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Abstract
The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014.
Notes
1. As Poore (Citation2003, p. 281) indicates, Gray later contradicted himself on this point.
2. This last claim is somewhat doubtful, as contemporary challenges are interdisciplinary by nature, and thus no epistemic community aspiring to influence policy would be drawn from a single profession.
3. I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
4. In the Israeli context, such a case was Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon. In contradiction with the then hegemonic strategic subculture, and condemned by its hegemonic epistemic community, the withdrawal was portrayed as a significant contributor to the Palestinian decision to initiate the Second Intifada, and to legitimising Israel’s overwhelming response. See Harel and Issacharoff (Citation2008, pp. 579–600), Kindle locations & Ehrlich (Citation2011, p. 70).
5. For an opposing position, see Cohen (Citation2006) and Levy (Citation2016).
6. Following James (Citation2000, p. 56), “international conflict” is defined hereby as: “any interaction delimited in time and space, involving two or more international entities (whether states or transnational actors) which poses non-identical preference orderings over one or more sets of alternative choices”.
7. On the traditional Israeli military culture see Vardi (Citation2008).
8. Despite being dismantled, the “Army” course at the CGSC maintained the name “Barak” until the establishment of a joint command and staff course in 2007.
9. The programme’s third leading figure and its former commander, Colonel (Ret.) Dr Hanan Shai, pursued an academic career as an adjunct in several security-related study programmes. His influence on future intellectual debates within the IDF was limited. On Benny Amidror’s career, opinions and influence on Israel’s security policy and thought see Barzilai (Citation2004).
10. Although the team was only designated officially as OTRI in 1996, this common and famous title will be used to denote an earlier period as well for convenience of reading.
11. The IDF Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for the West Bank.
12. For Yaalon’s (Citation2008) worldview see his autobiography.