Hybrid goals: institutional complexity and ‘legacy’ in a global sporting mega-event

ABSTRACT

Definitions of social enterprise and hybrid organizations are compatible and allow application to a variety of organizational forms. We analyse the not-for-profit enterprise formed specifically to deliver the regional element of a global mega-sporting event: The 1994 FIFA (soccer) World Cup. The organization planned a sporting spectacle with commercial objectives to provide long-term benefits for society and a short-term economic boost.

This longitudinal case traces the evolution of the organization and its emergent institutional complexity as it aligned commercial and societal goals.

KEYWORDS:

• Institutional complexity
• philanthropy
• social enterprise
• social entrepreneurship
• local authorities

Introduction

Hybrid organizations are defined as ‘organizations that exist in the intersections of two distinct spheres i.e. the public and the private’ (Kickert 2001, 135). One form of hybrid organization is Social Enterprise (SE), defined as an organization that trades, not for private gain, but to generate positive social and environmental externalities (Santos 2012). SEs use their sector hybridity to blend social purpose and market-oriented income generation (Doherty, Haugh, and Lyon 2014).

Definitions of SE and hybrid organizations are compatible and broad, allowing the SE and hybridity lenses to be applied to various organizational forms, including situations involving public value entrepreneurship and multiple individuals or organizations (Bryson et al. 2017). We apply the SE and organizational hybridity lenses to a SE involved in delivering a global mega-sporting event; the FIFA World Cup, including the proposed benefits to local communities and longer-term legacy for society. These inclusions are important because it is often claimed by organizers (in particular the host national and local government and public authorities) that such events justify public sector funding of service and infrastructure development and provision. It is claimed they can be a part of strategies both at national and local authority level to bring community benefits stemming from tourism, local economic multiplier effects, and ethical supply chains, addressing health and well-being issues, and regenerating and improving urban areas (e.g. Preuss 2007; Zimbalist 2015). Indeed, evidence shows how surpluses generated by global sporting mega-events can be invested in charitable aims with a societal or public service focus, perhaps most famously the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics LA84 Foundation, and the legacy for regenerating East London following the 2012 Olympic Games (Zimbalist 2015). Legacy is now often an important part of global sporting mega-events, but such success is not guaranteed, and these projects are financially and reputationally very risky (Flyvbjerg 2014; Zimbalist 2015).

Our study focuses on an organization established to deliver a regional portion of the FIFA (soccer) World Cup of 1994 and to achieve a social legacy. Such organizations typically have a combination of funding sources, such as earned income from operating the event, private sector backing, as well as contributions from the public and civic sectors (financial as well as ‘in kind’). Profits are then re-allocated into providing a meaningful longer-term legacy for societal benefit.

We firstly review the literature regarding SE definitions and institutional complexity. We then explain our methodology before introducing our findings, discussion and conclusions, including implications for research and practice.

Literature review

Social enterprise

Within Anglo-Saxon economies (United Kingdom [UK] and the United States of America [USA]) there has been growth in the number of organizations operating at the intersections of public, private, and charitable sectors (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Andrews, Esteve, and Ysa 2015). Academic and policy makers have pointed to the opportunities for increased stakeholder input and value creation, and the need for more research into this growing phenomenon (Osborne and Brown 2005; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015).

One term used to describe organizations operating at the intersection between these sectors is ‘social enterprise’ (SE). SEs primarily have a social mission whilst undertaking commercial activities that contribute to sustaining their operations (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Hoffman, Gullo, and Haigh 2012). Doherty et al. (2009) and Lounsbury and Strang (2009) propose that the dominant view amongst practitioners in the USA is of SE as a business with a heroic social mission, focusing mainly on earning profits to achieve social aims as there is an apparent emphasis on market-based approaches (Dees 1998; Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern 2006; Defourny and Nyssens 2010). Less emphasis is placed on user participation and democratic governance than in the European model, although cooperative organizations do exist. In the USA, non-profit organizations must demonstrate that they serve the public interest by serving ‘the needs of persons’ to qualify under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code for tax exemption (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2011). Whilst these organizations can provide employment, they cannot pay dividends to shareholders. Etzioni (1973) explained social entrepreneurship as a ‘third alternative’ located between state and marketplace, with the power to reform society. This is similar to Europe, where the concept of the social economy embraces a similar array of organizations, but typically with governance structures that are more participatory.

From the USA perspective, social entrepreneurship is often related to philanthropy: Money raised by or from wealthy individuals supports ‘non-profit’ organizations which serve the public interest (Dees 1998). Furthermore, social entrepreneurship also involves applying private sector expertise and adapted approaches to achieve public projects, and/or using income generated from applying private sector expertise to reinvest in supporting social action (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2011). Such action is targeted at underserved, neglected, or highly disadvantaged segments of society, which lack the financial or political strength to otherwise achieve transformative benefit (Martin and Osberg 2007). Thus, the institutional forms created by social entrepreneurs may be considered as SEs (Spear 2006). They are non-profitmaking social organizations, clearly delineated from commercial businesses, although sometimes work in partnership with them for activities such as cause-related marketing (Austin 1999). However, in the USA the term social enterprise may also be used broadly as a verb to describe market-focused projects serving a social goal, undertaken by for-profit organizations (Defourney and Nyssens 2006; Doherty et al. 2009).

We posit that the development of individually and USA-based entrepreneurially focused SE can be further understood through a philanthropy perspective. Harvey et al. (2011, 429) demonstrate that philanthropists often see their socially motivated activities as an extension of entrepreneurial activity, a phenomenon that they label ‘world making.’ One way that world making can manifest itself is through entrepreneurial philanthropy which stimulates a network of new interpersonal connection harnessing the participation of diverse actors (Willmott 2008). For instance, philanthropy within geographical spheres (Maclean, Harvey, and Gordon 2013), allowing for philanthropists to use the opportunity-discovery process to fight the dis-embedded character of late modern social life (Giddens 1991). For philanthropic entrepreneurs this can lead to self-fulfilment, for instance an opportunity to give some non-tangible social value back to customers. This form of philanthropic provision may not initially intend to replace public sector provision of services but may ultimately augment or replace them because of its low cost, lacking a bureaucratic source of institutional legitimacy. Thus, philanthropy can feasibly combine with the innovative modality of entrepreneurship through a single enterprise vehicle, by actors committed to a locality which self organizes to both raise funds and then redistribute them (Tapsell and Woods 2010).

A common feature of approaches to SE in the USA as well as in Europe, is for simultaneous revenue generation and social outcomes, by prioritizing positive social change above private wealth creation (e.g. Laville and Nyssens 2001; Peattie and Morley 2008; Murphy and Coombes 2009; Hall, Miller, and Millar 2016). It is the reinvestment of this profit (sometimes called ‘surplus’) in the social mission that differentiates SEs from other types of business (Bull 2006). SEs often struggle however, to balance the tension associated with meeting these dual aims (Foster and Bradach 2005; Santos, Pache, and Birkholz 2015; Batillana and Lee 2014; Gillett et al. 2019; Powell, Gillett, and Doherty 2019). We now explore why this might be, with reference to institutional theory.

Institutional logics and institutional complexity

A corpus of work on large-scale projects exists that is underpinned by a sociological perspective of institutional theory (e.g. Javernick-Will and Scott 2010; Scott, Levitt, and Orr 2011). Here, conception of institutional theory, ‘attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure’ (Scott 2005, 460) to suggest ‘institutions lead to regularized or homogenous behaviour within a group’ (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007, 523) because ‘a dominant institutional form will over-come a weaker one’ (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007, 526).

Institutional logics (ILs) represent a set of rationalities, driven by culturally reinforced rules of action, that shape processes of organizational identity formation, sense-making and legitimation (Suchman 1995; Thornton 2004). These institutional orders are summarized by Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012), as: family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation. They influence the decision-making and actions of individuals, and aggregately are perceived as the behaviour of their organization (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012). For example, private sector business is typically guided by market forces to maximize financial returns. Ownership typically involves shareholders and the main income streams are sales and fees for service. Contrastingly, public sector organizations are typically owned by citizens and the state to achieve the principles of public benefit and collective choice and are financed through taxation. The third or ‘non-profit’ sector is typified by social and environmental goals; organizations are owned by members and revenue is generated from membership fees, donations and legacies. Non-profit distributing organizations are legally prohibited from distributing residual earnings to stakeholders with a managerial or ownership interest (Hansmann 1980).

Organizations experience institutional complexity (IC) when they experience multiple institutional logics, which bring with them competing demands leading to ambiguities (Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Pache and Santos 2013; Meyer et al. 2014; Skelcher and Smith 2015). Clashes can occur when logics collide and compete, e.g., logics stemming from regulatory, societal, and/or corporate and commercial requirements (Mullins 2006; Matinheikki, Aaltonen, and Walker 2018) or when organizational sizes, power, or geographical distances add further dimensions and dynamics to the complexity (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Nicholls and Huybrechts 2016). The organizational culture or atmosphere may involve actors co-existing in a state of dynamic tension (Smets et al. 2015). As well as opportunities there are risks, and IC may present different and changing exposures to risk depending on the perceptions and tolerances of the individuals involved, that may be driven by sectoral or professional standards derived from their dominant logic.

Compromises or trade-offs may be required if logics collide (McPherson and Sauder 2013). IC may be confusing, frustrating, and challenging for decision-making (Battilana et al. 2015). Actors may use or manipulate logics for their own objectives, allegiance or compulsion (or those of their organization) although the different possibilities also create positive opportunities for improvisation and innovation, beyond merely self-interest (Bertels and Lawrence 2016). Innovation may occur if organizations from different sectors collaborate on projects (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015). Projects can be multi-layered, with local collaborations nested within a larger-scale national project, such as the hosting of a global mega-event. For example, the FIFA World Cup, which might be hosted to legitimize a political ideology or approach, or to boost the economy with infrastructure spending, tourism, and showcasing local products and services to potential exporters, amongst other motives beyond the sport itself (e.g. Tennent and Gillett 2016; Gillett and Tennent 2017). In such collaborative projects, it is likely that multiple ILs exist and compete, requiring careful management.

For Gillett (2015, 2016) advocates that in some circumstances, local authorities can better achieve their broader societal objectives by working in a relational rather than adversarial way with suppliers and other stakeholders. However, this can be difficult, and some scholars associate multiple logics with contestation and tension or even organizational failure (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011). Others describe the co-existence and blending of logics (Binder 2007) and that multiple logics can result in innovation (Jay 2013).

Research contributions

We research a sport mega-event project organization to address the broader research question ‘how do SEs manage institutional complexity over the evolution of a mega-project in order to achieve financial and non-financial benefits for society?’

The contribution of our longitudinal study is to critically examine the factors that enable SEs to build effective relationships, make decisions, and evolve over the duration of a defined project, in scenarios where objectives are divergent and at times conflicting. Specifically, we explore how hybrid objectives were successfully planned and delivered as the project evolved and operated regionally within a broader multimillion-dollar national project of global significance. This contributes to emerging literature about how SEs manage their hybridity (e.g. Batillana and Lee 2014; Santos, Pache, and Birkholz 2015; Powell, Gillett, and Doherty 2019) and institutional logics (e.g. Besharov and Smith 2014; Battilana et al. 2015).

Methodology

We focus on a single longitudinal case: The 1994 FIFA World Cup, held in the USA. We generated information spanning the planning, delivery, and long-term legacy of the tournament, due to the availability of longitudinal data (1980s-present date). Our approach is consistent with Wond and Macaulay (2011) who argued that the research and evaluation of public management and policy are too often short term in nature. They champion the use of longitudinal research, and consideration of extended temporality, supporting Rose (1993) who identified the importance of temporality and geography (or ‘time’ and ‘space’) in lesson-drawing for public policy.

Following Yin’s (2003) matrix of different situation strategies, our study exists within the overlap of archival analysis, history, and case study. We were mainly concerned with the explanatory factors of our case in relation to motives and decision making, and event legacy relevant to public management. With reference to Yin’s (2003) taxonomy, it was not necessary to control behavioural events because most have already occurred, while the ongoing legacy was observed. We also follow Eisenhardt (1989) in highlighting the extent to which historical specificity matters, creating opportunities for future researchers to exploit the differences between our research and other global mega-events.

Adopting the principles of historical and theoretical rigour, we used inductively based archival research. Our sources included materials produced for communications internally (e.g. strategy documents, meeting minutes, memos) and externally (e.g. published annual financial statements, marketing materials) (Moss 2017). Compatibly with Gillett and Tennent (2020a, 77) definition of the archive as a distinct collection of materials kept in an archival location, we identified the San Francisco Bay Area due to the constraints of project resources and access, and the availability of a collection of curated documents. This distinct collection provided us with traces of the organization process, which we were then able to interpret and reconstruct, and triangulate with documents collected by both researchers from FIFA’s own archives. Furthermore, periodicals contemporary to the event, and more recently generated secondary sources, were carefully integrated where necessary, to triangulate and compensate for the problems of archival silence and selection (Decker 2013). As an authentic and stable resource, this archival data shed light on the corporate, financial, managerial, communicative, legal, regulatory and productive aspects of the project organization, providing a window into the decisions and observations recorded within the project’s existence. The utility of our approach is further summarized in Appendix 2.

To analyse our data and systematically induce our themes, we used an extensive database of key critical considerations and measures for ‘sporting mega-events’. The framework was consistent with the critical literature, as summarized by Gillett and Tennent (2017). The database gave us a high-level and top-down perspective of the project. We then further penetrated the case by analysing the regional/host city level organizing committee archives, which provided from lower in the organizing hierarchy) containing a much greater level of operational detail spanning the project lifecycle. To avoid being overwhelmed by the quantity of detail, research at this stage involved making and comparing notes between the researchers to identify a critical narrative. We charted events, activities, involvement, dilemmas and choices, within the SE tasked with project organization, to shed light on sequence and dynamics. Producing a chronology of events provided the building blocks of our case. To go beyond descriptive case history, to produce a case study, we observed patterns within the data (Pettigrew 1997), identifying motives for hosting the tournament, how it was organized (including interaction and involvement with public authorities) and indication of legacy (Langley 1999).

We explored public and quasi-public management theory for an explanatory framework, following Eisenhardt’s (1989) claim that linking to existing theory enhances the internal validity, generalizability and level of theory building from case research. We identified institutional logics as applicable, because our case shared cosmetic similarity to that described in the public–private partnership literature (Skelcher 2005) but with the complication that sport-governing bodies or host organizations themselves, having charitable status, are not supposed to be profit maximizing. Defining local-level organizations as hybrid and SE, operating at the interface of sport governing bodies as well as national and local government stakeholders, to deliver projects under high public awareness (and scrutiny) presented a novel way to consider global sport mega-event project management and related public services provision. Our theoretical choices were therefore made after data collection, and our research approach was exploratory and inductive.

Findings

Background to soccer in the USA

Soccer in the USA has its genesis among university campuses, and working-class immigrant populations and their descendants. The American Football Association was the third national association to be established in the history of the game (after the English and Scottish associations) when inaugurated in 1884. Arguably, the pinnacle was a semi-final appearance in the 1930 World Cup (Reck and Dick 2015) but, by the time of the 1950 World Cup, in which the national team beat England, the profile of the game in the USA had slipped, and whilst the result was seen as an upset by English fans, it was hardly reported by news media in the USA. The 1966 World Cup final in England was popular when broadcast via satellite, coinciding with plans by sports administrators and entrepreneurs to re-ignite interest in soccer (Tennent and Gillett 2018). A number of tournaments were played in the late 1960s, these consolidating as the North American Soccer League (NASL) (Seese 2015).

Having expanded its reach and popularity, by 1977 the NASL circulated ambitious proposals for the next decade to develop and market soccer, including a bid to host the World Cup in either the USA or Canada in either 1990 or 1994 (NASL 1977, 110). However, there followed a decline in soccer’s popularity as an entertainment spectacle through the 1980s and 1990s, although male and female youth soccer thrived in local ‘Parks and Recreation programs’ (Reck and Dick 2015, 130). Generally, the youth soccer movement encouraged broad participation rather than developing elite sports people (Guest 2013). Legislation introduced in the early 1970s required equal physical education provision for girls and boys, and the broad appeal of soccer outlined in the NASL’s (1977) marketing report meant that many females played it comparative to other sports. It is against this backdrop that we present the case of the 1994 FIFA World Cup. We outline the evolution of the project organization that planned and delivered the tournament, identifying and dating four project phases.

Phase I: formative years (1987- 1990)

In 1987, the United States Soccer Federation (USSF), with the formal backing of President Reagan, bid successfully to host the 1994 FIFA World Cup. There was considerable risk in a USA World Cup; soccer was not popular as a spectator sport in large areas of the country (Hopkins 2010). In the original business plan for the event (LeTellier 1989) the organizers hoped to broaden interest in soccer and achieve a social impact – to encourage health and fitness.

It is useful to explain that the FIFA World Cup operates along the lines of a franchise. National soccer associations bid to FIFA for the rights to host the tournament, with agreement that the host underwrites financial risk, and suitable host regions are identified based on criteria including venue availability. Substantial government funding is often required, and justified on the basis of boosting tourism, showcasing the nation’s industry, creating jobs and stimulating sectors such as construction and hospitality (Gillett and Tennent 2017). In the case of USA ’94, regions were also identified based on local demographics and market potential for soccer. Once the hosting rights were formally awarded in 1988 a corporation was established as a national organizing body to promote the event. Regional promoters could then bid for local hosting rights, as a sort of sub-contractor or sub-franchisee, meaning risk moved down the chain-of-command to local-level host committees, municipalities, and economies.

Overall, the risk paid off, as ‘USA ’94ʹ was the most profitable edition to date, breaking at least two FIFA World Cup records (total ticket sales were 3.6 USD million and overall income 350 USD million, returning a profit to US Soccer of 60 USD million, enabling it to sustain activities and invest in grass-roots soccer [Hopkins 2010; Baxter 2014]). This was significant; a stipulation placed by FIFA upon the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) in exchange for hosting the competition was to catalyse a new ‘major’ national league (Major League Soccer, or MLS) (Sugden and Tomlinson 1996).

It is evident that a longer-term legacy was achieved in terms of recirculating surplus profits. For example, the USSF was established in 1993, ‘to be the recipient and guardian of the World Cup profit’ (FIFA.com 2001) with the stated purpose of popularizing soccer nationally and enriching lives. Over 50 USD million was initially transferred into the Foundation, and this has particular relevance when considering social enterprise and public management: Grant awards were focused on initiatives providing ‘healthy and educational opportunities, promotion of participation in football by the physically or mentally challenged, gender equity, as well as creating public private sector partnerships that leverage even more funds into the world’s game’ (FIFA.com 2001).

We now focus in more depth on a regional project organization, which successfully brought 1994 FIFA World Cup games to the San Francisco Bay Area in northern California. Although no formal bid committee existed in the initial phase of our case, a loose collective of individuals with an interest in doing so was beginning to converge. As we shall explain, this collective successfully evolved to plan and operate the events profitably, and then established a philanthropically oriented SE to manage those profits, as a legacy fund to benefit the region’s youth. A supporting timeline showing the evolution of the project organization and emergent institutional complexity is also summarized in Appendix 1, which identifies the first phase of our case as spanning the years 1987–1990. Our findings suggest that the significant logics were those of market, corporation, and state, and were relatively balanced.

Phase II: establishing the task force (november 1990 – may 1994)

As we have already mentioned, following the announcement in 1988 that the USA would host the 1994 FIFA World Cup, it was necessary to finalize the choice of host cities. One delegation involved representatives and speculators from the San Francisco Bay Area (SFBA) in northern California, interested in hosting games at the Candlestick Park stadium in San Francisco, and at Stanford University, in the nearby city of Palo Alto. Phase II of our case thus begins in November 1990, when a non-profit organization was formed by a group of prominent Bay Area business and sports persons, who had a history of involvement and promotion of youth, senior and professional soccer in the Bay Area since the 1950s. This body, registered as a 501(c)(3) corporation for tax purposes, was known as the San Francisco Bay Task force ‘94 and its initial activity was to plan and bid to the US World Cup organization, for regional hosting rights, with the following aims:

• To boost the audience/market for soccer locally, by bringing world-class soccer to a world-class stadium (Candlestick Park and/or Stanford Stadium)

• To showcase and prove interest to re-launch professional soccer in the area, by getting a franchise from the planned new MLS.

• To use soccer as a tool for community cohesion.

• To enrich culture/enjoyment in the SFBA.

• To achieve a projected 500 USDmillion economic impact for the SFBA, attributable to the event (SFBATF 1991, 1992)

Start-up funding of 200,000 USD was raised from corporations, a bank, and sporting organizations, and further boosted by sponsorship (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1991; 1992). These efforts were rewarded when the Task Force was chosen to host, although Candlestick Park was soon ruled out as a venue, leaving Stanford University’s stadium as the sole venue for the SFBA. The Task Force changed its name to ‘San Francisco Bay Host Committee’ (hereafter the Host Committee) and began to progress its plan, although more finance was required. Whilst the national organizers would provide some payments, in instalments, its committee was tasked with raising more money to fund activities. One income stream was to sell tickets to the games, although this was not straightforward. Firstly, it was a hard sell until the draw to decide which teams would play at which stadiums happened in December 1993. A major concern was that the national promoters (WC94) were keeping the Host Committee ‘in the dark’ about ticket sales. This was important because the Host Committee needed to project financial and marketing information accurately, for example the quantity of sales it could expect to market locally, and determination of the likely bonuses to be received for sell-outs (SFBATF 1993a). Additionally, WC94, which implemented a sophisticated and aggressive ticketing campaign, then approved at least two other regional sellers, frustrating the Host Committee which considered this as unfair competition (SFBATF 1993b). A further income stream was merchandising, and a deal was made with a private business to operate as official regional vendor, in return for which, the Host Committee would receive 12%-15% of gross sales (SFBATF 1993c).

Less than a year before the tournament began, the Host Committee was still debating the exact nature of its potential legacy, and unable to predict what the financial surplus, if any, might be. Some members proposed donating money to a regional youth soccer organization, although it was suggested ‘that the whole concept for the “soccer legacy” be revisited’ early in 1994 (SFBATF 1993d) when more information about projected profits to initiate the proposed Soccer Legacy Plan would be known (SFBATF 1993e, 1993f1993f). This indicates the loose and emergent nature of the longer-term vision, and the inherent risk in the project, with financial outcomes difficult to predict.

A significant element of planning involved liaison with Stanford University, and also with the local authorities, such as the municipality of San Francisco (which wanted the World Cup as central to a programme to be titled ‘Celebrate the City – 1994ʹ) and more locally the City of Palo Alto. Indeed, towards the end of 1993 representatives of ‘the commercial, social, and municipal areas of the city were very positive about the world cup’ (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1993d) and relations were reportedly progressing well, with local security, transport and access being key considerations (SFBATF 1993g). By March 1994, with the event just three months away, progress on resolving traffic planning was slow. Previous bad experience of traffic problems relating to a Superbowl event at Stanford had made the City of Palo Alto authorities wary. The Host Committee wanted to emphasize that they were working with the City, and that revenues were to be dedicated to a legacy for local youth soccer, so, holding down charges ‘would mean more money for youth’ (SFBATF 1994a).

By May, the Host Committee had also reported tensions with an incoming administration at Stanford, which ‘has taken on an extremely negative attitude toward the World Cup causing terrible frustrations on both sides.’ Stanford was apparently not happy with the adjustments to its stadium and wanted to recover all of the improvement costs. The stadium required upgrades and adaptations to reach specification – a cost that would significantly reduce any possible financial legacy for funding longer-term societal objectives (SFBATF 1994c).

The university was now also rethinking ancillary services as called for in the stadium contract, for example, allowing the Russian team to train there, and wanted to manage stadium parking – with potential implications for operational planning and associated revenues (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1994c). With just five days until the first game at Stanford, the problems had escalated as national organizers World Cup ‘94 seemed to be in ‘severe dispute with Stanford authorities regarding the development of the games’ (SFBATF 1994b).

With reference to Appendix 1, we consider the second phase of our case as spanning November 1990 – May 1994. The non-profit organization was successfully established and operating as a 501(c)(3) corporation but changed its name to ‘San Francisco Bay Host Committee’ as its mission evolved. Market logic and corporation logic are evidenced as the dominant forces initially, stemming from the National World Cup promoters. Corporation logic within the organization emerged as the corporate form took shape. State logic also existed, as local authority and tax laws dictated, but clashes occurred with some stakeholders, for example, local authorities and the university, particularly over the delegation of responsibilities and costs. However, findings also indicated a shared longer-term vision of coexistence. It may also be argued that corporation logic stemming from the National World Cup promoters clashed somewhat with market logic and state logic, as the case organizations requirements and behaviours were at times perceived by its partners to undermine local efforts.

Phase III: the tournament arrives (June – July 1994)

With the tournament imminent, the Host Committee was still at loggerheads with the City of Palo Alto authorities, which wanted an open-ended agreement for traffic control and for security charges relating to provision in the city and outside of the venue area. Compromise was finally reached, involving no upper-cap on the potential fee, but with an upper-estimate provided as a basis for progressing the plan (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1994b). Such ‘last minute’ problems did not derail the project. A total of six games were held at Stanford Stadium, were well attended and considered to have been successful, at least from the perspective of the Host Committee, US Soccer, and FIFA; The 1994 FIFA World Cup was the most profitable and the most watched edition in the history of the tournament; average stadium attendance 68,991 (Guinness World Records 2014) and viewed on television by 32,115, 652,000 individuals in 188 countries (FIFA.com n.d.). The six games held at Stanford were no exception, all tickets were sold.

For the 1994 World Cup, economic stimulation for host cities is not evidenced within the planning documents as being the main priority for the US Government or for the national-level Planning Committee and its corporate structure, USA’94 Inc. At host city level however, economic benefit was a more prominent concern, with explicit objectives for inward soccer tourism, and showcasing of local businesses (Gillett et al. 2019). The extent to which the promised tourism and economic boost was successful is though less obvious: The CEO and president of the Palo Alto Chamber of Commerce were later quoted as saying ‘We did a lot to gear up for the foreign tourism and Palo Alto didn’t really benefit from it’ (Zinco 1998). The City’s Mayor regretted the way in which it had advertised, especially the tourist brochures, that had emphasized San Francisco (the nearest major city and tourist destination) rather than Palo Alto or Stanford. This was perhaps due to the way that the national organizers and FIFA had branded the event globally, but which may have confused some visitors (Zinco 1998). In particular, the municipality of San Francisco had publicized the event at Bay Area airports (SFBATF 1994d, 1994e), and hosted several World Cup events, including a VIP reception, press conferences (SFBATF 1994f) and having a ‘large soccer presence’ at its July 4^th fireworks display, on the same day that the Brazil v USA game would take place at Stanford (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1994f).

It is difficult to conclude the impact of the World Cup as a tourism boost for the USA nationally (Baade and Matheson 2004) because tourism was slow to grow until 3–5 years after the tournament; It is reasonable to argue that the tournament almost certainly affected the profile of tourists at that time, on the basis of demographics such as countries-of-origin, as well as the pattern of locations within the USA that people visited (Statistica 2018; US Census Bureau 1998, 274; National Travel and Tourism Office 2000; US; Census Bureau 2003, 791). However, this soccer tourism perhaps only compensated a greater shortfall in other tourism, or even displaced tourists who avoided World Cup destinations (see Gillett and Tennent 2017, for discussion of tourism and global sporting mega-events).

As summarized in Appendix 1, we found evidence of market logic, corporation logic, and state logic at times all clashing, over multiple objectives: To be profitable whilst also providing effective public services (i.e. traffic and security/policing), and to fulfil requirements for a ‘Media Center’ and branding handed down from the national World cup organizing corporation. However, as we have explained, the tournament was broadly successful for the Host Committee, if not meeting the expectations of some local authorities, at least in the short term.

Phase IV: lasting legacy (august 1994 – 2010)

In terms of a longer-lasting soccer legacy for the SFBA, the evidence is clearer, as efforts ‘to bring soccer clearly into the minds of individuals and companies who might be approached to support soccer in the community after the World Cup is over and preserve the legacy for soccer’ were supported by the Host Committee (SFBATF 1994g). These efforts were successful as the Bay Area city of San Jose was awarded a franchise for the inaugural MLS season in 1996. The legacy of the event was more far-reaching than just the business of winning a professional MLS franchise. As mentioned above, a long-term aim of the Host Committee was to develop soccer in the San Francisco Bay Area, particularly for the region’s youth. Whilst the philanthropic nature of this aim is supported by our data, it is also apparent that it dovetailed with the commercial aim. As long ago as the former NASL in the 1960s – 1980s, the requirement for market development was part of a ‘soccer strategy’ for making the professional game financially sustainable. This included educating the public and generating goodwill by fostering participation, particularly with families, and garnering interest in the game amongst America’s youth, to develop future players and fans before they committed to other sports (NASL (North American Soccer League) 1977).

In July 1995, with a balance of around 500,000 USD surplus from hosting the Stanford World Cup games, the Task Force opted unanimously to begin operating under the banner of ‘San Francisco World Cup Legacy Committee’ (hereafter Legacy Committee) with consensus for the monies to emphasize disadvantaged youth – boys and girls – aged 18 and under in the SFBA (SFBATF 1995a). The Committee was re-constituted, with a more focussed mission, to manage the fund, but many key individuals remained with the ‘new’ organization. The fund could have been as high as 1,000,000 USD but 500,000 USD was required for various infrastructure responsibilities including a contribution to stadium improvements, the provision of a media centre, as well as the final cost from the local authority for providing security – a cause of dispute since before the event, and which carried on for several months afterwards (SFBATF 1995b; SFBATF ’94 1994h, SFBATF ’94 1994i).

Furthermore, approximately 90 monitor TVs used at the Press Centre were distributed to ‘local high schools and other IRS 501(c)(3) organizations’ on behalf of the Host Committee (SFBATF (San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ’94) 1994h). The main financial legacy was cash grants. These were awarded annually and to multiple organizations, to a value of less than 20,000 USD. To publicize the fund, press releases and promotional letters were distributed, and a presentation was made on the field before a game of the newly inaugurated San Jose MLS team. There were many applicants from a relatively broad geographic spread, encompassing urban and sub-urban localities. Examples of grant applications indicate what was funded: Initiatives helping vulnerable and hard to reach children, including refugee and immigrant families. Preference was given to match-funded schemes that benefitted more than just one team, and applicants tended to request funds for finance towards kit, field improvements/maintenance (grass, sprinkler systems, labour for repairs), as well as social events such as awards ceremonies. Applicants included the Special Olympics, well-known national programmes such as AYSO (American Youth Soccer Organization) and Soccer in the Streets (which used sport for education and social cohesion to divert youths away from gang crime in urban areas), and also to myriad local or neighbourhood organizations (SFBATF 2013a). The fund operated successfully until 2010, when it was eventually dissolved and the remaining monies, which totalled over 500,000 USD were donated to the San Francisco chapter of a national organization America Scores (SFBATF 2013b).

We consider the administering of the legacy fund as constituting a fourth phase of the case, shown in Appendix 1. The Host Committee evolved into a philanthropic SE, managing a fund to benefit specific types of other SEs, with a focussed emphasis on public services for youth. Specifically, these services addressed education, health, and social cohesion, with a common activity being sport. We consider that state logic and corporation logic co-existed as the Host Committee transformed into the Legacy Committee. Market logic was also evident, but the development of a sustainable soccer market was a potential, and strived for, by-product from societal objectives. By pursuing multiple logics, we propose that the organization was a vehicle through which the individual actors were ‘world making’, because they pursued socially motivated activities as an extension of entrepreneurial activity.

Discussion

At the outset of this paper we sought to answer the research question: How do SEs manage institutional complexity over the evolution of a mega-project in order to achieve financial and non-financial benefits for society? We now discuss our findings in relation to this question.

Overcoming the difficulties of the past required that soccer be built in the San Francisco Bay Area as an institutional system, based on participation and competitive structures, creating the potential for sustained interest. Regional promoters acted entrepreneurially, speculating on the success of MLS and of a franchise being awarded to the city of San Jose. The commercial objectives appear to have been met – the World Cup created awareness of soccer and showcased the SFBA or Silicon Valley as a suitable location for a franchise. This was achieved by pursuing commercial interests and aligning them with a broader social mission. This involved investing in youth to develop the players and paying spectators of the future. There was also an effort to generate goodwill and positive attitudes towards soccer, by first giving something to the communities. Examples include funding health and leisure opportunities, education, and in extreme cases trying to divert young people from negative influences and crime. It is impressive that a voluntary committee was able to bring World Cup hosting rights to the Bay Area, play a significant role in planning and delivering important aspects of the event, manage its relationships with local authorities and other stakeholders, and successfully operate a charitable fund for years afterwards. That the organization finally dissolved by donating a sum equivalent to its original balance is also remarkable.

Part of our main contribution is to emphasize the processual and temporal nature of SE collaborations and public service. Specifically, we demonstrate that it is possible to consider how the evolution of the project enhances the institutionally nested hybridity theory. This resonates with Wond and Macaulay (2011) who have previously argued for a greater number of longitudinal studies to be published in the academic field of public management. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the achievement of social legacy and enhanced provision of local services in the realms of health, education and community cohesion can benefit from a somewhat flexible response to emergent opportunities, rather than by having a strictly pre-ordained and rigid plan for societal legacy from the outset. But this benefit was also due to having an organization populated by experienced individuals from local businesses, as well as representation from community groups, whose socially motivated activities were an extension of their entrepreneurial activity. These individuals were also able to work collaboratively with partners from local authorities, public services such as policing, and education institutions (mainly Stanford University) as well as the national tournament organizers, and FIFA, to overcome tensions and disagreements which stemmed from hybridity and institutional complexity. They did so in such a way that the project was a success (even if this required quite significant concessions such as having to relinquish half of its surplus to the university to cover stadium improvement costs). Here we build upon the work of Gillett et al. (2019) and Powell, Gillett, and Doherty (2019) who have studied how hybrid organizations operate to successfully deliver social outcomes whilst simultaneously pursuing commercial objectives to maintain financial sustainability.

A significant reason for this success appears to be the existence, from the outset, of an entrepreneurial philanthropic orientation. This finding provides evidence of what was described in our literature review as world-making (Harvey et al. 2011). We postulate it was this orientation which significantly helped the organization and its individuals to manage tensions stemming from institutional complexity. They operated at the intersection of market, corporation, and state logics, placing different emphasis on each as the nature of the project evolved, and re-invented the organization accordingly.

Appendix 1 summarizes how the project organization evolved as an institutionally complex entity. Organizing a World Cup requires a tapestry of actors, with varying sources of institutional legitimacy to cooperate, binding and blurring those sources of legitimacy, creating forms of hybridity as social and commercial logics co-exist and compete. Clearly, soccer in the USA was striving to induce legitimacy as a privately operated and self-sustaining, profitable business in the long term. Nonetheless, as Gillett and Tennent (2018) identify professional soccer as deriving some legitimacy from the representative component of its existence, and a philanthropically and public-service oriented participation structure was required to realize this logic in the context of the USA.

The World Cup offered an opportunity for the USA to rejuvenate its professional soccer industry, representing both the whole country and the SFBA, as well as leading to the establishment of MLS franchises such as the San Jose Clash/Earthquakes teams which would make that representation ‘permanent’ (in the sense that a franchise still exists today Gillett and Tennent 2020b). This required the broad support of regional public and third sector institutions such as the local authority and law enforcement bodies, as well as of Stanford University, to attain. However, the process of creating, facilitating and achieving such hybrid outcomes takes place longitudinally. Linkages between actors are built, and outputs that were not envisaged at the start of the process may also emerge during the process, e.g. as the result of new partners entering the process and seeking new outputs, while others may occur as a result of transactionality or bargaining processes, which occur to reinforce the legitimacy of actors through the process, often by resolving clashes between them.

Further, some form of reciprocity was required, creating the opportunity for philanthropic redistribution of benefits; the diversion of public sector resources towards public order appeared to challenge norms and expectations of operation, manifesting itself, for example, as the redistribution of computer monitors to schools and other public and third sector organizations. These trade-offs were not planned at the start of the cooperation, rather they developed as social capital and reciprocity grew over the length of the event process. What was important for our case organization was its ability to prioritize commercial and social logics at different phases of the project, from the commercial during the early phases whilst maintaining a longer-term vision for a more powerful societal impact from the profitability that would be achieved. Once a financial surplus was confirmed, the organization then deliberately evolved itself to achieve its long-term plan of directly prioritizing the social logic by becoming a funding body, with the commercial objective of developing and sustaining the regional soccer market as a by-product.

Conclusion

Our case relates to a single organization, in one geographic region, but draws upon very detailed archival resources, that allowed us to develop a rich, in-depth narrative, and to map the evolution of the organization over a period of years. As an empirical contribution this article provides a longitudinal, inductive case study of a philanthropically orientated SE delivering an event of global interest, the regional element of the FIFA World Cup mega-event. We explain how some of the organizational development for managing evolving institutional complexity works. By considering the philanthropic concept of world-making we are able to better consider the nuances of the case, and to contribute to the refinement of institutional theory.

The main contribution of this paper has been to demonstrate that it is possible to consider how the evolution of the project enhances the institutionally nested hybridity theory. Specifically, we also show how the achievement of social legacy and enhanced provision of local services in the realms of health, education and community cohesion can benefit from a somewhat flexible response to emergent opportunities. Our case shows that this is possible when socially motivated activities are considered by philanthropically oriented actors as an extension of entrepreneurial activity.

We have shown that the different institutional logics of market, corporation and state existed to create institutional complexity, and how this was managed throughout the process of delivering the 1994 FIFA World Cup. The nature and significance of the institutional complexity, and thus the tensions and challenges for the case organization, meant that it evolved its priorities and responses accordingly. In Appendix 1, we have identified and dated four project phases. We highlighted how the organizational form and composition evolved throughout the phases, to unite different purposes, over time, as priorities and opportunities evolved. In particular, the findings emphasized the relatively informal and emergent way in which the project organization planned for societal legacy. The case highlights the agility with which the organization was able to respond to opportunity. This was most significant when the financial surplus generated from hosting the tournament was clarified, and the Host Committee evolved its organizational form and logic-blend into a philanthropically oriented SE. We propose that a philanthropic orientation was to some extent present from the outset, and that the individual Actors within the organization engaged in a process of world-making in which they applied philanthropy as an extension of their entrepreneurial activity (Harvey et al. 2011).

FIFA World Cups have a footprint beyond the public sector, yet their impact upon civil society means they require governmental sanction to occur. The USA provides an interesting institutional framework for this, as mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup often adopt a private sector logic of ‘biggest show on Earth’ yet also require formal authorization from government to operate. Such events require large investments of public resources and rarely provide the economic benefits that boosters claim, but opportunities also exist for them to fulfil social enterprise like functions which can benefit broader society. Here, SEs can often deliver more cheaply than direct public funding as they avoid drawing on existing bureaucratic structures, instead bringing temporary structures into play that can be formalized later. Social or public outcomes have remained an important element of sporting mega-events since 1994, although often as a side-show, and to some extent the events have showcased less democratic regimes (most recent and topical at the time of writing: the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia and the forthcoming 2022 edition in Qatar) which have been criticized for similar tendencies, being largely supported by the public sectors in those countries. The legacy for their economies is not clear although may offer commercial or economic opportunities such as networking, human capital, and forms of innovation (Gillett and Tennent 2017). However, the return of the tournament to North America as the ‘United Bid’ in 2026 promises some opportunity for a wider benefit for society; A range of actors will come together, hopefully to build upon the efforts to promote soccer in the United States since 1994.

Implications for research and practice

The findings from our archival study provide rich insight regarding the role of philanthropic SEs in organizing mega-events. In particular this paper offers theoretical and practical insights for understanding how these organizations can be an effective vehicle for achieving long-term sporting and social objectives, and market-development. Specifically, our case charts and describes how organizational form can successfully evolve over the duration of a mega-event project, and to managing its legacy. Thus, this paper provides an example of how to cope with evolving institutional complexity and hybridity over time, and summarizes a four-stage process, summarized in Appendix 1.

Following Eisenhardt (1991) we emphasize the value of learning from an individual case. We acknowledge that a single case study may have limited empirical generalizability, and thus propose that our findings should be interpreted as transferable to other similar cases of World Cup project for which longer-term societal and market development objectives are sought, rather than to the entire population of sports tournaments, or to multi-sport mega-events.

The single case approach was determined by the availability of sources and the amount of time and finance available. To develop our work, we thus propose a need for further longitudinal research to be undertaken to examine the hybridity, institutional complexity, and the phases present in FIFA World Cup host organizations. Research could explore their relationships and intersection with public services, local authorities, and related SEs, operating in the other geographies. For example, if a similar breadth and depth of archival material become available relating to the other regional hosting bodies of the 1994 tournament, this could provide the basis for comparative cases and building a more complete picture of the project nationally.

Our methods involved document analysis from events that have already happened, and for which the outcomes are known, or at least discoverable. It could also have been enlightening to have interviewed decision-makers involved in our case organization, so as to better understand their perceptions and challenges. This would be useful for helping us to better understand the difficulty of managing the project. For example, the navigation of personal and organizational relationships, and the perceptions of complexity, risks, priorities, and the decisions that had to be made, without the benefit of hindsight, and often with imperfect information. However, as well as the challenges of gaining access to these individual Actors, the events of our case occurred over thirty years ago, the limitations of personal memory could also be a restricting factor. This approach does though present a possible direction for further research, to undertake oral history or questionnaire-based survey research with people who were involved in the project organization, or with the local authorities and university, worked within the local economy, who attended the event, or who were involved with some of the SEs that benefitted from its legacy. Similarly, other FIFA World Cups (before or since) could also be investigated, using archival sources or the other research methods that we have suggested, from the perspective of social entrepreneurship and enterprise, and philanthropy, to identify opportunities for greater generalization of theory.

Evident from our case was the way in which the organization managed its (at times, strained) relationships with multiple stakeholders, including public administrators, the university, and local businesses. Although analysis of institutional complexity within this wider network was beyond the scope of our study, it presents another interesting opportunity for future research, particularly to probe the existence and nature of world-making. In particular, the aforementioned 2026 event will provide an opportunity to examine the existence (or not) or path dependencies and legacies of 1994 in the North American context, including in Mexico which, as part of the 2026 package, is set to become the first country to host the tournament for a third time (1970, 1986, and 2026).

Specific areas for research, which might further explicate the SE paradigm and elucidate its connection to philanthropy, could include the motives of social entrepreneurs for engaging in sporting projects with reference to the potential of world-making being constituted by the construction and reinforcement of sporting ecosystems. Sporting events such as FIFA World Cups create spectacle and memory of the event itself, but this can be augmented by the creation of societal and welfare outcomes, comparable to philanthropists that build legacy by contributing to other forms of social project. Research could also deepen understanding of the social entrepreneurship process. Recent work by Chandra and Paras (2020) has drawn upon effectuation theory to explain the way that social entrepreneurs identify sand respond to emergent opportunities over time. Thus, research could be undertaken to investigate how world-making philanthropists effectuate, for example how they prioritize social and commercial objectives and how they rationalize dilemmas in which one objective may be prioritized or compromised in favour of the other.

Our research also has possibilities for practical impact; the application of a historic case study also provokes new opportunities for philanthropists and social entrepreneurs to explore how they could use historical knowledge, memory, archives and artefacts to further realize world-making impact. Sports such as soccer both derive and can further enhance their legitimacy as societal institutions from the perception of tradition-building that is embedded in their fabric.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the Department of Special Collections, Stanford University for their assistance and expertise during the data collection stage of this research project. Non-digital data supporting this study are curated.

The authors also wish to thank Stanford Department of Anthropology, Stanford Global Projects Center, and to Jim and Margaret Fox for their hospitality, the anonymous referees and to those involved in the editorial process for their comments, suggestions and encouragement, and to our employer The York Management School. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Professor James A. Fox.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alex G. Gillett

Dr. Alex G. Gillett is a Senior Lecturer at the York Management School, University of York, United Kingdom. His research interests are relatively broad, and much of his work has focused on organizational networks, relationships, and interaction across sectors. In addition to studying contemporary contexts, Dr Gillett has a keen interest in management history, and is a founding committee member of the Management and Business History Special Interest Group of the British Academy of Management. He can be contacted at [email protected]

Kevin D. Tennent

Dr. Kevin D. Tennent is Senior Lecturer in Management at University of York, United Kingdom. His research focuses on the themes of governance and strategy in management history, across the fields of sport, international business, the music industry, and transport. He is founding chair of the Management and Business History Special Interest Group of the British Academy of Management, and is active in the Management History Division at the Academy of Management. He can be contacted at [email protected]

Appendix 1:

Evolution of the Project Organization

Table

	Phase I: Formative Years (1987–1990)	Phase II: Establishing the Task Force (Nov 1990 – May 1994)	Phase III: The Tournament Arrives (Jun-Jul 1994)	Phase IV: Lasting Legacy (Aug 1994–2010)
What is Happening	USA bids to host, 1987 USA awarded hosting rights, July 1988 Aim was for a long-term legacy for professional soccer in the USA	Established non-profit corporation as vehicle for Bid to Host in San Francisco Bay Area (SFBA) Region Win bid to host world Cup Games in the SFBA	FIFA World Cup 1994 Six games held at Stanford Stadium	Legacy Committee established Grants awarded to SFBA soccer community San Jose awarded an MLS franchise for inaugural season in 1996. Hiatus in 2006 but returned to the League in 2008 FIFA Women’s World Cup 1999 included 1 game at Stanford, although the Host/Legacy Committee not directly involved in organizing it Legacy Committee dissolved
Institutional Logics	Balanced Logics: Market, corporation, state	Market logic and corporation logic stemming from the national World Cup promoters are the dominant forces in early stages Corporation logic within the organization emerges as the corporate form takes shape State logic exists as local authority and tax laws dictate, but clashes with others (i.e. minimize the costs to ensure a profit) but with longer-term vision of co-existence, i.e. using commercial profits to invest in society whilst developing a sustainable market. Corporation logic stemming from the national World Cup promoters clashes with market logic and state logic, as its requirements and behaviours are perceived to at times undermine ‘local’ efforts	Market logic, corporation logic, and state logic at times all clash, over objectives to be profitable whilst providing effective public services (i.e. traffic and security/policing) and to fulfil requirements for Media Centre and branding handed down from the national World Cup organizing corporation Market logic also important but development of a sustainable soccer market is a potential and strived for by-product from societal objectives.	State logic and corporation logic co-exist as the Host Committee transforms into the Legacy Committee
Organizational Form	A national level bid was made. No regional host bodies yet formed	501(c)(3) corporation: ‘San Francisco Bay Task Force ‘94’ When awarded host venue status, changed name to: ‘San Francisco Bay Host Committee’	Still operating as “San Francisco Bay Host Committee”	‘San Francisco Bay Area Youth Soccer Legacy’: A unanimous decision to retain corporate name ‘San Francisco Bay Area Task Force ‘94ʹ but to do business as ‘San Francisco World Cup Legacy Committee’ Consensus for the legacy to emphasize disadvantaged youth aged 18 years and under in the Bay Area
Organizational Composition	Formative: Loose collection of individuals, Bid Committee not yet existent	Prominent SFBA business and sports persons: Many alumni of the university venue, and with history of involvement and promotion of soccer in the SFBA since the 1950s, plus youth soccer representatives.	As per previous column	As per previous column but with some changes in membership to reflect greater emphasis on investment in youth soccer

Appendix 2: Practical Pathways to Impact through the use of history

Table

Use of History	Example of how it might be used
As a strategic resource (Suddaby et al. 2020)	Understand the empirical emergence of the tournament and sport, as well as of past specific tournaments and use to manage perceptions of new tournaments, emphasizing continuities with the past while creating opportunities for positive change and innovation
To reinforce legitimacy (Foster et al. 2011)	Draw upon understandings of traditions within sport and memories of past tournaments to reinforce the social mission and legitimacy of future tournaments
To foster authenticity (Hatch and Schultz 2017)	Reconnect events and athletes to historic artefacts and places such as stadiums to connect them with formative moments and periods in sport history thus deepening the meaning of them to fans and media
To enhance reflexivity (Tennent, Gillett, and Foster 2020)	Use organizational archives in the education of sports administrators as well as other stakeholders to study the organization of past events, raising historical consciousness and awareness.