BACK TO ZECHARIAH FRANKEL AND LOUIS JACOBS? ON INTEGRATING ACADEMIC TALMUDIC SCHOLARSHIP INTO ISRAELI RELIGIOUS ZIONIST YESHIVAS AND THE SPECTRE OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HALAKHAH

Abstract

This paper will discuss three new methods of teaching Talmud that Israeli Religious Zionist Yeshivas have adopted over the past two decades against the backdrop of the hitherto and perhaps still dominant approach to teaching Talmud in these Yeshivas, namely, the classical conceptual, ahistorical, highly abstract “Brisker” approach: (1) a modified Brisker approach; (2) the “Torat Eretz Yisrael,” “the Torah of the Land of Israel” approach; and (3) what I would call the “shiluv” approach, a term that implies forming a new and harmonious whole. What these three approaches have in common is the desire to retain the conceptual analysis of the Brisker approach, but to abandon its strict formalism and combine it with the search for religious meaning and significance. However, while the first two approaches in their search for the religious significance of the text generally eschew the use of the critical methodologies employed by academic Talmudic scholarship, the third approach embraces the use of those methodologies and seeks to integrate them into the world of traditional Talmud study. I will focus on the theological challenges raised by this attempted integration and on how the exponents of the “shiluv” approach have sought to deal with them.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank R. Dr Avraham Walfish and Professor Adam Ferziger for their close readings of my manuscript and many incisive suggestions which contributed greatly to improving this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. One can find anticipations of modified Brisk in Brisk itself. For example, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik's famous halakhico-phenomenological analysis of the mitzvah of Shofar on Rosh Hashanah appears to breach the Brisker requirement that one focusses on the “what” to the exclusion of the “why.” R. Soloveitchik argues that the sounding of the Shofar halakhically constitutes, among other things, a kiyyum of prayer, both shirah and zèakah, a wordless cry to God comprising both praise and supplication. But this very obligation of addressing this wordless prayer to God via the medium of the shofar derives, in turn, from Rosh Hashanah as a day of gilui Shekhinah, the revelation of the Divine Presence. Here, R. Soloveitchik does seem to move from “what” to “why” (Soloveitchik 1985, 74–75, 80). One may also argue that R. Aharon Lichtenstein's focus on “primary” questions and his conceptual mapping of halakhic topics set the stage for modified Brisk's exploring the values underlying those conceptually mapped out topics.

2. These “Ten Principles,” R. Weitzman claims, are an implementation of R. Kook's teachings regarding Torat Eretz Yisrael. A critical analysis of this claim, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

3. The Revadim (layers) method of Talmud study, which aroused a good deal of controversy in Israeli Religious Zionist circles about a decade ago, advocates, as its name indicates, differentiating between the different layers of rabbinic literature and studying them sequentially. As such, it shares some features in common with the shiluv approach. However, this method does not claim to be a comprehensive approach to Talmud study, but a “didactic-pedagogic” tool that can coexist with any of the classic approaches to Talmud study. Consequently, it has nothing to say about conceptualization and the search for meaning, and, somewhat apologetically, distances itself from any academic approach to Talmud study, refusing to draw any larger conclusions from the method about the historical unfolding and “embeddedness” of the halakhah. See Hayman (2011).

4. R. Shagar's diachronic explanation of the “apparent dissonance between the dimensions of Torah” regarding “an eye for an eye” should be contrasted with R. Rosensweig's more traditional synchronic one. One may suggest that this difference goes back to the debate between Maimonides and Nahmanides regarding the nature of the Oral Law, but I cannot elaborate on this here. If one accepts R. Shagar's diachronic explanation of this “apparent dissonance” regarding “an eye for an eye,” the transformation of this law may be seen as part of a broader transformation, suggested by R. Nagen with reference meitav, from viewing the laws of damages as kenasot to viewing them as mamonot.

5. R. Walfish's claim that R. Shagar adapted the developmental model set forth by Maimonides in the Guide 3:32 is problematic. As we have seen, R. Shagar's developmental model is not based on Maimonides, but on Ramhal and R. Kook, with more than a soupçon of Hegel.

6. R. Shagar's view resembles in many ways, which we cannot discuss here, that of the noted Orthodox feminist theologian, Tamar Ross.

7. The shi‘urim of Rabbis Aharon and Moshe Lichtenstein may be found on Yeshiva Har Etzion's website at http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/01petich.htm and http://vbm-torah.org/archive/kiddushin/03kiddushin.htm; the shi‘urim of R. Weitzman as well as his essay, “Torat Eretz Yisrael: Ten Principles” may be found on Yeshivat Ma‘alot's website at http://www.yesmalot.co.il/torat-il/mamarim/mtei11.asp; and, finally, the shi‘ur of R. Nagen as well as the “mission statement” of Yeshivat Otniel may be found on that yeshiva's website at http://www.otniel.org/about.asp?show=22005 and http://www.otniel.org/show.asp?id=22168.

Additional information

Lawrence Kaplan is Professor of Rabbinics and Jewish Philosophy in the Department of Jewish Studies of McGill University. His book Maimonides between Philosophy and Halakhah: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Lectures on the Guide of the Perplexed will be appearing shortly.