ABSTRACT
In contrast to expectations that the greater visibility of aid increases the donor's prestige, this paper examines why certain donor countries may seek to render their aid programs invisible. As the case of Japan's early Triangular Development Cooperation (TDC) in Southeast Asia demonstrates, donors at times seek to conceal their presence to better secure their national interests. By approaching this (in-)visibility puzzle through the focus on its politics, this study highlights the complexity of donors' motivations in selectively activating (in-)visibility in TDC. Via a historicised account of Japan's post-war aid/economic cooperation relationship with Southeast Asia, the paper finds how the triangular mechanism allowed Japan and Thailand as an intermediary to selectively render their presence in-/visible to shun hostile sentiments against them in order to pursue their respective diplomatic goals.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to reviewers, Kevin Gray for their comments, and Jamie Doucette for the invitation to co-organise a panel at the Development Studies Association Conference in June 2018 in which a shorter version of this paper was presented.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The reason for the geographical and temporal focus is that Southeast Asia was pivotal in the making of Japan’s TDC in the early years as the key destination of Japan’s economic cooperation (see JICA, Citation2013; Okaido, Citation2019; Shimomura, Citation2020).
2 This paper is based on information/materials acquired from fieldworks in Japan and Thailand from the years 2015-2019. In studying the early years of Japan’s TDC, the paper utilises Japanese materials including policy documents/reports on economic cooperation, ODA, and literature on aid, diplomatic history, international politics/relations, and Southeast Asian studies.
3 ASEAN is a regional intergovernmental organisation established in 1967. It consists of the five founding member states – the ASEAN five, and an additional five member states – Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999).
4 The rising anti-Chinese sentiments in Myanmar clearly shows how the local anti-coup protesters’ (mis)information and perceptions of the ties between China and Myanmar's military junta have been critical (Palmer, Citation2021; Reuters, Citation2021).
5 Economic cooperation (keizai-kyōryoku) refers to the broad process of Japan’s external relationship with developing countries that includes both governmental and private flows of ‘yen loans, export credits, and private foreign direct investment’ (MOFA, Citation1961; Nagasu, Citation1971, pp. 356–357; Suehiro, Citation1999, p. 86).
6 Such geopolitical attempts took the form of economic cooperation-oriented initiatives like the first Ministerial meeting on Southeast Asian Development in 1966 with Japan’s full-fledged commitment to support the US’ Vietnam War while announcing its own economic return to Asian markets (Aoki, Citation2018).
7 Between 1955 and 1977, a total of JPY 601.829 billion reparations (including quasi-reparation) was paid to Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand (Murai, Citation1999). Nine Southeast Asian countries accounted for approximately 71.5% of all reparations.
8 Some of those business leaders with personal connections and interests/stakes in those countries have personally struck deals (Shimomura, Citation2020, p. 35), which nurtured a cosy relationship between Japanese businesses and local elites (Soderberg, Citation1996).
9 Less than 12% was spent on rural and social development in 1972 (Ihara, Citation2016, p. 14).
10 A local joint venture company with the Indonesian overseas Chinese.
11 Japan’s Foreign Ministry was aware of how the local people instead vented their popular discontents in the form of anti-Japanese protests due to the suppressed free speech – especially in criticising the authoritarian/oppressive governments – in the region (Ihara, Citation2016, p. 13).
12 The Colombo Plan is a regional organisation established at Colombo, Ceylon, in 1950 - designed to facilitate/assist economic and social development of its South and Southeast Asian member countries. ICA – the predecessor of USAID - began hosting Southeast Asian trainees in Japan in 1954 (OTCA, Citation1966).
13 Its geographical proximity to Indochina and Myanmar (CLMV) was key to Japan’s regional diplomacy.
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Soyeun Kim
Soyeun Kim is Associate Professor at the Institute for East Asian Studies, Sogang University, Korea. Her main research interests are in the political ecology/economy of development cooperation in Asia. Her most recent publication in journals includes the Third World Quarterly and the European Journal of Development Research.