Hegemony's Dirty Tricks: Explaining Counter-Globalization's Weakness in Times of Neoliberal Crisis

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the international financial and sovereign debt crisis, this article revisits the development of the counter-globalization movements in the global North over the past thirteen years. How can we explain that the systemic failures of the current order are not being met through a broad ideological formation posing a serious challenge to the neoliberal hegemony in international politics and political economy? Why have the mass protests at summit meetings and democratic deliberation experiments at social forums not prepared the ground for such an ideological formation? Drawing on (neo-)Gramscian concepts, this paper argues that the counter-globalization movements' ‘war of maneuver’ has not been complemented by an adequate ‘war of position’. Counter-hegemonic dissent articulated broadly on the streets has not translated into counter-hegemonic capacity. Without focusing on movement-internal reasons, this article highlights the role played by the strength of the opponent in preventing such success. Our analysis sheds light on three important macro-contextual factors: the difficulties created for establishing counter-hegemony in international politics when hegemonic powers insulate themselves from critique; the co-optation of critical discourse that is achieved by bending critique into a new legitimation strategy for neoliberal measures; and the de-politicization of power relations by current international security discourses and policies. Together, these macro-contextual factors help explain how neoliberal forces successfully prevent counter-globalization movements from moving from ‘war of maneuver’ to ‘war of position’ and becoming counter-hegemonic, even in times of neoliberal crisis.

Desde el punto de vista de la crisis de la deuda soberana y financiera internacional, este artículo vuelve a tratar el desarrollo de los movimientos antiglobalización en el norte global, durante los últimos trece años. ¿Cómo podemos explicar que los fallos sistémicos del orden actual no se hayan satisfecho mediante una formación ideológica amplia, planteando un reto serio a la hegemonía neoliberal en las políticas internacional y económica? ¿Por qué no han preparado el terreno, las protestas masivas en las reuniones cumbre y en los experimentos de deliberación democrática en los fórums sociales, para tal formación ideológica? A partir de conceptos (neo-)gramscianos, este artículo sostiene que ‘los movimientos antiglobalización, ‘la guerra de maniobra’ no han sido complementados por una adecuada ‘guerra de posición’. La disidencia antihegemónica ampliamente articulada en las calles, no se ha reflejado en una capacidad antihegemónica. Sin enfocarse en las razones de los movimientos internos, este artículo destaca el rol jugado por la fuerza del oponente, para prevenir tal logro. Nuestro análisis esclarece tres importantes factores macrocontextuales: las dificultades creadas para establecer una antihegemonía en la política internacional, cuando los poderes hegemónicos se aíslan de la crítica, la cooptación de un debate crítico que se logra doblegando a la crítica a una nueva estrategia de legitimación para medidas neoliberales; y la despolitización de las relaciones del poder mediante debates de seguridad y política. Juntos, estos factores macrocontexuales ayudan a explicar cómo las fuerzas neoliberales previenen exitosamente a los movimientos antiglobalización de pasar de una ‘guerra de maniobra’ a una ‘guerra de posición’ y volverse antigemónicos, incluso en tiempos de crisis neoliberales.

以国际金融和主权债务危机为背景，本文重新思考过去13年的全球的北方的反全球化运动的演变。我们如何解释，当前秩序的系统性失败并未产生一个对国际政治和国际政治经济中的新自由主义霸权构成严峻挑战的宽广的意识形态构成？为什么在各类峰会中的大规模抗议和在各类社会论坛中民主的主张之实验没有为这样的意识形态构成准备依据？借助（新）葛兰西主义的概念，本文认为，反全球化运动的“策略战争”（war of maneuver）并未被足够的“立场战争”（war of position）所补充。 街头的广泛的反霸权的异议并未转化为反霸权的能力。并未聚焦于运动的内部理由，本文强调反全球化的优点组织了这样的成功。我们的分析着重于三大重要的宏观背景因素：国际政治中建立反霸权的困难性，当霸权的各国不理会批评；批评的话语的被吸收，新自由主义措施的新立法策略纳入了一些批评；由目前的国际安全话语和政策而存在的大国关系的去政治化 （de-politicization） 。综合起来，这些宏观的背景因素帮助解释了，即使在新自由主义的危机时代，新自由主义势力如何成功地阻挡了反全球化运动从“策略的战争”到“立场的战争”以及反霸权。

이 글은 국제 금융위기와 국가부채위기를 배경으로 난 13년 동안 북반부에서의 반세계화 운동의 발전을 다시 검토한다. 국제 정치와 정치 경제학에서 현재 질서의 체제적 실패가 신자유주의 헤게모니에 대한 중대한 도전을 제기하는 광범위한 이데올로기적인 형성을 통해서 왜 도전을 받지 않는지를 설명한다. 왜 정상 회당에서의 대중적 시위와 사회포럼에서의 민주적 협의 실험이 이데올로기적 형성의 토대가 되지 않는 지를 설명한다. 이 글은 (신) 그람시 개념을 끌어 들여 반세계화 운동의 기동전이 적절한 ‘진지전’에 의해서 보안되지 않았다고 주장한다. 거리에서 광범위하게 드러난 반헤게모니적인 불만은 반헤게모니적 역량으로 전환되지 못했다. 이 글은 운동 내부의 이유에 초점을 맞추지 않고, 이러한 성공을 막는데 반대 세력의 힘에 의한 역할을 강조한다. 우리의 분석은 세 가지 중요한 거시적-맥락적 요소에 초점을 맞춘다: 헤게모니적 권력이 비판으로부터 스스로를 차단할 때 국제정치에서 반헤게모니를 구축하는 있어서의 어려움; 비판을 신자유주의적 조치에 대한 새로운 정당화 전략으로 변질시키는 비판적 담론의 포섭; 현재의 국제 안보 담론과 정책에 의한 권력 관계의 탈정치화. 이러한 거시적-맥락적 요소들이 함께 어떻게 신자유주의 세력의 반세계화 운동이 ‘기동전’에서 ‘진지전’으로 나아가는 것을 막고 그리고 신자유주의 위기 시대에 반-헤게모니가 되는 것을 성공적으로 막을 수 있었는지를 설명하는데 도움을 준다.

На фоне международного финансового и полновластного долгового кризисов, статья пересматривает развитие антиглобализационных движений в странах Севера за последние тринадцать лет. Как можно объяснить, что системные сбои существующего порядка не решаются в рамках широкого идеологического формирования, представляя серьезную проблему для неолиберальной гегемонии в международной политике и политической экономии? Почему массовые протесты против встреч на высшем уровне и демократические эксперименты, рассмотренные на социальных форумах не подготовили почву для такого идеологического формирования? С опорой на неограмшианские понятия, в статье утверждается, что “маневренная война” антиглобализационных движений не была дополнена адекватной “позиционной войной”. Контргегемонистское инакомыслие, широко сформулированное на улицах, не привело к контргегемонистской мощи. Не сосредотачиваясь на причинах внутри движения, эта статья выдвигает на первый план роль, которую силы противника играют в предотвращении такого успеха. Наш анализ проливает свет на три важных макроконтекстных фактора: созданы трудности для основания контргегемонии в международной политике, при изоляции гегемонистских держав от критики; кооптация критического дискурса, которая достигается путем перехода критики в новую стратегию легитимизации неолиберальных мер; и деполитизации властных отношений на действующих международных дискурсах о безопасности и политике. Вместе эти макроконтекстуальные факторы помогают объяснить, как неолиберальные силы успешно препятствуют тому, чтобы антиглобализационные движения перешли от “маневренной войны” к “войне позиционной” и стали контргегемонией даже во времена неолиберального кризиса.

Keywords:

• global justice
• counter-globalization
• alter-globalization
• anti-globaliation
• social movements
• protest
• neoliberalism
• hegemony
• crisis
• counter-hegemony
• Gramsci

Notes

We prefer the term ‘counter-globalization movements’, because it stresses the oppositional character of the alternative practices and emphasizes the multiplicity of the movement(s).

We define neoliberalism with Peters (2001, pp. 14, vii; see also Chopra, 2003) on the theoretical level, as a selective reworking of the tenets of classical economics and political economy which preserves the idea that the free market is an essential prerequisite for a free society and assumes that all social behavior can generally be understood in terms of the human attributes of rationality, individuality, and self-interest. It is based on a definition of freedom as the individual's freedom from state interference, as well as freedom for the market, and contains strong opposition to the idea of the welfare or protectionist state (Peters, 2001, pp. 14–15). Inasmuch as neoliberal thinking is unreflective, does not seriously engage with critiques and alternatives, and is politically engaged to bolster its proponents' discursive and institutional power, it operates as an ideology (Harvey, 2007). As will be re-emphasized as the article goes on, the agents of neoliberal globalization are diverse and operate at all levels of governance. Key for international governance are, inter alia, the WTO, IMF, and G8 and most of their most powerful member states, on whom the discussion will consequently also focus.

These interventions can be seen as part of a ‘war of position’ and the first steps towards the construction of a counter-hegemonic project. Other economists, such as the late James Tobin or Dani Rodrik, have, if unwittingly, lent credibility to movement arguments.

We note that some scholars and activists reject the idea of counter-hegemony as a way forward for counter-globalization movements. Day (2005), for example, argues that the stratgey of counter-hegemony is surpassed by the prefigurative practices of counter-globalization activists engaging in the creation of self-organized and local alternatives. In his study of counter-globalization networks in Barcelona, Juris (2008) also shows how activists usefully shifted their focus from international mobilizations to local organizing and community work. Our analysis of the failure to construct a counter-hegemonic bloc does not presuppose that all actors involved in counter-globalization movements actually strive (or should strive) to do so.

On the role of international law, see also Rajagopal (2006, 2003).

In Gramsci's prison writings and meditations on Machiavelli's Prince, he conceptualized the newly emerging Italian Communist party in terms of its potential to function as the ‘Modern Prince’ by offering a fundamentally different vision of society and politics and a force for creating counter-hegemonic solidarity against the Fascist regime.

In Cox's (1986) application of this concept at the international level, historic blocs are constituted by the social relations of production and specific forms of state and world order, with Pax Americana as a prime example. Mark Rupert (1995, p. 29) adds that ‘the construction of an historic bloc is a precondition for the exercise of hegemony […] and entails a reconstruction for state-society relations through organically related processes of political, economic and cultural change’. The Bretton Woods system, for example, was hegemonic in the sense that it reflected a balance of material and ideological power aided and abetted by the classic compromise between labor and capital. In a similar way, the Washington Consensus (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2007) can be seen as the hegemonic economic doctrine of neoliberalism, sparking liberalization, privatization, and deregulation measures throughout the past decades.

The empirical information on the 2001 G8 summit is summarized from Scholl (2012).

Hosting the summit cost German federal, state, and local governments around 100 million euro at a time of massive welfare state cutbacks.

Quoted in Hugh Williamson, ‘Germany Aims to Please G8 Guests’, Financial Times, 2 May 2007.