The focus of the last Editorial was on the American Presidential Election and in particular the contest between the Republican and Democrat Parties’ nominees, Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton. The edition was published before the result of the election could be announced. All that could be observed was that in the course of his campaign, Trump had been articulating extreme and, to some, perverse policies which, if implemented, had the potential to destabilise not just America’s Western alliances, but even globally. Clinton’s appeal was more traditional and represented a continuation of American domestic and foreign policies with which she was associated when a Senator and, later, Secretary of State. Only as the first female President did she represent any departure from the norm. The outcome of the election was as unexpected as it was surprising, with Trump emerging the clear winner even though Clinton had received the popular vote, such is the American electoral college voting system.
Trump’s success has left many in a quandary; his victory and the way it came about, posed a challenge not only to the policies that have traditionally underpinned American politics but also to “America’s role as the world’s preeminent power.” Indeed, since being declared the next President, Donald Trump has articulated a number of initiatives that would suggest that America will disengage from main stream world affairs leaving others to adjust as best they can. In this threatened turmoil, serious uncertainties have surfaced, not least of which are: the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); America’s future relationship with the Russian Federation; the changed status of global economic and trade agreements; compromised initiatives on climate change; and to adjust, if not erase, many of America’s alliances, its one time strength. Only time will tell how his policies, both at home and at abroad, will emerge; what is certain is that the world, as well as the United States itself, will be a different place whilst he is President.
Trump will be inaugurated US President on 20 January 2017. The articles in this edition were therefore all written and submitted many months before that date. This effectively has meant that in several instances, the impact of recent months during which Trump has, metaphorically, shown his hand will not apply. It is interesting to speculate what difference there would be to the content of this edition and the body of submissions presented had Trump already become President. Of the articles included in this edition, three, those of Stephen Cimbala, Douglas Mastriano and Christine Rinehardt, would likely have been marginally different.
The edition opens, however, with two articles both of which are somewhat distanced from President-elect Trumps immediate concerns: both are historical. These are James Horncastle’s examination of the Macedonian question of 1940 and Jason Ridler’s analysis of Bohannan’s intelligence work on Japanese war criminals and Filippino collaborators during the Huk Rebellion of the 1950s. The significance of Bohannan’s pioneering work and the insights he brought to the study and legitimacy of insurgencies warrants study in their own right. Their relevance to Donald Trump’s outpouring against countries and regimes of which he disapproves the reader must decide for themselves; but his recent appointments to the senior personnel in the US Armed Forces might suggest that Bohannan’s tradition of counter-insurgency, reconnaissance and intelligence is alive and well.
The conceptual linkages between what, so far, have been learned about Donald Trump’s attitudes towards foreign states have rested in his occasional outpourings during the Presidential campaign. Perhaps not too much importance should be attributed to them, especially as foreign and defence policy has not been is prime concern and he has never held public office even remotely in those areas. That said, one can only speculate as to the significance for Trump of James Horncastle’s study of the Macedonian Question in the 1944 December Uprising (Dekemvriana) in Greece and how he would respond, given the ambiguities to which Horncastle alludes.
Both articles invite speculation in the light of recent developments in the United States, though both stand on their merits as of right. More specific, however, is Hans Liwang’s study of risk communication within military decision-making. Again, his argument when juxtaposed with Donald Trump’s outpourings about defence and security in the run up to his inauguration leaves the reader with some uncertainty. Liwang’s recommendations in respect of risk-based approaches to military decisions as outlined in his article do not currently blend well with either Trump’s personality or the attitudes and values of those with whom he has already engaged.
Christine Rinehardt’s article is much more contemporary and distanced from the vicissitudes if American politics. Her concern, rightly, is with security in an era if international cooperation but in particular with the rapid expansion of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As a weapon system, the UAV provides opportunities and that are new in the realms of modern warfare, particularly in respect of secret or covert attack on adversaries. More than that, in the hands of terrorists or non-state forces, they can prove a formidable weapon. At present, the United States leads in this novel technology, but the question really is for how much longer and which other military forces will embrace them.
The edition ends with two articles both of which focus on one individual – President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation – and analyse the reasoning behind his policies over the past decade or so. Stephen Cimbala has written relatively frequently for this journal, his main focus of concern being arms control between the two major nuclear powers. On this occasion his focus is slightly different: the concern remains with nuclear weapons, but he provides a constant reminder that no matter how much Russia might appear to be disintegrating, it remains a major nuclear power, one which allows for first nuclear use even in the event of a conventional conflict.
More sobering is Douglas Mostriano’s analysis of Putin, the President, and Russia the country. The title of his article sums it up: “the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity.” The evidence in recent years has been for Russia to reassert influence in Europe, policies that have prompted NATO, for example, to deploy multinational forces along the East European border. These were preceded, of course, by invasions of Georgia and more significantly, the Crimea. Mostriano’s proposition is that these diverse operations are used to confound and confuse decision-makers in the west. The evidence to date would suggest that he is in fact right.