The conflict over GM soybean seed saving in Argentina: ground rent, social actors, biotechnology, and intellectual property rights

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we aim to examine the changing dynamics of the conflict over seed saving of genetically modified soybeans in Argentina. After analysing recent global transformations in seed production, we provide a summary of some noteworthy examples of this confrontation, stressing the actions taken by the social actors involved, in particular the state, whose role in the conflict has changed over time. After battling the attempts of biotechnology and seed companies to charge fees for seed saving, the state has allowed the implementation of a royalty collection system for biotechnological traits. This political shift, we argue, is linked to the specificity of capital accumulation in Argentina, which is based on the appropriation of ground rent.

KEYWORDS:

• Biotechnology
• GM seeds
• intellectual property rights
• ground rent
• Argentina

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The portion of the seed market controlled by these capitals is hard to determine. For instance, the ETC Group (2013) claims that, in 2011, this number was over 60%. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the sources used to assess this do not cover the sales corresponding to smaller capitals, which gives way to an overestimation of that market share (Bonny, 2014). Fuglie et al. (2011) argue that the four global sales leaders made up 54% of the market share in 2009, with Limagrain occupying the fourth place. This number is higher if only soybean and corn sales are taken into account. A thorough analysis of the shape the process of concentration and centralization of capital took in this branch of production can be found in Howard (2009, 2015).

2 This specific character is also present in many other Latin American countries. For an analysis of some cases along these lines see, among others, Caligaris (2016) and Fitzsimons and Starosta (2018).

3 Based on their importance, two specific mechanisms stand out: export taxes on agricultural commodities and the overvaluation of national currency.

4 For an analysis of the structure of the soybean chain in Argentina and its recent changes, see Craviotti (2018).

5 Even though they knew there was no legal foundation to their claim, as their directives acknowledged to a commission set by the American Congress, ‘According to Monsanto, it is not feasible to charge a technology fee on soybean seeds in Argentina without patent protection’ (USGAO, 2000, p. 14).

6 This does not mean that environmental organizations, farmers associations, indigenous communities, or small farmers, among others, did not stand up to Monsanto. For the case of Greenpeace and the Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero (Peasant Movement of Santiago del Estero), see Poth (2010). It is evident, however, that these associations’ political agenda was quite different, since they tended to challenge the ‘agricultural model’ in its entirety.

7 These associations represent a fraction of agricultural capitalists and landowners, whether or not these personifications are embodied in the same person. Even though throughout the text we will, in purely analytical terms, present landowners and capitalists as ‘pure’ classes, Argentine agricultural production has a wide array of individuals that are simultaneously members of both classes.

8 The Intacta RR2Pro biotechnology stacks two events, none of which is a novelty in itself: RR2Y, an improvement of the old RR event, and Bt. On this basis, Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (another one of the main agrarian associations) denounced that ‘the patent … could be invalid … because it protects a gene that has already been used in Argentina prior to the patent filing. The purpose of the patent is to protect a nonpatentable gene through a juxtaposition, [which goes] against current legislation’ (La Nación, 2016). As for the SRA, it requested information from the government agency in charge of issuing patents, which replied that only ‘parts of the event’ were patented. This led the SRA to claim that ‘Monsanto does not have the patent’ (Etchevehere, 2015).

9 A similar system was implemented in Brazil, where a conflict also unleashed; see Peschard (2012) and Filomeno (2014).

10 On the different SL drafts between 2012 and 2017, see also Perelmuter (2017).

11 The same applies to breeders of autogamous plants, despite their smaller production scale.

12 The same might occur in regard to the relatively low profits appropriated by soybean breeders.

13 Marx (1981) argues that agrarian production is subject to natural conditions that determine the coexistence of different types of labour productivity. Thus, as the solvent social need for agricultural commodities expands, it is necessary to put in production those lands with less favourable natural conditions, which raises the individual price of production of commodities and turns it into the new commercial price. This creates extraordinary profits for capitalists operating in the best lands. Competition between capitalists to appropriate these extraordinary profits, though, makes the latter fall into the hands of those individuals who have a monopoly on land use: the landowners. Marx calls this ‘differential ground rent’, since it is based on the monopoly over differential natural conditions, and also includes under this category the resulting rent from the application of subsequent capital fragments over the same land that result in different labour productivities (on this latter form of differential rent, see also Caligaris & Pérez Trento, 2017).

It should be noted that differential ground rent (as opposed to absolute or simple monopoly rents) has a dominant presence in Argentina (Iñigo Carrera, 2007). In regard to the production of GM soybean seeds—where Monsanto could barely appropriate royalties for the RR biotechnology—this resulted in a remarkable drop in production costs throughout the country. In fact, local costs of RR soybean varieties represented approximately a third of their worth in the American market. This led to the establishment of a differential rent, since this decrease in costs could only take place by operating in Argentine territory.

14 The alliance between these actors is one of the most striking aspects of the conflict. Throughout Néstor Kirchner’s presidential term, the bond with the agrarian associations rapidly deteriorated due to the implementation of economic policies that affected the circulation of agricultural commodities: there were price agreements, maximum price limitations, temporary bans on exports, and, particularly, a hike in export taxes. In 2006, agrarian associations organized two strikes against the government, the first ever suffered by the Kirchner administration. Two years later, this time during Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s tenure, agricultural associations acted together to resist the passing of a law aimed at raising export taxes once more, unleashing one of the most important agricultural conflicts in Argentine history (Pérez Trento, 2017; see also Turzi, 2017). Therefore, forging an alliance of this sort only makes sense if the goal is to increase the level of appropriable ground rent.

 

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas under a Post-Doctoral Grant.

Notes on contributors

Nicolás Pérez Trento

Nicolás Pérez Trento is a Teaching Assistant at the University of Buenos Aires. His research explores the economic and political aspects of the deepening of primary production in Argentina. He has a Degree in Sociology (University of Buenos Aires), a Master in Social Sciences (University of General Sarmiento) and a PhD in Social Sciences (University of General Sarmiento). He actually holds a post-doctoral scholarship at the University of Quilmes.