Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

ABSTRACT

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of States and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear terrorism
• deterrence
• South Asia
• non-state actors
• rationality

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 A. Garfinkle, ‘Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?’ Washington, DC, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2009, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/05/does-nuclear-deterrence-apply-age-terrorism.

2 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9.

3 Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 1998).

4 Garfinkle, ‘Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?’.

5 I use the term “terrorist” for all non-state militant groups. So they may be freedom fighters or organized for a “good purpose.”

6 Garfinkle, ‘Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?’, 2.

7 G. Allison, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism’, Technology Review, November/December 2009, 71.

8 J.J. Klein, ‘Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism’, Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 1 (2012): 15–29.

9 A. Etzioni, Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism in a New Global Order (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 1.

10 S.A. Ellingsen, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Rational Choice’ (Theses for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, King’s College London, University of London, 2009), 87.

11 Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 7.

12 Ellingsen, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Rational Choice’, 89.

13 Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 58.