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ABSTRACT
Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Thomas M. Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2013), 9–10 and passim.
2 On this point, see Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Thermonuclear Cyberwar’, Journal of Cybersecurity (2017): 1–12, doi:10.1093/cybsec/tyw017, and Andrew Futter, ‘The Double-Edged Sword: US Nuclear Command and Control Modernization’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 29, 2016), http://thebulletin.org/double-edged-sword-us-nuclear-command-and-control-modernization.html. See also Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Occasional Paper, July 2016), www.rusi.org; and Futter, ‘War Games Redux? Cyberthreats, U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability, and New Challenges for Nuclear Security and Arms Control’, European Security (December 2015), doi:10.1080/09662839.2015.1112276.
3 Insightful analyses pertinent to this topic include: Colin S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2013); Kamaal T. Jabbour and E. Paul Ratazzi, ‘Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?’, in Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Adam B. Lowther (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), chap. 3, 33–45; and Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). Other references on this topic appear in later notes. The chronology of key government documents pertinent to cyberspace and US national security strategy is nicely summarized in Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy, Appendix, 45–6.
4 On the information operations concepts of major powers, see Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows over Information Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005), chaps. 5–6, 10, 14 and passim. See also Pavel Koshkin, ‘Are Cyberwars Between Major Powers Possible? A Group of Russian Cybersecurity Experts Debate the Likelihood of a Cyberwar Involving the U.S., Russia or China’, Russia Direct, http://russia-direct.org, August 1, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #143, August 6, 2013, [email protected].
5 Cyber weapons are not necessarily easy to use effectively as enabling instruments for operational-tactical or strategic effect. See Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. chaps. 4–5.
6 An expert critique of proposals for minimum deterrence for US nuclear forces appears in: Dr Keith B. Payne, Study Director, and Hon. James Schlesinger, Chairman, Senior Review Group, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, National Institute Press, 2013). For a favorable expert assessment of the prospects for minimum deterrence, see James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., ‘Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 74–90.
7 US Cyber Command plans for the equivalent of a “Star Wars” cyber defense, against attacks on computer networks and other targets, might be delayed or diverted by political controversy over NSA surveillance. See David E. Sanger, ‘N.S.A. Leaks Make Plan for Cyberdefense Unlikely’, New York Times, August 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/nsa-leaks-make-plan-for-cyberdefense-unlikely.html (accessed August 13, 2013).
8 ‘Putin Calls to Strengthen Protection Against Cyber Attacks’, Itar-Tass, July 5, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #122, July 5, 2013, [email protected].
9 Batyuk, cited in Jonathan Earle, ‘U.S. and Russia Sign New Anti-proliferation Deal’, Moscow Times, June 19, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #111, June 19, 2013, [email protected].
10 Major Clifford S. Magee, USMC, ‘Awaiting Cyber 9/11’, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 70 (3rd quarter 2013): 76–82, citation page 76.
11 Dr Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos and Dr Adam B. Lowther, ‘Saving NATO with Airpower’, Royal Canadian Air Force Journal, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 66–77, citation page 70.
12 See, for example, Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy, 10–11 and passim; Joel Brenner, Glass Houses: Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent World (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), esp. chaps. 6–7; Thomas, Three Faces of the Dragon, and Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011). See also U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, July 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf (accessed August 14, 2012), and The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf (accessed August 14, 2012). See also Colin S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyberpower: Why the Sky Is Not Falling (Wokingham, UK, September 2012), 8, [email protected]; Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow, ‘Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense’, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 61 (2nd quarter 2011): 18–23; Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar; P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), esp. chaps. 6–7; and Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace, esp. 15–31.
13 Miller, Kuehl, and Lachow, ‘Cyber War’.
14 Brenner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity, 3.
15 An example of such an attack was provided by the Stuxnet “worm” used to attack Iran's centrifuges as part of its nuclear program. Some 1000 of 5000 centrifuges were reportedly temporarily disabled by the US and Israel as part of a US program called Olympic Games that began under George W. Bush and continued into the Obama administration. See David E. Sanger, ‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran’, New York Times, June 1, 2012, http://global.factiva.com/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp (accessed June 1, 2012).
16 Miller, Kuehl, and Lachow, ‘Cyber War’, 19. Some of these objectives might also be accomplished by “friendly conquest” as opposed to “hostile conquest” in cyberspace: see Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace, 125–6 for contrasting definitions and the remainder of chap. 6 for pertinent discussion.
17 Patrick M. Morgan discusses the relationship between reexamination of deterrence theory and practice and cyber security in his article, ‘The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today’, Contemporary Security Policy, no. 1 (April 2012): 85–107, esp. 101–3.
18 Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyberpower, 36.
19 According to Adam B. Lowther, deterrence can be conceptualized as a continuous spectrum with three components: deterrence by dissuasion, deterrence by denial and deterrence by threat. Moving across the spectrum, from dissuasion through denial to threat, increases the level of action by the state attempting to deter. See Lowther, ‘How Can the United States Deter Nonstate Actors?’ in Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Lowther (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), chap. 9, 163–82, esp. 166–7.
20 Desmond Butler, Associated Press, ‘Flaws Found in U.S. Missile Shield for Europe’, Army Times, February 9, 2013, http://www.armytimes.com/mobile/news/2013/02/ap-flaws-missile-shield-020913 (accessed February 11, 2013). See also ‘U.S. Missile Defense Shield Flawed – Classified Studies’, Russia Today (RT), February 11, 2013, http://rt.com/usa/news/us-missile-defense-flaws-811/print/ (accessed February 11, 2013).
21 Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, 2012), prepublication copy, www.nap.edu (accessed September 17, 2012).
22 George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, ‘The Astonishing National Academy of Sciences Missile Defense Report’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 20, 2013, http://www.thebulletin.org/print/web-edition/op-eds/the-astonishing-national-academy-of-sciences-missile-defense-report.html (accessed February 11, 2013).
23 Rebecca Slayton, Arguments That Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).
24 Superior treatment of technical, political and economic challenges to US and NATO plans for European missile defenses is provided in Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 2013).
25 For US and NATO missile defense plans, see LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense Overview, presented to 10th Annual Missile Defense Conference (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 26, 2012, 12-MDA-6631), http://www.mda.mil/news/downloadable_resources.html (accessed May 23, 2012).
26 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf.
27 See Karen Kaya, ‘NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line’, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 71 (4th Quarter 2013): 84–9; John F. Morton and George Galdorisi, ‘Any Sensor: Any Shooter: Toward an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise’, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 67 (4th Quarter 2012): 85–90; and Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Growing Global Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense, Remarks as Prepared, Berlin, Germany, September 10, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/197547.htm (accessed September 13, 2012).
28 For example, see “Moscow Needs More ‘Predictability’ in NATO Missile Defense Plans,” RIA Novosti, October 23, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #191, October 24, 2013, [email protected].
29 See Kevin Ayers, ‘Expanding Zeus’ Shield: A New Approach for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Joint Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter 2017): 24–31 for a discussion of challenges and opportunities. See also essays in Dr Adam Lowther, ed., The Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, April 2013).
30 Increased interest in “left of launch” techniques (attacking before missiles reach the launch pad and/or interfering with the launch itself)is noted in David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘Trump Inherits a Secret Cyberwar Against North Korean Missiles’, New York Times, March 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html. See also Jesse T. Wasson and Christopher E. Bluesteen, ‘Taking the Archers for Granted: Emerging Threats to Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems’ (working paper presented at International Studies Association, Annual Meeting, 2017, Baltimore, MD).
31 Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, ‘Obama Has Plans to Cut U.S. Nuclear Arsenal, If Russia Reciprocates’, New York Times, June 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/ (accessed June 19, 2013). See also Roberts Rampton and Stephen Brown, ‘Obama Challenges Russia to Agree to Deeper Nuclear Weapon Cuts’, Reuters, June 20, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #212, June 20, 2013, [email protected].
32 Force structures in the analysis are notional and are not necessarily predictive of actual deployments. For expert appraisal, see Hans M. Kristensen, Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces, Special Report No. 5 (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, December 2012), www.FAS.org (accessed January 23, 2013); Gen. (Ret.) James Cartwright, Chair, Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission, Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture (Washington, DC: Global Zero, May 2012), www.globalzero.org; Pavel Podvig, ‘New START Treaty in Numbers’, from his blog, Russian strategic nuclear forces, April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/03/new_start_treaty_in_numbers.shtml. See also Joseph Cirincione, ‘Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons’, New America Foundation, June 29, 2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/strategic_turn; and Arms Control Association, ‘U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START’, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART (accessed July 18, 2011).
33 According to some experts, the US could conceivably satisfy its requirements for strategic nuclear deterrence with fewer than 400 deployed warheads on intercontinental launchers. See James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., ‘Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 3–12. Counterarguments appear in Payne and Schlesinger, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, passim, esp. 65–70.
34 Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction, 101.
35 For example, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Conflict’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 3–14.
36 Cham E. Dallas, et al., ‘Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale’, Conflict and Health, May 10, 2013, via BioMed Central, http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/7/1/10 (accessed May 15, 2013). See also Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran, Israel, and Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised November 19, 2007); and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1979), esp. 27–44 for case studies of attacks on a single city. Office of Technology Assessment cautions that the effects of even a small or limited nuclear attack would be “enormous” (4).
37 Rogozin, cited in Ilya Maksimov and Sergey Kuksin, ‘Russia Will Not Be a Bystander in the Arms Race’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 28, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #122, July 5, 2013, [email protected].
38 Lora Saalman, ‘How Chinese Analysts View Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War’, in Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, ed. Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 15, April 2009), 47–71.
39 For an expansion of the point about the possible conflict between Obama nuclear disarmament and advanced conventional weapons modernization goals, see Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won’t Work’, Nonproliferation Review, no. 1 (2013): 107–22, doi:10.1080/10736700.2012.761790.
40 Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Henry Holt – Times Books, 2012), esp. 215–20 and 267–70. For additional perspective on the second nuclear age, see Lowther, Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes; Paul K. Davis, Structuring Analysis to Support Future Decisions about Nuclear Forces and Postures (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, Working Paper, September 2011, WR-878-OSD); Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), esp. 94–132; and Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
41 For some interesting possibilities in this regard, see George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 24–52, esp. 25–30. This author road tests some models for multipolar nuclear power systems in his working paper in progress, “Anticipatory Attack,” available upon request.
42 Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives.
43 Sources of instability in the second nuclear age will include major powers, secondary powers and groups, sometimes making creative political uses of nuclear weapons short of war, overlaid by great power competition within a multipolar nuclear system. See Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, esp. 93–126; James E. Goodby, ‘The End of a Nuclear Era’, New York Times, August 15, 2013, in Johnson's Russia List 2013 – #148, August 14, 2013, [email protected]; and C. Dale Walton and Colin S. Gray, ‘The Geopolitics of Strategic Stability: Looking Beyond Cold Warriors and Nuclear Weapons’, chap. 3 in Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, ed. Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, February 2013), 85–115.