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Abstract
At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, the UK and Germany unveiled two new initiatives for European defence cooperation, known, respectively, as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Both were the result of economic pressures and the need to exercise intra-alliance leadership, but they represented very different approaches to cooperation. The JEF was to be a UK-led contingency force for short-notice operations, selectively incorporating forces from allies and partners. The FNC sought to coordinate capability development between groups of allies, centred on larger framework nations, to develop coherent capability-clusters available to meet NATO’s force requirements. The common denominator and novelty of the initiatives was the building of forces and capabilities multinationally by having major states act as framework nations for groups of smaller allies. The UK and Germany have ownership and continue to provide leadership to these initiatives. This is one key reason why they continue to evolve to accommodate changing circumstances and are likely to endure.
Acknowledgements
This article builds to a large extend on 15 semi-structured interviews with officials, officers and experts in Berlin, November 2015, and in Northwood/London, March 2016. I would also like to thank the security experts and officials who agreed to speak to me more informally about the JEF and FNC initiatives in 2015–16. Any mistakes or omissions are entirely my own.
Notes
1. For one overview of existing European (operational) defence cooperation models, see (Zandee et al. Citation2016).
2. Composed of countries connected by “regional ties”, the Italian-led framework group would concentrate on improving Alliance capabilities in areas such as stabilization and reconstruction, usability of land formations, provisions of enablers, and command and control. The Italian group would be composed of Austria, Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia, and would primarily seek to capitalize on their already existing ties of cooperation (NATO Heads of State and Government Citation2014, paragraph 67; personal communication with Brigadier General Giuseppe Di Giovanni, Italian Defence Attaché Stockholm, and the Italian MoD, 14 October 2015).
3. Authors correspondence with senior British officer, 14 October 2016.
4. The lower reduction in the number of British combat battalions was mainly due to the retention in the British land forces of its disproportionate high number of cheaper and less technologically demanding light infantry battalions. Armored, mechanized, artillery, and air-defense forces had been much more dramatically reduced. On the British Army’s disproportionate number of light infantry units during the Cold War, see Carver (Citation1983, pp. 87–89).
5. On the “lead nations” or “framework nation” concept in operations, see Multinational Interoperability Council (Citation2011), pp. 1–2.
6. The US was estimated to provide 75% or of key capabilities for the alliance, such as combat search and rescue, suppression of enemy air defences, air-to-air refuelling, airborne early warning, signals intelligence and unmanned attack platforms (NATO Citation2012, p. 14).
7. This phrase was used by both British and non-British interviewees. Interviews with British, Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian officers, Northwood HQ, 9 and 10 March 2016.
8. Canada provided medical personnel; Norway a C-130 transport aircraft. Interviews with British officers, Northwood HQ and UK MoD, 9 and 10 March 2016.
9. The JEF Lead Elements would initially be UK only, due to the very short reaction and deployment time.
10. Originally, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, The Netherlands’, and Norway had been approached by the UK in 2013 (UK MoD Citation2013, p. 4).
11. British official documents often made this link (see e.g. Secretary of State for Defence Citation2015, p. 12).
12. For example, this was a common expectation among officials in the Northern Group countries (Kaljurand et al. Citation2016, pp. III–IV).
13. Conversation with senior Finnish MoD official, Oslo, 2 February 2015; Finland and Sweden share similar security concerns about Russia (see e.g. Lundqvist and Widen Citation2016, p. 360).