Land grab in new garb: Chinese special economic zones in Africa

Abstract

At the 2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, President Hu Jintao announced the establishment of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa (CSEZAs) in the spirit of mutual development and cooperation. The Chinese government launched seven such projects across Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Zambia and Mauritius. In most of these countries, there was social outcry over land expropriation for the construction of the CSEZAs and the resultant displacement of existing settlers. Seven years since their launch, the delayed CSEZA development only exacerbate the frustration of the host African communities as they contemplate whether the land they appropriated for the zone, at the expense of rural livelihoods, is getting an appropriate usage. The case of Mauritius is particularly salient considering its size, location and outward economic dependence.

Keywords::

• special economic zones
• forum on China–Africa cooperation
• land acquisition
• compensation
• displacement
• development

Notes

^1. The FAO report equated land grab to three specific purposes: (1) food security, (2) biofuels and (3) rising rates of return in agricultural businesses.

^2. The Four Modernization programme aimed to develop the four main areas of the Chinese economy: agriculture, defence, industry and technology.

^3. Given the strategic location of the SEZ – near Navi Mumbai International Airport and Mumbai Trans-harbour Sea Link – it is obvious that real estate and housing investment in that area can be highly priced, and will attract a wealthy clientele.

^4. Although the general understanding is that the Chinese government did not favour SOEs as developers of the pilot CSEZAs, a glance at all the developers involved across the seven zones reveal that all the main developers of the SEZs in Africa are SOEs – with the exception of the Jiangsu Qiyuan Group in the EIZ Ethiopia, and Tianli Group in JFET – who, nevertheless, partner with SOEs in their respective SEZs.

^5. Besides, contribution in terms of expertise derived from previous SEZ management experience also cannot be counted as an input if we consider the case of TEDA in Egypt. The Egyptian SEZ started in 1998. The contract for its development was assigned to TEDA, who by that time was running the successful Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area in China. Nonetheless, TEDA had a disappointing launch in Egypt, which pushed it to revisit the project in 2000. It adopted a new partnership pattern and reduced the size of the SEZ project to only 100 hectares. Egypt TEDA SEZ was relaunched in 2007, with TEDA again revising the partnership pattern it adopted in 2000. This indicates that even though China has experience in SEZ management, the transposing of this expertise onto CSEZs in Africa is of no value as it fails to deliver (Brautigam & Xiaoyang, 2011, p. 75).

^6. Here, we are referring to land not only for the construction of the CSEZ but also for the roads and other infrastructural networks like water, sewerage, telecommunications and electricity, essential to service the zone. The construction of service plants, exchange centres, reservoirs and so on are also accounted for. By land, we also allude to the location of the land, which, if strategically situated, elevates the value of the African input in the CSEZAs.

^7. Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co Ltd is a subsidiary of Tianli Group.

^8. Throughout the discussion of the case of the displaced planters of Riche Terre and Terre Rouge, this work will apply the currency and land-measuring units used in Mauritius, i.e. Mauritian Rupee (MUR), and arpent and perches, respectively. These are the units on basis of which the compensation was worked out.

The exchange rate of the MUR to US dollars is as follows:

 MUR 1 =  USD 0.0326/MUR100 =  USD 3.26

The land unit conversion ratios are as follows:

 One arpent = 0.34 hectare/one perche = 0.0025 hectare.

^9. The report calculated the per arpent additional support cost coming from FSF in terms of: land preparation (MUR 25,000), upgrade of irrigation network (MUR 25,000), fertilisers and seeds (MUR 10,000) and fencing (MUR 60,000).

^10. Bois Marchand is one of the pockets of poverty in Mauritius. It was the recent beneficiary of a corporate social responsibility housing project by Mauritius Telecom.

^11. Translated as Movement for Self-sustaining Food Security.

^12. Original: ‘Les agriculteurs de Riche-Terre produisaient et fournissaient au marché en gros de Port-Louis au moins 20 tonnes de légumes par semaine et contribuaient d'une façon très significative à la sécurité alimentaire du pays avant d'être déplacés dans le cadre du projet Tianli/JinFei à partir de 2006. Le projet JinFei, s'il se réalise, va couvrir de béton les terres les plus riches de l'île afin de répondre aux perspectives et aux impératifs économiques de nos dirigeants et du pays’.

^13. With reference to the second schedule of State Lands Act 1945: Calculation is done on basis that JFET site is beyond 81.21 m from the high water mark of Zone D. Therefore, it would have benefited from a 25% rebate of the prescribed rent of MUR 38, 259 per arpent per year.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Honita Cowaloosur

Honita Cowaloosur is a doctoral research candidate at the University of St. Andrews, UK. She currently works as an economic reporter at L'Express (Mauritius) and has been a member of the Knowledge and Capacity Building Department of the Ministry of Finance (Mauritius). She has a Master of Science in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Master of Arts in Politics from the University of Iceland.