North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy and deception

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy. For this purpose, it applies Vipin Narang’s theory to North Korea and analyzes North Korea’s efforts to develop and strengthen its nuclear weapons on a strategic level. This study argues that North Korea’s deception operations were crucial to the ultimate success of its “strategic” nuclear buildup. This article found that North Korea initially employed a “hiding strategy,” but after its nuclear program was exposed, it managed to continue its nuclear program through deceptive agreements with the United States and eventually succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in 2013. Then, North Korea adopted a “sprinting strategy” and initiated deceptive denuclearization negotiations with the United States to prevent a military strike by the United States and gain the time necessary for its continuous nuclear buildup. China also allowed a “sheltered pursuit” through tolerance of North Korea’s nuclear armament and diplomatic assistance as well as various clandestine assistances.

KEYWORDS:

• North Korea
• North Korea nuclear
• North Korea denuclearization
• deception
• denuclearization negotiation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hwee-rhak Park

Hwee-rhak Park is a visiting scholar at Fletcher School’s Center for Strategic Studies, TUFTS University. Prior to coming here, he was a professor and dean of Kookmin University’s Graduate School of Politics and Leadership in Seoul, South Korea. He retired in August 2021 due to the age restriction of 65. He has taught courses at Kookmin University on Military Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, as well as the United States-South Korea Alliance. He has been particularly focused on North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, as well as ways to deter and defend against them.

He graduated from the Korea Military Academy with a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations. In 1983, he earned a Master’s degree in International Relations from Yonsei University, and in 1999, he earned a Master’s degree in Security Strategy from the United States National War College. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science in 2008 from Gyeong-gi University in Seoul, South Korea. While serving in the military, he was a diligent and studious military officer who studied security and military theories.

He published lots of books and articles on security issues in Korean. He received a special award for active research efforts from the university in 2019. He also wrote several English articles: “An Investigation into North Korea’s ‘Real’ Nuclear Strategy: A Comparison with Pakistan’s Case.” (Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, forthcoming in August); “An Analysis of the Singapore and Hanoi Denuclearization Summits between the United States and North Korea: from a Negotiation Theory Perspective.” (Philippine Political Science Journal, 2021); “The South Korean Alliance with the U.S. under the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Reluctant Return to the ‘Autonomy–Security Trade-Off’ (The Pacific Focus, 2019); ”The Ballistic Missile Defense Construction Strategies of South Korea and Japan: Self-reliance versus Cooperation with the U.S.”(Journal of International and Area Studies, 2018); South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind”(Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2017): “The Expectation and Reality Gap in South Korea’s Relations with China”(Asian International Studies Review, 2017); “An Analysis and Lessons on South Korea’s Attempt and Postponement of the OPCON Transition from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command” (Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2015); “South Korea’s Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance,” (International Studies Review, 2015); “Time to Balance Deterrence, Offense, and Defense? Rethinking South Korea’s Strategy against the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” (The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2012); “The Right Approach to Change North Korea: Consistent Pressure Learned from Chicken Game Theory,” The Journal of Security Analysis, 2010), “The Self-entrapment of rationality in Dealing with North Korea,” (Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2008); “The Forgotten Half of South Korea’s Civil-Military Relations Based on Huntington’s Theory: Military Professionalism.” (The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, 2007).