Egypt’s diaspora policy in the post-June 2013 era as a transnational mechanism of regime legitimation

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explore the question of why and how autocrats update their diaspora policy. Building on scholarship that deals with states’ motivations to engage with ‘their’ diasporas, alongside scholarship that has focused on authoritarian regimes’ durability, the article demonstrates how a regime’s legitimation process takes place in the transnational sphere and illuminates how authoritarian consolidation strategies maintain a constant interaction with the transnational sphere and are fed by it. Presenting an extended case study of Egypt’s diaspora policy under ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, this article demonstrates how the updated policies and discourse, which include positive and negative engagement, are part of regime legitimation strategies and are designed to mobilize support for the post-June 2013 regime and its narrative, both domestically and abroad, and constitute part of the regime’s strategies for consolidating its power.

KEYWORDS:

• Diaspora policy
• legitimation
• authoritarian regimes
• Egypt

Introduction

One of the most prominent phenomena in the diaspora field in the last two decades is the efforts that countries make to extend their reach beyond national borders to affect their diaspora communities. An increasing number of scholars have focused on the variety of policies of sending states toward their diasporas. Studies that deal with states’ motivations to engage with their diaspora have emphasized three main explanations: utilitarian, identity-based, and governance-oriented (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Koinova, 2018; Ragazzi, 2014). Until recently, the literature on diaspora politics did not focus on authoritarian regimes and their efforts to retain control over their migrants and diaspora communities abroad (Brand, 2006). A new wave of studies has addressed the potential of diaspora politics to challenge authoritarianism’s political order (Betts & Jones, 2016; Lewis, 2015) and begun to address the various manners in which authoritarian emigration states reach out to their population abroad and the power they exercise beyond their borders (Conduit, 2020; Glasius, 2018; Moss, 2016; Lewis, 2015; Tsourapas, 2018). Besides exploring the negative policies, which are part of what is termed transnational authoritarianism (Tsourapas, 2021), such studies have shown that regimes’ efforts to mobilize the diaspora, whether for economic and political reasons or for the construction of a desired identity, are significant in establishing the regimes’ legitimacy at home and abroad and for the consolidation of their power (Collyer, 2013; Tsourapas, 2018). Yet, despite studies showing that extraterritorial authoritarianism shares many of the characteristics of authoritarian power within state boundaries (Conduit, 2020), few studies have addressed the sending state’s mobilization of the diaspora in terms of political legitimacy (Glasius, 2018; Hirt & Abdulkader, 2018; Tsourapas, 2018).

This article seeks to delve into the question of why and how autocrats updated and reconstructed the existing policies and discourse toward the diaspora. Building on previous research that focused on the resilience of authoritarian regimes and emphasized repression, co-optation, and legitimation as pillars of stability (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017; Gerschewski, 2013; von Haldenwang, 2017), I would like to explore how authoritarian origin-states design and update diaspora policy to legitimize their role and to consolidate it. Following studies that emphasize that a regime’s claims to legitimacy are important for explaining its means of rule and, in turn, its durability (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017), I would like to show that regimes’ efforts to mobilize the diaspora and incorporate it in economic and political national projects or by constructing a desired identity are part of their legitimation strategies.

The case of Egypt is a useful one for examining sending states’ shifting interest in mobilizing their diaspora and exploring diaspora policies as a means of enhancing their legitimacy. Egypt is one of the largest emigration countries (The World Bank, 2021). According to official Egyptian sources, in the end of 2017, ten million Egyptians lived abroad, 70% of them in Arab oil-producing countries and 30% in Europe and North America (CAPMAS, 2019, pp. 41–44). Over the years, the Egyptian state developed a distinct policy toward the two emigrant communities. While minimal and reactive toward worker emigrants in the Arab oil countries, the state’s engagement with emigrants and diaspora communities in Western countries was more active, aimed at strengthening their cultural link to the homeland and mobilizing them as economic and public diplomacy assets (Tsourapas, 2015). These relations changed significantly after the January 2011 revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year regime and led Egypt into a period of upheavals and a socio-political and economic crisis. The 2011 revolution exposed the diaspora’s desire for political involvement at home, thereby precipitating a change in the state’s diaspora policy, from ‘building diaspora’ to ‘diaspora integration’ (Müller-Funk, 2017). The shift in the state’s policy and engagement with the diaspora took place after June 2013, as the first democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi, was overthrown in a military coup backed by a mass uprising and the subsequent re-entrenchment of authoritarianism under the rule of ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. During this period, the regime has ‘reclaimed the diaspora’ (Ho, 2011) and become more active in managing its relationship with Egyptians abroad.

It will show that Egypt’s initiatives vis-a`-vis its diaspora may be perceived as part of a larger state-legitimation process designed to serve a performative function, justifying and supporting the post-June 2013 regime narrative and constituting one of the regime’s strategies to consolidate its power. The post-June 2013 regime updated its policies with the aim of integrating the diaspora communities into what the regime has called the creation of ‘the new republic’, a slogan launched by al-Sisi to signal the departure from the ‘old’ republic, and as an expression of his vision to rebuild Egypt's economy through ambitious projects and by providing a better quality of life for its citizens (al-Ahram, August 3, 2021). Similar to Turner’s argument (2013) in his study on the Rwandan diaspora policy, this study will show that the target audience of this policy is not only the diaspora but also the Egyptians at home. By scrutinizing diaspora policy, we will demonstrate how this is part of the legitimation process vis à vis the re-entrenchment of authoritarianism, the political repression, the structural economic crisis, and the increased burden on Egyptian citizens. State positive and negative engagement mechanisms and the construction of good-loyal and hostile-traitor diasporans (Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Glasius, 2018; Turner, 2013) will be presented as part of the regime’s legitimation strategies and its efforts to exclude those who do not cooperate with its narrative – especially the Brotherhood and other post-June 2013 exiles in Western countries – and stifle their attempts to mobilize Egyptians at home and the international community against the regime.

The analysis presented in this article contributes to the understanding of diaspora policies in two ways. First, it reveals how authoritarian regimes attempt to mobilize and govern the diaspora as part of their legitimation process. Secondly, the discussion that links domestic political processes with changes in diaspora policies and legitimation strategies demonstrates how the adaptation capabilities of authoritarian regimes, which are manifested in reconfiguring their strategies of governance and discourse (Heydemann & Leenders, 2014), take place in the transnational sphere. The consolidation strategies of authoritarian regimes maintain a constant interaction with the transnational sphere and are fed by it.

In the next section, the conceptual framework for state-diaspora engagement will be presented, focusing on authoritarian regimes’ motivations and strategies. In the following sections, I contextualize the Egyptian state’s engagement with the diaspora, providing a concise discussion of the history of Egypt’s diaspora policy. In the last section, the updated diaspora policy under al-Sisi will be examined, focusing on al-Sisi’s legitimation strategies and the state’s positive and negative engagement with the diaspora in Western countries. Despite acknowledging that part of the state’s updated policy is directed toward worker emigrants in the oil-producing countries, this article seeks to examine only the diaspora in Western countries since it represents different policy rationales. In the case of the oil-producing countries, state policy is expected to serve the temporary workers by taking care of their rights abroad, while the policy toward the communities in Western countries is primarily expected to serve the state.¹

Diaspora policies and authoritarian regimes

In the last three decades, diaspora communities have emerged as non-state actors that have an impact on the political arena in the sending states and are potential agents of change. Scholars from different disciplines have emphasized the role of actors in the diaspora in influencing domestic politics and foreign policy in their homelands and host countries (Bauböck & Faist, 2010; Betts & Jones, 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Diaspora studies have broadened the inquiry, and a growing scholarly literature has begun to focus on explaining the various factors and objectives that shape state ‘diaspora management’ or ‘diaspora strategies’ (Bauböck, 2003; Brand, 2006; Collyer, 2013; Gamlen, 2008, 2014; Ho, 2011; Koinova, 2018; Mylonas, 2013; Ragazzi, 2014).

Scholars have written extensively on the motivations of sending states to engage with their diasporas. In categorizing states’ motivations, three main – sometimes overlapping – explanations are emphasized: utilitarian, identity-based and governance (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Koinova, 2018; Ragazzi, 2014). Utilitarian explanations emphasize the diasporas’ potential as a source of resources that can stimulate the economic development of the sending state by remittances or attracting investments (Bauböck, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; Ho, 2011), or as a tool of soft power and public diplomacy (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Shain & Barth, 2003). Constructivist approaches suggest identity-based explanations which seek to establish a state-led, long-distance nationalism that binds emigrants and those who remained in the homeland to one citizenship (Collyer & King, 2015; Gamlen, 2014; Glick-Schiller, 2005; Ho, 2011). A governance-oriented explanation based on the governmentality approach to power introduced by Foucault proposes that diaspora policies reflect sending states’ efforts to create and control citizens abroad through consent. The act of governing entails a range of practices and organizations oriented toward governing the diaspora, mobilizing national identities, and institutionalizing the links for the purpose of creating citizen-sovereign relationships beyond territorial borders (Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014).

Until recently, the literature on diaspora politics did not focus on authoritarian regimes and their efforts to retain control over their migrants and diaspora communities abroad (Brand, 2006). A new wave of studies has addressed the potential of diaspora politics to challenge authoritarianism (Betts & Jones, 2016) and begun to address the various forms in which authoritarian emigration states reach out to their population abroad and the power they exercise beyond borders, connecting such extraterritorial strategies to authoritarian survival strategies (Conduit, 2020; Glasius, 2018; Moss, 2016; Tsourapas, 2018, 2021).

Studies have pointed to the diverse forms of transnational authoritarianism (Tsourapas, 2021) focusing on the repressive side of diaspora engagement intended to obstruct the political engagement of diaspora communities (Conduit, 2020; Glasius, 2018; Moss, 2016). Other studies focused on positive engagement, showing that regimes’ efforts to mobilize the diaspora, whether for economic and political reasons or for the construction of a desired identity, are significant in establishing the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad (Tsourapas, 2018). Such engagements are intensified due to internal changes involving governmental changes, or when a politically engaged diaspora acts to bring about political change in the homeland. In this case, the state acts intensively to incorporate its diaspora communities into domestic projects (Uztürk & Taş, 2020). An interesting example is Turkey, which has experienced a shift from a passive to a pro-active diaspora engagement policy since the early 2000s and with its transition to competitive authoritarianism. Studies have shown that Turkey’s diaspora policy emanates from domestic changes and was designed to serve domestic factors such as the Muslim nationalist and neo-Ottomanist agenda of the regime (Adamson, 2019; Arkilic, 2021). Another example is the intensification of the policy of diaspora-building in Azerbaijan in the early 2000s under President Heydar Aliyev, who promoted the political project of constructing an ethnonational pan-Azerbaijani diaspora. Hundreds of separate organizations, guided and coordinated by the political homeland, many of which exist only on paper, hardly impact Azerbaijan’s international image or challenge the power of the Armenian lobby regarding their decades-long struggle for control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region; rather, their main function is to entrench the cult and legitimacy of Heydar Aliyev and the regime he founded (Rumyantsev, 2017).

Despite the growing literature on the link between diaspora policies and authoritarian regimes’ legitimacy at home and abroad, only a few studies have addressed regimes’ mobilization of diaspora communities in terms of political legitimacy (Glasius, 2018; Hirt & Abdulkader, 2018; Tsourapas, 2018). Studies that have dealt with the resilience of authoritarian regimes have shown that they cannot survive over time by relying on repression or co-option alone (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017; von Haldenwang, 2017). Alongside co-optation and repression, such regimes are constantly engaged in ‘a process of legitimation’ that includes legitimation claims, narratives, symbols, and procedures designed to guarantee active consent and compliance and to establish the notion that the social, economic and political order for which the regime is responsible best serves the needs and interests of society (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017; Gerschewski, 2013; von Haldenwang, 2017).

Therefore, since extraterritorial authoritarianism shares many of the characteristics of authoritarian power within state boundaries (Conduit, 2020), analyzing the legitimation process will be extended to the regime’s attempts to mobilize and control the diaspora. Claims of legitimacy not only endeavor to justify the right to rule. By analyzing them, we also analyze additional mechanisms of control that constitute the means of delegitimizing other forces and interests (Sottimano, 2016; Grauvogel & von Soest, 2014). Studies that have dealt with sending states’ diaspora engagement have shown that it includes the formulation of positive and negative engagement intended to mark who is part of the nation and who is not, who is a patriot, and who is a traitor. Such strategies aim to limit opposition forces and their political involvement in the homeland and abroad (Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Turner, 2013). Thus, diaspora policy is not directed only at the diaspora communities; its audience is the citizens at home as well as the international community (Turner, 2013).

By focusing on the legitimation process, this study does not contend that the process of legitimation necessarily means the regime’s acceptance among the population or influences the perceptions and actions of diaspora communities (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). The suggested analysis serves to illuminate the motives for shaping and reconstructing diaspora policy. Analyzing utilitarian, identity-based and governance-oriented motives for engagement as part of the regime’s process of legitimation, the analysis examines the policy’s relationship to the regime’s consolidation strategies at home and abroad.

Research on the diaspora policy of an authoritarian regime and investigating the relations between the regime and diaspora communities and individuals involves constraints and challenges, especially regarding access to information. For the analysis of Egypt’s diaspora policies post-June 2013, I analyze primary sources that can testify to the regime’s policy such as official documents, official speeches, press statements and press interviews, NGO reports and media sources, as well as secondary literature. Since the Ministry of Emigration and the Affairs of Egyptians Abroad was at the forefront of the state’s policy, I also monitored the ministry’s agenda through its official website², which meticulously documented all the ministry activities, including initiative conferences, meetings, and statements since its establishment in 2015. I also assessed the policy and discourse by examining all the issues of the ministry journal, Misr Ma‘ak (Egypt With You) in Arabic and in English. Since I seek to establish that the updated diaspora policy is also part of the regime’s domestic legitimation process, I examined news reports since 2015 in several prominent local newspapers, which allowed me to trace the changing local discourse toward the diaspora.

Egyptian diaspora policy in historical context

Egypt is one of the largest emigration countries of the world. According to the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, in the end of 2017, ten million Egyptians lived abroad. Most of the Egyptian emigrants resided in the Arab oil-producing countries (6.2 million), 1.6 million in North and South America, 1.2 million in Europe and 340,000 in Australia (CAPMAS, 2019, pp. 41–44). Migration from Egypt to Western countries began in the 1960s for economic and political reasons. Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s regime perceived emigration as a violation of the regime’s development project and acted to restrict it through control over the issuance of exit visas (Ayubi, 1983). This policy was in line with the regime’s legitimation strategies based on the socialist vision and opposition to Western capitalism. In this period, emigration to the West included small groups of state-funded students or political dissidents seeking to escape repression, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood and members of the Jewish community. As the legitimation benefits from emigration restriction decreased, the restrictions were eased (Tsourapas, 2018). The nationalist and socialist policies led to the emigration of industrialists, businessmen, landowners and professionals. The target destination of these well-off populations was North America and Europe (Ayubi, 1983; Dessouki, 1982; Tsourapas, 2018; Zohry, 2014; Müller-Funk, 2017).

A significant change in emigration policy occurred in the early 1970s with the economic liberalization of Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat. The open-door policy, which included the opening of the Egyptian economy to foreign investment, led to the formulation of a liberal emigration policy as a tool for development and for encouraging large-scale labor emigration to ease the pressure on the local labor market and inject remittances into the economy (Dessouki, 1982). This policy led to a massive influx of Egyptian workers into oil-producing Arab counties in the Persian Gulf and also to a wave of migration to Europe and North America, most of which, at least until the 1990s, was educated and highly skilled (Zohry, 2014). During this period, Egypt had no official policy regarding emigrants and diaspora. Unlike emigrant workers in the oil countries, who were not granted citizenship and were therefore perceived by the state as ‘temporary’, the ‘permanent’ emigrants in the West enjoyed the attention of the state institutions, which worked to accommodate their needs (Tsourapas, 2015; Müller-Funk 2017).

Despite the lack of a comprehensive policy for coping with the brain drain, the state developed tools to promote the return to the homeland of well-educated, professional and highly skilled emigrants (Tsourapas, 2015; Ayubi, 1983). The state also developed initiatives to maintain emigrants’ ties with the homeland. Attention was focused on cultural organizations that were politically and financially dependent on the Egyptian government, state-funded trips to Egypt and language classes for the second generation of emigrants (Ayubi, 1983; Müller-Funk, 2017; Tsourapas, 2015). This strategy, which continued under Mubarak’s rule, has been defined by Müller-Funk (2017) as the first stage of ‘building a diaspora’, in which the state establishes means to cultivate and recognize Egyptians’ presence abroad. During the last days of Sadat’s rule, a special ministry focusing on migrants was established. However, the abolishment of this ministry in 1990 represented the low interest in mobilizing the diaspora community. In 1996, the state integrated the issue of immigration with the Ministry of Manpower. Although this ministry was engaged in facilitating regular migration as well as establishing and enhancing cultural and social ties with the diaspora, it was mainly concerned with the conditions of Egyptians working abroad, especially in the Gulf countries, and its initiatives were mainly based on the economic benefit that Egypt could derive from the diaspora (Jureidini, 2010).

Under Mubarak, the state did not make efforts to mobilize the community as a political tool for international or domestic legitimacy. One explanation focused on the diaspora’s character and the fact that it was not perceived as a threat to the regime’s stability (Tsourpas, 2020). The Egyptian diaspora in Western countries is fragmented politically, ideologically, religiously and by socio-economic status. While the Coptic organizations in Western countries have consistently focused on lobbying their government and international bodies in order to raise international awareness of the Coptic minority status (Yefet, 2017), other communities were relatively silent and did not utilize the transnational spheres to challenge the regime, or alternatively, to lobby for Egypt’s interests (Kuşçu, 2012; Pagès-El Karoui, 2015).

The January 2011 revolution that led to the toppling of Mubarak’s regime opened a window of opportunity for challenging the existing authoritarian order. This triggered the diaspora consciousness and increased the expatriates’ sense of belonging to the homeland (Müller-Funk, 2019; Underhill, 2019; Dazey & Zederman, 2017; Pagès-El Karoui, 2015; Weißköppel, 2015). In practice, it spurred the involvement of diaspora groups in homeland affairs and led them to renegotiate their relationship with the homeland (Kuşçu, 2012; Pagès-El Karoui, 2015), by claiming their right to participate in the political process back home and exercise their right to vote among other things (al-Masry al Yawm, 31 October 2011).

However, despite the growing activism in the diaspora, the efforts of the activists were not enthusiastically received in the Egyptian political arena. The transitional government led by the Supreme Military Council distrusted their activities and tried to control the diaspora organizations operating in Egypt (Kuşçu, 2012). The barriers posed to their activities, alongside the political instability in the homeland in the transition period, weakened the initial enthusiasm among diaspora activists (Kuşçu, 2012). Moreover, the polarization of the emerging arena of activism in the diaspora intensified even further after the removal of Muhammad Morsi from the presidency by the military on 3 July 2013. Similar to the political arena in Egypt, diaspora activists became fragmented regarding the question of the legitimacy of the military involvement, between those who supported what they perceived as the second revolution and those who defined it as a coup and supported Morsi (Müller-Funk, 2019; Underhill, 2019; Pagès-El Karoui, 2015; Weißköppel, 2015).

The re-entrenchment of authoritarianism in Egypt under al-Sisi led to a decline in diaspora political activism (Müller-Funk, 2019; RAD, 8–9). On the other hand, the repression of the members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the severe curtailing of the opposition and civil society led to the migration of Muslim Brotherhood members who sought to avoid prosecution and fled to Qatar, Turkey, Europe and North America; numerous political activists, intellectuals, journalists and civil society activists also went into exile, some out of fear of political harassment or court convictions (ANHRI, 2016; Dunne & Hamzawy, 2019). Many Egyptian exiles have continued their political activism, using social media to maintain close relations across borders and to influence politics at home. Despite the decline of political activism in the diaspora, these exiles have contributed to shaping the diaspora as a transnational sphere that is critical of the Egyptian regime and that exposes Egypt’s violations of human rights in order to mobilize Egyptians and the international community against the Egyptian regime (Dazey & Zederman, 2017; Dunne & Hamzawy, 2019). Therefore, as will be shown in the following sections, the diaspora policy also included an attempt to exclude opposition voices by marking good-loyal versus bad-traitor diasporans (Baser & Ozturk, 2020; Glasius, 2018).

Intense engagement for domestic and international legitimacy: diaspora policy under al-Sisi

The regime established under al-Sisi was termed by Rutherford (2018) ‘a new authoritarianism’, in order to single out the shift to a new set of rulers and the establishment of a new political order under the control of the military. Under al-Sisi’s rule, Egypt has been experiencing a systematic and extensive political repression that has been stifling all the forces across the entire ideological spectrum, a crackdown on civil society and restrictions on the media and freedom of expression, along with an increased military presence in the economy and politics. The regional instability following the Arab Spring uprisings allowed al-Sisi to claim legitimacy based on protecting Egypt from terrorist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which were presented by the regime as a subversive force and an existential threat to the Egyptian nation and its civil culture (Rutherford, 2018).

Egypt’s structural, chronic economic crisis is the most important challenge facing al-Sisi’s regime. Economic recovery and development promises are a fundamental dimension of al-Sisi’s quest for legitimacy. Al-Sisi, who is relying heavily on International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which deepen Egypt’s national debt, has pursued a policy of subsidy cuts and price increases that run counter to the population’s long-standing expectations for the continued existence of a welfare state (Heydemann, 2020, p. 6). Alongside these measures, al-Sisi has invested in large-scale infrastructure projects and ambitious development projects, including the further development of the Suez Canal Zone, the construction of the new administrative capital city east of Cairo, and mega, high-end housing projects. Critics have cast doubt on the economic value of these mega-projects, which absorb the bulk of state revenues instead of dealing with the necessities of the growing population. The critics point to the symbolic value of these projects as creating an image of development and prosperity and their role in strengthening al-Sisi’s legitimacy as a leader who provides an economic vision of development (Springborg, 2022).

The need of the regime to redefine its legitimacy in the post-2011 uprising era, alongside the existence of diaspora activists who challenge the regime’s narrative, are reflected in Egypt’s updated diaspora policy. Under al-Sisi, we are witnessing a proactive diaspora engagement policy, which marks a shift from the Egyptian state’s past policies toward the diaspora. ‘Claiming’ the diaspora (Ho, 2011) and the right of the Egyptian regime to act on behalf of an Egyptian nation that binds emigrants, their descendants and those in the homeland to one citizenship is one of the pillars of the regime’s legitimation strategy both domestically and abroad.

Shifting policies reflect the regime’s attempt to control citizens abroad through consent. The act of governing entails organizing and institutionalizing these links through the participation of diaspora communities in elections, which is needed for the regime’s legitimacy and for creating citizen-sovereign relationships beyond territorial borders (Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014). One of the practical manifestations of the proactive policy occurred in September 2015 with the re-establishment of an independent Ministry of Emigration and the Affairs of Egyptians Abroad, thereby transferring the responsibility for managing and caring for the affairs of expatriates from the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration. Since then, and in clear contrast to the situation under Mubarak, the ministry has been at the forefront of the change in the relationship between the state and Egyptians abroad, as it has been directed to coordinate the initiatives, actions, ministries and agencies dealing with Egyptians abroad (interview with the Minister, al-Watan, 24 December 2015).

The re-establishment of this ministry signaled the regime’s strategy to lay down the foundation for a new relationship between the state and the diaspora communities. The new minister, Nabila Makram, claimed that in contrast to the previous regimes, which marginalized the role of Egyptians abroad and sought to exploit them mainly financially, under the rule of al-Sisi, the state is responding to their desire to contribute to the building of modern Egypt.³ This measure represents the desire to enhance the process of integration of the diaspora, which according to Müller-Funk (2017) had already started after the 2011 revolution, when the state granted the Egyptians abroad the right to vote in elections and referendums. This process of integration was deepened after the military coup in June 2013. In the post-2013 era, we are witnessing an intensification of the efforts to enlarge what Varadarajan (2010) termed ‘the domestic abroad’ and to enhance the legitimacy of the regime as representing Egypt’s new imagined community: a constituency that includes the whole Egyptian nation, inside and outside the boundaries of the Egyptian territories. Thus, the authorities made efforts to mobilize diaspora voters and encouraged their participation in elections, especially for the president (al-Masry al-Yawm, 29 November 2015; al-Watani, 14 March, 2018). Consequently, in the 2018 presidential elections the right to vote was extended. Contrary to the past, when this right was limited to those with a valid residency status in their host countries, the Minister of Emigration announced that all Egyptian expatriates, regardless of their legal status, would be allowed to vote.⁴

The integration efforts under al-Sisi included for the first time in history the right of Egyptians abroad to be elected to the Egyptian parliament. Section 88 of the 2014 Constitution refers to the state’s responsibility toward the Egyptians living abroad and their public duties towards the state. As part of the implementation of this section, the parliamentary law allocated at least eight parliament seats to Egyptians abroad through a quota system that included underrepresented groups such as women, Copts, youths and Egyptians with disabilities (Aziz, 2017).

The participation of diaspora communities in the elections and the possibility of electing alternative representatives did not pose a threat to the regime due to the re-entrenchment of authoritarianism under al-Sisi. This included the nomination of candidates who do not endanger the regime and the position of the president, as happened in the 2018 presidential elections, which were seen as a farce and as designed to express confidence in al-Sisi (Ahramonline, February 7 2018). Furthermore, these elections were managed by the embassies. A tradition of mistrust of the state institutions and the role of surveillance disinclines many emigrants – and especially opposition forces – to register with the relevant embassies and consulates (Zohry & Debnath, 2010). From the point of view of the regime, the very participation of the diaspora in elections conducted in an authoritarian setting not only institutionalizes the link with the diaspora, creates sovereign relationships beyond territorial borders (Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014) or reinforces the monitoring of communities abroad (Brand, 2006) – it also legitimizes the regime at home and abroad.

Economic mobilization of the diaspora as a tool of legitimacy

One prominent component of the updated diaspora policy is the portrayal of the diaspora as an agent of change and economic development. Indeed, targeting professional and business networks in the diaspora and mobilizing human capital is designed to serve al-Sisi’s economic policy and to improve the nation’s economic competitiveness in the global, knowledge-based economy (Ho, 2011). The regime’s effort to co-opt what Gerschewski (2013, p. 22) termed ‘strategically relevant’ actors in its development project is intended to provide them with economic and other opportunities, in return for their support. Nonetheless, these efforts go beyond utilitarian motives to use them as resources that can stimulate economic development (Bauböck, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Gamlen, 2014; Ho, 2011). The support of these actors is important for enhancing the legitimacy of the regime’s economic development agenda, which has been a subject of criticism, as mentioned above. Therefore, the regime has clearly and systematically linked the mobilization of these diaspora professional and business networks to its development plan.

In her speeches, the Minister of Emigration has emphasized that the ministry’s goals are communicating with Egyptians abroad, benefiting from their abilities and experience, and integrating them into all the development projects (al-Shorouq, 25 August 2019; 21 November 2021). The business networks and scholars are presented as ‘an active part of the sustainable-development equation in Egypt’ (al-Masry al-Yawm, 10 January 2021; al-Shorouq, 9 January 2021), and their involvement is ‘a condition for Egypt’s economic recovery’ (al-Shorouq, 25 August 2019). Their important role and responsibilities as an integral part of the Egyptian nation are being emphasized. Thus for example, their role in Egypt’s struggle for development was presented by the minister as equivalent to the battle against terrorism, which requires the participation of all Egyptians in the homeland and abroad (Daily News-Egypt, 25 February 2018), or as a role not different from that of a soldier defending Egypt’s’ borders (Misr Ma‘ak, no. 10, 2019). Presenting their contribution as equivalent to that of the soldiers defending Egypt borders and using metaphors of battle and war in the quest to mobilize their participation and support of the regime’s development project serves to strengthen the regime’s narrative and its main legitimacy claims, which link its ability to drive economic development with its role in providing security and defending the Egypt state from its enemies, first and foremost the terrorist organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In practice, the ‘Egypt Can’ (misr tastati‘) initiative that is being led by the Ministry of Emigration is focused on creating a database of all Egyptian scholars and experts in universities and research institutes around the world in different fields of knowledge under one umbrella in order to facilitate the use of their knowledge and experience (Akhbar al-Yawm, 5 April 2019). The initiative was also accompanied by a series of conferences organized by the ministry in collaboration with various other ministries under changing slogans such as ‘Egypt Can through Education’, or ‘Egypt Can through Industry’, which are being used to discuss Egypt’s challenges and for presenting optional solutions (e.g. Akhbar al Yawm, 13 December 2018; 14 June 2020; 8 February 2021).⁵

These initiatives were also accompanied by a change in the discourse toward this ‘knowledge community’. Unlike the past, when the discourse focused on brain drain and the desire to bring emigrants back home (Tsourapas, 2015, p. 11), the current discourse in the state-controlled media refers to migratory birds (al-tuyur al-muhajira) who excelled in Western countries and reached leadership positions in their field of work, their contribution to the advancement of life in the countries in which they live and the respect they are afforded (Akhbar al-Yawm, 25 July 2019; Fikri, 2021). These Egyptian expatriates are presented as a symbol of the transformation in Egypt and as embodying the spirit of entrepreneurship that is promoted by al-Sisi and that should be emulated by all Egyptians (e.g. Akhbar al-Yawm, 1 July 2018; 15 October 2018; 4 August 2019). The selection of individuals whose achievements are highlighted are in line with other agendas of the regime and serves them. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Emigration uses women in the diaspora who stand out in their achievements in medicine, engineering, law, education, and other fields for the purpose of advancing the ‘state feminism’ promoted by the regime.⁶

Alongside the initiative to mobilize the diaspora’s ‘knowledge community’, the Ministry of Emigration focused on initiatives to mobilize business networks and individuals to invest in development projects (Misr Ma‘ak, no. 5 and 10, 2019; Yawm al-Sabi‘, 24 September 2019; Daily News-Egypt, 6 October 2019; 12 January 2020).⁷ These initiatives aimed at attracting investment in the regime’s mega-projects and were accompanied by coverage in the local media, including a description of the tours organized for the potential investors to the major development projects – especially the government’s urban development projects (al-Ahram 15 July 2019).

Similarly, efforts are being made to include them in national projects sponsored by the president. Particularly prominent efforts have been made to mobilize their contributions to the philanthropic foundation A Decent Life (Hayah Karima), which aims to improve standards of living, infrastructure and basic services including health care across the neediest governorates in the Egyptian countryside.⁸ Similar to former initiatives, the support of Egyptians abroad for the ‘Decent Life’ project, which focuses on the development of the poorest areas in Egypt, serves as vehicle to promote the state’s ‘national human rights strategy’ – a strategy that was established as a response to Western pressures and that prioritizes social and economic rights over civil and political rights (Salem & Mamdouh, 2021). According to the former minister, ‘it is evidence of the political support of the diaspora, and an affirmation that Egyptians abroad are with the state in its strategy to promote human rights’ and ‘as the most effective response to any allegations of human rights’ (as quoted in al-Ahram, January 2021).⁹

The discussion of these initiatives is not intended to claim that they have been crowned with success. Many doubt the actual impact of the initiatives in attracting investments and donations.¹⁰ Moreover, these efforts of the ministry were subject to local criticism, which was reflected in a debate in the Egyptian parliament in which some members of parliament questioned the ministry’s initiatives and asked for its abolition and re-integration into other ministries, such as the foreign ministry (al-Masry al – Yawm, 14 and 20 November 2021). Similarly, the campaign to glorify the role of diaspora scientists and experts has not been accompanied by a practical plan. As one of the expatriate scientists explained, the Ministry of Emigration is managing a positive campaign to contact the Egyptians abroad. However, these relationships often do not engender continuity and turn into recommendations that remain on paper (Akhbar al-Yawm, 15 October 2018).

And yet these policies, which focus on diaspora support for the regime’s development projects reflect an activism that serves the process of co-optation of parts of the diaspora community and constitute an essential layer in the regime’s legitimation strategies both internationally and domestically. Portraying a segment of the diaspora as a force for change that is cooperating with the regime’s economic and political projects contributes to the positive image of the regime as acting to improve the economic situation in Egypt. As the former minister emphasized, their support is not only economic and logistical but also spiritual and is intended to constitute an instrument in refuting what she terms ‘rumors and false reports questioning the development efforts exerted by the state’.¹¹

Identity and international and domestic legitimacy

Al-Sisi’s regime seeks to strengthen its image as the guardian of the ‘home’ and its traditional values, and therefore it has constructed the ‘home’ as a central issue in the connection between the diaspora and the homeland. Such a policy is part of the endeavor to establish a state-led, long-distance nationalism that binds emigrants and those who remained in the homeland to one citizenship (Collyer & King, 2015; Gamlen, 2014; Glick-Schiller, 2005; Ho, 2011). Similar to former regimes, the state under al-Sisi has invested in creating opportunities for cultural engagement of the diaspora with the official national identity through official celebrations of Egyptian heritage and commemoration of events abroad (Misr Ma‘ak no. 5, 2019).¹² Other initiatives include the ‘Speak Arabic’ campaign, which aims to preserve the national and cultural identity of the second and third generation of Egyptian emigrants (Misr Ma‘ak, no. 7 & 9, 2019; al-Shorouq, 30 September 2020; Akhbar al-Yawm, 2 October 2020). The state is also sponsoring tours and courses for youth delegations to reinforce their knowledge of Egypt’s history, heritage, traditions and society (Akhbar al-Yawm, 29 August 2019; al-Ahram 26 January 2020) but also to expose them to what has been defined by the former minister as ‘credible knowledge about how Egypt is dealing with problems of terrorism, far from the false information disseminated in the international media’ (Misr Ma‘ak, no. 1, 2019–2022; Akhbar al-Yawm, 29 August 2019).

These ‘traditional’ efforts, intended to express the extraterritorial power of the state and promote an identity that serves the regime, are accompanied by a special interest in youth. Egypt’s unprecedented need to reach out to the youth became more urgent after the January 2011 revolution, which was driven by frustrated revolutionary youth. Al-Sisi’s engagement with the youth in the diaspora overlaps and parallels the attempts to co-opt the youth at home. In conjunction with the state crackdown on the revolutionary youth, the regime has sought the consent of the youths in the homeland, aiming to foster their identification with the regime’s policies and goals. As part of this effort, the regime has worked to shape an image of the ‘new Egyptian’, which is meant to constitute an alternative to the model of revolutionary young men. These efforts are nurtured, among other ways, through the establishment of youth forums. Beginning from 2017, the local youth conferences have been extended to the World Youth Forum, which is held annually at a Red Sea resort in Sharm al-Sheikh under the auspices of the president. These forums are defined by the regime as a dialog platform for young people to express their opinions about global challenges and as a bridge of communication between the political leadership and diaspora youths from different countries (wyfegypt.com). The conferences are attended by delegations of hundreds of young people from the diaspora and those who study abroad, who are invited by the Ministry of Emigration (al-Masry al-Yawm 11 November 2017; al-Shorouq, 15 December 2021).

These forums and initiatives seek also to strengthen Egypt’s soft power, further its position in the international arena, and even promote Egyptian tourism. They are an inseparable part of the regime’s efforts to harness the younger generation’s support for the regime. The participation of the diaspora youth enhances Egypt’s image in the international arena by transforming them into unofficial ambassadors of the country. Special effort has been made to integrate young Egyptian students abroad, who were defined by the Minister of Emigration as the most dangerous segment of immigrants, because of their exposure to misconceptions regarding Egypt from those with anti-Egypt tendencies (AFTE 2022; al-Shouroq, 22 April 2021).

However, the motive behind this initiative goes beyond using the youth as a tool of soft power and public diplomacy (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Shain & Barth, 2003). The image of the young people promoted in these forums is that of science-seekers, religiously moderate, tolerant of other religions, conformist to the regime and patriots who do not deviate from the purpose of maintaining the nation’s integrity and stability (Bird, 2016; Winter & Shiloah, 2019). The participation of diaspora youth in these conferences contributes to strengthening the regime by enabling it to exalt them as a role model for the ‘new Egyptian’. This enables the regime to reproduce existing exclusions of the revolutionary youth, who continue to pose a challenge to the image of the regime and to justify their suppression at home and abroad.

Public diplomacy and de-Legitimation across borders

The legitimacy of the post-June 2013 regime in the international arena was contested. The overthrow of the first democratically elected government alongside al-Sis’s oppressive patterns of control aggravated Western countries’ criticism of Egypt’s human rights record, particularly by the United States and the European Union. In the case of the United States, this criticism had a practical implication, when the bilateral relations between Cairo and Washington included threats to suspend military aid (Carothers & Press, 2021). This threat has become more urgent following the activities of Egyptian opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which have been urging Washington to condition US military aid to Egypt on human rights improvement (Middle East Eye, November 10, 2020).

The mobilization of the diaspora as a tool of soft power and public diplomacy (Shain & Barth, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003) in refuting the allegations against Egypt were manifested clearly, as Egyptians abroad were required to help improve Egypt’s image (al-Watan, 28 August 2018). The role of the diaspora in the United States was defined by former speaker of the parliament, ‘Abd ‘Ali al-‘Al, as ‘standing up to US media attacks that paint a flawed picture of Egypt’.¹³ Efforts to establish an Egyptian lobby in the United States intensified after Joe Biden’s administration began exerting pressure on Egypt regarding human rights issues. The Egyptian government, in collaboration with the General Union of Egyptians Abroad, has set up a branch of the organization in the United States with the aim of forming an Egyptian lobby comprising Egyptian figures capable of influencing American society and decision-makers in Washington (Al-Ahram, January 2022).

Along with attempts to create a functioning lobby, an effort was made to mobilize expatriates to assist in Egypt’s dispute with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which aggravated Egypt’s concerns regarding Ethiopia’s ability to control the flow of the Nile via the dam. In this case, the Ministry of Emigration launched a social media campaign that included a call to the diaspora to share a short film ‘The Nile is Our Life’, aimed at developing awareness in world public opinion of the dimensions of this dispute and its impact on downstream countries and to confirm Egypt’s historical and legal rights in the Nile waters (Misr Ma‘ak, no. 15, 2019–2022). Given its complexity due to its focus mainly on social media, the potential of this effort to influence policy makers in the West is questionable. Nonetheless, the importance of such campaigns lies in their effect on the audience at home by re-invigorating the regime’s image as protector of Egypt from its external enemies.

Along with the glorification of the good-loyal expatriates who express solidarity with the so-called ‘battle of development’, efforts are being made by the regime to delegitimize and exclude those who are presented as hostile-traitor diasporans, i.e. those who are responsible for misleading other Egyptians and the international community. One of the main roles of the Ministry of Emigration was to mobilize the support of Egyptians abroad against the counter-mobilization operations carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood and other exiled dissidents, who utilize social media in order to criticize the regime from abroad and who have the potential to influence the domestic arena and mobilize protests. The attacks against any Egyptian who expresses oppositional positions toward the regime have become part of the ministry’s strategy. These attacks sometimes became brutal, such as when the minister’s statements included direct threats against Egyptians abroad if they criticize the regime or participate in activities that seek to mobilize the international community against human rights violations in Egypt (Afte, 2022).

Other means designed to categorize loyal-versus-traitor diasporans includes prosecuting or imposing penalties on them in absentia. Thus, for example, prominent human rights activists Bahey al-Din Hassan, who lives in exile in France, was sentenced in 2020 by an Egyptian court to 15 years in jail for ‘publishing false news’ and ‘insulting the judiciary’ (al-Masry al Yawm, 25 August 2020 and 14 September 2020). Other prominent figures, such as Egyptian actors Amr Waked and Khaled Abu El-Naga, were charged with treason and lobbying in favor of ‘the agendas of those plotting against Egypt’s safety and stability’. This occurred after they held several meetings with US members of Congress in order to lobby against human rights violations under al-Sisi, especially the constitutional amendments which extended al-Sisi’s rule beyond two terms. They were also expelled from the actors’ association in the homeland (Akhbar al-Yawm, 5 January 2022). Hassan, Waked and Abu El-Naga were slandered in the local media as tools of the Muslim Brotherhood, implementing the movement’s plan to distort Egypt’s image (al-Ahram, 12 March and 8 April 2019). Linking their activity abroad to the Muslim Brotherhood served the regime’s narrative of serving as guardian of the Egyptian homeland from the Islamist threat, while also enhancing its legitimacy at home and abroad.

Conclusion

My empirical investigation of the shifting Egyptian diaspora policy under al-Sisi reveals that contrary to Mubarak’s regime, which did not perceive diaspora communities as a decisive variable in its internal legitimacy and thus did not devote efforts to their political mobilization, with al-Sisi we are witnessing a proactive diaspora policy that is part of the regime’s legitimation process.

Egypt’s proactive diaspora policy, which focuses on mobilizing the diaspora’s support for the regime’s development projects or what it terms as the building of the ‘new republic’, whether through investment, participating in conferences or through donations, reflects an activism that serves the process of co-optation of parts of the diaspora community and constitutes an essential layer in the regime’s legitimation strategies both internationally and domestically. Portraying a segment of the diaspora as a force that is cooperating with the regime’s economic and political projects legitimizes the regime as acting to improve the economic and security of Egyptians, and confirms its ideological orientation and narrative. Thus, also, the boundaries of the imagined Egyptian nation are redefined by the loyalty and patriotism of the diasporans. The mobilization and the endeavor to co-opt segments of the diaspora and their presentation as loyal problematize other parts of the diaspora, which are portrayed as traitorous. Such a strategy is part of the endeavor to exclude and delegitimize diasporans and exiles who mobilize Egyptians and the international community against the Egyptian regime and undermine the regime’s narrative of security and development.

While this article has focused on Egypt and its diaspora policies, the Egyptian case is not exceptional with respect to the significance of the quest for legitimacy in designing diaspora policy. Diaspora policy in an authoritarian setting is not merely about development or governance but is part of the international aspect of authoritarianism. The discussion, which has demonstrated how the regime’s legitimation process takes place in the transnational sphere, illuminates how consolidation strategies of authoritarian regimes, which are composed of a variety of measures – oppression, co-optation and legitimation – maintain a constant interaction with the transnational space and are fed by it.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Noam Hassan for his assistance with data collection and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bosmat Yefet

Bosmat Yefet is a lecturer in the Middle Eastern Studies and Social Science department at Ariel University and the editor-in-chief of The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies. In addition to her book The Politics of Human Rights in Egypt and Jordan, which was published in 2015, she has authored a variety of articles dealing with human rights and other aspects of authoritarianism in Egypt, including the role of civil society, freedom of expression, the renewal of religious discourse, majority-minority relations, and the relationship between the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and the diaspora communities in the West. Her current research deals with the political representation of women in Egypt.

Notes

1 See a similar distinction regarding the government rationales for Moroccan diaspora policies (Mahieu, 2019).

2 http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/default.aspx

3 See interview with Nabila Makram, the minister of emigration, Al-Shorouq, 22 September 2015; see also al-Sisi’s words al-Shorouq, 20 September 2021.

4 Ahramonline, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/288591.aspx.

5 See. e.g., the effort to mobilize scientists and experts to support the government’s plans to achieve food security. The Ministry of Emigration official website, 16 June 2022. http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ArtID=1670

6 On “state feminism” under al-Sisi see Allam, 2019; See for example the ministry’s praise Egyptian women abroad at the Ministry of Emigration official website http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ArtID=1414. 14 October 2021.

7 See, e.g., http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ArtID=1456. 5 November 2021.

8 See interview with the minister of emigration, al-Shorouq, 25 September 2021; See also the electronic platform for Egyptians in the United States to donate to the project “A Dignified Life” https://hayakarimausa.com/

9 See also a review of the ministry efforts to support the national project of “a decent life” at the Ministry’s website, 21 September 2021. http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ArtID=1389

10 For example, the donations to the “Decent Life” project remained modest and did not exceed $500,00, a small amount in light of the budget allocated to this project, which covers 4,658 villages across the country, that are home to 58 percent of Egypt’s 102 million population and exceeds $44 billion. See data, as presented in the Ministry official website, 16 November 2021. http://www.emigration.gov.eg/DefaultAr/Pages/newsdetails.aspx?ArtID=1469

11 See the minister’s interview to Ahramonline, 26 August 2021. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/421832.aspx

12 Ahram online 7 October 2014. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/112479.aspx

13 As quoted in AhramOnline 1 November 2017. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/280783.aspx