarterly 40/4 (1996) pp.531--58.

71 Kornprobst (note 8).

72 According to the Correlates of War dataset, the major powers during the period under study are identified as China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

73 Vasquez and Valeriano (note 28).

74 Crescenzi (note 46); C. Gelpi and J. Grieco, ‘Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace’, Journal of Peace Research 45/1 (2008) pp.17--36.

75 B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1981).

76 Crescenzi (note 46) p.389 ascertains that, ‘Recently, the Cox model has emerged as the tool of choice when using event history models, due to its parsimonious demands and flexibility in handling time-varying covariates.’

77 S. Werner, ‘The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816--1985.’ Political Rese Quarterly 53/2 (2000) p.350. Additionally, we have complemented this analysis by testing for the validity of the underlying proportionality assumptions of all covariates included in the model. We applied the residual-based test (i.e., scaled Schoenfeld residuals test) to individual covariates present in the model to detect for the possibility of non-proportionality of their influence over time. Based on all covariates’ individual tests as well as the global test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the hazard ratios for different values of covariates are constants over time. The results of the tests are not shown in the present paper, but can be provided upon request.

78 The results of these preliminary analyses are not shown in this paper. They can be provided by the author upon request.

79 Miller and Gibler (note 39).

80 Clare (note 36).

81 Kocs (note 10); Tir and Diehl (note 7).

82 Carter and Goemans (note 63).

83 Senese and Vasquez (note 5).

84 Gleditsch (note 14) and Hegre 2000 and 2004 (note 28).

85 Dixon (note 44).

86 Kornprobst (note 18).

87 Walter (note 35); S. Werner, ‘The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816--1985’, Political Research Quarterly 53/2 (2000) pp.343--74

88 Simmons (note 31).

89 Miller and Gibler (note 39).

90 Vasquez (note 3) p.285.

91 Tir and Diehl (note 7).

92 D. Balch-Lindsay, A. Enterline, and K. Joyce, ‘Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process’, Journal of Peace Research 45/3 (2008) p.355.

93 Miller and Gibler (note 39).

94 Dixon (note 44) p.25.

95 Gleditsch (note 14).

96 Vasquez (note 3); J. Vasquez and M. Henehan, ‘Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816--1992.’ Journal of Peace Research 38/2 (2001) pp.123--38.

97 Senese and Vasquez (note 5) p.277.