Economics and climate emergency

ABSTRACT

In this essay we provide introductory comment for the collection of solicited essays on Economics and Climate Emergency. In the first section we suggest that recent critique of the climate movement has broader systemic significance and this is indicative of issues that bear on the collected essays. In the following section we rehearse some of the standard arguments leading to complacency and delay to action on climate change and ecological breakdown. In the last section we set out the broad themes of the essays.

KEYWORDS:

• Economics
• climate emergency
• ecological breakdown
• carbon emissions

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to confirm that they are joint and equal co-authors of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Note the 2020 UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity Global Biodiversity Outlook 5 report highlights progress made and opportunities that still exist despite the underlying scale of problems of loss of biodiversity and threatened extinctions etc. highlighted by the IPBES.

2 The UNEP report calls for a 55% reduction by 2030 in its introductory summary. To be clear, the IPCC calls for reduction of 45% on 2010 levels (IPCC, 2018, p. 12) and the UNEP for 55% on 2017 levels (UNEP, 2018, p. xv).

3 Though one should note China augmented its commitments in September 2020, committing to carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak GHG emissions in the coming decade. Policy detail and real commitment are, of course, what will ultimately matter (the nature of ‘net’, the difference between ‘carbon’ and all GHGs for some metrics etc.).

4 As Jason Moore notes, the influence of climate on socio-economic change is not unique to the present, but the current situation is perhaps better understood as capitalist produced (‘Capitalocene’) rather than more generically an ‘Anthropocene’ – though he argues the term is not meaningless as geological Anthropocene (see e.g. Moore, 2015). Class and capitalism, not man and nature are the appropriate context for Moore. So, whilst larger global population is not irrelevant, what matters more is the spread of industrialization and of a consumption model within an asymmetrical capital accumulation system. It is important to note a simple focus on population as ‘overpopulation’ tends to distract attention from issues arising from a capital accumulation system and shift responsibility from the relatively few producing much of the problem (Fletcher et al., 2014). According to a recent Oxfam and Stockholm Environment Institute report, between 1995 and 2015: ‘The richest 10% of the world’s population (c.630 million people) were responsible for 52% of the cumulative carbon emissions – depleting the global carbon budget by nearly a third (31%) in those 25 years alone; The poorest 50% (c.3.1 billion people) were responsible for just 7% of cumulative emissions, and used just 4% of the available carbon budget; The richest 1% (c.63 million people) alone were responsible for 15% of cumulative emissions, and 9% of the carbon budget – twice as much as the poorest half of the world’s population’ (Gore, 2020, p. 2). Moreover, World Bank data clearly indicates that emissions closely track GDP ranking and that the top 10 countries by GDP produce the majority of emissions. China accounts for about 30%, USA 15% and the EU collectively 10%. Note, figures can vary using per capita measures and consumption measures rather than production measures, but the general relation between GDP and emissions remains similar and the fact a few countries are responsible for the majority of emission remains the same. As Goodman and Anderson (2020) note, 65% of global emissions 1751–2010 were produced by 90 entities (of which two thirds were corporations), and 71% of emissions 1988–2015 were produced by 100 corporate and state entities. See Heede (2014) and Griffin (2017). For a useful graphical summary of emissions contributions see: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21428525/climate-change-west-coast-fires-cause-charts.

5 She begins from 304 ppm in 1921; preindustrial levels for the Holocene typically report 180 to 280 ppm. Hansen et al. (2017), argue that Paris notwithstanding it makes more sense to target a return to less than 350 ppm. Note also that (1) a ton of carbon equates to about 3.7 tons of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (2) ppm measures can vary globally and model estimates for ppm associated warming effects have also varied and are subject to readjustment as observations change. For example, 450 ppm has previously been used as a trigger for 2 degrees warming (which seems to be an underestimation). This, however, is an issue of general evidence trends under rational uncertainty rather than spurious precision.

6 Note, Wunderling et al., 2020 had not yet completed review at the time of writing.

7 For example, Stay Grounded campaigns for a just transition reduction in aviation as a necessary aspect of real decarbonization to mid-century (e.g. Smith, 2019).

8 The point, of course, does not condone the personal dynamics of conduct and intra-organizational struggles involving matters of identity, recognition respect etc. It merely highlights the use made of division to undermine a movement.

9 There are many other subjects one might focus on, such as the work of Bjorn Lomborg.

10 The concept of an externality is, of course, much older. We are highlighting the prominence given to some standard lines of argument and suggesting readers should find this familiar and that each is a source of complacency and delay.

11 Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration states: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary principle shall be widely applied by the States [UN members] according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ The cost effective’ clause is, however, obviously open to problematic abuse.

12 For a critique of mainstream economic thought as a belief system, see George and Sabelli (1994).

13 To be clear, not all ecological economists are anti-capitalist, nor do they reject the idea of price signals. The shared commitment is that adequate theorization of a sustainable economic system must start from material processes and their consequences, rather than simply assume these are taken care of by exchange values. Most ecological economists also place strong emphasis on distribution, justice, fairness and alternatives to commodified and consumerist versions of identity.

14 Integrated assessment models, such as the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model, are very different, but when explained to a layperson they can seem to be covering the same ground as ecological economics in so far as they pay lip service to climate systems. See later and also Keen (2020).

15 Though it is worth noting that even mainstream economists when surveyed think low discount rates are more appropriate – at around 2% – and, of course, the whole endeavour ignores proper context of impacts etc. (Drupp et al., 2020).

16 There are, for example, issues regarding transport transition and electric cars (Morgan, 2020) and contradictory assumptions about future policy and matters of income and wealth inequality (Morgan, 2017).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Barry Gills

Barry Gills is Editor in Chief of Globalizations and Professor of Global Development Studies at the University of Helsinki. He has written widely on World System theory, neoliberalism, globalization, global crises, democracy, and resistance.

Jamie Morgan

Jamie Morgan is Professor of Economic Sociology at Leeds Beckett University. He co-edits the Real-World Economics Review with Edward Fullbrook. He has published widely in the fields of economics, political economy, philosophy, sociology and international politics.