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ABSTRACT
This study examines the unintended consequences of decapitation strategies. Two Islamist terror networks in Spain have been used to critically evaluate theories of leadership removal guided by large-N cross-sectional research. Arguably, current models neglect to include relational variables that constitute the foundation for policies of network disruption. Spanish terror networks are mapped out over a 10-year period (1995–2004) to demonstrate the importance of network variables. Policies meant to disrupt militant networks can generate unintended consequences, as was the case with Spain’s Operation Dátil following the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in the United States. The Madrid train bombing network developed in the vacant political space following the counterterrorism operation that targeted radical Islamists in Spain.
Acknowledgements
The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and not of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For example, see L. Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu and Matthew Wells, ‘Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers’, Journal of Public and International Affairs Princeton 15, Spring (2004): 59–78; Aaron Mannes, ‘Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?’, Journal of International Policy Solutions 9, Spring (2008): 40–9; Jenna Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation’, Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719–55; and Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hattfield, ‘Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israeli Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness During Al-Aqsa Uprising’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 359–82.
2 For example, see Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns’, International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 47–79 and Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism’, International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 9–46. Note that Johnston’s study differs from the other large-N pieces in his focus on counterinsurgency campaigns, though many of his cases are included in articles on counterterrorism as well.
3 Martha Crenshaw, ‘How Terrorism Declines’, Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 70.
4 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 80.
5 See Carlos Iván Degregori, Que Dificil Es Ser Dios: Ideología y violencia política en Sendero Luminoso (Perú: El zorro de abajo ediciones, 1989); Carlos Iván Degregori, ‘The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path’, in The Legitimization of Violence, ed. David E. Apter (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 33–82.
6 Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll’.
7 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, 14 and Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups’, International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 18.
8 The exception is Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, who includes an admittedly weak proxy of “coleader” to try and capture hierarchical vs. decentralized structures. Authors also include a group size variable that does capture unspecified elements of structure.
9 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chap. 1.
10 James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990), 2.
11 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’, 12.
12 For more on the “dark network” concept see Rene M. Bakker, Jorg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, ‘A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 1 (2013): 33–62.
13 I use data similar to the John Jay & ARTIS Transnational Terrorism (JJATT) database. These network relations data, attribute data, and codebooks can be found at http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/ (accessed May 6, 2014). I use binary measures for the relational ties instead of measures that vary by strength. I collapse actor role into four broader categories from the JJATT data.
14 The Yarkas group is named for its leader, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas. The group is also known as the Abu Dahdah cell (one of Yarkas’ aliases).
15 Mark S. Handcock, David R. Hunter, Carter T. Butts, Steven M. Goodreau and Martina Morris, statnet: Software Tools for the Statistical Modeling of Network Data (2003), http://statnetproject.org (accessed May 6, 2014).
16 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War’, in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 473–513.
17 See the Spanish Court Indictment SUMARIO (PROC.ORDINARIO) 0000035/2001 E for more information on those accused and the charges against them. See Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 005, Sumario número. 35/01, Sentencia número 36/2005 for more on the sentences given by the court.
18 See Fernando Reinares, ‘The Evidence of Al-Qàida’s Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack’, CTC Sentinel 5, no. 3 (2012): 1–5 for more on the possibility of al-Qaeda involvement in the Madrid train bombing through the influence of Yarkas’ associate Amer Azizi.
19 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 28.
20 Indictment 20/04, Juzgado Central de Instruccion Número 6, Sumario 20/2004. Auto de Procesamiento del 11-M (April 2006), http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados11m/documentos/index.html (accessed May 6, 2014), 1–2.
21 Manuel Marlasca and Luis Rendueles, Una historia del 11-M que no va gustar a nadie (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2007), chap. 1.
22 Ibid., chap. 2. Fakhet and Ahmidan are considered to be the two key architects of the attacks.
23 Indictment 20/04, 347–8.
24 Marlasca and Rendueles, Una historia del 11-M que no va gustar a nadie, chap. 3.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 154.
29 Ibid., 161.
30 Indictment 20/04, 254.
31 Ibid., 529.
32 Ibid., 1344. Note that the original Yarkas indictment did not mention Fakhet, though the state later asserts the relationship in the Madrid bombing indictment.
33 Wasserman and Faust, Social Network Analysis, chap. 5.
34 Indictment 20/04, 664, 1007.
35 Ibid., 1212.
36 John Horgan, ‘From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 80–94.
37 For more on countering the global Islamist insurgency, see David Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617.
38 Javier Jordan, Fernando M. Mañas and Nicola Horsburgh, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 17–39.
39 Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, ‘Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2015): 1–22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671.
40 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 34.
41 Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, ‘Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism’, Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 371–99.
42 Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘Religion as a Cause of Terrorism’, in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 133–44.