Military advising and assistance in Somalia: fragmented interveners, fragmented Somali military forces

ABSTRACT

Southern Somalia has attracted substantial military aid and assistance for decades. As the state disintegrated in the late 1980s, clan dynamics became more critical, warlords emerged, and power bases shifted. Since 2008, the number of foreign military forces and advisors (including private military contractors) has substantially increased, as has the creation of numerous Somali security units. Such actions are symptomatic of broader trends concerning multilateral attempts to rebuild security forces in fractious states, where security assistance activities lack unity or common national interests. This has resulted in various Somali military forces with different loyalties (domestic and international), capabilities, and priorities in each Federal Member State (FMS). Uneven foreign military training programs in the context of survival politics fuels the fragmentation of various security forces. Locally appropriate military forces in each FMS potentially appear to be more effective at resisting Al-Shabaab. However, locally appropriate military forces contribute to further fragmentation, as security donors bypass the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to directly assist these localized forces. This accelerates devolution of military forces outside of FGS control. These assessments are based on fieldwork and interviews with security officials in East Africa.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Whitney Grespin for helpful comments and suggestions and the anonymous reviewers at Defence Studies. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of Lt Col Matisek and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, Department of the Defense, or the United States government. This material was cleared for release PA# USAFA-DF-2020-326 and is based upon work supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. There is a Somali Minister of Defence (MoD) Asset Management plan being supported by “Strand 2A” and is also a centralized point of contact for training coordination at MoD that collaborates with SNA HQ. For more information, see: https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/new-achievements-for-the-strand-2a-military-coordination-executive-meeting/.

2. Based on a firsthand account written by a US Army officer (Steigman 2018) training the SNA in Mogadishu.

3. The December 2020 announcement by the Trump Administration to withdraw all – approximately 700 – US military forces from Somalia in January 2021, only adds further confusion about whether the US is actually committed to the FGS. The US Department of State (DoS) is not withdrawing, and despite the Department of Defense (DoS) repositioning, the DoD apparently still intends to support counter-terrorism activities in Somalia.

4. For the latest AFRICOM reconfiguration of security assistance in Somalia, refer to: https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation/military-coordination-cell.

5. In some cases, the MCC job can be treated as an afterthought because it can become a dual-hatted position as was the case in 2017 where the Deputy Commander of CJTF-HOA was also the MCC Director. See: https://www.hoa.africom.mil/story/21001/senior-u-s-military-representative-in-somalia-promoted-to-brigadier-general.

6. In dozens of Interviews (2017) with personnel at US Africa Command (AFRICOM) a common refrain heard was “Africa Good Enough.” The expression was used to describe the scaling back of objectives, efforts, and goals with partner armies in Africa, succumbing to the harsh reality that partner forces only have to be slightly better than the insurgents they fight. This expression has taken on similar meaning in Afghanistan where Interviews (2020a) with over 20 SFA advisors led to many describing lowered TAA expectations with Afghan security forces, “trying to get them Afghan Good Enough.”

7. For more on NPM, see: https://unsom.unmissions.org/police.

8. At the moment, foreign assistance to Somalia for COVID-19 leads to various FGS battles over who will reap this patronage, with many seeking alternative ways of maximising resources. Harper (2020) omits this from her discussion on the “Anti-Corona Army.”

9. From 2017, Author #1 worked with an extremely experienced NGO team, helping to compile over 50 reports to donors on Somali military and security issues. Author #2 conducted over 40 interviews with different military personnel in East Africa, August 2017, and has interviewed over 10 military personnel that have worked in Somalia in various capacities in 2020.

10. In 1991, Somaliland – a previous UK colony – declared itself a country independent of Somalia. Somaliland has sought international recognition since then, establishing diplomatic outposts in several western countries and is rated by Freedom House as “Partly Free.” Puntland constituted itself in 1998 as autonomous, but still falls under the formality of FGS rule.

11. The distortion of political economies and rent-seeking behaviors through international aid in Somalia is difficult to stop (Jaspars et al. 2019).

12. Al-Shabaab did not form until the dissolution of the ICU. However, as Al-Shabaab was a by-product of the ICU, many of their most prominent leaders and commanders retained the legacy of being able exert control through various state-building mechanisms as they once did operating the ICU.

13. Bancroft worked alongside AMISOM in 2008, and only more recently did AMISOM personnel start working formally in the training of the SNA.

14. For more on this AMISOM operation, refer to: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/amisoms-new-offensive-creates-more-questions-than-answers.

15. TCC corporate-institutional reasons for wishing to remain in Somalia earning money (Williams 2018).

16. In Somalia, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS), and Ministry of Defence (MoD), have carved out different parts of Somalian security with considerable overlap and competition among each other.

17. For more, see: https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/isis-affiliate-in-somalia-declares-war-on-al-qaeda-linked-al-shabaab.

18. Ethiopian involvement in Somalia has waned since their own internal Tigray conflict began in November 2020.

19. Most recent abuses by the Turkish-backed Haram’aad forces:https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-politics-int/somalias-opposition-urges-turkey-not-to-send-arms-to-police-unit-idUSKBN28Q29B.

20. A directive was issued from HQ SNA on 30 October 2019 appointing a lieutenant colonel as commander of the new Brigade 16 Danab, with a subordinate lieutenant colonel remaining commanding Battalion 4 Danab, both still at Baledogle.

21. Important case studies into the problems associated with personalizing an army include: Chile under Pinochet (Barros 2001), Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny and Mali under Touré (Matisek 2019).

22. The “S6” group – formed in May 2016 – are the main security donors to Somalia: EU, Turkey, UAE, UK, UN, and US.

23. For more context on the Andar Uprising, see: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/uprising-alp-and-taleban-in-andar-the-arc-of-government-failure/.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research [FA9550-20-1-0277].

Notes on contributors

Jahara Matisek

Colin D. Robinson ([email protected]):

Dr. Colin D. Robinson was the Military Expert on an EU-funded project focusing on Somalia at Sahan Research in Nairobi, Kenya, 2018-2020. He has carried out defense reform research and work in East Timor, Somalia, Kenya and Liberia. Since 2012, he has conducted research on Western interventional army reconstruction.

Jahara Matisek ([email protected]):

Dr. Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek (Lt Col, US Air Force) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies and Director of Research, Strategy and Warfare Center, at the US Air Force Academy. He is a US Department of Defense Minerva-funded researcher studying security assistance to militaries in Africa and Middle East.