ABSTRACT
Grassroots bureaucrats are confronted with multiple accountability pressures which result in diverse or even conflicting expectations. Based on a survey experiment conducted in China, this study examines how bureaucrats respond to the divergent expectations of upper-level authorities and local citizens and how the intensity of such accountability influences those responses. The findings show that although bureaucrats tend to put more effort into tasks that are aligned with citizens’ interests, over-stringent accountability may crowd out their intrinsic motivation to serve the public and push them to follow top-down instructions mechanically. Intensified accountability may not necessarily lead to better policy outcomes.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
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Notes on contributors
Wenyan Tu
Wenyan Tu is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong. Her major research interests cover corruption, integrity management, and bureaucratic behaviour. She has published articles in Asian Journal of Social Psychology and Journal of Chinese Governance.
Ting Gong
Ting Gong is a professor in the Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, and Distinguished Chair Professor in the Institute for Global Public Policy & School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, China. Her research interests include public governance, bureaucratic ethics, and corruption. She has published in journals such as Governance, International Public Management Journal, Regulation & Governance, Social Indicators Research, Publius: The Journal of Federalism and some area studies journals.