Social Movements Confront Neoliberalism: Reflections on a Caribbean Experience

Abstract

In 2008 15 Caribbean countries signed an ‘Economic Partnership Agreement’ (EPA) with the European Union providing for liberalisation of trade and investment between the two regions and the binding of investor-friendly government policies. The agreement occasioned much controversy and was signed over the protests of many sectors of civil society. This article discusses the controversy from the perspective of social movements confronting neoliberalism. First, I summarise the background and conduct of the EPA negotiations in the context of asymmetrical power in relations between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. Next, I give an account of the civil society campaign to review and renegotiate the Caribbean EPA; focusing on issues, methods and tactics and the factors leading to the eventual outcome. Finally, I reflect on the lessons to be drawn for social movements in confronting neoliberalism.

En el 2008, quince países caribeños firmaron un ‘Acuerdo de Asociación Económica’ (EPA, por sus siglas en inglés) con la Unión Europea, que contempla una liberalización de comercio e inversión entre las dos regiones y la unión de políticas gubernamentales más propicias para la inversión. El acuerdo ocasionó mucha controversia y se firmaron bajo las protestas de varios sectores de la sociedad civil. Este artículo detalla la controversia desde la perspectiva de los movimientos sociales que confrontan al neoliberalismo. Primero, hago un resumen sobre el fondo y la conducta de las negociaciones de la EPA en el contexto del poder asimétrico en las relaciones entre la UE y el Grupo Africano, Caribeño y Pacífico (ACP, por sus siglas en inglés). A continuación, describo la campaña de la sociedad civil para analizar y renegociar la EPA caribeña, enfocándome en las cuestiones, métodos y tácticas y factores, dando pie al resultado final. Por último, reflexiono sobre las lecciones que deben sacarse para los movimientos sociales, al enfrentar el neoliberalismo.

2008年，15个加勒比地区国家与欧盟签署了《经济伙伴关系协定》（Economic Partnership Agreement， EPA）。该协定以推动两个地区间的贸易和投资自由化为目的, 包括一系列有利于投资的政府政策。该协定引发了许多争议，最终在公民社会许多部门的抗议声中签署。本文从与新自由主义对抗的社会运动这一角度讨论了这些争议。首先，结合欧盟与非洲、加勒比和太平洋地区国家集团权力不对称的背景，本文概括了此次EPA谈判的背景和行为。其次，本文叙述了公民社会以对加勒比地区国家签署的EPA进行评估和重新谈判为目标的活动，集中于活动的议题、方式、策略以及导致最终结果的因素。最后，本文反思了社会运动在对抗新自由主义时应吸取的教训。

2008년 15개 카리브해 연안국들은 유럽연합과 무역과 투자의 자유화와 투자에 유리한 정부정책에 관한 ‘경제협력협정(EPA)을 유럽연합과 맺었다. 그 협정은 논란을 낳았고, 많은 시민사회의 저항에도 불구하고 조인되었다. 이 글은 신자유주의에 대항하는 사회운동의 관점에서 논쟁을 논의한다. 첫째, 유럽연합(EU)과 아프리카, 카리브와 태평양 집단(ACP) 사이에 존재하는 비대칭적 권력 맥락 속에서 이루어진 EPA 협상의 배경과 전개과정을 요약한다. 그 다음, 이슈, 방법과 전술과 최종적인 결과에 영향을 준 요소들에 초점을 맞춰, 카리브지역의 EPA을 검토하고 재협상을 요구하는 시민사회 캠페인을 설명한다. 마지막으로 신자유주의를 직면하고 있는 사회운동에 주는 교훈을 다룬다.

Keywords:

• neoliberalism
• trade agreements
• Caribbean
• European Union

Notes

Mainly on investment, debt, trade, intellectual property and the environment.

‘Developmentalism’, i.e. non-reciprocity in market access for poor countries and space for them to employ state interventionist policies such as tariff protection, subsidies and state monopolies.

Bilateral and regional trade agreements. See Khor (2008). The EPA is classified as an RTA.

The ACP Group now comprises 79 countries: 48 from Sub-Saharan Africa, 16 from the Caribbean, and 15 from the Pacific. With the exception of Cuba, all are signatories to the CPA.

Four of these groups are from Africa, one is from the Caribbean, and one is from the Pacific.

The ‘Singapore Issues’: investment, public procurement, trade facilitation, and competition policy.

For details see European Commission (2006c) and Seattle to Brussels Network (2006).

A major factor was EU insistence that it had no option but to impose tariffs on imports from ACP countries which did not meet the deadline of 31 December 2007 for conclusion of the EPA negotiations. On the dubious legality of this, see Bartels (2007) and Stevens (2007).

This was headed by the controversial Peter Mandelson for the better part of the EPA negotiations.

Critically, the EU insisted on an interpretation of WTO trade rules that required ACP countries to liberalise 80–90% of their imports from the EU. See also footnote 8 on the contentious issue of the negotiating deadline.

Notable in the case of the Caribbean negotiations, see Reasons for Signing the EPA.

Since December 2007, EPA negotiations have continued with most African and Pacific countries on the basis of ‘Interim’ EPAs which allow them continued duty-free access to the EU market. As of June 2011 only one of these 36 countries had signed an EPA. See Julian and Dalleau (2011).

The Caribbean group within the ACP is known as CARIFORUM. It comprises the 14 member states of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic.

Some countries have liberalised access to some non-service sectors; and there is to be negotiation on further liberalisation of services. See CRNM (2008c) and Jane Kelsey (2010).

This semi-independent body, which reported directly to Caribbean heads of government, had responsibility for the EPA negotiations.

One researcher found that most civil society stakeholders believed that they had limited impact on the negotiating positions taken by Caribbean officials and became alienated, resulting in a diminishing attendance at meetings. See Montoute (2009, pp. 269–72).

The reference is to officials of the CARICOM Secretariat and of the respective member country governments represented on CARICOM's COTED.

The latter commented that ‘the EPA was considerably aided by the successful implantation of the EU's world view of the region and its future among significant sections of the region's intellectual and ruling elites, including those holding influential positions in the negotiations. In this regard, it is useful to note that the EU has played a crucial role in training and financing a multitude of activities and actors serving Cariforum's negotiating remit over the past few years.’

MFN Clause: both CARIFORUM and the EU automatically confer on each other any better treatment granted by one Party to a ‘major trading partner’, defined as countries or regional blocs garnering 1%, or 1.5% and above, of world merchandise exports. This MFN provision covers both goods and services (CRNM, 2008b, para. 12); It would therefore apply to any trade agreement made between CARIFORUM and China, Brazil, India, the US, Canada, and others. For further explanation, see Girvan (2008c).

The Regional Preference Clause: ‘whatever concession is granted by one CARIFORUM State to the EU should automatically be conferred on all other CARIFORUM states; will be implemented in one, two and five years respectively in CARIFORUM MDCs, LDCs and Haiti’ (CRNM, 2008b, para. 13). CARICOM's LDCs are entitled to special treatment under the CARICOM treaty.

Other problematic provisions that were later identified concerned the regulatory implications for services (Kelsey, 2008) and the restricted ability to respond to the effects of the global financial crisis (Third World Network, 2009).

From shortly before the negotiations were concluded on 16 December 2007, when the text was initialled by negotiators from both sides, to the time when the governments gave their formal agreement by means of ministerial signature of the EPA on 15 October 2008. The controversy took place almost entirely within the English-speaking countries of CARICOM.

Responding to praise of the negotiated EPA by the Prime Ministers of Barbados and Jamaica and the head of the CRNM, President Jagdeo of Guyana dissented publicly in declaring that the Caribbean had ‘got nothing’ out of the EPA. This drew a sharp rejoinder from Prime Minister Golding of Jamaica, who accused critics of the EPA of ‘mendicancy’. See Jagdeo (2008); Myers (2008); Singh (2008b).

The text of the negotiated agreement with its Annexes, which ran to over 1,000 pages, had to be checked for legal errors and translated into all the EU languages, a process which took approximately six months. Meanwhile the English text was released to some civil society stakeholders and eventually published on the EU website, making it available for public examination.

Of the three, the first was a former senior official of UNCTAD, ambassador to Brussels for a CARICOM country, and alternative Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank; the second (the present writer), a former secretary general of the Association of Caribbean States and senior regional academic; and the third a former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of a CARICOM country, Director-General of the Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS), and senior regional academic. The first two were also ‘senior associates’ of the CRNM, a largely honorary position.

During the period October 2007 to October 2008, this author monitored over 300 EPA-related news items in the print media of the English-speaking Caribbean and published approximately 100 reviews and commentaries of the EPA on the blog, http://www.normangirvan.info.

These included a seminar jointly sponsored by the ACP and the Commonwealth (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008); a report by Oxfam (2008) and the ‘Taubira Report’ commissioned by President Sarcozy of France on the African EPA negotiations. See Girvan (2008e).

The online petition was eventually to receive 477 signatories. See CPDC (2008a).

This became known as a ‘goods only’ EPA.

Notably those of Jamaica and Barbados; JIS (2008); Nation News Barbados (2008b).

The governments of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, 2008) and Grenada announced their own internal reviews; the Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda expressed his concerns (Bilaterals, 2008a); the government of Grenada (Singh, 2008a) and St Lucia (CMC, 2008a) said its EPA signing was ‘on hold’.

Information for the rest of this paragraph is taken from the page, EPA and CSME Media Watch, at http://www.normangirvan.info/media-watch/ over the period July–October 2008.

Sir Shridath Ramphal, former secretary general of the Commonwealth and former head of the CRNM, who had played a leading role in the formation of the ACP in 1975; and Sir Ronald Sanders, a former senior diplomat and international negotiator for the government of Antigua and Barbuda. See Pantin (2008); Sanders (2008).

The CARICOM summit (early July 2008) had postponed the EPA signing from late July to early September. By the end of August it became clear that this date would be missed. CARICOM leaders hurriedly scheduled a special summit, scheduled immediately after the Guyana national EPA consultation, to fix a new date.

This came towards the end of August. See Rose (2008).

The ACP held a summit in mid-September 2008 at which the impasse in EPA negotiations with the African countries was the main topic (Brewster, 2008c; Government of Guyana, 2008a; Joy Online, 2008; Pascal, 2008); but apart from Guyana, CARICOM was not represented at the ministerial level.

The Declaration also undertook that implementation of the EPA would pay ‘due regard’ to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas on the CSME. See Brewster (2008c); Girvan (2008d).

Haiti signed the EPA in 2009 over the objections of civil society organisations.

Jamaica stood to lose US$72 million, and Guyana US$120 million. See Jamaica Gleaner (2007); Guyana (2008a).

Caribbean governments showed no interest in following the African route of signing ‘Interim’ EPAs, which allow continued access to the EU market while continuing negotiations. Earlier, they had not challenged the questionable assertion of the European Commission that there was no alternative to the EPAs except the payment of tariffs under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences arrangement.

Fiscally stressed Jamaica is to receive EU 60.5 million over 2008–2013 for macroeconomic support (European Commission, 2008b); and the government of Jamaica played a key role in the decisions on the EPA.

Nearly three years later it was reported that ‘The EU Aid-for-Trade (AfT) facility, which was expected to be a significant source of funding for EPA implementation projects, has been a major disappointment’ (Humphrey, 2011, p. viii).

Guyana, which has a resource-exporting economy; stood alone in holding out for a ‘goods only’ EPA.

The Dominican Republic had already joined Central America in negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States (so-called CAFTA-DR) which included several WTO-plus provisions. Its main interest in the EPA was in securing access to the EU market.

Prime Minister Golding of Jamaica was Chair of the CARICOM Prime Ministerial Subcommittee on External Economic Negotiations, with political responsibility for the EPA negotiations. He was vocal in his attacks on the EPA critics from the outset of the controversy. Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados had political responsibility for CARICOM's economic integration programme. He lost office shortly after the EPA negotiations were concluded, but the successor administration, after announcing a review of the EPA, became one of its strongest defenders. The CRNM itself mounted a vigorous campaign of speeches and publications in praise of the agreement.

English (12 CARICOM countries), French (Haiti), Spanish (Dominican Republic), and Dutch (Suriname). The protests were mounted mainly in the Anglophone Caribbean, and independently in Haiti (Haiti Support Group, 2007).

For example, an introductory chapter that refers to a trade partnership for sustainable development; and the many references in the agreement to development cooperation which are not are not quantified or time bound, and hence are not legally enforceable.

A case in point is the impact of the North American free trade agreement on the subsequent realignment of political and economic forces in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

Examples of translating EPA issues into relatively simple accessible language are Haiti Support Group (2008) and Oxfam (2008). On the subject of framing issues to show their social relevance, see Reitan (2007, Chapter 4).