Who benefits from collaborative governance? An empirical study from the energy sector

ABSTRACT

Collaborative governance can positively affect desired policy outcomes, but questions remain about who benefits. This article asks how and to what extent collaborative governance of utility conservation programmes in the U.S. states affects industrial, commercial, and residential ratepayers’ programme benefits. Panel data analysis shows that collaborative processes improve the equitable distribution of energy savings, but inequities persist, particularly for residential ratepayers. Additional qualitative analysis suggests representation in the collaborative process is not a major driver of equitable distribution of benefits, but that over time, collaboration can help participants to look beyond their individual interests and advocate for other stakeholders’ interests.  

KEYWORDS:

• Collaborative governance
• participatory governance
• stakeholder engagement
• utility regulation
• equity
• distributional outcomes

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Most U.S. states require utilities to develop programs that will help their customers save energy via building retrofits, HVAC upgrades, or rebate programs to encourage use of high-efficiency appliances and lighting. These programs are funded by utility rates, with the expectation that resulting savings benefit not only the customers who individually reduce their energy bills, but also systematically reduce the economic and environmental costs of providing electricity throughout a utility’s service territory. Utility program offerings and their resulting savings are subject to regulatory approval and oversight. In a growing number of states, regulators have formed ‘energy efficiency collaboratives’ that bring together multiple stakeholders to engage in review and approval of utilities’ energy efficiency plans (Department of Energy 2015).

2. While there are other potential benefits from energy efficiency programs, including quality of life for residential consumers, we focus on energy savings as the primary benefit from utility programs, and the explicit goal of energy efficiency collaboratives.

3. We omit Nebraska from our analysis, because it does not provide traditional regulatory oversight over utilities or require them to meet energy savings mandates.

4. We also run alternative specifications of the model that use utilities’ estimated savings from energy efficiency programs as a dependent variable. Results were consistent with and nearly opposite to those presented here, illustrating good correlation between utilities’ reported energy savings from their programs and actual changes in energy consumed by ratepayers. We do not use this dependent variable for our primary model because utility estimates of energy savings are subject to measurement error and are thus not as reliable as direct measures of energy sales.

5. To maintain interviewee anonymity, we use a coding process that indicates the interview number, state, and sector. Interviews conducted in Maryland are designated with M and interviews conducted in Connecticut are designated with C. Interviews with government agencies are designated with G, interviews with utilities are designated with U, interviews with environmental and community organizations are designated with E, and interviews with business interests are designated with B.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Minwoo Ahn

Minwoo Ahn is a doctoral candidate in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. He studies and teaches public administration, collaborative governance, and environmental governance

Elizabeth Baldwin

Elizabeth Baldwin is an Associate Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. She studies and teaches environmental, energy and water policy in the U.S. and internationally.