Restrictions on ownership under New Zealand registered trade mark law

ABSTRACT

New Zealand trade mark law contemplates the exclusive ownership of symbols for the purpose of indicating the origin of goods and services. Historically, United Kingdom trade mark law (upon which New Zealand trade mark law is based) has been concerned to ensure traders had access to certain symbols. Legislation thereby excluded some symbols, like shapes, from registration. Judges also applied a ‘need to keep free’ policy and denied registration to descriptive, laudatory or geographical words. In this article, I trace how and why New Zealand trade mark law has moved away from imposing any ontological restrictions on what symbols can be registered, and has also limited the ability of judicial concerns about access to dictate registrability decisions. I then make the case for why some restrictions on registration would be desirable and explain how the existing Trade Marks Act 2002 could be amended to subtract certain symbols from the sphere of ownership entirely.

KEYWORDS:

• Trade mark law
• New Zealand
• Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ)
• registrability
• ownership
• distinctiveness
• functionality

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Acknowledgments

My thanks go to Juan Felipe Acosta-Sánchez, Michael Handler, Lisa Ramsay, Warren Swain and the two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this article. This article is based on a paper which was presented at the 2019 INTA Trademark Scholarship Symposium in Boston, Massachusetts. My thanks also go to the organisers and participants of that event.

Notes

1 The convergent interests of preventing consumer confusion and protecting producers from the diversion of trade are usually treated as the primary goals and justifications of trade mark law, see Mark A Lemley and Mark P McKenna, ‘Owning Mark(et)s’ (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 137, 142.

2 AA Insurance Ltd v AMI Insurance Ltd [2012] 1 NZLR 837 (New Zealand High Court (NZHC)) [1].

3 See Re Dunn’s Trade-Marks (1889) 41 Ch 439 (England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA)) 455 and Eastman Photographic Materials Co Ltd v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [1898] AC 571 (United Kingdom House of Lords (UKHL)) 583.

4 Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [1954] 1 WLR 554 (UKHL) and York Trade Mark [1984] RPC 231 (UKHL) 254.

5 See generally Andrew Griffiths, ‘Modernising Trade Mark Law and Promoting Economic Efficiency: An Evaluation of the Baby Dry Judgment and its Aftermath’ [2003] Intellectual Property Quarterly 1 who also cites Johan Verbruggen, ‘Baby-Dry—The Origin Function “Revisited”’ (2002) 51 GRUR International 213.

6 In some literature, the term ‘public domain’ is used not only to refer to signs that cannot be registered, but also forms of use that cannot be controlled by the registered trade mark owner, see Martin Senftleben, ‘Public Domain Preservation in EU Trademark Law—A Model for Other Regions?’ (2013) 103 Trademark Reporter 775.

7 As noted in General Electric Co Ltd (USA) v General Electric Co Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 729 (UKHL) 742, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to detach the current operation of registered trade mark law from its history.

8 The 1905 Act was an attempt to codify the law regarding trade marks, see Select Committee on the Trade Marks Bill, Report and Special Report from the Select Committee on the Trade Marks Bill (1905, HC 231) q 1–4. See also Re Ducker’s Trade Mark [1929] 1 Ch 113 (EWCA) 120: ‘[the 1905 Act] was passed in order that its terms should be more specific than those of the old Act’. With the passing of 1905 Act, trade mark law was described in General Electric Co Ltd (USA) v General Electric Co Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 729 (UKHL) 747, as assuming ‘what is substantially its modern form’.

9 Earlier legislation had defined what types of symbols were registrable trade marks for the purpose of the legislation (see for example Trade Marks Registration Act 1875, s 10), but contained no statutory definition of a trade mark. This point is made in Duncan M Kerly, The Law of Trade Marks and Trade Name (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 1908) 23.

10 Trade Marks Act 1905 (UK), s 3.

11 ibid s 9.

12 Re Van Duzer’s Trade Mark (1887) 34 Ch D 623 (EWCA) 634: the object of earlier legislation was to reduce ‘the numerous forms of words and other things, by the use of which traders tried to secure to themselves exclusive rights’.

13 It was said that the aim of the 1905 Act was that all signs that were being used as trade marks be registered, so the public at large could know what marks were free to use, see arguments of the applicants in Re Apollinaris Trade Mark [1907] 2 Ch 178 (England and Wales High Court (EWHC)) 180. The Registrar had suggested in his evidence to the Select Committee considering the Trade Marks Bill 1905 that there should be ‘as large an area of registrable trade marks as possible’: Select Committee on the Trade Marks Bill (n 8) q 936.

14 Trade Marks Act 1905 (UK), s 9.

15 ibid s 9(5); Re Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd [1910] 1 Ch 130 (EWCA) 145.

16 See Robert Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 1862–1969 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 19–20 and Stefan Schwarzkopf, ‘Turning Trademarks into Brands: How Advertising Agencies Practiced and Conceptualized Branding, 1890-1930’ in Teresa da Silva Lopez and Paul Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2010) 169.

17 Schwarzkopf (n 16) 168.

18 John Mercer, ‘A Mark of Distinction: Branding and Trade Mark Law in the UK from the 1860s’ (2010) 52 Business History 17, 25, 35.

19 ibid 25.

20 Patents, Designs, and Trade-marks Act 1921 (NZ).

21 These two Parts of the Register provided slightly different levels of protection for trade marks. The Trade Mark Act 1919 (UK), s 4 provided that for marks registered in Part B of the Register, a defendant could avoid an order for relief in favour of the trade mark owner in certain circumstances.

22 (1886) 33 Ch D 392 (EWCA) 395.

23 Mercer (n 18) 32–33; Thomas D Drescher, ‘The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From Signals to Symbols to Myth’ (1992) 82 Trademark Reporter 301, 335–336.

24 Ralph S Brown, ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols’ (1948) 57 Yale Law Journal 1165, 1189.

25 See Ronald A Fullerton, ‘How Modern Is Modern Marketing? Marketing’s Evolution and the “Myth of the Production Era”’ (1988) 52 Journal of Marketing 108, 114. See also Alec Davies, Package and Print: The Development of Container and Label Design (CN Potter 1968) on the development of packaging up until the early part of the 20th Century.

26 Drescher (n 23) fn 110.

27 Audrey A Horton, ‘Designs, Shapes and Colours: a Comparison of Trade Mark Law in the United Kingdom and the United States’ (1989) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 311, 312–313; Drescher (n 23) fn 110.

28 (1924) 41 RPC 658 (EWHC) 668. cf Reddaway’s Application [1914] 1 Ch 856 (EWHC) where an application was made to register a mark consisting of two blue lines and one red line of colour woven into fabric. Despite this symbol being integral to the goods rather than added to them, Warrington J, after noting the inclusive definition, held that it was a mark.

29 Board of Trade, Report of the Departmental Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Trade Marks (Cmd 4568, 1934) 7.

30 ibid 7.

31 Report of the Committee to Examine British Trade Mark Law and Practice (Cmnd 5601, 1974) 15–16.

32 [1975] 1 WLR 914 (UKHL).

33 ibid 918. See also Horton (n 27) 316.

34 [1986] RPC 421 (UKHL).

35 ibid 457.

36 Horton (n 27) 316.

37 Coca-Cola Trade Marks (n 34) 458.

38 ibid.

39 ibid 456.

40 See generally Daniel M McClure, ‘Trade Marks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought’ (1979) 69 Trademark Reporter 305 and George Pickering, Trade Marks in Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing, 1998) ch 2.

41 Andrew Griffiths, An Economic Perspective on Trade Mark Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) 37.

42 See Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Harvard University Press 1938) app E; Brown (n 24).

43 See Board of Trade, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire into the Duties, Organisation, and Arrangements of the Patent Office (C (2nd series) 5350, 1888) xi.

44 See Re Dunn’s Trade-Marks (n 3).

45 [1898] AC 571 (UKHL) 580.

46 Sidney Diamond, ‘The Public Interest and the Trade Mark System’ (1980) 62 Journal of Patent Office Society 528, 532.

47 York Trade Mark [1984] RPC 231 (UKHL) 254: ‘ … in relation to certain words, of which laudatory epithets and some geographical names were established examples, traders could not obtain a monopoly in the use of such words (however distinctive) … ’.

48 Andrew Brown and Anthony Grant, The Law of Intellectual Property (Butterworths 1989) 14–15.

49 Mario Franzosi, ‘What is a Trade Mark?—a Challenge to the House of Lords’ (1987) 9 European Intellectual Property Review 63, 63.

50 Christopher Morcom, ‘The Trade Marks Act 1938—Twenty Years of Decisions of the House of Lords’ (1994) 16 European Intellectual Property Review 67, 73.

51 Trade Marks Act 1905 (UK), s 9.

52 ibid; Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK), s 9(3).

53 Joseph Crosfield (n 15) 145.

54 Passing off jurisprudence had shown the courts were prepared to intervene where consumers were being misled by the use of symbols, even in cases involving wholly descriptive words, see Reddaway v Banham (1896) AC 199 (UKHL). Also later under the law of passing off, for example, it was recognised that traders could acquire a protectable goodwill associated with the shape and design of a container: Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341 (UKHL).

55 Joseph Crosfield (n 15).

56 ibid 149.

57 ibid 143.

58 ibid 148.

59 ibid 151.

60 ibid 149 (Fletcher Moulton LJ), 153 (Farwell LJ).

61 ibid 142.

62 (1913) 30 RPC 660 (UKHL).

63 Re Applications of W & G Du Cros Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 644 (EWCA) 653.

64 du Cros (n 61) 670.

65 ibid 672.

66 ibid.

67 ibid 673. Lord Parker found that other individuals or a firm may legitimately desire to use a mark consisting of their own initials, such as William Green or Wallace Graham.

68 Re Auto-strop Safety Razor Company (1912) 32 NZLR 666 (New Zealand Supreme Court (NZSC)); Re Bengal Iron and Steel Company (1914) 33 NZLR 877 (NZSC); Re Clark & Co (Ltd) (1912) 32 NZLR 690 (NZSC); Re Millhoff & Co (Ltd) (1915) 34 NZLR 948 (NZSC). Note the Supreme Court was renamed as the High Court in 1980.

69 Bengal Iron (n 67).

70 ibid 881.

71 ibid 882.

72 [1954] 1 WLR 554 (UKHL) 560–561 (Lord Asquith of Bishopstone), 562 (Lord Cohen).

73 ibid 561.

74 WELDMESH Trade Mark [1966] RPC 220 (EWCA) 228.

75 York Trade Mark (n 46).

76 ibid 254.

77 ibid.

78 Duckworth, Turner and Company Limited v Commissioner of Trade Marks [1959] NZLR 1341 (NZSC) 1344; Dollar Rent A Car Systems Inc v Commissioner of Patents, Trade Marks & Designs High Court Wellington AP121/97, 24 March 1998, 9.

79 Bestform Foundations Incorporated v Commissioner of Trade Marks [1957] NZLR 574 (NZSC) 578.

80 ibid 578, using wording from Re Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd’s Application (1942) 59 RPC 134 (EWHC).

81 See generally Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment? (Auckland University Press, 1995).

82 ibid 85. See further Paul Daziel, ‘The Economic Summit: What Were People Thinking’ in Brian Easton (ed), The Making of Rogernomics (Auckland University Press 1989) 53.

83 ibid 46–52.

84 See Brian Easton, ‘From Reaganomics to Rogernomics’ in Alan E Bollard (ed), The Influence on American Economics on New Zealand Thinking and Policy (NZIER Research Paper 1989).

85 On the differences between the ‘Harvard School’ and ‘Chicago School’ see Roger J Van den Bergh and Peter D Camesaca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 79.

86 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th edn, Wolter Kluwer, 2014) 40–41.

87 William Landes and Richard Posner, ‘Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective’ (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265. See also Griffiths (n 40) 125–131.

88 Kelsey (n 80) 100.

89 Law Commission, Intellectual Property: The Context for Reform (NZLCR 13, 1990) 10; Peter A Gorringe, ‘An Economic Perspective on Trademark Law’ (April 1988).

90 Lee McCabe, ‘The Economics of Property Rights, Intellectual Property and Canadian Copyright and Patent Law Reform’, in Law Commission, Intellectual Property: The Context for Reform (n 88) 113.

91 Ministry of Commerce, Reform of the Trade Marks Act 1953: Proposed Recommendations (1991) citing Landes and Posner (n 86) 267.

92 (n 86) 274.

93 ibid 290.

94 Ministry of Commerce (n 90) 5–6.

95 ibid 6. This was consistent with the concept of functionality discussed by Landes and Posner (n 86) 297–299.

96 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (opened for signature 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299.

97 See generally Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2011) 68–74.

98 Irene Calboli and Christine Haight Farley, ‘The Trademark Provisions in the TRIPs Agreement’ in Carlos M Correa and Adulqawi A Yusuf (eds), The Trademark Provisions in the TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International, 2016) 159–160.

99 See Annette Kur, ‘TRIPs and Trademark Law’ in Fredrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPs: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (VCH, 1996) 100.

100 ibid 100.

101 Trade Marks Amendment Act 1994, s 2.

102 Trade Mark Amendment Act 1999, s 2.

103 See John Hackett, ‘The Money of Colour Argument: Has Anything Really Changed?’ (1999) 2 New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal 139.

104 See Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v Cadbury Confectionery Ltd and Horizon Biscuit Co Ltd [2002] NZIPOTM 45 (New Zealand Intellectual Property Office (IPONZ)); Phillips Electronics NV [2003] NZIPOTM 29 (IPONZ); Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v Cadbury Confectionery Ltd and Effem Foods Ltd [2005] NZIPOTM 14 (IPONZ).

105 Explanatory Note to the Trade Marks Bill 2001 (142-1), 1.

106 ibid.

107 ibid.

108 Commerce Select Committee, Report on the Trade Marks Bill 2001 (2002) 6, 8.

109 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [1989] OJ L40/1 (now superseded by Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJ L336/1 (European Trade Marks Directive 2015)).

110 ibid art 2.

111 See Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Reform of Trade Marks Law White Paper’ (Cmd 1203, 1990) 6–7, discussing the background to the enactment of the European Directive.

112 Trade Marks Act 2002, s 5: sign ‘includes a brand, colour, device, heading, label, letter, name, numeral, shape, signature, smell, sound, taste, ticket, or word; and any combination of signs’.

113 Ministry of Economic Development, Clause by Clause Analysis of Submissions on the Trade Mark Bill (26 November 2001) 9.

114 (2006) 11 TCLR 751 (New Zealand Court of Appeal (NZCA)) (Fredco Court of Appeal).

115 ibid [39]–[42].

116 For examples of cases referring to European trade mark jurisprudence, see Leisureworld Ltd v Elite Fitness Equipment Ltd High Court Auckland CIV 2006-404-3499, 21 July 2006 (meaning of consent) and Metalman New Zealand Ltd v Scrapman BOP Ltd [2014] NZHC 2028 (NZHC) (meaning of genuine use).

117 Case C-49/02 [2004] ECR I-06129 [24].

118 Case C-321/03 [2007] ECR I-00687.

119 ibid [38].

120 ibid [39].

121 There have not been any New Zealand cases, though, where a ‘sign’ has fallen foul of the graphic representation requirement under Trade Marks Act 2002, s 5. However, in Kellogg Company v Société des Produits Nestlé SA [2019] NZIPOTM 17 (IPONZ) an argument was raised about the clarity of a graphic representation under reg 42 of the Trade Mark Regulations 2003. The applicant had filed an application comprising six images of a 3D shape for ‘breakfast cereal’. It was also argued that the application was contrary to s 32 of the Trade Marks Act 2002 because the application comprised several different signs.

122 Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, ‘Practice Guidelines: Absolute Grounds Distinctiveness’ <www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/trade-marks/practice-guidelines/current/absolute-grounds-distinctiveness/> accessed 8 August 2019. See for example Ty Nant Spring Water Ltd’s Trade Mark Application [2000] RPC 55 (EWHC).

123 Case R 215/1998-3 Carrier Corporation’s Application [2000] ETMR 234 (OHIM Third Board of Appeal) [11], referred to in Coombe v Coca-Cola Amatil (New Zealand) Ltd (2011) 9 NZBLC 103 (NZHC) [19].

124 Coombe (n 122) [35].

125 Procter & Gamble Ltd’s Trade Mark Applications [1999] RPC 673 (EWCA) 679 cited in AA Insurance (n 2) [66].

126 Coombe (n 122) [42].

127 Intellectual Reserve Inc v Sintes [2014] NZAR 556 (NZCA) [22], [35(a)].

128 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark [1994] OJ L11/1, art 7, now superseded by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark [2017] OJ L154/1 (European Trade Mark Regulation), art 7. These derived from the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883 (as last revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and as amended on 28 September 1979) 828 UNTS 305, art 6quinquies, B2.

129 Case C-329/02 SAT. 1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2004] ECR I-08317 [25].

130 ibid [23], [27]; Annette Kur, ‘Fundamental Concerns in the Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law’ in Graham B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds), Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2008) 161.

131 See Case C-191/01 P OHIM v Wrigley [2003] ECR I-12447 [31]; Case C-173/04 Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH & Co. Betriebs KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR I-00551 [55].

132 Kur (n 129) 161–162. cf Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-3793 [54].

133 Intellectual Reserve (n 126) [22].

134 ibid [35(c)].

135 ibid [30]. See further AA Insurance (n 2) [30].

136 Joined cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 [1999] ECR I-2779, approved in Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [68]. This guidance emphasises a multi-factorial approach to assessing acquired distinctiveness, taking into account things like the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical spread and length of the use and the amount invested in promoting the trade mark.

137 ibid [48]: when assessing acquired distinctiveness a different standard is not applied because of ‘the perceived importance of keeping the geographical name available for other undertakings’.

138 British Sugar v James Robertson & Sons [1996] RPC 281 (EWHC) 285.

139 Griffiths (n 40) 247.

140 This is consistent with some background legislative materials, see Cabinet Economic Committee, Review of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (ECO (99) 34, 1999) 3 (Appendix A): ‘ … there is no policy reason to reduce the scope of marks that can be registered’.

141 Aleem Pty Limited v Nelson Petroleum Limited [2016] NZIPOTM 8 (IPONZ) [20]. See further Rob Batty, ‘Unravelling the Distinctiveness Knot in New Zealand’s Trade Marks Act’ (2017) 23 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 36.

142 Paul Sumpter observes that there is support for the ‘at law’ bar remaining under the 2002 Act: Paul Sumpter, Intellectual Property Law: Principles in Practice (3rd edn, CCH, 2017) 172, fn 60, citing Fredco Trading v Miller (2004) 65 IPR 653 (NZHC) [34]–[35], [39] (Fredco High Court).

143 cf British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 (EWHC) 285; AD2000 Trade Mark [1997] RPC 168 (EWHC) 173; Dualit Ltd’s (Toaster Shapes) Trade Mark Applications [1999] RPC 890 (EWHC) 894.

144 Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2002] ECR I-05475.

145 [2003] EWCA Civ 48 (EWCA) [62].

146 ibid [35]. cf Starfire Publishing Ltd v Ordo Templi Orientis [2009] RPC 437 (EWHC).

147 Fredco High Court (n 141) [24]–[27].

148 Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [61].

149 Intellectual Reserve (n 126) [25]. Complicating matters further, seemingly contrary to the approach in Fredco, in AA Insurance (n 2) [24], Williams J suggested that terms capable of distinguishing and distinctive character are synonymous where a mark is filed on the basis of intended use. Williams J offered no direct observations on whether a legal bar existed to the registration of certain signs, however, his suggestion that where there is prior use, a mark may be capable of distinguishing on the basis of prior use, suggests that all signs are capable of being registered if they are factually able to distinguish.

150 For a suggestion, see Batty, ‘The Distinctive Knot’ (n 140).

151 ‘Practice Guidelines’ (n 121) [2.2].

152 See Batty, ‘The Distinctive Knot’ (n 140) fn 129, noting that in Aleem v Nelson Petroleum (n 140) the Assistant Commissioner was considering an application to register MINI-TANKERS for industrial oils, greases, fuels and lubricants and related services. The Assistant Commissioner found (at [25]), that on balance, the application was not barred by s 18(1)(a). However, she commented that the balance was ‘a fine one’.

153 See for example, Canadian Trade Marks Acts 1985, s 13(2) and Singapore Trade Marks Act (Chapter 332, Revised Edition 2005), s 7(3).

154 See Kellogg Co v National Biscuit Co 305 US 111 (1938) (United States Supreme Court (USSC)); Qualitex Co v Jacobson Products Co, 514 US 159 (1995) (USSC); TrafFix Devices, Inc v Marketing Displays, Inc, 532 US 23 (2001) (USSC).

155 Lanham Act § 2(e); 15 USC § 1052(e)(5).

156 TrafFix Devices (n 153) 33: ‘Functionality having been established, whether MDI’s dual-spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be considered’.

157 456 US 844 (1982) (USSC) 850, fn 10.

158 Justin Hughes, ‘Non-Traditional Trademarks and the Dilemma of Aesthetic Functionality’ in Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben (eds), The Protection of Non-Traditional Trademarks (Oxford University Press 2018) 107–109.

159 Qualitex (n 153).

160 ibid 165. Clarified in TrafFix Devices (n 153) 33.

161 Malaco Leaf AB v Promotion in Motion, Inc 287 F Supp 2D 355 (SDNY 2003) (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York) (cited from Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Law and Policy (3rd edn, Aspen Publishers, 2010) 221).

162 Re Florists’ Transworld Delivery Inc 106 USPQ2d 1784 (TTAB 2013) (United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board).

163 Hughes (n 157) 114.

164 ibid 112–113.

165 European Trade Marks Directive 2015 (n 108).

166 European Trade Mark Regulation (n 127).

167 Koninklijke Philips (n 143) [78].

168 ibid.

169 Case C-48/09 Lego Juris A/S v OHIM [2010] ECR I-08403 [45].

170 Case C-205/13 EU:C:2014:2233.

171 C Ramirez-Montes, ‘Louboutin Heels and the Competition Goals of EU Trade Mark Law’ (2019) 38 UIC Review of Intellectual Property 38, 42.

172 Uma Suthersanen, ‘Excluding Designs (and Shape Marks): Where is the EU Court of Justice Going?’ (2019) 50 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 157, 159.

173 Hauck (n 169), [31]–[32].

174 Trade Marks Bill 2001 (142-1), cl 18(1)(e).

175 Commerce Select Committee (n 107) 4.

176 James Mellor and others, Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (16th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) 323.

177 Case C-218/01 Henkel KGaA [2004] ECR I-01725 [52].

178 Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Samara Bros Inc 529 US 205 (2000) (USSC) 213.

179 Sistema Plastics Limited [2008] NZIPOTM 23 (IPONZ).

180 Buteline Industries Limited [2016] NZIPOTM 24 (IPONZ).

181 The language used in Fredco High Court (n 141) [27], [41].

182 NYDJ Apparel, LLC v Commissioner of Trade Marks [2014] NZHC 2678 (NZHC) [19]; The Coca-Cola Company v Frucor Soft Drinks Ltd [2013] NZHC 3282 (NZHC) [133]: ‘The fact that a feature of an article may have a functional purpose does not however mean that that feature cannot also serve as a trade mark’ (in the context of determining infringement). See also J H Whittaker & Sons Limited v Empire Confectionery Limited [2015] NZIPOTM 4 (IPONZ).

183 Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [36]–[37].

184 cf Philips Electronics NV v Remington [1999] RPC 809 (EWCA) 818, where Aldous LJ said no matter how much use there had been of certain signs there was a need for some ‘capricious alteration’ for a sign to be considered one that was capable of distinguishing.

185 British Sugar (n 137) 305.

186 See Lego Juris (n 168), [53]–[60].

187 Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [38].

188 ibid.

189 ibid [73].

190 See Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ) s 17(1)(c) which probhits the registration of trade marks that would be ‘likely to offend a significant section of the community, including Māori’.

191 A similar point is made by Lisa Ramsey, ‘Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment’ (2003) 70 Tennessee Law Review 1095, 1150. See also Lotte Anemaet, ‘The Public Domain Is Under Pressure—Why We Should Not Rely on Empirical Data When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness’ (2016) 47 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 303, on ‘dsyfunctional incentives’.

192 Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 611, 613. See also Robert Burrell, Huw Beverley Smith and Allison Coleman, ‘Three-Dimensional Trade Marks: Should the Directive Be Reshaped?’ in Norma Dawson and Alison Firth (eds), Trade Marks Retrospective (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) 141.

193 Intellectual Reserve (n 126) [15].

194 Ramsey, ‘Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment’ (n 190) 1150.

195 New Zealand Trade Mark Registration No 211576.

196 New Zealand Trade Mark Registration No 1012864.

197 Jeremy Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford University Press, 2003) 104–106.

198 ibid 105.

199 See Griffiths, ‘Modernising Trade Mark Law’ (n 5); Phillips (n 196) 105; Case C-383/99 Procter & Gamble Company v OHIM [2001] ECR I-6251 [48] (Opinion of AG Jacobs).

200 Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326 (Australian Federal Court), referred to in Mainland Products Ltd v Bonlac Foods (NZ) Ltd [1998] 3 NZLR 341 (NZCA) where it was held that the use of ‘vintage’ for cheese did not fall within the defence of bona fide descriptive use under s 12 of the Trade Marks Act 1953.

201 See further Paul Sumpter, ‘What Exactly Does a Registered Trade Mark Protect? A Fresh Look at the “Use as a Trade Mark” Defence’ (2008) 14 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 255.

202 See Qualitex (n 153) 165.

203 The London Taxi Corp Ltd v Fraser-Nash Research Ltd [2016] EWHC 52 (EWHC) [199], citing Hauck (n 169) (Opinion of AG Szpunar).

204 Thomas J McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks (4th edn, Thomson Reuters, 2014) 1–3, citing Eastern Wine Corp v Winslow-Warren Ltd 137 F.2d 955 (US Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir 1943) 958.

205 Commerce Act 1986 (NZ), s 1A.

206 Burrell, Smith and Coleman (n 191) 144.

207 Barton Beebe and Jeanne C Fromer, ‘Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion’ (2018) 131 Harvard Law Review 945.

208 ibid 1021–1025, 1028–1029.

209 See Rob Batty, ‘Is New Zealand’s Trade Marks Law Out of Shape?’ (2011) 35 European Intellectual Property Review 281, 285–286.

210 For example, Intercity Group (New Zealand) Ltd v NakedBus New Zealand Ltd [2014] NZHC 124, [2014] 3 NZLR 177 (NZHC) (use of ‘inter city’ in relation to bus transport services). cf in the context of shapes, Philips Electronics NV v Remington (n 183) 824.

211 Tasman Insulation New Zealand Ltd v Knauf Insulation Ltd [2015] NZCA 602, [2016] 3 NZLR 145 (NZCA) [200].

212 Mainland (n 199) 351.

213 The Trade Marks Act 2002 provides that infringement can only occur where a person uses ‘in the course of trade’ a sign contrary to s 89(1)(a)–(d).

214 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ‘Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation’ (1990) 65 Notre Dame Law Review 397.

215 Senftlben (n 6) 777.

216 Lisa Ramsey, ‘Non-Traditional Trademarks and Inherently Valuable Expression’ in Calboli and Senftleben (eds) (n 157) 337.

217 Henry E Smith, ‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 453, 454.

218 Henry E Smith, ‘Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information’ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1742, 1746.

219 Case C-273/00 [2002] ECR I-11737 [36] (Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer).

220 Carleton Kemp Allen, ‘Things’ (1940) 28 California Law Review 421, 422.

221 ibid. See also Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 (Australian High Court).

222 Sieckmann (n 218).

223 ibid [51].

224 ibid [55].

225 ibid.

226 Longer term and, as European trade mark law has now recognised, the requirement for the representation of a sign to be in graphic form under the 2002 Act could be relaxed to allow other forms of precise representation without detracting from the rationale of the requirement. See Annette Kur, Reto Hilty and Roland Knaak, Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2011) 67; European Trade Marks Directive 2015 (n 108) art 3(b).

227 As in Société Des Produits Nestlé SA v Cadbury UK Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1174 (EWCA) and JW Spear & Son Ltd & Ors v Zynga Inc [2013] EWCA Civ (EWCA).

228 See Batty, ‘The Distinctive Knot’ (n 140), drawing on David Keeling, ‘About Kinetic Watches, Easy Banking and Nappies that Keep a Baby Dry: A Review of Recent European Case Law on Absolute Grounds for Refusal to Register Trade Marks’ (2003) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 131.

229 As noted in Starfire (n 145) [90].

230 Paul Sumpter, Trade Marks in Practice (4th edn, LexisNexis, 2018) 65.

231 [2017] EWCA 358 (EWCA).

232 Case C-215/14 Société de Produits Nestlé SA v Cadbury United Kingdom Ltd EU:C:2015:604.

233 (n 230) [77] (Kitchen LJ).

234 ibid [105] (Floyd LJ).

235 A possibility raised by the Australian Productivity Commission, ‘Intellectual Property Arrangements’ (Inquiry Report no 78, 2016) 384.

236 Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, ‘Practice Guidelines: Disclaimers’ <www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/trade-marks/practice-guidelines/current/disclaimers/> accessed 13 August 2019, citing Re Australian Airlines Ltd (1991) 20 IPR 270 (Australian Patent Office) and Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s 69 (note the Practice Guidelines provide a different citation to the Re Australian Airlines case).

237 Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s 71. See Intellectual Reserve (n 126) and NYDJ Apparel (n 181).

238 James Bessen and Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Princeton University Press 2008) 46.

239 Trade Marks Act 2002 (NZ), s 3(a).

240 Sieckmann (n 218) [48].

241 Joseph Crosfield (n 15) 141.

242 See David Orozco and James Conley, ‘Shape of Things to Come’ <online.wsj.com/article/SB121018802603674487.html> accessed 13 August 2019; Dev S Gangjee, ‘Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and Enforcement’ in Calboli and Senftleben (eds) (n 157) 59.

243 See Peter Birks, ‘The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership’ [1985] Acta Juridica 1, 9 on ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ techniques in Roman Law for ensuring access to tangible things.

244 See Batty, ‘Is New Zealand’s Trade Marks Law Out of Shape?’ (n 208); Julia Baird, ‘The Registrability of Functional Shape Marks’ (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 218; Mark Davison, ‘Shape Trade Marks: The Role and Relevance of Functionality and Aesthetics in Determining Their Registrability’ (2004) 15 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 106.

245 Michael Handler, ‘Disentangling Functionality, Distinctiveness and Use in Australian Trade Mark Law’ (2018) 42 Melbourne University Law Review 55.

246 ibid 105–106.

247 Koninklijke Philips (n 143), [81], [83].

248 See for instance in Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [38].

249 See Julius Sämann Ltd v Tetrosyl Ltd [2006] EWHC 529 (Ch) (EWHC) [100]; The London Taxi Corp (n 202) [209].

250 Handler (n 244) 113.

251 ibid 108.

252 ibid 113.

253 ibid 104.

254 Ramsey, ‘Non-Traditional Trademarks and Inherently Valuable Expression’ (n 215) 359.

255 See Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, ‘Patent Examination Manual: Section 11: Computer Programs’ <www.iponz.govt.nz/about-ip/patents/examination-manual/current/computer-programs/> accessed 13 August 2019.

256 Lego Juris (n 168) [53]–[60]. cf Fredco Court of Appeal (n 113) [38].

257 See Coombe (n 122) [20].

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Notes on contributors

Rob Batty

The author is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland.