ABSTRACT
This article examines the emergence since 2011 of the ‘Diaosi’ (loser) identity among second-generation migrant workers in China. This subjective identification of a new social category with little hope can be contrasted with the hopeful policy constructions of a strong China eager to promote the civilizing ‘suzhi’ (population quality) of its population nationally and internationally. Yet, as this article shows, in four steps, these phenomena are intertwined. First, it locates the emergence of this ‘Diaosi’ subject in the global and national dialectics of hope in China since the global financial crisis. Second, drawing on neo-Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian scholarship, Diaosi marginality is related to the interactions among global capitalist production, the socialist market economy, continuous state domination via a household registration system (hukou), and the civilising discourse of ‘suzhi’. Third, it shows how the Diaosi embody their multiplex loser identity and marginality affectively and expressively in their everyday demeanour. Fourth, it examines recent efforts by state/corporate capital and the party-state to re-make and re-hegemonize Diaosi life in the name of consumption, civility, and social stability. The article ends with some neo-Gramscian remarks on the complexities and contradictory consciousness of marginal social categories, such as the Diaosi, and their openness to passive revolution and (re-) hegemonization.
ORCiD
Ngai-ling Sum http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4285-1351
Notes
1 Worried about social instability, central government took steps between 2010 and 2013 to dampen the property market (e.g. tightening credit, raising deposits for purchase of new land to 50%; restricting the purchase of second and third homes, etc.) with only moderate effects upon housing prices and rents.
2 The Market and Media Research Centre of Beijing University conducted a survey on the 2014 Living Conditions of Diaosi. Of 210,000 youths interviewed, more than 60% described themselves as Diaosi. This survey showed that they earned RMB 2917.7 (USD 479). From this, they spent RMB 500 (USD 81) on rent, RMB 39 (USD 6) per day for 3 meals, RMB 1076 (USD 174) to send to parents, and RMB 500 (USD 81) on vacations.
3 ‘Hal-hal’ is a popular Chinese term used by social networks and QQ groups. It has various meanings that range from communicating self-mockery through helplessness to don’t know what to say. For details, see http://nx.shangdu.com/news/72-16463-0.html
4 This article draws on but goes beyond first-generation subaltern studies especially Spivak’s post-Marxist-Derridean conception of the communicative process between subalterns and elites (Zene, Citation2011, p. 94). Whereas Spivak examines this in terms of speech acts, this article directs attention to the contradictory consciousness and self-representation of the subaltern and everyday struggles. This more Marxist–Gramscian analysis draws on Green (Citation2002) and second-generation subaltern scholars (e.g. Zene, Citation2011; Nilsen & Roy, Citation2015).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ngai-Ling Sum
Ngai-Ling Sum is Reader in Cultural Political Economy in the Politics, Philosophy and Religion Department and Co-Director (with Bob Jessop) of the Cultural Political Economy Research Centre at Lancaster University. She was awarded (with Bob Jessop) the Gunnar Myrdal Prize by the European Association of Evolutionary Political Economics (EAEPE) for their co-authored book Beyond the regulation approach (Edward Elgar, 2006). Together with Bob Jessop, she is also the author of the volume Towards a cultural political economy (Edward Elgar, 2013).