Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the most offensive of them all? – Explaining the offensive bias in military tactical thinking

ABSTRACT

This article explores why the offensive predominates military tactical thinking. With survey results showing an offensive bias among 60 per cent of senior Swedish officers and as many as 80 per cent in the case of the army, it is clear that this is not just a problem of the past but is equally relevant today. The article asks why there is a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions for why the offensive bias exists are tested using a mixed-method approach. Based on the findings, the article develops a model to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking. It is found that the two key constitutive factors behind the offensive bias are military culture and education. These factors most directly and profoundly influence an officer’s identity, perceptions, and thinking. Military culture and education, in turn, work as a prism for four other factors: military history, the theory and principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors.

KEYWORDS:

• Military
• cult of the offensive
• attack
• offensive
• tactical thinking
• tactics
• education
• military culture
• Sweden
• army

Introduction

Mon centre cède, ma droite recule, situation excellente, j‘attaque.[My centre is giving way, my right is retreating, situation excellent, I am attacking]. (Marshal Ferdinand Foch at the First Battle of the Marne 8 September 1914).

Figure 1. What role do the following factors play in the predominance of the offensive in military tactical thinking?.

The core question addressed in this study is why the offensive predominates in military tactical thinking. Why is there a tendency to perceive and understand offensive tactics, i.e. different forms of attack rather than defence, as the preferred choice and the way to conduct battle that should be encouraged and preferred? When analysing military thinking and practice across time and space the idea of “the offensive” stands out as being placed on a pedestal by military thinkers and officers alike (Van Evera 1984, 1999, Finlan 2013). A preference for offensive approaches in both strategy and tactics has been dominant in thinking and practice throughout history. It has become an innate truth that “attack is the best form of defence” and the superiority of attack, victory and pursuing the offensive flows through the language, esprit de corps, and is embedded in military culture itself. Offensive strategies also carry far more prestige and cultural resonance than defence, representing the idea of what a “warrior” or great leader should be.

This pattern is not just a question of the past, but is equally present today. The offensive continues to dominate doctrine and manuals. It is clear that it is present in military training and exercises, staff-rides, case studies and war games alike. It has also been both observed by the authors and confirmed in conversations and interviews with military officers. In fact, in surveys conducted with senior Swedish army officers, as many as six out of ten officers thought that military tactical thinking is predominated by the offensive, in contrast to one in ten thinking this was not the case. In the case of the Army, the focus of this study, the numbers were even higher, with 80% agreeing and a mere 5% disagreeing.

So, why has the idea of the superiority of the offensive been so pervasive in the thinking of the officer corps throughout history? Why is the idea of the offensive placed seemingly on a pedestal by military thinkers and officers alike? These questions are addressed using a mixed-method approach focusing on tactical thinking among senior military officers, with the aim of identifying the reasons behind the predominance of the offensive. Drawing on existing research and the findings of a pilot study, ten propositions were identified for why the offensive is predominant: 1) military history, the study of military history tends to focus on successful offensive operations; 2) military theory & the principles of war, both showing a bias towards the use of offensive methods; 3) that the development of Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) focuses on the offensive; 4) military culture, as the officer collective is schooled in a tradition and culture that foster and reward offensive thinking, an offensive bias becomes an innate belief among officers; 5) education, in the tactical training of soldiers and officers one is taught to think offensively in practical case-studies, war games, field exercises and military exercises; 6) psychological factors, the offensive is preferred as it is in line with values such as victory, being a warrior and a great leader; 7) technology, today’s technology makes the offensive more effective than the defensive; 8) indoctrination, as attack demands high morale, there is a need for indoctrination in the benefits of the offensive; 9) geography, the operational space makes offensive methods the best way to pursue warfare objectively (e.g. because of a lack of operational depth), and 10) tactical considerations, merely that the offensive is generally better when trying to realise tactical goals.

The predominance of the offensive is of not only academic interest but also a military problem as military organisations risk selecting sub-optimal tactical options due to their innate preference for attack and offensive tactics. For example, even in cases where they acknowledge the defender’s advantage, they rationalise the use of offensive strategies in a false belief that, despite its superiority, by striking first the violence and shock of the attack will cause a collapse of the defence, because its leadership, communications and morale will be destroyed. Stephen Van Evera calls this phenomenon the “sharp rap” (Van Evera 1984). When such an approach is pursued because of innate beliefs, rather than objective and accurate tactical evaluations, it is most problematic. The paradoxical use of offensive tactics, even where an objective assessment would favour the use of defensive tactics, has been and continues to be present in various military exercises.¹ In the case of the Swedish Armed Forces, this presence has been confirmed in other studies (Frykvall 2014, Gustafson 2014).

Furthermore, in today’s world, where the character of war has changed, the military preference for the offensive is also problematic because the conditions of victory are seldom clear-cut; a complete victory is not necessarily needed. Most armed conflicts are not major wars, and there are more limited objectives than total victory. Often, a limited victory may be enough, such as causing sufficient trouble to get a third party involved to mediate or engage in dialogue and conflict resolution processes. The aim might be limited power or autonomy, or just waiting for help from allies or the international community, rather than complete victory. For example, in the case of Sweden, despite having no formal alliances or security guarantees, successful national defence requires external help, with a Strategic Doctrine from 2016 stating that defensive operations should aim to win the war together with others or avoid losing if alone. One therefore ought to think twice before pursuing an offensive option.

Another clear example is international stabilising operations, where the framework for most combat is generally built on constraints, casualty concerns, and complex objectives. Finally, limited force size is also a problem for offensive thinking. Many small countries, and to some extent medium-sized ones, have armed forces that are too small for offensive campaigns. In short, more defensive strategies and tactics ought to be preferred in many cases.

Research design

The focus of this study is on military thinking about tactics, rather than strategy or operational art. Tactics are something that concerns the fighting of battles, not the waging of wars (Storr 2009, p. 34). Drawing on Milan N. Vego’s Joint operational warfare: Theory and Practice, tactics is defined here as the “art and science of planning, preparing, and employing individual platforms, weapons and associated sensors, and combat arms to accomplish tactical and sometimes operational objectives” (Vego 2007, p. 22). In our view tactics is something that exists at all levels of war, going beyond the tactical level, which tends to be “almost exclusively focused on physical combat, applying military force to achieve a series of specific tactical objectives.” (Vego 2007, p. 22) Tactics set out the goals and planning for the way to realise one’s objectives. Thus, tactics are at the epicentre of military thinking, linking overall goals with the tactical situation and operational outcome. Tactics are essential at all leadership levels, from the political, through military-strategic, operational, to the tactical level, which includes brigade, battalion and company levels. This study examines the levels from battalion to operational level, focusing on the Swedish Army.

The research question is operationalised as “What are the constitutive factors that cause the predominance of the offensive in military tactical thinking?” The focus of this article is not what we do, but what we think we ought to do. The aim is to develop an understanding of the constitutive factors of military tactical thinking among officers. By studying the military tactical thinking rather than the tactical actions and tactical outcomes, this article goes beyond the observable manifestation of tactical decision making and behaviour that can be assessed and measured in, for example, war games or historical case studies. Instead, it focuses on what is happening before and beyond the observable manifestations (tactical actions²), i.e. the actual tactical thinking and problem solving that occurs in the minds of the officers. That is what we think we ought to do rather than analysing what we do in a specific tactical situation. In this way, it explores the factors that have constitutive power over tactical thinking.

Thus, the focus of this study is on “tactical thinking”, not “tactical actions”. Tactical thinking is defined as the “mind game” between the strategic decision, setting out the overall goals and directions, and the operational execution. The fundamentals for tactical thinking concern the ‘tactical situation’, defined as ‘the entirety of the military and non-military aspects of the situation that directly or indirectly affect the planning, preparation, and conduct of a battle or engagement or other tactical action’ (Vego 2007, p. 22). Tactical thinking is the intervening variable, or ‘black box’, between the tactical situation and tactical actions, a process crucial in deciding whether the outcome will be of an offensive or defensive nature.³

Using a classical constructivist approach, it is assumed that our ideas and identities determine or influence our actions. Thus, we can explain what we do by understanding what we think. The framework draws upon the works of Elizabeth Kier using a culturalist approach to the choice between offensive or defensive alternatives (Kier 1995, 1997). It is argued that as with the choice between offensive and defensive military doctrines (the focus of Kier’s work), military tactical thinking is best understood from a constructivist perspective. Like doctrines, military organisations do not have an inherent preference for the offensive or defensive alternative – how they and their officers lean is largely dependent on cultural characteristics that shape choices (Kier 1995, 1997). Culture is defined as the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a social field; tactical thinking is, in turn, a process embedded in and a manifestation of culture.⁴ The culture “of an organisation [or other identity-constituting entity such as profession] shapes its members’ perceptions [how do they perceive the tactical situation?] and affects what they notice and how they interpret it [what tactical actions should be taken?]; it screens out some parts of reality while magnifying others” (Kier 1995, pp. 69–70). Thus Kier’s argument is most relevant for tactical thinking, that an “[a]ctor’s preferences cannot be deduced from structural conditions or functional needs”, but we must understand “an actor’s culture in order to make sense of its choices. Independent exigencies such as the distribution of power, geographical factors, or technological discoveries are important, but culture is not simply derivative of functional demands or structural imperatives.” Here culture is argued to have independent explanatory power, particularly when it comes to choices between the offensive and defensive. As with military doctrines, the preferences officers bring to tactical decisions “respond to cultural more than to structural or functional characteristics. Preferences are endogenous; they must be understood within their cultural context.” (Kier 1995, p. 67)

To be able to answer the question posed, a case-study design has been chosen using a mixed method approach. Based on a review of existing research and a pilot study using open-ended interviews with military officers combined with personal experiences, ten propositions of possible reasons for an offensive bias in tactical thinking were identified. After that, a combination of structured and semi-structured interviews and participatory observation is used to understand why the offensive bias exists.

The case study chosen is the Swedish Armed Forces, more specifically the Army. This case was selected because it is an excellent example of the predominance of the offensive, with as many as eight out of ten of the 60 responding OF3 and OF4 officers confirming such dominance (see below for details). Furthermore, Sweden’s current doctrine and training manuals, which despite superficially having taken a defensive turn, are still dominated by underlying thinking that is predominantly offensive.⁵ The same offensive bias has also been clear when observing the tactical behaviour of officers at different exercises and war games, in the teaching of officers, and within the armed forces.⁶ This results in seemingly irrational tactical thinking and behaviour has been illustrated in simulations showing the tactical irrationality of using the prescribed offensive approach.⁷ Why does this irrationality prevail, even though rational choice theory would reduce it, or at least nuance it, due to the tactical irrationality demonstrated and its inferiority as a tactic?

The interviews conducted in this study were with high-ranking officers (OF3-4). This is an elite group bound together by social and educational background, which often shares unique experiences and identifies itself with the military, and the heritage and culture of the officer profession. Thus, the interviews in this study come with a range of specific problems related to elite interviewees that need to be taken into account. These include: obtaining access to the respondents, the problem of power asymmetry between the researcher and the interviewee, the problem of assessing the openness of elites, and whether to provide feedback to the interviewee or not (Catherine Welch et al. 2002). The first potential problem was that, in comparison with non-elites, access to elites is regarded as particularly challenging because they, by their very nature, “establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society.” (Also see Hertz and Imber 1995, viii, Adler and Adler 2003) This problem was overcome as both authors are faculty at the Swedish Defence University, which created trust and gave them the respect needed.

Moreover, one of the authors is a lieutenant colonel, who worked as a gatekeeper. The actual selection of respondents was made using theoretical and snowball sampling. The authors experienced no problems related to power asymmetry and the openness of the respondents because the respondents had respect and trust in the two authors, their professionalism and intentions, as well as a generally strong willingness to share their experiences and knowledge. No feedback was requested more than a general interest in our research.

The structured interviews were conducted in the form of a survey to senior Swedish officers. The survey was designed to test the basic premise of the research, the propositions, and respective respondents’ individual tactical thinking. There was also space for open-ended answers to capture the respondents’ thoughts, and any possible factors we may have failed to include. The question asked what role the ten propositions identified played as factors in the predominance of the offensive. In this way, the survey aimed to capture the officers’ perception and understanding of their own thinking. The survey was internet-based, and invitations were sent out to 140 Swedish Army officers, mainly at OF3-4 level in spring 2015. The response rate was 43 per cent. In the survey, the respondents’ anonymity was emphasised in the invitations to ensure frank answers. The system did not log any names, IP-addresses or other information that could connect an answer with a specific individual.

Participatory observation and semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior Swedish military officers (Maj, Lt Col and Col level) at the 2015 Combined Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) in Sweden. Participatory observation was also conducted during the Advanced Staff Course at the Swedish Defence University (as either full participants or observers). This allowed for an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of tactical thinking among the participants in the context of the tactical scenario and the tactical actions decided upon. It allowed for hands-on experience regarding how and why tactical thinking developed in the verbal interactions among the participants. Participation also allowed for informal discussions with the participants.

During the semi-structured interviews, an interview guide was used, which developed over time. The guide included interviewer questions that were sufficiently open to allow for improvised, theory-based follow-up questions, which were not possible to plan in advance (Wengraf 2001, p. 5). The focus and topics of the interviews were the same for all officers interviewed. The interviewee was seen primarily as an expert on the topic of the interview. Sometimes, interviewees added interpretations of their own observations or experiences to answers. Overall, these interpretations have been helpful in understanding the dynamics behind military tactical thinking. Nevertheless, the emphasis has been put on separating empirical data and analyses.

Why is the offensive predominant?

As set out above, drawing on existing research and a pilot study, ten propositions have been developed. These were tested in the interviews, where they were presented as possible factors behind the predominance of the offensive. The respondents were asked to what extent they thought they played a role (or not) in the predominance of the offensive in military tactical thinking. The survey asked respondents what role each proposition played in the predominance of the offensive. Respondents could choose between not at all important, of limited importance, some role/inconclusive, important or very important.

Military history, theory and the principles of war

Military history is central to the study of war and the development of tactics and tactical thinking. Historical experiences are of foremost importance in the learning and advancement of tactics and for general theory development. The importance of history is embedded in the military profession and military culture. The officer corps is a profession with a long history, which has long held a prominent position and a deep interest in military history. This ingrained interest, combined with military history’s tendency to focus on successful offensive operations, creates a bias in military tactical thinking towards the offensive. More often, it is the offensive, rather than the defensive, that is in focus and praised. As correctly noted by Finlan, the ideational discourse of military history is dominated by institutions and great leaders renowned for offensive strategies, and leaders famous for defensive strategies are given much less prominence (Finlan 2013, p. 25). The qualitative interviews confirmed the military historical prominence of successful offensive operations, where victory is one of the foremost characteristics of the dominant narratives (Interviews with European and American officers, April 2015.).

The argument that there are a need for offensive operations and tactics to achieve decisive victory is supported by many historical cases. For example, the majority of the Arab-Israeli wars during the last 50 years, and the two World Wars were ultimately won by offensive operations. The cases where a decisive strategic victory has been reached without offensive warfighting, such as Switzerland vs Austria 1315–1350 and Hezbollah vs Lebanon in 2006, are in a clear minority. However, even if it is true that an attack is the (only) way to achieve a decisive victory, it becomes a problem today when the conditions for victory are seldom clear. A decisive victory may not be needed because most armed conflicts are not major wars and have more limited objectives. Nevertheless, with such ideas historically embedded in military culture and thinking, it is highly likely that they will affect military tactical thinking at all levels.

The proposition that military history tends to focus on successful offensive operations is a factor in the predominance of the offensive receiving strong support in the survey results. As many as 74% of the respondents thought this to be the case whereas a mere 5% thought it was of limited importance and nobody considered it to be a without any importance. The qualitative interviews confirmed the same pattern, and it was noted that there was a tendency to avoid putting forward offensive failures (Interview, Lt Col, April 2015). In fact, it was even noted that those who tried to build on defensive successes were seen as ridiculous (Interview, Major, April 2015.). Thus, both the structural interviews and the qualitative findings confirm the idea that we are interested in and study successful offensives and brave attacks, rather than successful defences or attacks that failed. Taking this into consideration, the influence in creating an offensive bias is not surprising. By studying when offensives and attacks succeed, we risk both being inclined to overestimate and prefer the (offensive paths) to victory and seeing limited benefits from pursuing a defensive path, or for that matter becoming experts on the same. This bias in the study of military history also supports the basic premise of this study, that the offensive is predominant in military thinking (and the argument that it is simply more interesting or fun to study victories and successful attacks in itself confirms the bias).

The second proposed factor behind the offensive’s dominance can be traced back to military theory and the principles of war, both of which are dominated by an offensive bias. Possibly the best example is seen in the misinterpretation of Clausewitz, who is accused by many of being a relentless champion of offensive strategies (Bassford 1996). This is simply not true, despite the allegations by some that he was exclusively a proponent of offensive strategy. In fact the opposite is true; he was mindful of the advantage of the defensive, calling defence the stronger form of fighting (Heuser 2002, pp. 90–123). Nevertheless, every aspect of his work that could be taken as advocating the offensive has been taken as doing so.

Clausewitz is but one of many examples of the predominance of the offensive in military theory, which can be seen in the works of, among others, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Clausewitz’s teacher. He saw the offensive as part of defence, because the first rule of defence was “not merely to defend oneself, but to attack” (Heuser 2002, p. 90). Thus, pursuit of the offensive is an underlying predominant goal. Constantin von Lossau, in turn, in his book “War of 1815” mostly shared Scharnhorst’s views on the subject, seeing the offensive as central to war, because even when defending, one can go onto the offensive (Heuser 2002, p. 91). All the efforts of the defender have to be directed to countering the attack and then launching a counterattack. In sum, in the way classical theorists are read, there is a clear propensity for developing a bias towards offensive approaches.

It should be acknowledged that not all theorists are as pro-offensive as Clausewitz has been perceived. Others, like Sun Tzu and Corbett, were generally opposed to taking unnecessary risks in war. These can be contrasted with Clausewitz, who believed that the military genius, led by his intuition, must be defined by his readiness to take significant risks. In his own words, “[b]oldness in war .. has its own prerogatives. It must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations.. In other words, it is a genuinely creative force.. A distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable” (Clausewitz 1976, p. 190). This form of reasoning indeed encourages offensive tactical thinking.

In contrast, while respecting boldness as a critical leadership quality, Corbett concludes that strategic creativity and careful calculations should govern all actions (Handel 2000, p. 113). Nevertheless, it is Clausewitz’s legacy that dominates Western military thinking. As Heuser argues, regardless of how Clausewitz can be read, it is clear that it is the offensive aspect that permeates his legacy (Heuser 2002, pp. 93–97).

When looking beyond military theories and at the principles of war, they are predominantly offensive. Prominent principles such as flexibility, initiative, manoeuvre and surprise all create a bias for the offensive (Dunnigan 2003, p. 2–4). Arguably, the best example is Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach”, later to be called manoeuvre warfare, which is evident in military theory and principles of war today. The indirect approach can be linked to the realisation that directly attacking an opponent’s strongest point rarely provided good results. Thus, there was a need to identify and exploit “critical vulnerabilities”, on which the main effort or “Schwerpunkt” would focus. Speed and rapid movement are crucial for an indirect approach, as is there is a need for surprise and shock. In other words, there is a bias towards the offensive.

There is also often an emphasis on the need for and benefits of counterattacks, with arguments such as once a counterattack is initiated “the perceptual advantage lies with [the attacker]” (Storr 2009, p. 93). The indirect approach can also be found in German tactics during the Second World War, and can be seen in concepts such as ‘Blitzkrieg’ (Corum 1992, Frieser and Greenwood 2005). It was also of central importance in, for example, the Six-Day War, (Dunstan and Dennis 2009, p. 79, Olsen and van Creveld 2011, pp. 171–173) and in the operational thinking that arose in the US in its aftermath. The use of ‘Stormtroop tactics’ is another excellent example of how the offensive is predominant in military tactical thinking (Gudmundsson 1995). Although it could be used defensively in principle, it has most often been perceived and used offensively. In short, success is perceived as coming down to attack (or at least counter-attack). This offensive bias is problematic, as it risks making the offensive a self-fulfilling prophecy, without consideration of actual goals and aims. This is important, as this legacy and these principles have both been adopted into military doctrines and TTPs, as well as into the mind-sets of officers (also see below).

This second proposition gained the same level of support as the role of military history in the structural interviews. Here military theory and the principles of war were seen as almost as important a factor, with 74% thinking it was important or very important and 7% thinking it was partially wrong. As with history, nobody considered it to be of no importance. In the qualitative interviews, the views were more varied, with some Swedish officers making the point that military theory provides instruments for both defensive and offensive tactics (Interviews, senior officers, April 2015). These findings are in line with the argument, considering the bias in the principles of war and the problem related to the cherry-picking of offensive aspects when reading military theory. It also gives a clear indication of what to expect when it comes to doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), which are one manifestation of how military history and theory are interpreted. The biased reading of military theory also confirms the basic premise that the offensive is predominant in tactical thinking.

Doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)

An offensive bias is prominent throughout Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), which is not surprising as TTPs are described in manuals on how to conduct warfare; in essence they are the operationalisation of military theory, best practices and the collective experiences of the officer corps. This is not a historical abnormality from the First and Second World Wars, but continues to be clear when analysing more recent and current doctrine.

Offensive doctrines can be found in big and small countries. For example, since 1982 US tactical doctrine has leaned towards the offensive. Donn Starry’s Air Land Battle doctrine reversed the defensive posture of the 1976 manual, assuming a more manoeuvre-oriented approach (Kretchik 2011). The same pattern can be seen in Swedish doctrine, which is also biased towards the offensive. Its tactical army regulations emphasise ground operations with an offensive focus, stating that the only way to achieve victory on the battlefield is through attack (Försvarsmakten 2013, p. 46). Even when using defensive tactics, Swedish military doctrine and tactical regulations are biased towards the offensive. The Swedish Army Tactical Regulations state that “defensive operations should only be conducted in order to gain time to enable subsequent offensive operations” [author’s own translation] (Försvarsmakten 2013, p. 46). A similar pattern can be seen in the case of US Army manuals, which for example discuss offensive operations before defensive ones (as do the Swedish ones). The patterns were confirmed in the interviews with Swedish as well as other western officers (Interviews, senior officers from Sweden, Austria, Finland, the US and Estonia, April 2015).

A similar pattern can also be found on a more general level beyond the manuals. For example, in the early to mid-1990s military thinking was dominated by the so-called OODA loop, which suggests that the basic process of command and control (C2), Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action, is an inherently circular and iterative process. This loop is inherently offensive, as it is driven by the idea of getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle. The OODA loop may also be used defensively. By observing an attacker’s actions and being faster in orientation, decision making and taking (counter) actions, it may be possible to prevent the success of an attack. Although its inherent focus is on taking the initiative and being in control, it encourages offensive tactical thinking.

The interviews strongly support the argument that biased doctrines and TTPs are part of the explanation for the offensive bias in tactical thinking. A total of 70% found them to be an important factor for the offensive bias in tactical thinking, with 22% stating they were very important. In contrast, no respondents thought that doctrine and TTPs were of no importance in the offensive bias, and only 10% found it to be of limited importance. This is of course not surprising, as these are guides and manuals on how to behave and act. Nevertheless, it confirms their influence and impact.

Military culture and the role of education

The officer corps is as a collective schooled in a tradition that encourages the offensive. It is clear that an offensive ideology dominates military culture across Europe because it shows a distinct preference for offensive tactics both on a collective and individual level (Van Evera 1984, 1999). As described above, offensive approaches have dominated military thinking and practices throughout history. Doctrines and manuals have been and are at the forefront of military theory. A “Cult of the Offensive” has existed, and there has been a tendency to obscure the technical domination of the defence. As will be discussed below, there is a culture with a psychological drive to pursue the offensive and in the officer profession, education and exercises focus on the offensive. In short, being an officer means belonging to a culture with heritage, tradition and norms, where there is an entrenched offensive ideology. It is a culture where ideas such as a distinguished commander without boldness are unthinkable and meet little resistance. Here, placing a high value on victory, ideas of bravery and valour is natural. This is not to argue that this is necessarily wrong, but highlights how the military culture and heritage is inherently a good facilitator for the offensive.

Here it is important to stress the importance given to heritage and its manifestations in a military culture among officers. In general, being an officer is a shared identity that is extremely hard to separate from ones’ identity. Perceiving oneself as holding an important position for the nation, with a lot of responsibility, is very much a way of life. Thus, in line with Soeters, the military culture results in:

… a worldview that is shaped by mutually supporting beliefs into patterns or ‘mental models’… [where] military practitioners tend to take a coherentist view of the world. The coherentist view of the world regards the justification of a given belief as being at least in part contingent on its compatibility with other beliefs, many of which may be deeply tacit and derived from the influence of cultural norms. Within the military, this tendency is reinforced by the value placed by practitioners on qualities that are often difficult to describe and objectively analyse, for example values, relationships and character. (Jans 2014, p. 21)

So how does the military culture have an impact? It is essential because the officer corps reproduces itself. It is officers who educate, influence and set out the practical guidelines for the next generation of officers. They are also the ones introducing, teaching and guiding the new generation in its historical roots and culture. This becomes particularly important, as in military organisations the adoption of explicit and implicit rules and norms is strongly shaped by “what works”, especially in times of crisis (Schein 2010). The rules that have been developed are then passed down to new members in the form of a ready framework for how to interpret and interact with the environment, thereby becoming deeply embedded to the extent that, even if organisational structures shift significantly, embedded rules endure (Jans et al. 2002). One example is the Australian Army, which has warrior identification at the tactical level of warfare at regimental and lower levels (Jans et al. 2002). Identification with the warrior role does not change just by changing the organisation; it is deeply embedded in the heritage and culture itself. It is also essential because information overload gives an important role for tacit and silent knowledge and informal practices.

The observation concerning the dominance of the offensive in military culture is strongly supported in the survey results as well as in the qualitative interviews. In the qualitative interviews, it has been described as a reality, although the explanation and reasoning why this is so – its importance for the profession, and if it is good (or less good) – has varied. This matter of fact view was confirmed in the survey results, where 78% found heritage to be important for the offensive’s dominance. This is also the factor with the largest share of respondents finding it to be very important: 29% (5% found Military Culture to be of no or limited importance). This is more than twice as many as in all other factors, except doctrine and TTPs (22%) and psychological factors (19%).

These results are in line with the fact that 61% of the respondents thought that the offensive was predominant in military tactical thinking, with only 1.6% rejecting the idea outright (in the case of the Army as many as eight out of ten perceived the offensive as predominant, with nobody rejecting the proposition outright). Furthermore, support is gained from the fact that, when aggregating the survey results, with few exceptions the offensive predominance is the norm.

The role of military culture itself for the army profession as well as that played in the offensive bias received strong confirmation from virtually all respondents in the qualitative interviews. It was emphasised that the offensive was “ingrained in the walls” and “it is not nice to be defensive” (Interviews with Swedish senior army officers, April 2015). The statement by one lieutenant colonel in the Swedish Army is representative of the general view that military culture promotes an offensive bias, “Yes! a) attack, and b) defend what is left.” (Interview, Swedish army Lt Col, April 2015)

Education is an aspect that received strong support in the pilot study. The experience of the authors supports the observation that officer education is biased towards the offensive. This was also confirmed in the interviews, where the proposition was that the offensive predominance is partly explained by the fact that in tactical training officers and soldiers are taught to think offensively in case studies, war games, field and other exercises. This was confirmed in the qualitative interviews (Interviews with Swedish senior army officers, April 2015). For example, one interviewee pointed out not only that education tended to focus on the offensive, but that they were badly trained in defensive tactics (Interview, Army Major, April 2015).

Education was seen as playing an important role among 70% of the respondents, with nobody rejecting its importance and only three respondents finding it of limited importance (5%). These findings are also in line with experiences of how case studies, field and other exercises are used in the Swedish Defence University’s training of army officers and in the Swedish Army’s own exercises (personal observations and discussions with officer colleagues).

Other factors

In addition to the factors above, another five possible factors were identified in the literature and/or pilot study: psychological factors, technology, indoctrination, geography, and tactical considerations. These were tested in the survey and discussed in the interviews, where all but geography (because a lack of operational depth made offensive tactics the best approach) and indoctrination were confirmed as important.

The importance of psychological factors is based on the observation that the offensive is rewarded because it is in line with important values such as victory, being a warrior, a great leader and/or being a man (masculinity). Thus, the offensive has a cultural resonance (Finlan 2013, p. 25). These can be seen to a different degree in different armed forces and their subsections. The respondents saw psychological factors as one of the most important elements behind the offensive predominance in tactical thinking, with as many as 72% considering them important for the predominance of the offensive in tactical thinking and only one of the respondents rejecting the idea. It is worth noting that 19% found them very important, putting them next only to heritage/culture and doctrine/TTPs. Drawing on the answers in the qualitative interviews, at least among Swedish officers, the psychological factors put forward as important relate to different aspects of being a great leader. This relates to the need for initiative rather than masculinity and warrior identity (Interviews, senior officers, April 2015).

One factor behind the predominance of the offensive that often arises in previous research concerns the offensive-defensive balance of existing technologies (Levy 1984, Adams 2003). This concerns not only whether a certain technology is geared towards attack or defence, but also how it is perceived in tactical thinking. History has shown that the two are not necessarily the same. Often there has been a tendency to overestimate weapons’ offensive advantages. As Marshall Joffre remarked in his memoirs, ”[m]ythical or mystical arguments obscured the technical dominion of the defence, giving this faith in the offense aspects of a cult, or a mystique” as for instance when Foch mistakenly argued that the machine gun actually strengthened the offense (Van Evera 1984, p. 61).

The idea that technology today would be part of the reason for the offensive predominance received limited support in the interviews. A share of 46% of the respondents considered it of limited importance and twice as many as found it to be of importance. Only one respondent found it to be very important. The same pattern was seen in the qualitative interviews, where no support was given for the idea of current technologies being tilted towards the offensive.⁸ In the qualitative interviews, the responses were more mixed, with a number of the respondents noting that information warfare is in their view an offensive weapon. However, apart from information technology, there was limited support for this factor. In conclusion, this proposition does not hold.

The next proposition, indoctrination, arguing that as attack demands high morale there is a need for indoctrination in the benefit of the offensive, received limited support in qualitative as well as structured interviews. In the survey, 46% of respondents found it important and 35% of limited or no importance. However, when combining this limited support with the findings in the qualitative interviews, where there was little support for this proposition, its role for the offensive bias cannot be confirmed.⁹

We also explored whether the geography, more specifically the operational space, makes offensive methods the best way to pursue warfare objectively (e.g. because of lack of operational depth). This proposition gained limited support among the respondents in the survey, where ¼ found it to be of limited or no importance and ¼ of importance). Neither operational depth nor geography were seen as a problem among the respondents in the qualitative interviews. The idea also received varied support in the qualitative interviews, where some respondents agreed with the proposition while others disagreed. In sum, no support was found for this proposition.

The final proposition, and possibly the simplest one, concerns tactical considerations: if the offensive is generally better when trying to realise tactical goals. This proposition is founded on the idea that the offensive is the better tactical option as it reduces uncertainty by imposing ones’ own “standard scenario” on the opponent (Posen 1984, pp. 47–50). Moreover, by taking the offensive, you also deny opponents their standard scenario and create surprise. This proposition gained some support in the survey where 51% considered it important, twice as many as those finding it of limited or no importance. The responses in the qualitative interviews were similar, with the support being varied. The impact of this proposition is difficult to assess because, arguably, one reason for a bias towards offensive tactics being better to achieve tactical goals could be the predominance of tactical thinking outlined at the beginning of the article. This, combined with our findings, makes us conclude that this factor has no major impact on the bias toward the offensive.

Conclusion

A total of six factors have been found to have constitutive power on the predominance of the offensive in military tactical thinking among Swedish Army officers. Considering the strong theoretical base for the original proposition and the similarities shared by western military forces, the findings can be expected to also have a bearing beyond the case study in focus. The predominance of the offensive in military tactical thinking can be attributed to a function of military history, military theory and the principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, military culture, education and psychological factors. Together they are constitutive of the tactical thinking among military officers.

The effect of respective factors cannot be assessed from the material in this study. However, we would, in fact argue that their influence on tactical decision-making comes from their combined power, as they are all interlinked and mutually constitutive of each other. This argument is based on a constructivist understanding of how officers and their thinking is produced and reproduced over time. It is the officer corps that collectively reproduce themselves, both as a collective and as the system in which this tactical thinking is embedded. The officer profession reproduces itself at the individual, collective and organisational levels. At the individual level, he or she is a reproduction of the military culture of his or her peers and channelled through the social context and training of the armed forces. The same pattern applies at the collective level, with the addition of a shared education that creates a shared understanding of the military (tactical) reality. Additionally, the military organisation is to a large extent produced and reproduced by the officers, and is an institution deeply entrenched in the military culture and education system, guided by shared experiences of the military as a collective manifested it its culture, education and doctrines & TTPs, which in turn are the manifestation of historical experiences (military history) and an understanding of the reality of war (military theory and principles of war).

In more concrete terms, military tactical thinking among officers is the base both for practice today and for how tactical thinking is reproduced over time. It is officers who educate, influence and set out the practical guidelines for the next generation of officers. They are also the ones introducing, teaching and guiding the new generation on its historical roots and culture. Thus, tactical thinking and education today are based on the shared experience of previous generations of officers. Today’s senior officers are both re-evaluating and developing existing knowledge and traditions, and transferring this to junior officers, whereby they become part of the shared experience of previous generations of officers.

A model of tactical thinking

In a constructivist interpretation of the predominance of offensive thinking, as outlined in Figure 2 in theoretical terms, officers construct and re-construct the normative and ideational structures in the form of military culture and education, which in turn are important in how they construct their own identities, norms, perception of reality and in turn their behaviour (in the context of tactics, their tactical action). In line with Reus-Smit, (2005, p. 198) non-material factors affect what actors perceive as within the realm of possibility, i.e. how they can act, what limitations they see for their actions and what strategies they can imagine as ways to achieve (tactical) objectives. Non-material factors also influence communication, when individuals seek to justify their behaviour (or tactical thinking) or logic of appropriateness (e.g. TTPs, experience or best practice).¹⁰ Material structures, in this context tactical situations, are also restraints and enablers.

Figure 2. Schematic framework for understanding tactical thinking.

Somewhat simplified, we propose the following model as a way to understand why the offensive dominates military tactical thinking (See Figure 3 below). The two key factors in the process of producing and reproducing an offensive bias in tactical thinking are linked to the constitutive factors: military culture and education. These most directly and deeply influence an officer’s identity, perceptions and thinking. They can be understood as working together as a prism for the other four identified factors: military history, military theory and the principles of war, doctrine and TTPs, and psychological factors. Military culture and education are the vessels for the selection of what historical examples and theories are to be channelled into doctrine and TTPs. They also influence the choice of experiences to be reproduced in the development of new military theory, the history for future generations, and in the development of new doctrines and TTPs.¹¹ Additionally, they are the channel through which the cultural resonance of the psychological factors has an impact on tactical thinking.

Figure 3. The dynamics behind the offensive bias.

When it comes to education, the officer corps largely drives, and conducts the actual training. In the case of tactical considerations, they are taught by officers drawing on their own perceptions and understanding of military history, theory, and doctrines & TTPs, which in turn are a product of the military culture and education they are products of and embedded in. Thus, education reproduces the collective knowledge and values of the corps. The importance of military culture for education cannot be stressed enough; it is not unusual that one asks a teaching officer “Why do you it this way?”, and receives the answer “Because that way is effective!” or “Because it works!”.¹² Military history and theory, in turn, are the key sources for the development of Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), which is influenced by military culture because it is developed and redeveloped by officers who are part of the same culture. Military culture and education also fundamentally decides which psychological factors become important and ultimately achieve cultural resonance, as it is the officer corps that creates, sustains and reproduces its own understanding of what it means to be an officer. Indoctrination, if the factor is relevant, is also a combination of learned understanding and psychological factors.

This model covers the offensive bias, but it should be emphasised that it has a potential bearing beyond understanding why military tactical thinking is dominated by the offensive. In this article, the offensive bias is the focus of analysis, yet the model can work as a framework for other aspects of tactical thinking. What the model captures is the essential role of military culture and education in influencing and shaping tactical thinking.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mikael Weissmann

Mikael Weissmann, PhD, is an Associate Professor in War Studies with special focus on military operations and the Head of Research- and Deputy Head of the Land Operations Section at the Swedish Defence University. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Previously he has been working at the Swedish Research Defence Agency (FOI), Copenhagen-, Uppsala and Stockholm University. He has also spent extensive periods as a Visiting Fellow in Great Britain (University of Warwick) and China (Beijing University, Renmin University and China Foreign Affairs University). Weissmann holds a PhD in Peace and Development Research from University of Gothenburg. He has published a monograph on the East Asian Peace (Palgrave, 2012) and a range of articles and chapters on Conflict Management, Hybrid Warfare, Shadow Wars, Security and Strategy in East Asia, Chinese Foreign Policy, the North Korean nuclear issue and the South China Sea.

Peter Ahlström

Peter Ahlström, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) (Sweden) is former Director of the Land Operations Section at the Department of Military Studies of the Swedish Defence University. Before joining the Swedish Defence University in 2003 where he today is a teacher and Director of Section, he has among others been Chief of Staff of the 6th Kosovo Battalion and of the Södermanland Regiment, Strängnäs, Sweden.

Notes

1. This pattern has been observed first hand by the authors and it has been confirmed in discussions with Swedish officers. Although our experiences are mainly related to the Swedish armed forces, the same pattern has been observed in multi-national joint staff exercises.

2. Tactical actions is a “collective term for diverse actions and measures aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sector” (Vego 2007, p. 21).

3. Tactical choices can and will of course include features of offensive (attack) and defensive (defence) features, although at its most basic level there is always a need to choose between either defensive or offensive tactics. This is the same logic as in the case of operational strategies, where an army has two primary choices: offensive or defensive. (Finlan 2013).

4. Kier’s research uses an organisational perspective, defining organisational culture as “…the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated.” (Kier 1995, p. 69).

5. The same pattern can be observed today, for example, the US Army’s signature approach “towards the application of force is heavily orientated towards offensive strategies.” (Finlan 2013, p. 25).

6. Observations by the authors. These observations have been confirmed in interviews with a number of Swedish officers based at the Swedish Defence University (Interviews, Stockholm, 2015).

7. The simulated scenario was “Case 9”, an unclassified version of a scenario used by the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters simulating an attack on Sweden after a deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region. (Frykvall 2014).

8. There was some elaboration in the context of information warfare, which was considered largely offensive.

9. Interestingly, in the semi-structured interviews another type of indoctrination arose: that the offensive was used as a starting point, or baseline, in tactical discussions in the respondents’ respective units.

10. This communicative appeal need not necessary be verbalised, but could also be internalised in the officer’s own tactical thinking and problem solving.

11. The development of doctrine and TTPs is largely a military project, although others are involved to some extent and also have some influence on what to select. However, a lot of control is still military.

12. Discussion with senior Swedish army officer. The same kind of response has been heard on numerous other occasions in conversation with teaching officers.