Navigating the Af-Pak arena: India-US relations under the Trump administration

ABSTRACT

The gradual elevation of India-US relations over the past few decades highlights a significant convergence of interests, a similarity in dominant political discourse and a converging geopolitical environment that has aided this elevation. This article explores engagements between India and the US within the Af-Pak arena, reflected in policy discourse and public pronouncements in both countries. It does so through a critical discourse analysis and examination of personal, national interest, and broader structural calculations that have driven Indian and American policy engagement reflected in their policy positions with regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The gradual elevation of India-US relations over the past few decades indicates a convergence of interests, a similarity in dominant political discourse amid a converging geopolitical environment. Significant advances were made in India-US bilateral engagements in the George Bush-Manmohan Singh era, and subsequent political administrations in India and the US have worked to increase the level of political, economic, and strategic cooperation.¹ The legacy of the Cold War with the US proclivity for Pakistan over India meant that Indian foreign policy elite had to overcome the historical distrust toward the US. Subsequent politics following the Indian nuclear tests in the 1990s, while initially leading to sanctions by the US, created preconditions for India-US dialogue which gained new momentum with India’s rising economic potential. The common threat from a rising and aggressive China, and the resultant structural imperatives have further brought India and the US closer.² There was recognition in the US that India is a “possible strategic bulwark against an increasingly assertive China”³ – a new reality that both the Obama administration and the subsequent government led by President Donald Trump took cognizance of in their dealing with India.

Through an examination of a broad range of official documents including political speeches and statements, and various other proclamations by Trump and other influential political actors, this essay investigates India-US dynamics in the Af-Pak region. It offers an exploration of the India-US relationship under Trump through Singer’s levels of analysis framework.⁴ The consideration of individual (focus on the leader or decision-maker), domestic (the state, interest/lobby groups, media and public opinion among others), and systemic factors (the distribution of power in the international system) is a useful framework within which India-US relations will be examined.

Under the Trump presidency, the bilateral relationship between India and the US further evolved into a dynamic defense and strategic partnership.⁵ As argued by other contributors in this special issue, the Trump administration placed significant emphasis on India’s role in the Indo-Pacific and India emerged as a meaningful partner of the US. Indian policymakers, however, had to navigate the unpredictable trajectory of Trump’s politics and India’s national security ambitions, visible in disagreements regarding trade and Trump’s problematic immigration policies. India-US relations were also complicated by Trump’s public pronouncements and political objectives in South Asia. An arena where the convergence between India-US relations was tested is the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region,⁶ particularly during the Trump years.

India and the US under Trump were broadly in agreement over Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism, specifically on the subject of terror financing. The US under Trump, aided by the personal rapport between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump (explicated by Singer’s first level of analysis) also achieved significant US reticence on India’s policies in Kashmir (albeit not uniformly). Additionally, increasing contacts between Indian and US defense and strategic actors (explained by Singer’s second level of analysis) further strengthened the bilateral relationship.⁷ Notable government officials within the Trump administration including the first Secretary of Defense James Mattis, first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo who succeeded Tillerson, played an active role in recognizing the strategic significance of India as a partner for the US in Afghanistan. In India, the role of policy elites including former External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, succeeded by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has been crucial to continue to draw attention on India’s strategic interests in the region, including but not limited to highlighting Pakistan’s role in terrorism. The US and India were also broadly in agreement on the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, yet this remained an arena where the convergence between India-US relations continued to be tried. Structural calculations and domestic factors including public opinion and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan also led to divergences, particularly on the future of Afghanistan and the salience of Pakistan to the US’s disentanglement strategy in Afghanistan.

Dealing with Pakistan

Donald Trump’s presidency reflected a change in the US policy toward Pakistan – although this change was not uniform. US-Pakistan bilateral relations were strained for the first two years of the administration, but a more positive relationship developed in the later part of the Trump presidency, owing to the Trump administration’s need for cooperation with Pakistan on the Afghan peace process. Between 2016 and 2018, there was a noticeable reassessment of US-Pakistan relations under Trump with heightened concerns regarding Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorist organizations – a concern that the US shares with India.⁸ The Indian leadership, making use of the public camaraderie between Trump and Modi and elite connections between India and the US actively drew American attention toward terrorism supported by Pakistan, urging the US to take stricter action and to reconsider its relationship with Pakistan. In September 2017, for instance, in a veiled comment on Pakistan during a visit to India, Mattis stated “there can be no tolerance of terrorist safe havens.”⁹ This sentiment was expressed more openly by Tillerson in October 2017, when he said, “we expect Pakistan to take decisive action against terrorist groups based within their own borders that threaten their own people and the broader region.”¹⁰

In an open validation for Indian concerns, in 2017, much to the delight of India, while recognizing Pakistan as a “valued partner,” Trump was publicly critical about Pakistan’s support to terrorism when he said,

We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban,

and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists.¹¹

In a further reiteration of his position, in January 2018, he commented, that “American governments had over the last 15 years ‘foolishly’ given 33 billion dollars in aid to Islamabad that gave ‘safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan.’”¹² India welcomed Trump’s tough message to Pakistan, saying that “our stand is vindicated as far as the role of Pakistan is concerned in perpetrating terrorism.”¹³ Reflecting significant convergence with Indian interests, subsequently, in 2018, the US suspended its military assistance payments, military sales and led the way for the inclusion of Pakistan in the “grey-list” at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).¹⁴ In December 2019, at the US-India 2 + 2 dialogue in Washington, DC, the Indian foreign policy establishment now led by Jaishankar and a new Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, strongly reiterated India’s position against Pakistan and its continuing involvement with terror.¹⁵ Reflecting on the convergence in the Indian and US perspective on this issue, in his address to the media, Jaishankar noted that, “with regard to Pakistan, what we heard was very clear position from the American side which was for them to take immediate, sustained and irreversible action regarding the fact that territory under their control is being used for terrorism.”¹⁶

Pakistan’s relationship with the US, however, remained steady, albeit problematic. It was crucial for American objectives in Afghanistan – both during the early period of the war against terrorism and particularly after the US initiated its plans to withdraw from Afghanistan. There was, it is argued, a calculation that “an [American] exit out of Afghanistan would not come via a military victory,”¹⁷ making Pakistan essential to a future peace process in Afghanistan. Domestically as well, as has been argued elsewhere, opinions were no longer in favor of continued involvement in the war in Afghanistan and there was a bipartisan consensus that the US should withdraw from Afghanistan.¹⁸ A survey of domestic public opinion in 2019 also indicated that 58% US veterans and 59% members of the public felt, that “the war in Afghanistan was not worth fighting.”¹⁹

Subsequently, therefore, on the request and encouragement of the US, Pakistan hosted the leadership of the Afghan Taliban as well as the Haqqani Network and played a critical role in facilitating dialogue between these groups and the Americans.²⁰ In a major blow to India, Trump initiated a dialogue with the Taliban in 2020 with significant concessions to Pakistan including renewed military cooperation and a calculated silence in the review meeting of the FATF in 2020. There appeared as others have argued, a rediscovery of “convergence of interests” between the US and Pakistan.²¹ Further, as India-Pakistan relations deteriorated, Trump’s unpredictable statements raised concerns in India. In February 2019, following the escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan and the cross-border aerial confrontation, Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to help resolve the Kashmir issue – an offer he argued to have made on Modi’s request – something that India denied vehemently.²² He repeated his offer in September 2019 and suggested mediation in the India-China border conflict in May 2020 as well.²³ He even suggested that he would deserve the Nobel Peace Prize should he succeed in contributing to such a resolution.²⁴

While US-Pakistan strategic ties continued to worry India, these concerns were overshadowed by the burgeoning US-India strategic and defense partnership, and the Modi government’s active engagement with Trump. The focus on the leaders as well as strategic elites, can explain why the US under Trump expressed a muted response to the Indian government’s assertive approach in Jammu and Kashmir, culminating in the revocation of Kashmir’s constitutional autonomy and reorganization of the state in August 2019. In separate phone conversations with Modi and Imran Khan, Trump conveyed “the importance of reducing tensions” but did not go further.²⁵ This was despite attempts by Pakistan to draw attention to the Indian state’s actions in the disputed territory.²⁶ As argued elsewhere in this collection, Trump also failed to comment on the Delhi riots that broke out on the eve of his trip to India in February 2020 in the backdrop of another controversial policy initiative of the Modi government, namely the Citizenship Amendment Act.²⁷

Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The dynamics in Afghanistan have also reflected the India-Pakistan proxy war, further exacerbated by Afghanistan’s landlocked status and an environment of conflict and political instability.²⁸ Since 2002, India has been an active stakeholder in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, investing nearly US$3 billion in developmental assistance. It was involved in infrastructure development notably the Salma Dam in Herat, the Zaranj-Delaram highway on the border with Iran and the Afghan parliament house in Kabul. As an aid provider, India contributed to educational and infrastructure capacity building in Afghanistan, and to the logistical support and training to Afghan defense forces. The Indian government also extended its diplomatic presence beyond Kabul and Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence agency, was also known to have allied with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in the years before 2001.²⁹

The unpredictable nature of Trump’s political discourse was also reflected in his pronouncements and policy ramifications on Afghanistan resulting in divergences between India and the US. Despite the initial signaling that was critical of Pakistan’s role in the region, Trump’s policy shifted, testing the convergence of India-US interests in rebuilding Afghanistan. At one level, while India and the US were in agreement with regards to the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the US was largely appreciative of Indian involvement, in 2017, Trump stated, “India makes billions of dollars in trade with the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.”³⁰ The joint statement concluded during Modi’s visit to the US in June 2017 also announced that Washington would co-sponsor the India-Afghanistan Export, Trade and Investment Fair in September 2017.³¹ Yet, in another statement, Trump called into question the significance of Indian developmental projects noting, “And we’re supposed to say, ‘Oh, thank you for the library.’ I don’t know who’s using it in Afghanistan.”³² Despite the developing partnership and the public show of affection between Modi and Trump, India did not respond well to Trump’s dismissal of Indian projects in Afghanistan or heed to American demands to send troops to Afghanistan.³³ Yet, the role of individuals and domestic political elites that were encouraging a closer US-India relationship remained important in managing the relationship despite the volatility of Trump’s rhetoric. Days after Trump’s pronouncements, Modi and Trump spoke and “agreed to continue to work together for further strengthening India-US bilateral relations in 2019.”³⁴

Despite its cultivated goodwill, however, India remained conspicuously absent from political negotiations in Afghanistan. India’s reluctance to engage actively with the Taliban conflicted with US strategic interests that desired a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan. This contributed to Pakistan’s centrality to the Afghan conflict for the US under Trump. In a setback to Indian interests in Afghanistan, in February 2020, the US signed the Doha agreement with the Taliban, according to which, the majority of US troops were to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2021.³⁵ Further, the agreement concluded that sections of the Taliban could be expected to play a larger role in Afghan politics.³⁶ The agreement was a product of lengthy negotiations led by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leadership including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was released from a Pakistani prison in 2018. It was signed in the presence of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo along with a large group of Taliban representatives, whose presence was a direct result of Pakistan’s involvement.

For India, this agreement was of significant concern as Indian assets in Afghanistan were targeted by the Haqqani group.³⁷ India’s investments in Afghanistan also relied on the relative stability assured by the presence of US-led troops. The official Indian position on reconciliation in Afghanistan also differed from the American strategy. India was in favor of “an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled process for enduring peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.”³⁸ In addition to the impact on India-led economic projects in Afghanistan, the Indian government was more acutely concerned about the changing political leadership in Afghanistan – one that would likely be more amenable to Pakistan’s interests. India’s troubled history with a Taliban led Afghanistan led to renewed fears that Afghanistan would once again become Pakistan’s partner in promoting terrorism within Indian territory, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Outlining Indian concerns, India’s Chief of Army Staff, General MM Naravane said, “What we can say and learn from the past is that when the previous Taliban regime was in power, that time, definitely we had foreign terrorists of Afghan origin in Jammu and Kashmir.”³⁹ While Trump reportedly provided Prime Minister Modi with certain “guarantees” during his visit to India in 2020, regarding Taliban reconciliation, Indian concerns remained.⁴⁰

For the US however, domestic political interests and larger strategic calculations favored a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan.⁴¹ As Trump noted soon after the Doha agreement was signed, “‘Everybody’s tired of war,’ adding that the 18-year conflict in Afghanistan, America’s longest-running war, has ‘been a particularly long and gruesome one.’”⁴² On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced, “We will implement President Trump’s orders to continue our repositioning of forces” from Afghanistan and that 2,500 US forces would remain in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021.”⁴³ On January 15, 2021, Acting Secretary Miller confirmed that the number of US troops in Afghanistan had reached 2,500.⁴⁴ The US began withdrawing forces before the February 2020 Doha agreement was reached and continued to do so afterward, despite American assertions that Taliban violence and other actions were inconsistent with the agreement.⁴⁵

Soon after the Doha agreement was signed, Khalilzad encouraged India to engage with the Taliban and “directly discuss its concerns related to terrorism,” adding that Washington wants New Delhi to “take on a more active role in the Afghan peace process.”⁴⁶ Amid speculation about a belated dialogue track with the Taliban, India’s approach was to focus particularly on the sanctioning of Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, ISI, for its support to the Taliban.⁴⁷ In August 2021, in a military operation that surprised most, the Taliban regained control in Afghanistan, putting an end to the American presence in the country.

The drawdown of US presence in Afghanistan encouraged by the Trump presidency has also enabled a growing role for China that has increased its engagement with Afghanistan. Since 2014, Beijing has participated in trilateral (US, China, and Afghanistan) and quadrilateral meetings on Afghanistan (US, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) and has pledged $327 million in economic aid to Kabul through 2017. China’s increasing presence in Afghanistan is particularly concerning for India – owing to close China-Pakistan relations and increasing confrontation on the India-China border. India is also concerned with the “security vacuum” created by American withdrawal that has resulted in the rise of the “Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), a branch of the self-proclaimed Islamic State operating in South Asia and Central Asia.”⁴⁸

Conclusion

India-US relations have undoubtedly developed significantly during the Trump administration.⁴⁹ While the national interest calculations of India and the US with regards to Afghanistan and Pakistan have differed, systemic pressures due to China’s rise and the desire to counter China’s role in the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become an area of strategic convergence – as reflected in the Quadrilateral dialogue and critical US-India strategic engagements. The personal affinity between Modi and Trump played an important role in deepening India-US relations and was reflected in increased US tolerance for Indian political objectives in Kashmir, to the detriment of Pakistan’s preferences. Trump’s unpredictable behavior, reflected in offers of mediation between India and Pakistan or criticism of Indian aid to Afghanistan, however problematic, was also managed well by a foreign policy elite in both India and the US, who saw the benefit of maintaining continuing in policy and in recognizing the strategic convergence that brought the US and India closer.

While at one level, the US’s unwillingness to comment and critique the Modi government’s controversial domestic policies was a win for diplomacy and the closeness between the leaders – it was also driven by the desire by both to benefit domestically and was aided significantly by the geopolitical significance accorded to India in American political calculations. Larger structural imperatives that relied on encouraging India as a regional power meant that it was not in the interests of the US to highlight concerns with regards to democratic problems in India. In the Af-Pak arena, however, Indian and American calculations have diverged. Despite the stated convergence on Pakistan’s negative influence in the region, the American desire for a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan meant maintaining Pakistan’s salience to the Afghan dialogue and enabling and legitimizing the Taliban in Afghanistan – heightening India’s security concerns. Unfolding developments in Afghanistan are also reflective of the diminishing US interest in an area that is crucial for India’s strategic interests.

Initiatives put in place by the Trump government have been largely upheld by the Biden administration since January 2021. Honoring the Doha agreement brokered by Trump, the Biden presidency completed the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Owing to the American military withdrawal, the strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan has weakened, and Pakistan’s importance for American initiatives in Afghanistan has ended. This has provided a stronger platform for Indian emphasis on terrorism emanating from Pakistan. India remains a critical partner for the US, “at the very top of Washington’s list of strategic priorities”⁵⁰ and connections cultivated between domestic policy elites have endured. The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, creates complications and indicates a dissonance in India-US strategies in the Af-Pak arena. It remains unclear how India will reconcile its relationship with the Taliban and salvage existing projects in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the US has also presented to India a challenging regional security landscape with heightened India-Pakistan tensions, and, of course, India-China acrimony. Indian security concerns regarding the Taliban have resurfaced with the attack on the Karta-e-Parwan Gurudwara (Sikh temple) in Kabul on June 18, 2022, raising questions about any possible future Indian presence in Afghanistan.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ For more on the elevation of India-US relations since the Cold War see: Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Waiting for America: India and the United States in the New Millennium. (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2002); S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of US-India relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the future.” Asian Survey, 47:4, 2007, 642–656; R. Chaudhuri, Forged in crisis: India and the United States since 1947. (Oxford University Press, 2014).

² A. J. Tellis, & R. D. Blackwill, “The India Dividend: New Delhi remains Washington’s Best Hope in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 98:5, 2019, 173–183.

³ Sumit Ganguly, “Obama, Trump and Indian foreign policy under Modi”, International Politics, 59, 2022, 9–23.

⁴ David J. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics, 14: 1, 1961, 77–92. For a detailed discussion on Singer’s level of analysis, see the introduction to the special issue.

⁵ Jason A. Kirk, “India’s Season of Discontent: U.S.-India Relations through the Prism of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak’ Policy, Year One.” Asian Affairs, 37: 3, 2010, 147–66.

⁶ “Af-Pak” is a policy approach introduced by the Obama administration which regarded Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of operation – an approach that was continued to a large degree by the Trump presidency.

⁷ Sumit Ganguly, “Obama, Trump”.

⁸ Teresita C. Schaffer, “Pakistan and the United States: A More Turbulent Ride?” Asia Policy, 23, 2017, 49–56.

⁹ Elizabeth Roche, “James Mattis in India; US commits to transfer advanced defense technology for Make in India”, Live Mint, September 26, 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/07dee1V8WtcWlYPFcFeslM/US-commits-to-transfer-advanced-defense-technology-for-Make.html.

¹⁰ Gardiner Harris, “Tillerson Hails Ties with India But Criticizes China and Pakistan.” The New York Times, October 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/politics/tillerson-india-china-pakistan.html.

¹¹ Donald Trump, “Full text: Trump’s speech on Afghanistan” August 21, 2017. Politico. (Accessed October 10, 2021).

¹² “’No More!’: Trump Says US Got Only ‘Lies’ From Pak For Billions In Aid” NDTV, January 2, 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/no-more-trump-says-us-got-only-lies-from-pak-for-billions-in-aid-1794453.

¹³ “ ‘Our Stand Vindicated,’ Says India After Trump Rips Into Pak On Terrorism” NDTV, January 2, 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/our-stand-vindicated-says-india-after-us-president-donald-trump-rips-into-pakistan-on-terrorism-1794603.

¹⁴ Abdur Rahman Shah, “The geopolitics of Pakistan’s 2018 greylisting by the Financial Action Task Force” International Journal, 76 (2), 2021.

¹⁵ Yashwant Raj, “India. US sign key defense pact, discuss cross-border terror at 2 + 2 meet”, The Hindustan

Times, December 19, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-us-sign-key-defense-pact-discuss-cross-border-terror-at-2-2-meet/story-3AvKHbw1RdvujJADEZVGKM.html, (accessed June 27, 2022).

¹⁶ Vinay Kaura, “Jaishankar says US wants Pakistan to end terrorism, but Trump has his own plans”, The Print, December 28, 2019, https://theprint.in/opinion/jaishankar-says-us-wants-pakistan-to-end-terrorism-but-trump-has-his-own-plans/341423/.

¹⁷ Madiha Afzal, “Evaluating the Trump administration’s Pakistan reset” Brookings, October 26, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/10/26/evaluating-the-trump-administrations-pakistan-reset/.

¹⁸ Rudra Chaudhuri & Shreyas Shende, “Dealing With the Taliban: India’s Strategy in Afghanistan After U.S. Withdrawal” Carnegie India Paper, June 2, 2020, https://carnegieindia.org/2020/06/02/dealing-with-taliban-india-s-strategy-in-afghanistan-after-u.s.-withdrawal-pub-81951 (accessed June 25, 2022), p. 3.

¹⁹ Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. veterans, public say the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth fighting” Pew Research Center, July 10, 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-were-not-worth-fighting/.

²⁰ Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Role in the Future of Afghanistan” ISAS Insights (National University of Singapore), No. 682. August 26, 2021, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistans-role-in-the-future-of-afghanistan/ (accessed October 9, 2021).

²¹ Sandeep Singh, Bawa Singh & Balinder Singh, “Trump’s strategy in South Asia: Afghanistan’s Gordian knot”, Global Affairs, 7:3, 2021, p. 387.

²² Al Jazeera, “US President Trump reiterates offer to mediate Kashmir crisis” September 24, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/24/us-president-trump-reiterates-offer-to-mediate-kashmir-crisis (Accessed October 11, 2021).

²³ Amy Kazmin, “Donald Trump offers to mediate in India–China Dispute”. Financial Times, May 28, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/ce361221-6f19-4e77-b83b-de6fa1bc2f0b (accessed June 27, 2022).

²⁴ Nolan Hick & Bob Fredericks. “Trump offers to mediate Kashmir dispute between Pakistan,

India. The New York Post, September 23, 2019, https://nypost.com/2019/09/23/trump-offers-to-mediate-kashmir-dispute-between-pakistan-india/ (accessed June 27, 2022).

²⁵ “Trump addresses Kashmir in call with India, Pakistan”, Deutsche Welle, August 20, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/trump-urges-restraint-on-kashmir-in-call-with-india-and-pakistan/a-50090598.

²⁶ CNN, “UN Security Council has its first meeting on Kashmir in decades – and fails to agree on a statement,” August 16, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/16/asia/un-security-council-kashmir-intl/index.html (accessed October 10, 2021).

²⁷ There were attempts in the US to criticize the Indian government for its actions in Kashmir. In December 2019, Democratic Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal introduced a resolution in the House Foreign Affairs Committee asking the Indian government to lift all restrictions in Kashmir. The resolution did gain some support but was largely incapable of bringing about any change in the official US position. Seema Sirohi, “For the Modi Government, Trouble Is Still Brewing in the US Congress”, The Wire, February 4, 2020, https://thewire.in/rights/anti-caa-activists-us-indian-americans (accessed June 27, 2022).

²⁸ Stuti Bhatnagar & Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Geopolitics of landlocked states in South Asia: a comparative analysis of Afghanistan and Nepal.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 75:1, 2020, 60–79.

²⁹ Stuti Bhatnagar, “Afghanistan’s collapse shifts strategic dynamics in South Asia” Lowy Interpreter. August 18, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghanistan-s-collapse-shift-strategic-dynamics-south-asia, (accessed August 19, 2021).

³⁰ Donald Trump, “Full text: Trump’s speech on Afghanistan”.

³¹ Sourina Bej, “What Trump’s Afghanistan Policy Means for India”, The Diplomat, July 15, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/what-trumps-afghanistan-policy-means-for-india/ (accessed June 27, 2022).

³² “‘Don’t know who’s using it’: Trump mocks PM Modi for funding library in Afghanistan” Indian Express, January 3, 2019. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/donald-trump-mocks-pm-narendra-modi-library-afghanistan-us-india-5520986/.

³³ Al Jazeera, “India responds to Trump’s ‘Afghan library’ dig at PM Modi” January 3, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/3/india-responds-to-trumps-afghan-library-dig-at-pm-modi (accessed October 11, 2021).

³⁴ “Days after Trump’s jibe at PM Modi over India’s role in Afghanistan, the two leaders discuss bilateral ties”, January 8, 2019, https://news.abplive.com/news/world/days-after-trumps-jibe-at-pm-modi-over-indias-role-in-afghanistan-the-two-leaders-discuss-bilateral-ties-891925.

³⁵ “Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”, US Department of State, February 29, 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf.

³⁶ Chaudhuri & Shende, “Dealing With the Taliban”.

³⁷ “Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Deputy leader of the Taliban, is wanted for several attacks on the Indian embassy and consulates in Afghanistan, including a suicide bombing in 2008 in which Indian diplomats were among 58 people killed, and the attack on Kabul’s Gurdwara Har Rai Saheb in 2020, in which 25 people were killed.” Suhasini Haidar, “Afghan-origin terror prime concern: India”, The Hindu, September 2, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/main-concern-is-curbing-terror-threat-from-afghanistan-india/article61422760.ece (accessed June 28, 2022).

³⁸ “India stresses on importance of ‘Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled’ peace process” Deccan Herald, July 6, 2020, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-stresses-on-importance-of-afghan-led-afghan-owned-and-afghan-controlled-peace-process-857938.html.

³⁹ “India fears Taliban fallout in Kashmir” Live Mint, October 16, 2021, https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/india-fears-taliban-fallout-in-kashmir-11634352912573.html (accessed June 27, 2022).

⁴⁰ Chaudhuri & Shende, “Dealing With the Taliban”, 12.

⁴¹ Pradeep V. Kamat, “American Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Taliban Takeover – Implications for India”, FINS India, March 21, 2022, https://finsindia.org/american-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-and-taliban-takeover-implications-for-india/ (accessed June 27, 2022).

⁴² Ryan Pickrell, “Trump says US troops will start leaving Afghanistan immediately”, Business Insider, March 1, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/news/trump-says-us-troops-will-start-leaving-afghanistan-immediately/articleshow/74421783.cms (accessed June 28, 2022).

⁴³ Department of Defense, “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq.” November 17, 2020. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2418641/acting-secretary-miller-announces-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-and-iraq/.

⁴⁴ Department of Defense, “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on Force Levels in Afghanistan”. January 15, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2473337/statement-by-acting-defense-secretary-christopher-miller-on-force-levels-in-afg/.

⁴⁵ Gibbons-Neff, T. & Mujib Mashal, M. “U.S. Is Quietly Reducing Its Troop Force in Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troop-reduction.html; K. Atwood, & R. Browne, R. “US troop drawdown in Afghanistan running ahead of schedule,” CNN, April 30, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/30/politics/us-troops-afghanistan-drawdown/index.html.

⁴⁶ “India yet to decide on issue of engaging the Taliban” Hindustan Times, May 14, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-yet-to-decide-on-issue-of-engaging-the-taliban/story-0e6T85ahCNlMHgFgitGgvM.html (accessed June 27, 2022).

⁴⁷ Abdul Basit, “Why did India open a backchannel to the Taliban?” Al Jazeera, July 7, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/7/why-did-india-open-a-backchannel-to-the-taliban, (accessed June 27, 2022).

⁴⁸ Chaudhuri & Shende, “Dealing With the Taliban”.

⁴⁹ Dhruva Jaishankar, “India and the United States in the Trump Era: Reevaluating bilateral and global relations.”, Brookings Institution, Policy Paper No. 37, June 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/india-and-the-united-states-in-the-trump-era-reevaluating-bilateral-and-global-relations/ (accessed October 9, 2021).

⁵⁰ “A Conversation With Kurt Campbell, White House Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific” Asia Society, July 6, 2021, https://asiasociety.org/video/conversation-kurt-campbell-white-house-coordinator-indo-pacific; C. Raja Mohan, “Post-American Afghanistan and India’s Geopolitics,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/18/afghanistan-withdrawal-india-china-russia-pakistan-geopolitics-indo-pacific/.