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Abstract
Despite tight budgetary constraints, the number of military interventions in which Belgium participated is substantial. The Belgian air force and navy were able to retain their basic war fighting capabilities after the Cold War. The land forces lost and are losing capabilities because of a lack of strategic anchoring. The most important Belgian contribution to international and European defence thinking has to be found in the innovative approach with respect to Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation. The latter could be an example for Europeanizing and generating the use of military capabilities in order to make the EU a strategic actor in the multipolar world.
Notes
1 This corresponds to a more general trend lowering the direct implication of ‘Western’ troops in crisis management to a more supportive and stand-off posture, for example, providing close air support for local forces next to training and educating local forces.
2 Belgium is the 31st richest country of the world in relative terms (per capita) (CIA Citation2014).
3 Belgium is the sixth most economically globalized country (according to the KOF Swiss Economic Institute) and the most globalized country in the world, also taking into account social and political globalization (KOF Citation2013). Belgium is the world’s 13th export nation and 13th import nation (World Trade Organization Citation2013, p. 33).
4 The Belgian foreign policy tries to keep Central Africa and especially the Great Lake region with some success on the international agenda. Still, a permanent international mobilization let alone real progress of the security situation in this region remain as a policy goal to be fulfilled. The contribution of the Belgian defence effort for this region is limited partly due to the reluctance to operate in former colonies.
5 Currently an overarching national security strategy is lacking while all neighbouring states have introduced such a strategy for some time.
6 In the Libya operation in 2011 the coordination of NEO-operations was for the first time ever done by the EU while the Lisbon Treaty supports the use of the European militaries as a whole for natural and man-made disasters (but also terrorism) within EU member states through the solidarity clause (EU Citation2008, p. 148). The other four strategic tasks defined by Belgian defence are even more clearly seen in a multilateral framework: collective defence, the collective protection of the vital and essential interests of the NATO and/or EU, security operations and humanitarian operations. (Belgian Chief of Defence Citation2014, p. 13.)
7 The costs for operations went almost constantly up since 2000. Nevertheless, this part of the defence budget has been kept below 25%.
8 The level of ambition describes the capabilities of the Belgian armed forces that can contribute to different scenarios within the conflict spectrum.
9 Approximately 250 military personnel.
10 The range of both artillery systems is also limited compared to what NATO requires.
11 With four NH90 TTH helicopters approximately 60 soldiers and equipment can be transported or approximately two platoons, being a half company.
12 The Strategic Framework document of Belgian Defence talks in general about « the level of equipment of its units that is not ideal anymore for offensive operations in a conflict of high intensity ». (Belgian Chief of Defence Citation2014, p. 11) But for the moment being this is mostly valid for the Belgian land forces.
13 Crisis management in a military framework are all actions of military forces that are not connected to collective defence nor to defence diplomacy, but in response of crises all over the world that could or are leading to insecurity. Most of these crisis management operations (CROs) will happen in coordination with civilian security actors and can be adapted to every part of the cycle of a crisis.
14 This is also the view the Nordic countries have on their Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) (NORDEFCO Citation2009, p. 3, Citation2011, pp. 2–3, Stoltenberg Citation2009).
15 All descriptions of the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation are based on Parrein (Citation2011a)
16 Although pooled sovereignty would in fact be a better term because it reflects more the current situation in which the states remain the central power institution for defence. It remains the sovereign decision of states to cooperate intensively for a certain domain of defence (capabilities) going to the level that they are bringing a part of their defence effort on an almost supranational level (integration) to increase their possibility to act in international security. Bringing individual national parts of sovereignty together is more in line with the concept of pooling. Shared sovereignty would be when a supranational institute (such as the European Commission) would become the power centre for defence or a domain of defence. But the boundary between the two concepts is small and depends on how one wants to look at examples of deep defence cooperation.
17 Contrary to less positive examples of duplication between both security organizations, these are exemplary efforts to coordinate both multilateral capability programmes in order to get real complementarity.
18 Underlining the novelty of comprehensive cooperation is essential as cooperation combining different lines of development of a capability (DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities) and/or different cooperation domains (capabilities, armament, industry, R&T, operations, policy …) makes it possible to go much further in the reduction of overhead in the national defences because it makes it possible to build up a very deep and comprehensive form of defence cooperation by making associations between these lines of development and domains.
19 Contrary to comprehensive forms of defence cooperation, only focusing on one specific domain/line of development.
20 Being in the first place the Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation, and further the close cooperation between Belgium and Luxembourg for the land forces, the Belgian-Dutch cooperation for the F16 fighter jets and the recently started Belgian-Luxembourg cooperation for the air transport fleet.
21 For more information on the BENELUX Defence Cooperation structure, see the website www.militarycooperation.eu. Different projects are studied, elaborated and some almost finalized within the different Working Groups of the BENELUX Defence Cooperation: (Working Group (WG) 1) A Combined Joint Helicopter Command, (WG 2) Far-reaching cooperation in the area of air defence control and QRA, (WG 3) a BENELUX para training centre, (WG 4) cooperation for professional education and training – Land, (WG 5) Cooperation in the area of army tactical and shooting exercises, (WG 6) Cooperation between special operations forces, (WG 7) Exchange of staff officers, (WG 8) Cooperation for medical support, (WG 9) Cooperation for ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance), (WG 10) Cooperation for basic and continued officer education, (WG 11) OSCE cooperation (confidence and security building measures), (WG 12) Cooperation for professional education and training – Air, and within the already existing Working Groups of the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation (such as those on the pooling of the NH90s of both countries and the common studying and acquisitioning of the replacement capabilities for the current bi-national MCM-ships and bi-national multipurpose frigates) that were incorporated in the BENELUX Defence Cooperation structure.
22 Deeper cooperation with France for the land forces is also a Belgian defence policy aim.