Canada’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan: A Critical Review of Literature, 2001–2011

Abstract

Following a critical review of the extensive literature on the topic of Canada’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2011, this article traces the genealogy of the approach, identifies three major contributions as well as three serious limitations. A subsequent qualitative analysis of the content of this literature, as well as a quantitative meta-analysis provide a deeper than ever understanding of the complexity of Canada’s so-called Comprehensive Approach and as such, presents the theoretical underpinnings of a pragmatic executive decision-making model for Canada’s future engagements, to be developed through further iterations of grounded theory.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes especially to thank Professor L. Lemay for her strategic management insights.

Notes

1 ‘At present, there are no clear measures of effectiveness to accurately assess the performance of the Canadian CA in Afghanistan. The absence of performance indicators, trend analysis, and objectives, impairs iterative and objective assessment of organizational efficiency. Without functional measures of effectiveness, no authoritative judgements can be made regarding the suitability of the CA as expeditionary conflict tool (Ritchie (2010) p.119)’: <www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc36/mds/Ritchie.pdf>.

2 ‘Strategic decision-makers assigned missions to NATO forces that are impossible to complete with military means alone. Thus the Comprehensive Approach exists to draw on civilian capabilities to support these overarching political-military strategies (Rotmann (2010)p.4): <www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=231>.

3 ‘The promise of a formal top-down campaign introducing the Comprehensive Approach is very limited. Instead, new ways of pragmatic collaboration bellow the strategic level need to be encouraged. Most examples are drawn from Afghanistan, the alliance’s most demanding mission that permeates both its other operations and largely shapes its institutional evolution’. (Rotmann (2010) p.1): <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=231>.

4 For more on Inductive Logic see Stanford Encyclopedia online: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/>.

5 Dennis L. Rennie, ‘Grounded Theory Methodology as Methodical Hermeneutics’, Theory & Psychology, York Univ., Toronto, ON, Vol. 10(Aug. 2000), pp.481--502: <http://tap.sagepub.com/content/10/4/481.short>.

6 ‘The logic of looking at the body of evidence, rather than trying to understand studies in isolation, is always compelling. Meta-analysis refers to the statistical synthesis of results from a series of studies. While the statistical procedures used in a meta-analysis can be applied to any set of data, the synthesis will be meaningful only if the studies have been collected systematically.’ Michael Borenstein, Larry V. Hedges, Julian P.T. Higguns, & Hannah R. Rothstein, Introduction to Meta-Analysis, (Toronto: Wiley, 2009). Available at http://www.meta-analysis.com/pages/book_introduction_to_meta-analysis.php

7 See Afghanistan News Center: <www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/august/aug23h2001.html>.

8 UN (2004) High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report: www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

9 United Kingdom (2005), The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4/05 Ministry of Defence: <www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BEE7F0A4-C1DA-45F8-9FDC-7FBD25750EE3/0/dcdc21_jdn4_05.pdf>.

10 United States (2007), Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07, pp.1--4: <www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.

11 ‘3D – Defence, Diplomacy and Development – reflects the reality that today’s complex operations require a more comprehensive, holistic, and integrated approach that ‘match our military might with a mature diplomatic and development effort worthy of the task ahead’. This focus is similar to the whole of government approach described in FM 3-07, Stability Operations, which describes the integration of ‘the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal’. However, some areas of the US government view the 3D approach as merely a descriptor for what each department’’s role and responsibilities are in a conflict and based on how the 3D activities will be funded (Finney (2010) p.1)’.

12 Canadian Forces (2008), Counter-Insurgency Ops, p.5-1: <http://info.publicintelligence.net/CanadaCOIN.pdf>.

13 ‘From participation in the search for Osama bin Laden, to taking command of the Kabul-based International Security Assistance Force, to operating in Kandahar, to assuming responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team as well as security for much of Kandahar province, Canada’s responsibilities evolved rather than being part of a unified strategic vision and implementation plan.’ (Fitz-Gerald & McNamara (2012), iPolitics): <www.ipolitics.ca/2012/03/07/canada-needs-a-more-comprehensive-approach-to-national-security/>.

14 Structuration: <www.istheory.yorku.ca/structurationtheory.htm> and <www.theory.org.uk/giddens2.htm>.

15 Prism is also a Journal of the US National Defense University (NDU): <www.ndu.edu/press/prism.html>.

16 Patrick and Brown (2007), Greater Than the Sum of its Parts?, International Peace Academy (IPA), pp.128--9.

17 Chapin and Petrolekas: <www.ipolitics.ca/2012/02/21/cda-institute-canada-needs-a-national-security-strategy/>.

18 Canada’s Three Signature Projects: <www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/projects-projets/index.aspx>.

19 NATO, Comprehensive Approach: <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm?selectedLocale=en> and UNPK: <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml> andOSCE: <www.osce.org/sg/75766>.

20 CARE, NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan, May 2005: <www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/>.

21 ‘Despite its reputation as a catchphrase of little consequence, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach is a necessary response to practical coordination challenges and capability gaps that affects all of the Alliance’s operations. While the need for ‘comprehensiveness’ is therefore well founded, the record of its implementation in key missions, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, is not encouraging.’ (Rotmann (2010) p.1).

22 ‘While PRTs are related to humanitarian efforts, unlike NGO and UN relief organizations, they seek to achieve the political ends of their sponsoring governments by extending the reach of the host government and providing strategies to improve security and governance in conflicted regions.’ (Woodrow Wilson School – PRTs (2008) p.5)’.

23 ‘In other words, to strengthen the impact of an integrated approach, Canada must become more adept at directly linking its development efforts to its security operations while launching capacity building initiatives in the same geographic location.’ (Jorgensen (2008) p.36): <www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/nssc/nssc10/jorgensen.pdf>.

24 ‘Over the course of the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, there were two relatively divisive parliamentary votes (May 2006, March 2008) occasioned by concern over the essential character of the mission and its duration, along with the highly politicized public and parliamentary debates over the government’s Afghan detainee transfer policy.’ (Coombs, CDAI (2012) p.5): <www.cdainstitute.ca/images/CDAInstitute_WOG_Dec2012.pdf>.

25 Canada, Quarterly Reports: <www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/qr-rt.aspx?lang=eng>.

26 ‘The objective of this diplomatic effort should be to raise Canada’s voice, commensurate with the Canadian contribution in Afghanistan, to establish a comprehensive political-military ISAF strategy; to press for improvements in NATO/ISAF force structure, command organization and operational effectiveness; and to advocate the deployment of more forces to Afghanistan by other NATO partners’. (See Manley Report (2008) p.27).

27 ‘The idea that UN peacekeeping is -- or should be -- a central pillar of Canada’s international security policy has major political and potentially strategic implications. First, it has led to a perceptible change in political rhetoric regarding the mission in Afghanistan. The Conservative government has put greater emphasis on “rebuilding”,’ ““stabilization”’, human security, and non-military dimensions of the mission, as well as Canada’s international responsibilities, with fewer references to “‘retaliation”’ and ‘war’. The objective is to frame the mission as a nation-building intervention.’ (Massie (2009) p.638): <http://ijx.sagepub.com/content/64/3/625.full.pdf+html>.

28 Canada, ‘The Manley Report’: <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf>.

29 Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force: <www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/about-a_propos.aspx>.

30 John McCain, and Joe Lieberman (2009), ‘Our Must-Win War’, Washington Post, 19 March 2009: <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-19/opinions/36770352_1_afghanistan-war-plan-terrorists>.

31 Cited by Susan Sachs: ‘Newsmakers 2011: In Their Own Words’, The Globe and Mail, 24 Dec. 2011, A11.

32 ‘The Comprehensive Approach arguably emerged from the identification of needs on the ground and the recognition of shortfalls in the response and was never meant to act as a set template fixing roles once and for all. Yet while definitional debates may appear secondary in light of pressing operational concerns, they are noteworthy in that they might reveal a degree of uncertainty behind the overall project of stabilisation.’ (Baumann (2010) p.3).

33 ‘Because the JIMP construct has yet to be fully and clearly defined, there are imminent dangers in moving ahead until there is more clarity around what the concept represents from the perspectives of all relevant parties. The theoretical underpinnings of the construct will need to be fully elaborated before it can serve as an adequate base for future research and development efforts (p.68). […] Although certainly framed from primarily a CF perspective, at least implicitly, the current conceptualization of JIMP seems to run somewhat counter to the true inclusive spirit of JIMP. The ‘M’ in JIMP is presumably not just about working in multinational military coalitions and alliances, but in theory, should also include the CF’s ability to work with both military and non-military players of all diverse cultures. As the conceptual clarification of the JIMP concept proceeds, it might also be important to consider a more inclusive term to replace ‘JIMP.’ The JIMP construct (and particularly the joint and multinational components) seems most relevant when applied exclusively to the military context. The term ‘comprehensive approach’ may be better suited for conceptualizing the nature of the diverse collaboration necessary.’ (Brown & Adams (2010) p.70).

34 ‘Canadians should value what they have learned from their Afghanistan experience and make a determined effort to ensure that that learning is not lost before they next find themselves engaged in an international peace operation. If Canadians aspire to play an international leadership role, the expertise required in future will not be in traditional peacekeeping but in complex operations combining the skills of both military and civilians.’ (Coombs (2012) p.15).

35 International Journal 68/2 (June 2013) pp.269--377: <http://ijx.sagepub.com/content/current>.

36 Comprehensive Approach Research Team (2008): <www.defmin.fi/files/1316/Comprehensive_Approach_-_Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_Cooperation_in_Crisis_Prevention_and_Management.pdf>, p.9.

37 ‘Without benchmarks there can be neither success nor failure; only muddle’ (State of Readiness (2012) p.51)’.

38 ‘The continuing challenge for Canada, the US, and the other parts of the hemispheric and global communities, then, is to exploit the fact that contemporary security – at whatever level – is, at base, a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The corollary is to move from a singular military approach to a multidimensional whole-of-government and whole of alliance/coalition paradigm. The Canadian whole-of-government approach and the NATO whole-of-alliance model to homeland defense and global security requirements do that, and could be very useful as primary organizational principles to establish a comprehensive North American process for active intergovernmental and multilateral policy cooperation. That, in turn, requires a conceptual framework and organizational structure to promulgate unified civil-military planning and implement the multidimensional, multi-organizational, and multilateral/multinational security concept.’ (Manwaring (2006) p.3).