The design of performance budgeting processes and managerial accountability relationships

ABSTRACT

Performance budgeting (PB) can play an important role in managerial accountability. Prior research focuses on the operation of PB as an information production device and concludes that its effects are shaped by context. Through a case study of reforms to government PB processes, the study extends understandings of how PB processes affect managerial accountability by showing how the design of PB shapes important elements of managerial accountability relationships that extend beyond information provision. A second contribution is in revealing how accountability arrangements come about through ‘micro-level’ interactions, comprising contests between participants in redesign processes.

KEYWORDS:

• Performance budgeting
• managerial accountability
• parliament

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. PB takes two forms, a decision rule (direct performance budgeting) and a less defined analytical tool (performance-informed budgeting) (Schick 2007; OECD 2008). This study considers the second form of PB from the perspective of managerial accountability.

2. I thank the reviewer who pointed out this possibility.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Suresh Cuganesan

Suresh Cuganesan is Professor of Organizational Control and Performance at the University of Sydney Business School. His research interests span strategy execution, organizational design and performance measurement. He is particularly interested in how public and private-sector organizations balance competing goals and manage tensions in the pursuit of value. Prior to his academic career, Suresh worked in institutional banking and management consulting.