ORTHODOXY AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM

Abstract

Traditional Jewish theology and practice are predicated on belief in the divinity of the Torah. Biblical criticism has posed increasingly formidable challenges to this belief in modern times. To the extent that Modern Orthodoxy has addressed the problem, it has generally attempted to refute the findings of scientific scholarship on its own terms. This article will suggest that such an approach represents a misplaced framing of the question, by viewing all religious truth claims cognitively as simple statements of fact. Instead of questioning whether the doctrine of Torah from Heaven is true empirically, its “truth” is established via its function within the context of the “form of life” (in the Wittgensteinian sense) that it engenders.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. For a summary of the distinctions between Heschel's Torah as Midrash (i.e. a human interpretation of some primal content revealed by God), Buber's understanding of Torah as response merely to the revelation of God Himself, and Rosenzweig's understanding that this silent theophany nevertheless also conveys a sense of commandedness, see Gillman (1990, 22–25). For various formulations of Jacobs regarding biblical reflections of both the human and the divine, see Jacobs (1957, 89–90; 1995, epilogue, 139, 1990, 50,1973, 204–205, 225,1964, 219, 270–311,1999, 50–51).

2. By “modernist” I refer to a world view based on the assumption of rigid and stable notions of truth, supported by a universal, neutral, and objective rationality that serves as their justification.

3. The Hungarian-born rabbi and Torah scholar, David Zvi Hoffman, was a prominent initiator of this approach. For more recent examples, see Shavit and Eran (2007, 423–434). Many of these responses rely on the findings of various Jewish biblical scholars such as Moshe Zvi Segal, Naftali Herz Tur-Sinai, Umberto Cassuto, and Yehezkel Kaufman who objected to Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis, despite their conclusions not necessarily confirming the notion of a one-time revelation to Moses (389–395); see also Schwartz (2012b, 203–229), Yedida (2013), and Bazak (2013).

4. See, for example, Shapiro (2004), Kellner (2006), and Wettstein (1997, 423–443).

5. Such rejection is distinct from the recent willingness of some Orthodox thinkers to cite various Talmudic and medieval sources that already allowed for the possibility of later interpolations to the original Torah text, while generally acknowledging a qualitative difference between such isolated cases and the conclusions of more radical source theory. See, for example, http://seforim.blogspot.co.il/2013/03/torah-mi-sinai-and-more.html and http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/deot/kanohel.htm. These concede the dispensability of Mosaic authorship on the basis of precedent, provided that more extended interpolations are also regarded as prophetically inspired. The reference here, by contrast, is not to rational claims, but rather to a variety of religious existentialism which distinguishes between cognitive and non-cognitive statements, allocating a unique role to the latter in the religious sphere.

6. For broader discussion of similarities and differences between Soloveitchik's and Leibowitz's approach to Scripture, see Sagi (1997a).

7. See, for example, Leibowitz (1976, 346–347).

8. See Sagi (1997b, 203–216); and Bareli (2007, 275–276):

On the one hand the religious Jew accepts the mitzvot as the mitzvot of God and accepts the yoke of the Torah as the word of God. On the other hand, he knows that these mitzvot and this word are human creations set down at a certain place and time. Is this not a contradiction? … No. The "word of God" does not point to a fact; it point to a special category of awareness on the part of the believer. To see a certain matter as the word of god is to maintain that it possesses a special status in the consciousness of the believer … in terms of his attitude to the word and to humanity and to fashioning his mode of life. (as translated by Lawrence Kaplan—see http://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2013/02/11/conversation-with-james-kugel-a-follow-up/, comments section)

9. It is this insistence upon God's utter "Otherness" that leads to Leibowitz's radical theocentrism, since any humanistic considerations represent a form of idolatry, reducing God to the image of man by applying categories drawn from human experience.

10. The degree of reliability Leibowitz attached to biblical accounts of Sinaitic revelation, beyond their theocentric import, is unclear. According to Yaakov Levinger's testimony (Sagi 1995, 9), Leibowitz's somewhat circumspect response was that if the significance of the Sinai revelation lay in the event itself, it failed because, as biblical history teaches, there is no correlation between God's revelation and intervention in Jewish affairs and the Jewish people's willingness to believe in and worship Him. Shavit and Eran (2007, 433) nevertheless suggest that

it would be a mistake to think that Leibowitz ascribed no value to the veracity of the historical description in the Bible … in particular formative events such as the Exodus from Egypt and the theophany on Mt. Sinai … His writings show that he also considered these as historical events not only because the Oral Law views them as such, but also because their veracity is self-evident.

This suggestion appears to be corroborated by Leibowitz's ahistorical attitude regarding some laws of biblical origin (see Ross 1995, 151), as well as his dismissive remarks regarding “heretical scientific and pseudo-scientific biblical research, better known as ‘biblical criticism’, when considering suggestions of post-Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy” (Leibowitz 2004, 827–828). These examples, as others, indicate that Leibowitz's naturalistic view of revelation is more accurately attributed to his affinity with Maimonidean theology (Maimonides 1963, II:32), according to which prophecy reflects some genuine, man-initiated absorption of the eternal divine effluence, than to the influence of modern biblical scholarship and its critical methods.

11. Such as philosopher Eliezer Goldman (see 2009). His aversion to metaphysical claims echoes Leibowitz's views and replicates the latter's resistance to grounding religious obligation on claims that draw upon empiric evidence or anthropological interests (albeit in somewhat milder form). Biblical scholar Schwartz (2012a, 30–31) contends that belief in Sinaitic revelation is a by-product rather than basis for commitment to the halakhic way of life; a similar argument, made by law professor Perry Dane (1994), that belief or disbelief in a literal revelation at Sinai is neither necessary nor sufficient to either accepting or rejecting traditional halakhic commitment, might be regarded as another example of interest in divorcing the authority of halakhic demands from claims for supernatural intervention in human affairs.

12. For one pungent version of this critique, see Statman (2005, 64–66).

13. For application of this criticism to both Leibowitz and Soloveitchik—viewing each as limited in their attempt to understand the entire meaning of Scripture in accordance with one exclusive (normative or existential, respectively) hermeneutic principle, see Sagi (1997a, 437–440).

14. This aspect of Leibowitz's thought might be viewed as philosophic expression of contemporary Jewish Orthodoxy's need to define its religious world in terms of accepting the yoke of mitzvot as compensation for its loss of the sense of God's immediate presence, which typified pre-modern generations of believers—see Statman (2005).

15. See Alan Brill's blog-post (http://kavvanah.wordpress.com/2010/04/01/critique-of-kugel-1) and comment: "Acceptance of revelation is not pixie dust to magically wave over a human document. One cannot treat the Bible simply as primitive and then call it revelation." See also Sommers' critique (2010). With regard to Kugel, I believe this criticism is somewhat misplaced. (1) The major theological thrust of Kugel's scholarly endeavours is that in Judaism the sanctity of the Torah was not determined by a Protestant-like faith in Sola Scriptura but on the ongoing internal interpretive tradition that it evoked. It is this understanding that leads Kugel to reject an “excavationalist” approach, irrespective of its academic merits, as totally irrelevant in a religious setting. (2) Despite emphasising the critical role of subsequent interpretive layers in hallowing earlier biblical fragments, Kugel's reverence for such core texts does not rely solely on these later developments. Alongside traces of pagan influence and a primitive mindset, he finds elements of biblical narrative (such as depictions of Abraham's and Jacob's confusion between men and angels), and other testimonies to fleeting experiences of the sublime even before the “great Interpretive Revolution” (as he terms it) that he attributes to the closing centuries BCE. In his opinion, these can offer religious inspiration for our day, even when taken on their own. Nevertheless, Kugel's religious privileging of the text as viewed through the lens of tradition does lead him to dismiss more contemporary methods of analysis originating from non-Orthodox sources, but increasingly embraced by Orthodox defenders of the faith as tools for demonstrating the spiritual superiority of the biblical text as it stands. Literary approaches relating to the final unified version of the Torah as their object of study, are increasingly invoked by religious advocates, suggesting that focus on the text itself leads to richer appreciation of the Torah's content. On this view, even without drawing any conclusions regarding its divine nature, this approach does facilitate an interpretative framework that draws attention to certain suggestive patterns lurking behind its “face value” which offer important spiritual and psychological insights. Given such considerations, Kugel's prejudice against the notion of a final redactor in his reconstruction of the process whereby the bible was transformed into Scripture, contra Rosenzweig, may indeed be causing him to overlook important intra-textual nuances, and the lofty messages that can be derived from these. Kugel's dichotomous approach to text-based scholarship versus traditional learning leads him to be even more critical of recent work conducted under the rubric of biblical theology. Unlike literary approaches, such efforts do not reject "excavational" assumptions regarding the text's multiple layers and the varying political/historical circumstances and interests that these reflect, but purport to extract redeeming moral and spiritual lessons even from these—an effort that amounts, as Kugel quips, to “having your Bible and criticizing it too.” Kugel regards both methods as questionable samples of Western eisegesis, often made possible only through selective use of the evidence, however sophisticatedly masked—see “Kugel in JQR” (http://www.jameskugel.com/kugel-jqr.pdf). From this perspective, ongoing attempts to discover spiritual significance in the Torah beyond the interpretive tradition laid down by the Rabbis might be taken as greater testimony to the continuing ingenuity and creativity of the human spirit than to any biblical (or divine) message of genuine religious import, despite the apologetic “feel good” use to which they are put.

16. This difference may be attributed to their differing philosophical orientations. Despite the striking resemblance that some scholars find between the role that Leibowitz accords halakha in establishing the status of the Torah as the foundational text of Judaism and the approach developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, according to which religious beliefs do not stand independently of their function in the form of life in which they are embedded (see Sagi 1997b, 210–213; Bareli 2007), Leibowitz's dismissal of metaphysical truth claims as “nonsense” appears closely aligned to the logical positivist distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive statements established in Wittgenstein's earlier writings. Solomon's approach, by contrast (as intimated by his biographical account—see Solomon 2012, 7–8), is more likely attributable to indirect influence of Wittgenstein's later writings, according to which such claims are not nonsensical, but can only be judged from within the parameters of the language game itself, and not by appeal to objective referents "out there" that simply force such doctrines upon us. Moreover, as Sagi (1997b, 203–204) notes, although Leibowitz admired Wittgenstein, most of his ideas were framed long before publication of the latter's writings.

17. Whether biblical narratives were originally written for mythic purposes remains a moot point. Some of the Torah's genealogies or chronologies, which bear no moral or theological message, do not lend themselves to this assumption and are better understood as bona fide attempts at reporting history, whose inaccuracies simply reflect mistaken beliefs of the time. However, the fact that other aspects of the text, such as repeated barrenness of the matriarchs or even the sacrificial binding of Isaac, have striking parallels in other religions and cultures of the time (with regard to the latter and its Christian and Islamic adaptations, see Spiegel 1967), strongly suggests the influence of prevailing conventions on how tales of origin should be written, and perhaps the lack of a clear distinction between myth and systematic history in ancient times.

18. While professing personal faith that such an event did take place, Kula (2011) similarly distinguishes between the facticity of the biblical account of Sinaitic revelation and its mythic function. Kula's stance resonates with the position adopted by Rabbi A.I. Kook, who undoubtedly granted great credence to biblical accounts of early Jewish history, yet was prepared in principle to accept Torah for its beneficial mythic influence, rather than on faith in its accuracy (Kook 1985a, 48–49).

19. For two notable precursors of this constructivist trend, see Bentham (1932) and Vaihinger (1924). More radical and contemporary extensions of this view, as represented by Continental postmodern philosophers such as Jean Boudrillard (1929–2007), reject all distinction between reality and its representation, contending that there is no truth beyond language and the depictions that we construct. Common to both is their opposition to a philosophy of objectivism, which embraces the belief that humans can come to know the natural world with varying degrees of accuracy in a form of truth that is not mediated by any interpretive approximations. Although a constructivist might, in principle, adhere to either of these positions, it would be a mistake to equate even the latter version with wholesale dismissal of truth or a denial that there is a particular state of affairs or "way things are." Rather, one must move beyond the reduction of truth in cognitive-propositional terms to a more relational, pragmatic, or communal understanding of its nature. Instead of viewing knowledge as the discovery of a fixed ontological reality, it is now understood as the product of an active ordering and organization of a world constituted by our experience.

20. For formulation and lively discussion of this and related topics, visit the Association's website (www.philosophyofJudaism.blogspot.com), particularly the symposia entitled Wettstein's “Doctrine”/“Theological Impressionism;” “Religious Belief, Make-Believe, and Science;” “Foundational Questions for the Study of Judaism;” and “Evidence and Exodus.”

21. For further amplification, see Ross (2013).

22. See, for example, Kook (1985b, 48). For further sources, and elaboration upon the precise nature of R. Kook's extension of the Maimonidean conception, see Ross (1997, 491–492). For a possible medieval precedent for this type of extension, see Twersky (1979).

23. Copied from the blog of Modern Orthoprax, 30 July 2009, which has since been deleted from the Internet.

24. “First order” in this context designates theological understandings that are primary to any belief system, functioning in accordance with that system's own internal concepts and guidelines. “Second-order” understandings, by contrast, function less immediately, as a type of meta-view which comes to reflect, in terms that are external to the tradition, upon the talk and practice of theology from within.

25. See Levine (2010) and Misak (2007), including Stout's own contribution: “On our Interest in Getting it Right: Pragmatism without Narcissism,” 7–31.

26. See, for example, Ross (2004b, 2008). See also (2004a, ch. 11).

27. See, for example, Cathey (2009), Griffin (1989), and Lehtonen (2012), several relevant chapters in Vanhoozer (2009) and in Hart, Kuipers, and Nielsen (1999), and the many works of Dan Cupitt and John D. Caputo struggling with this issue.

28. See http://thetorah.com/the-challenge-of-biblical-criticism/ and a forthcoming Hebrew version of this paper for one paradigm I find particularly promising here, because of its ability to suggest a layered view of reality in bridging the gap between inside and outside perspectives. This paradigm, which was developed in kabbalistic writings in the modern period and has come to be known as “the allegorical interpretation to the doctrine of Tzimtzum” promoted by the sixteenth century mystic, R. Isaac Luria, has produced several models that are fruitful for our discussion. Common to all of them is a unique mix of realism and non-realism that transfers the question of God's relationship to the world from the realm of ontology to that of epistemology. In their struggle to acknowledge the mediating role of human perception while simultaneously defending a view that makes claims upon how “faith in God” should be conducted in actual practice, I believe these models have much to offer in resolving the self-aware constructivist's theological dilemma.

Additional information

Tamar Ross is Professor Emeritus of the Department of Jewish philosophy at Bar Ilan University. She continues to teach at Midreshet Lindenbaum, a women's Yeshiva in Jerusalem with which she has been associated since its inception in 1976. Born in the United States, she moved to Israel at the age of 16, completed her academic training at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and served as a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Jewish Studies at Harvard. After raising seven children she returned to academia, serving on the faculty or as visiting scholar at various universities in Israel, the United States, and South Africa. She has published over 60 articles relating to Jewish thought in scholarly journals and anthologies and a book entitled Expanding the Palace of Torah: Orthodoxy and Feminism. Her areas of interest include: contemporary challenges to traditionalist Jewish theology (including feminism, historicism, biblical criticism and postmodernity), concepts of God and divine revelation, religious epistemology and hermeneutics, philosophy of halakha, the Musar movement (a modern pietist movement devoted to the development of spiritual discipline and moral conduct), and the thought of the 20th century mystic, Rabbi A.I. Kook.