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Abstract
This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Chad Huckaby for his research assistance on this article. The author would also like to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions, and members of panels at the International Studies Association conference and the Southern Political Science Association conference.
Notes
1. Many have argued that the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will allow India to divert its domestic uranium reserves into military production. Tellis (Citation2006) summarizes this literature in Atoms for War. Tellis notes the work of both Joseph Cirincione and Daryl Kimball in this regard. While it is true that India can now use as much of its limited uranium on weapons as it wishes, the reality is that in the past India simply starved its civilian reactors when forced to choose between military and civilian uses. This is demonstrated by the fact that India’s civilian program operated at reduced capacity especially from 2003 to 2005 (Squassoni Citation2006). As Tellis notes, should India ever truly desire to maximize nuclear weapons production, it could produce over 2000 warheads using only its own resources. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the “guns or butter” issue is made easier by the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
2. Kristensen and Norris assert a similar stockpile of 540 kg of plutonium (Citation2015).
3. Whitfield (Citation2016) and others note RgPu is unlikely to be used for nuclear weapons. Others argue “the potential weapon utility of reactor grade plutonium is greater in India than has commonly been appreciated” (Dalton and Perkovich Citation2016, p. 489).
4. This warhead is said to be nearly 1000 kg and require a 1 m diameter launch vehicle (Kampani Citation2014, 385 and Dalton and Perkovich Citation2016, p. 15).
5. Norris and Kristensen (Citation2008, pp. 39–40, 2015, pp. 80–81) remain “skeptical of India’s ability to MIRV its missiles…” and note that doing so would “seriously challenge the credibility of India’s minimum deterrent doctrine.”
6. Command and control is, of course, a simple way of discussing the ever increasing set of variables that go into commanding and controlling weapons systems, whether nuclear or otherwise. This article opts for simplicity, with the recognition that entire treatises have been written on command, control, communications, computing, combat systems, intelligence, information, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and much more.
7. Note that assorted writers argue India’s strategic culture is different from the US and thus it is unwise to borrow US C&C. While this may be the case for doctrine in the past (e.g. NFU for India vs. counterforce for the US), in fact most organizations copy what they perceive to be successful policies (Ahmed Citation2011a).
8. Tellis (Citation2001, p. 88) discusses a “baseline model” where integration and delivery do not occur until “after India has suffered a nuclear attack” (emphasis deleted). This does not serve signaling purposes and exposes the weapons to the possibility, however unlikely, of an effective counterforce strike. It is more likely that the weapons will be integrated and delivered to military authorities before any nuclear attack on India.
9. One must always take India’s pronouncements regarding the acquisition of new systems and capabilities with a healthy grain of salt. The informal nature of command chains and responsibilities (as well as bureaucratic demands) often creates an incentive for assertions of successful deployment of new capabilities. India’s use of the term “induction” in the armed forces is instructive.
10. Kumar (Citation2006, p. 102) has argued for a TACAMO-like system, possibly purchased from the US. It is unclear whether US law or international law would permit such a sale.
11. Others refer to this lack of specificity as demonstrating the “dynamic” nature of “a credible minimum nuclear deterrent” (Roy-Chaudhury Citation2009, p. 406).