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ABSTRACT
If we examine the role played by nuclear weapons in Russia's war against Ukraine, we find that they play an offensive role in Russian strategy. The deterrence mission is as much intended to free Russia's hands for conventional war on its periphery as it is intended to prevent a nuclear first strike from the West. Indeed, the evidence of exercises etc. strongly points to a readiness for attacking Western sea-lines of communication in the Atlantic were a Western response to come as a result of the attack on Ukraine. Similarly, the potential for nuclear threat exists in the vicinity of the Black Sea as shown by Russian exercises in advance of the war there and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those exercises reveal that Moscow's power projection policy into the Levant and beyond is also part of its deterrence strategy and has amongst its objectives protecting the Black Sea as a Russian lake, an inherently offensive posture. Therefore Russia's nuclear strategy in this war and in general stand revealed as offensive ones which the West must reckon with.
KEYWORDS:
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Tim Lister, ‘Putin Floats Possibility That Russia May Abandon “No First Use” Nuclear Doctrine’, December 9, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/09/europe/russia-putin-nuclear-weapons-intl/index.html.
2 Lawrence Freedman, ‘General Winter Knocks at the Door’, October 26, 2022, www.substack.com.
3 ‘Putin Says “No Need” For Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine’, October 27, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/vladimir-putin-rules-out-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine.
4 Freedman, ‘General Winter Knocks at the Door’.
5 ‘Russia Warns West: We Can Target Your Commercial Satellites’, October 27, 2022, www.reuters.com.
6 ‘Putin Says All Infrastructure at Risk After Nord Stream Hit’, October 12, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-12/putin-says-any-infrastructure-at-risk-after-nord-stream-attacks.
7 Jaroslav Adamowski, ‘Russia to Provide Nuclear-Capable Missiles and Fighter Jets to Belarus’, June 27, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/27/russia-to-provide-nuclear-capable-missiles-and-fighter-jets-to-belarus/; Barbara and Natasha Bertrand, ‘US Official Says Russia’s Purported Fears of Ukraine Using a Dirty Bomb Are “Transparently False”’, October 10, 2022.
8 Roman Meitav, ‘New, Troubling Developments with Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal-US Official’, Jerusalem Post, October 25, 2022, www.jpost.com.
9 Stephen Blank, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War: An Interim Report’, June 15, 2022, /https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IS-525.pdf; Freedman, ‘General Winter Knocks at the Door’.
10 Stephen Blank, ‘Reflections on Russian Nuclear Strategy’, in Guide to Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great Power Competition, ed. Adam B. Lowther (Bossier City: Louisiana Tech Research Institute, 2020), 229–43; Mark B. Schneider, ‘Russian Nuclear “De-Escalation” of Future War’, Comparative Strategy XXXVII, No. 5 (2018): 361–72; Mark B. Schneider, ‘Yes, the Russians Are Testing Nuclear Weapons and It Is Very Important’, August 8, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/08/08/yes_the_russians_are_testing_nuclear_weapons_and_it_is_very_important_114651.html.
11 Major Amos C. Fox (USA), ‘Hybrid Warfare: The 21st Century Russian Way of Warfare’, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 2017, 15, Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Cross-Domain Strategy: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Paper 54 (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 2015), 9.
12 Fox, ‘Hybrid Warfare: The 21st Century Russian Way’, 18–19.
13 Ibid., 56.
14 ‘Border Alert: Nuke War Risk Is Rising, Russia Warns’, November 17, 2011, www.rt.com.
15 Ibid.; Roger N. McDermott, ‘General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict’, Valdai Discussion Club, December 8, 2011, www.valdaiclub.com.
16 Andrei Lebedev, ‘Yuri Baluevsky: The Russian Military Has a Chance to Straighten Its Spine’, Izvestiya, March 2, 2005, LexisNexis.
17 Michael Kofman, ‘Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy’, Frivarld, April 2019, http://frivarld.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Drivers-of-Russian-Grand-Strategy.pdf.
18 Blank, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War’.
19 Stephen Blank, ‘Reflections on Russian Nuclear Strategy’, 229–43.
20 Blank, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy in the Ukraine War’.
21 Max Fisher, ‘Thoughts Turn to the Unthinkable: A Spiral into Nuclear War’, New York Times, March 17, 2022, www.nytimes.com.
22 ‘Aktual’nye Zadachi Razvitie Vooruzhennykh Sil’ Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 2003, available from www.mil.ru/.
23 ‘Ukaz Prezidenta, Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, publication.pravo.gov.ru/; available in English as Anna Davis, trans., Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030, RMSI Resarch 2 (Newport, RI: Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 2017), 11, dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Michael B. Petersen, ‘Strategic Deterrence, Critical Infrastructure, and the Aspiration-Modernization Gap in the Russian Navy’, in Improvisation and Adaptability in the Russian Military, ed. Jeffrey Mankoff (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), 31–2.
27 Blank, ‘Reflections on Russian Nuclear Strategy’, 229–43.
28 Max Fisher, ‘Thoughts Turn to the Unthinkable: A Spiral into Nuclear War’, New York Times, March 17, 2022, A12, www.nytimes.com/.
29 Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia Launches “Passportization” in Occupied Ukrainian Donbas (Part Two)’, May 3, 2019, https://112.international/opinion/russia-launches-passportization-in-occupied-ukrainian-donbas-part-two-39393.html.
30 Oliker, ‘Putin’s Nuclear Bluff’.
31 ‘Russia Mulled Raising Nuclear Readiness over Crimea, Says Putin’, France24, March 15, 2015, www.france24.com/.
32 ‘Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’, June 8, 2020, archive.mid.ru/.
33 ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, February 23, 2022, kremlin.ru/; Communication from James Sherr, February 27, 2022.
34 Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Sense and Nuclear Weapons Today’, National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series No. 425, December 11, 2017, www.nipp.org.
35 Peter Clement, ‘Putin’s Risk Spiral: The Logic of Escalation in an Unravelling War’, October 26, 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com.
36 Gustav Gressel, ‘Signal and Noise: What Russia’s Nuclear Threat Means for Europe’, European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2022, ecfr.eu/.
37 ‘The Horror Ahead’, The Economist, March 5, 2022, www.economist.com/.
38 Ibid.
39 Ignatius, ‘The Hidden Risks of Russia’s War in Ukraine’.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Freedman, ‘General Winter Knocks at the Door’.
43 Mycael Schnell, ‘Sullivan Says Putin “Resorting” to Potential Use of Chemical Weapons Due to Frustrations’, The Hill, March 13, 2022, thehill.com/; Austin Ramzy, ‘The Base Attacked in Western Ukraine Has Been a Hub for Foreign Militaries’, New York Times, March 13, 2022, www.nytimes.com/.
44 ‘Russia Threatens to Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, Voice of America, December 14, 2021, www.voanews.com/.
45 ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’.
46 ‘Russia Threatens to Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons’; Tzvi Joffre, ‘Russian FM Repeats Nuclear War Rhetoric as Invasion of Ukraine Continues’, Jerusalem Post, March 3, 2022, www.jpost.com/; “Get Out of Romania and Bulgaria, Russia Tells NATO amid Ukraine Tensions”, Moscow Times, January 21, 2022, themoscowtimes.com/.
47 Max Seddon, Victor Mallet, and Roman Olearchyk, ‘Russia Threatens to Attack Western Weapons Shipments to Ukraine’, Financial Times, March 12, 2022, www.ft.com/.
48 Azi Paybarah, ‘A Kremlin Spokesman Says Russia Could Use Nuclear Weapons If There Is “an Existential Threat for Our Country”’, New York Times, March 23, 2022, www.nytimes.com/.
49 Ibid; Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Putin Ally Warns of Nuclear Dystopia Due to United States’, Reuters, March 23, 2022, www.reuters.com/; Martha Kelner, ‘Russian Diplomat: If NATO Threatens Us We Have the Right to Press the Nuclear Button’, Sky News, March 25, 2022, news.sky.com/.
50 Peter V. Pry, ‘The Nuclear Crisis Nobody Knows’, WVW Broadcast Network, March 6, 2022, www.worldviewweekend.com/.
51 ‘Putin Oversees Routine Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Drills’, October 26, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/10/26/putin-oversees-routine-strategic-nuclear-deterrence-drills-a79202.
52 ‘Kremlin Plans Second Grom Nuclear Drill This Year’, Ukrainsaya Pravda, October 25, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/kremlin-plans-second-grom-nuclear-122712265.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall.
53 Pavel Baev, ‘The Grom-2019 Exercise Illuminated the Risks of Nuclear Renaissance in Russian Strategic Culture’, Security Insights 43, Marshall Center, 2020, www.marshallcenter.org/.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russian Warships Steam from Arctic Storm to Exercise in Irish Waters’, Barents Observer, January 25, 2022, thebarentsobserver.com/.
57 Maxim Starchak, ‘Russian Strategy and Strategic Capabilities in Ukraine’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 28, 2022, www.jamestown.org/.
58 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russia Issues Largest Ever Warning Zone in Norwegian Part of the Barents Sea’, Barents Observer, February 15, 2022, thebarentsobserver.com/.
59 Joe Gould, ‘No Changes Coming to US Nuclear Posture after Russian Threat’, defense.com, March 2, 2022.
60 Atle Staalesen, ‘“Human Activity” behind Svalbard Cable Disruption’, Barents Observer, February 11, 2002, thebarentsobserver.com/.
61 Stephen Blank and Peter Huessy, ‘How Russia’s Military Buildup Is Changing the Arctic’, National Interest, January 26, 2022, nationalinterest.org/.
62 Henry Holloway and Anthony Blair, ‘Russian Planes Carrying Nuclear Weapons Violated Swedish Airspace’, news.com, March 31, 2022.
63 ‘Russia Crisis Military Assessment’, February 16, 2022, [email protected]/; Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Russia Sends Warplanes to Syria for Naval Drills in Mediterranean’, Military Times, February 16, 2022, www.militarytimes.com/.
64 Tim Ripley, ‘Russia Deploys Tu-22M3 Bombers to Syria’, Janes, May 27, 2021, www.janes.com/.
65 David Axe, ‘Meet Russia’s Tu-22M3M Backfire Bomber: Everything We Know So Far’, National Interest, January 24, 2019, nationalinterest.org/; Mark B. Schneider, ‘The Renewed Backfire Bomber Threat to the U.S. Navy’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 145/1/1,391 (January 2019), www.usni.org/.
66 Arie Egozi, ‘Did Russia Test Hypersonic Missile from Syria? Israel May Know’, Breaking Defense, June 28, 2021, breakingdefense.com/.
67 ‘Russian Navy to Form Strategic, Non-Nuclear Deterrence Force by 2020 – Commander’, February 20, 2014, OSC CEL2014020205598297.
68 Starchak, ‘Russian Strategy and Strategic Capabilities in Ukraine’.
69 ‘Watch Russian Defence Minister Shoigu Inspect Naval Exercises in Mediterranean’, Sputnik News, February 15, 2022, sputniknews.com/.
70 Keir Giles, ‘Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military’, Carnegie Endowment, May 3, 2017, 3, carnegieendowment.org/.
71 Ibid.
72 John Paul Rathbone, ‘Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric “Requires Full Attention”, Estonia’s Spy Chief Says’, Financial Times, October 25, 2022, www.ft.com/.
73 Will Stewart and Adam Cailler, ‘Russian TV Warns of “Armageddon” at Nuclear Power Plant and Threatens to Bomb London’, January 10, 2023, https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/russian-tv-warns-armageddon-nuclear-27692595.
74 ‘Western Air-Defence Systems Help Ukraine Shoot Down More Missiles’, The Economist, November 6, 2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/11/06/western-air-defence-systems-help-ukraine-shoot-down-more-missiles; Lara Jakes and Steven Erlanger, ‘Western Tanks Appear Headed to Ukraine, Breaking Another Taboo’, January 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/europe/ukraine-western-tanks.html.
75 Mike Brest, ‘Russia Allies India and China Call for De-Escalation in Ukraine’, October 10, 2022, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/india-and-china-call-for-deescalation.
76 Eugene M. Fishel, The Moscow Factor: U.S. Policy Toward Sovereign Ukraine and the Kremlin. Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2022).
77 Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia Is Now Fighting NATO in Ukraine: Top Ally Says’, January 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-ally-patrushev-says-russia-is-now-fighting-nato-ukraine-2023-01-10/?fbclid=IwAR1YrPG1u5O0f9aGhLWOGtNj192owdWT9wXsyKqu9lG_BLt5MAWj2hWzO0g; ‘Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists' Questions’, December 22, 2022, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70170; ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with Newsweek, September 21, 2022’, September 21, 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1830540/.
78 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Dr Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, ‘Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022’, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.
79 India Trummer, ‘The New Mafia: Vladimir Putin’s Inner Circle and Russian Organized Crime’ (honors thesis, University of Mississippi, 2018), egrove.olemiss.edu/; Leonid Nevzlin, ‘The Result of 20 Years of Putin: Russia as a Mafia State’, Institute of Modern Russia, January 24, 2020, imrussia.org/; Anders Aslund, ‘Why Gazprom Resembles a Crime Syndicate’, Moscow Times, February 27, 2012, www.themoscowtimes.com/.
80 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58, no. 4 (2016): 8; Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Deterrence a La Ruse: Its Uniqueness, Sources, and Implications’, in NLARMS Netherlands: Annual Review of Military Studies, ed. F. Osinga and T. Swejis (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020), 163.
81 Ibid., 171–3; Okke Geurt Lucassen, ‘In Between War and Peace: The Conceptualisation of Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Uptake, 2019, www.uptake.ut.ee/.
82 Military-Encyclopaedic Dictionary of the Russian Ministry of Defense, encyclopedia.mil.ru/, as cited by Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, 11.
83 Ibid., 15–19; Adamsky, ‘Deterrence a la Ruse’, 172–3; Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, Cross-Domain Strategy: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Paper 54 (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 2015).
84 Harry G. Summers [Col., USA, (Ret.)], ‘War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; the Purpose of War Is a Better Peace’, Naval War College Review 39, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 20.
85 Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, 18–19.
86 Adamsky, ‘Deterrence a la Ruse’, 173.
87 Lucassen, ‘In between War and Peace’, 17.
88 ‘Putin Says “No Need” for Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine’, October 27, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/vladimir-putin-rules-out-using-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine.
89 European Council, ‘European Security Situation: Notions of “Spheres Of Influence” Have No Place in the 21st Century’, January 24, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/01/24/european-security-situation-notions-of-spheres-of-influence-have-no-place-in-the-21st-century/.