Pericentricity on the Congolese copperbelt: how the DRC shapes Chinese cobalt supply chains and the low-carbon transition

ABSTRACT

Through the case of cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we examine the role of local politics in critical mineral sourcing and its implications for the lead processing and battery manufacturing industry in China. We propose a pericentric and multiscalar analysis of cobalt extraction to understand the connections and contingencies within the cobalt supply chain and DRC’s place within it. Pericentricity acknowledges geopolitics while emphasizing localized power dynamics that shape cobalt supply, as seemingly peripheral actors in the DRC influence core extractors, processors, and traders. Our analysis contributes to scholarship on African agency amid resource extractivism, highlighting Chinese dependency on foreign extractive political economies. While Chinese firms remain central in cobalt mining, processing, and battery manufacturing, the complex dependencies on local, provincial, and national systems must be understood in their intricacy and flux.

KEYWORDS:

• Battery manufacturing
• China
• cobalt
• critical minerals
• Democratic Republic of the Congo
• energy transition

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Dr. Jacob Henry for his editing and invaluable feedback that improved the article’s structure, and to Eric Leinberger for designing the map. We thank the two anonymous reviewers who provided comments that strengthened the article. Dr. DiCarlo thanks the Wilson Center and Wilson China Fellowship for supporting her research related to critical minerals.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The secrecy surrounding the renegotiation of the Deal of the Century does not explicitly point to a direct effort of the DRC to reshape China’s energy dominance. However, the accumulation of policies targeting Chinese mining investments beyond this specific deal indicates a trend in Kinshasa to mitigate Chinese dominance in the cobalt sector.

2 China largely dominates both the production of EVs and their sale. In 2023, the country registered more EVs than any other, with 56% of global battery EVs and 62% of global plug-in hybrids (IEA, 2024).

3 See for example Deberdt & Le Billon, 2023 in the case of outer space mining and Willaert, 2020; Carver, 2023, and Carver et al., 2020 in the case of deep-sea mining.

4 These taxes also affect non-Chinese mining actors, including Glencore, ERG, Somika, or Chemaf.

5 These numbers often fluctuate. Leberdt and Deberdt (2023, p. 211) provide some insights into the lack of effective methodology.

6 Kamoto Copper Company (Glencore subsidiary), Metalkol RTR (ERG subsidiary), Tenke Fungurume Mining (CMOC subsidiary), Sino-Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines), Société Minière de Deziwa (CNMC subsidiary).

7 The 2007 contract between China and DRC aimed to provide Kinshasa with a US$8.5 billion loan (US$2 billion for modernization of the mining sector and US$6.5 billion for infrastructural works by Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering). The contract was updated in 2008 with an additional US$5 billion loan for the mining sector. Under Western pressures, the contract was renegotiated in 2009 to US$3 billion for the mining sector and US$6 billion for infrastructure. Sicomines is owned by Chinese companies (68%) and the Congolese public company Gécamines (32%) (Coloma, 2011). At present, Sicomines does not extract cobalt but focuses on copper.

8 According to some researchers, China imports 97% of global cobalt, making the country the lead importer, followed by Japan with only 2% (van den Brink et al., 2020). While this number could be accurate, the use of customs data shows significant flaws preventing us from effectively estimating the trade relationship between DRC and China. Cobalt is classified into three distinct harmonized system (HS) codes – 2605, 2822, and 8105. According to Comtrade data, in 2018, China imported 86,000 tons from DRC of 2605, while Congo exported only 4,000 tons to China. In the same year, China imported no 2822 from Congo, while DRC exported 84,000 tons to China. Finally, regarding 8105, China imported more than 219,000 tons from Congo, one and a half times the global cobalt production.

9 As of February 2023, Chinese brands have a share of home market sales of just above 50% (Pang & Luman, 2023).

10 With the diversification of chemistries the share of cobalt-containing batteries is decreasing. However, with booming EV markets, the net amount of cobalt needed is also increasing.

11 In 2024, the Biden administration is even going further in the hopes to secure deposits for Western companies. After establishing sanctions on Israeli businessman, Dan Gertler, in December 2017 and June 2018 for corruption, the US is now considering easing them to force the sales of his currently frozen assets to Western-leaning interests (Psaledakis, 2024).

12 Already in 2005, former Chinese president Hu Jintao hosted then newly elected Joseph Kabila at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, thus cementing relationships between the two countries (Uren, 2021).

13 We do not argue that President Tshisekedi is decoupling from China but that current political priorities align Kinshasa better with Western powers.

14 In January 2024, following its second election, President Tshisekedi announced that a deal had been reached but no information has since been released (Livingston, 2024).

15 The Commission also targeted TFM in Haut Katanga.

16 This also echoes calls for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices to better understand and engage with local communities. According to interviewees, Chinese companies are well behind their Western counterparts and only now begin to invest in these projects.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Raphael Deberdt

Raphael Deberdt is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Colorado School of Mines.

Jessica DiCarlo

Jessica DiCarlo is an Assistant Professor of Geography in the School of Environment, Society, and Sustainability at the University of Utah.