Two major factors determine a state’s foreign policy and international ambition: its perception of the security environment and the capabilities it possesses. The current special issue that the reader holds in their hand, entitled Security Perception and Security Policy in Central Europe, provides an overview of how these two factors. By extension, state-level foreign policies have varied in Central and Eastern Europe in; and the post-Cold War era. The contributing authors to this special issue take a deep dive into nine Central and Eastern European states’ policies: Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. In the subsequent pages, the contributing authors examine in detail how these states’ security perceptions and foreign and security policies; two intertwined concepts, have evolved throughout this time period.
For an outside observer, Central Europe may be perceived as a homogeneous sub-unit: a geographic locale that shares similar cultural traits, common histories, and a linked troubled past, and one that has embarked on a joint process of European integration in the past three decades. But even a cursory scratch of this surface demonstrates that reality is a much more complex, heterogenous amalgam. Despite recent regional political priorities that were designed to foster sub-regional integration, a closer look reveals that there are significant differences hidden amongst the various cracks. The states of Central Europe exhibit considerable variety in two key elements: their strategic cultures and their relations toward Russia. Such heterogeneity makes regional co-operation uniquely challenging. The research provided in this special issue attempts to deconstruct this monolithic regional-level approach through the methodical study of the states of the region. This approach will be particularly useful to scholars and interested individuals who want to understand why and how individual Central European states participate in NATO and EU security and defence initiatives and policies.
Methodology and structure
From a methodological standpoint, the underlying goal of this issue (and that of the editor himself) was to solicit expert studies that share similar premises and are comparable in structure and content. Thus, the invited contributors share Arnold Wolfer’s approach to security theory, namely that “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, [and] in a subjective sense, [measures] the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”Footnote1 Stemming from this common interpretation, the authors of this volume emphasise the study of the perception of security, using public opinion polls whenever possible to corroborate their arguments. In addition, the ideas of the Copenhagen School in security studies and the “critical security studies” approach have both informed the authors’ views of security, providing a common departure point of addressing security in a comprehensive, multidimensional manner, a standpoint that takes into account human and individual security, as well. Evidence of this approach is clearly visible through the comprehensive analysis each individual author employed in examining their respective state’s security and defence strategy.
Our intent was to make the volume appealing for both the policy community and practitioners as well. As such, we provided analysis of the individual states security and defence policies that include: their NATO and EU defence policy goals and strategies; their participation in international crisis-management and peace-keeping operations; and the development and modernisation goals of their respective armed forces in the short-to-medium term. This scoping focused the authors’ writing into a shared, disciplined structure.
The analytical framework of the studies builds on the “Transformation of Security Culture” research project (2013)Footnote2 through the examination of four pillars or sets of topics. Each of the chapters in this volume reflects on four broader sets of topics, two of which – the level of ambition in international security policy and foreign policy orientation – are key elements of national strategic culture as well. These four broader sets of topics that appear in each individual study as sub-chapters were: (1) the elements and patterns of security perception; (2) the level of ambition in international security policy; (3) foreign policy orientation; (4) and policy field-specific issues. To guide further the authors’ methodological approach, and to attempt systematically to make the studies more comparable, the following detailed questions were submitted to the authors for their consideration for each of the four broader set of topics:
Elements and patterns of security perception since 1989 (or since gaining independence)
Has the understanding of security been comprehensive (multidimensional), going beyond military aspects?
What have been the determining elements of security and threat perception? How have these been changing (e.g. what new elements have emerged)?
How did public opinion and domestic rhetoric on security underpin these patterns?
How has the changing pattern of security perception been reflected in official security policy documents?
Level of ambition in international security policy
What are the respective countries’ main objectives in the security realm (e.g. its position on a continuum between passive indifference and the claim to international leadership)?
How do security and defence policy documents (national security and defence strategy, white book, etc.) define the role respective countries seek to play?
Do respective countries define a formal level of ambition for their international engagement (e.g. number of troops deployed, amount of development funds to be provided)?
What kinds of international operations are respective countries willing to participate in (military, police, rule of law, etc.)? Do countries claim a leadership role as framework nation or lead nation in such operations?
Do respective countries in their security policy documents allow for the unilateral use of armed forces, or is the use of the military framed exclusively in a multinational context?
How many troops has the country deployed to crisis-management operations, and based on what grounds?
What kind of tasks do the deployed forces usually fulfil and how are their missions framed (e.g. with reference to humanitarian needs, international stability demands or specific national interests)?
Do respective countries usually deploy armed forces in international operations with or without national caveats? If there are caveats, what are the reasons and what restrictions are defined?
Foreign policy orientation
Do security and defence policy documents define a preferred arena for co-operation (e.g. preference for the UN, NATO, EU or other institution)? Do they define important bilateral relationships, and in general place emphasis on bilateral or multilateral co-operation?
Which are the specific areas of geographic responsibility that respective countries define for themselves?
How are the roles of multinational security organisations (UN, NATO, EU or other) defined, also in terms of complementarity, or competition? Do respective countries favour a clear division of labour among these organisations?
Do documents, or elite discourses, describe specific objectives for the future development of the EU and / or NATO?
What is the respective countries’ position on developing an EU defence core as a stronger European pillar of NATO / autonomous defence capability toolbox for the EU?
Policy field-specific issues
What is the main operational spectrum of the armed forces (high-end – low-end, territorial defence – expeditionary operations)?
What are the currently defined capability-development priorities of the national armed forces?
What are the trends in defence spending that can be seen for respective countries?
In general, authors of this volume began their essays with a brief chronological overview of the trends and patterns in security perceptions and policies, highlighting important milestones, turning points, and significant breaks when relevant. Their work incorporates a wide set of primary sources (national strategic documents, public opinion polls) and is supplemented by diverse secondary sources (policy and research papers). The combination of these provide their analysis with a solid empirical footing.
At the end of each study, authors offer a brief outlook on the foreseeable renewal of strategic documents (white papers or long-term capability development concepts) for the respective state under study. As these strategic documents may indicate shifting priorities in aims and/or means of national security policies, their incorporation into the analysis is vital. In the case of Serbia and Slovakia, the authors were able to incorporate the draft versions of strategic documents currently under preparation. In the case of Hungary, where playued both the national security and the national military strategies are outdated, classification and secrecy issues, coupled with the fact that the drafting work of these strategic documents is in its early stages, have prevented their incorporation.
As outlined above, the nine states included in the volume do not form a homogenous set. As such, to accommodate for state-level variation and national specifics, we were flexible to some degree in our methodological design. For example, in the case of Austria and Serbia, the research questions regarding the foreign policy orientation were adapted to account for the alignment of these non-NATO countries. Further, the starting date of the assessment diverged from 1989 in some cases. These happened mainly when historical events forced a logical divergence, such as in the case of the date of independence for Slovakia and the Czech Republic, or at times of fundamental structural transformations of the state, as was the case with Serbia. Regardless, the divergence was minor and the starting point – the change of regimes in 1989 – proved a useful unifying date for the beginning of the analyses. Other minor variations are also present, but they do not detract significantly from the uniform methodology of the studies of the volume.
A brief preview of the studies
With the end of the Cold War, the security environment of Central and Eastern European states was fundamentally transformed. Taken individually, the subjective perception and objective content of the threats and challenges that these states face differ considerably. In the recent past, many of these differences can be attributed to Russia’s resurgence as a great power, to the long-term effects of the 2008 economic crisis, to non-military challenges to security in cyberspace, or to the form of irregular mass migration flows, organised crime, or the increased potential of terrorism, etc. Public opinion polls demonstrate that most societies in Central and Eastern European states perceive these threats to be significant, even though their level of exposure to varies.
The structured-comparative approach adopted in this volume allows the identification of some general takeaways and conclusions for the states under study. They are presented below as a brief preview, showcasing what the subsequent chapters detail further.
One starting point for the structured-comparative approach was the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The nine states under study experienced this phenomenon from various positions. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania underwent regime changes followed by a period of democratisation (although it is important to note the transition was not peaceful in Romania). Austria, as a neutral state, experienced the easing of international tensions and end of block politics as a quasi-beneficiary. Croatia and Serbia, on the other hand, underwent a bloody ethnic war that was largely driven by Serbian nationalism, and resulted in independence for the two states. Serbia only reached its current constituent status in 2006 (or in 2009 depending on the acknowledgement of the status of Kosovo), and this status also marked the end of process of the dissolution of federated state formations in the region. Further, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also peacefully and constitutionally separated in 1993.
Apart from Austria (which enjoyed relative continuity in institutional policies), these fundamental transformations marked a new beginning for the states of the region. These transformations mandated the necessity of establishing democratic institutions and redesigning national foreign and security policies. In one sense, the direction, speed, and results of the transformation pre-determined the Euro-Atlantic integration of these states; but this process, as of 2019, is still incomplete, notably in the Western Balkans, with Serbia not desiring NATO membership. Further, territorial and sovereignty concerns, as in the case of Serbia, make association and accession talks even harder.
When it comes to spheres of primary interest within a security environment, there are two major geostrategic directions that state policies converge around within the region. The first, the Eastern Europe or Russian angle, is the primary preoccupation of Poland and Romania (the latter of which has strategic interests in the Black Sea region as well), while the second, the Western Balkans approach, is the region of attention for most of the other states under study. This dual approach can be seen in divergent threat perceptions and prioritisations by the regional powers. Poland and Romania are concerned with a resurgent Russia, which is concerned with re-establishing its great power status and is taking assertive destabilising actions and enhancing its military presence, whilst the other states are more concerned about non-military (transnational) challenges to their security from the South. The former are modernising their armed forces for territorial defence and whole-heartedly support NATO’s enhanced forward presence, whilst the latter are preparing their armed forces for crisis-management and are slower at phasing out their dated equipment.
The policy stance toward NATO and the EU that any of the examined states held at a given time had a strong effect on their international engagements, including their willingness to sustain higher levels of defence spending. It is not surprising that these states, when they were currently on a path towards accession, were increasing their respective defence expenditures. Further, those states that joined only later (like Croatia) had begun contributing to crisis-management operations even before their accession (for example through NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme), increasing the credibility of their accession pledges. Once these states became members of these organisations, they began to tailor their contributions to the actual policy needs of their country, sometime balancing lower spending and neglected modernisation of the armed forces with more substantial contributions to out-of-area operations (e.g. Hungary). “Special” or “strategic” bilateral partnerships (notably with the United States) in this regard also serve as a guide-post to understanding foreign and defence policies: for example, Poland and Romania have provided substantial contributions to US-led operations first in Iraq, then in Afghanistan, and were engaged in higher-level co-operation, deciding to host elements of NATO’s missile defence system. To a lesser extent, maintaining a strong bilateral relationship (but not amounting to “special” or “strategic” partnership status) with the US is present among the strategic priorities of almost all the states under study, and only a few identify other key partners (notably with Germany).
In sum, Central and Eastern European states attempt to design security policies that provide an effective answer to military or non-military, internal and external, long-term and newly emerging threats and challenges. Several states have adopted strategic documents that incorporate human security (Austria and the Czech Republic for example), and several put special emphasis on the individual level of security as well (like Hungary). At the end of the research period, most of the states under study had up-to-date strategic documents in effect or were in the process of drafting new ones in 2019.
“What might be the future of regional co-operation?” is one of the potential questions that springs to mind when pondering the conclusions at which this research volume has arrived. The heterogenous characteristics discussed above, in addition to the myriad others discussed in detail throughout the studies themselves, suggest that the states of Central and Eastern Europe are not yet ready for crafting comprehensive strategic partnerships with each other. But there might be ways to alleviate, or bridge differences.
For example, in recent years we have witnessed several major co-operation initiatives: the Visegrad countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – have been working together in a non-institutionalised format with high-level political support since the 1990s with varying intensity, and have established closer co-operation on a wider range of topics since 2009. In addition to closer co-ordination, the Visegrad Four have also acted jointly on a set of issues of shared interest, like in cultural policies (building trust), in energy policy (developing alternative supply sources to the existing East–West, Russian-controlled sources), in infrastructure development (connecting their countries with roads and railways, significantly relying on EU structural and development funds), in developing the digital agenda (addressing vulnerabilities together), etc. Further, in two issue areas that are a priority for their political leadership; in defence policy and tackling the challenges of migration and internal security, these four states have developed even closer co-operation and have upped the ante (worthy to note that these efforts were at times supported by other regional states, for example Austria). The Visegrad Four have also intensified their defence collaboration, through the formation of a Visegrad EU Battlegroup, the development of a Long-term Vision for Defence Co-operation and the Framework for Enhanced Defence Planning Co-operation, the adoption of a Training and Exercise Strategy; all of which have paved the way for long-term co-operation designed in a framework until at least the next decade (2032 to be more precise). Through these actions and policies, the “Visegrad Four” brand has gained increased visibility in both the EU and NATO.
In spite of these meaningful outcomes and the persistent V4 political will to continue increasing political co-operation, there are important heterogeneous characteristics that vary significantly amongst the states of the region that must be overcome to continue this process. The most visible of these is “structural inequality” within the region: the fact that some states are larger and possess more resources. One such notable example is Poland, which is sometimes stylised as a medium-power and can be found occasionally sitting at the table together with Germany and France in the “Weimar Triangle” format. Second, various sectoral differences inhibit co-operation amongst states in the region. The sustained Russian influence in energy policy considered vulnerabilities that are not shared uniformly through the region, for example in the new strategic dependencies of Hungary (the major Hungarian nuclear power plant development of the era, “Paks II,” was made possible through a Russian loan, by a Russian firm, and using Russian technology and fuel). Third and finally, there is large variation in the perception of the need to maintain sovereign integrity in the field of resilience and strategic communications, especially given the observable external destabilisation activities across the region. Poland, for example, remains significantly concerned with Russian activities and influence, while Hungary seems to be committed to continuing its relationship with Moscow in various ways.
Other regional collaboration initiatives in the field of security and defence have also appeared. The Central European Defence Initiative (CEDI), a shared forum of amalgamating Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, works toward fostering defence co-operation programmes between its members, whilst the Three Seas Initiative, a political platform of twelve EU member states across the region, aim to enhance infrastructure development and inter-member economic co-operation. We hope that the analysis of the nine states provided in this special volume will serve as a valuable asset to readers who are looking to assess the potential of these initiatives or to map the convergences (or divergences) in multiple issue areas throughout the region.
The research project supporting the studies in this special issue
The National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary) was granted multi-annual research funds from the European Union through the government of Hungary for the purposes of developing good governance practices, adopting best practices in this field, and improving the training, education, and work of those employed in the public sector. Within the KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15–2016-00001 “Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” project funding framework, the Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies applied for funding from NUPS in an overarching research project entitled “Strategic Analyses for Supporting Governmental Decision-making in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy.” The current research project, “CSDS Partnership in EAst Central Europe (PEACE),” enabled co-operation among Central European researchers and had been conducted by CSDS throughout 2017–2018 as part of this project. PEACE focused on assembling comparative studies on ten policy fields in Central and Eastern European countries, to be written by subject-matter experts of the region. The ten studied and analysed policy fields were: Security perception (the current volume); Economic integration and interdependence; Defence policy role in NATO & EU; Demography and migration; Foreign & security policy institutions and decision-making; Regional co-operation; Relations with the United States; Relations with Russia; Relations with Germany; and Relations with China. The research conducted and results published within the project are offered not only to academics studying Central and Eastern Europe in various disciplines, but also for policy analysts, members of public administrations, and young professionals who desire to gain better knowledge and understanding of the region.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Tamás Csiki Varga PhD ([email protected]) is a research fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies of the National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary).
Notes
1 Arnold Wolfers, ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, in Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore, US: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), 149.
2 Transformation of Security Culture (2019), http://www.sicherheitskultur.org/en.html.