Propaganda versus Pragmatism: Iraqi Foreign Policy in Qasim's Years, 1958–63

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Notes

W. Roger Louis, ‘The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution’, in Robert Fernea and W. Roger Louis (eds.), The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: the Old Social Classes Revisited (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 35.

Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 764.

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 147–9.

Russel Stone, OPEC and the Middle East: the Impact of Oil on Societal Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 214.

George Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), pp. 230–31.

Middle East Economic Survey, July 25, 1958.

Telegram 11 from Wright to Foreign Office, July 19, 1958, in Public Record Office, Kew, London (hereafter PRO, London), FO371/134205, V531/91.

Telegram 15 from Wright to Foreign Office, July 20, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134205, VQ1015/112.

Financial Times, July 22, 1958.

Telegram 24 from Wright to Foreign Office, July 23, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134205, VQ1015/137.

Letter 624/58 from Mr Powell, British Ministry of Defence, to Board of Trade, July 24, 1958, in PRO, London, AIR20/10317, VQ1015/137.

Telegram unnumbered from Wright to Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134205, VQ1022/12.

Telegram 72 from Wright to Foreign Office, Aug. 12, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134205, VQ1022/13.

Memorandum on ‘Policy towards Iraq’ by Mr Crawford, Baghdad, July 23, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134220, VQ1051/33.

Letter 10615/42/58 from British Embassy in Paris to Foreign Office, July 29, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134207, VQ10317/2.

Le Monde, July 27, 1958. The relations with France deteriorated rapidly, due to the worsening of the Algerian crisis. In Dec., 1958, the Iraqi government severed all economic relations with France, stopped all imports from that country and asked the Development Board to refrain from concluding any new contracts with French firms. Letter 1038/1/59 from British Embassy in Baghdad to Foreign Office, Jan. 21, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140975, EQ11317/2.

The Foreign Office replied that Her Majesty's Government had no such intentions, that they would not support king Hussein in any ventures and that the sole purpose of their intervention in Jordan was to prevent that country from falling a victim of subversion. Telegram 1465, unsigned, from Foreign Office to British Embassy in Bonn, July 20, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134220, VQ1051/2G. In April 1959 the German Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted an invitation by the Iraqi authorities for a visit to Baghdad. That invitation was later postponed. Letter 10229 from the British Embassy in Bonn to Foreign Office, May 19, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140942, EQ10318/2.

Letter from the British ambassador in Ankara to the Foreign Office, Jan. 10, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140956, EQ1071/1.

David Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview, 1992), p. 173.

The New York Times, April 29, 1959, cited in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p. 899.

Telegram 51 from Sir Bernard Burrows, British ambassador in Ankara, to Foreign Office, Jan. 9, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140956, EQ1071/8.

Iraq Times, April 9, 1959, cited in Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, p. 216.

The Times, April 24, 1959.

Only in 1962 did Qasim ask for and obtain relevant Soviet technical and military support: in 1962 a total of 168 Soviet advisers were attached to the Iraqi armed forces, and about 500 technicians from the Eastern bloc were active in the civilian sector. The role of the military experts appeared to be to give instructions on technical matters, such as maintenance of aircrafts and radar systems, training of pilots, etc. (Letter unnumbered from the UK Delegation to Nato, to Foreign Office, Jan. 5, 1962, in PRO, London, FO371/164251, EQ1071/1).

No orders were placed, and it rather looked as though the Iraqis had second thoughts about the cost or the political implications. Memorandum on ‘The Anglo-Iraqi Relations’ by Mr Le Quesne, Foreign Office's Eastern Department, Jan. 26, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149875, EQ1051/6.

Letter 1041 from Trevelyan to Foreign Office, March 24, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140952, EQ1051/13.

Letter 1013 from Trevelyan to Foreign Office, Oct. 24, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140953, EQ1051/38.

Memorandum on ‘Policy towards Iraq’ by Mr Crawford, Baghdad, July 23, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134220, VQ1051/33.

Memorandum on ‘The Anglo-Iraqi Relations’ by Mr Le Quesne, Foreign Office's Eastern Department, Jan. 26, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149875, EQ1051/6. But in a subsequent letter the British Council's representative in Baghdad complained about the fact that only two Iraqi students benefited of a British scholarship, while in the US 93 Iraqi students were on scholarships (out of 928), and in Soviet Union 101 out of 779. Letter 680/2 from Mr. Frean, Baghdad, to the British Council's Overseas Division, March 22, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157737, EQ1746/1.

The Ministers of Defense and Economics were Communists, as was Qasim's Chief of Staff and the Head of Broadcasting System. According to the British, trade unions, universities and schools were also alive with Communists, who received their support mainly from the Christian and the Kurdish elements of the population. The armed forces had been purged in the senior ranks and penetrated by Communists in the junior ranks, but the British did not think that the Army would go Communist: it was determined to hold on to its gains and could be relied on to resist efforts from any quarter to take away from them what they had won with the July revolution. See the memorandum of Mr Nutting's visit to Baghdad, June 12, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140953, EQ1051/24.

Letter 1041/87/59 from Trevelyan to Foreign Office, Nov. 25, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140953, EQ1051/42.

Telegram 432 from Hood, British ambassador in Washington, to Foreign Office, Aug. 4, 1958, in PRO, London, FO371/134213, VQ10345/1.

Some politicians were thinking of a possible compromise in the form of a federation, with Nasser as president, under which Iraq would be solely responsible for its own internal affairs, while having a common foreign and defense policy with the UAR.

The interview with Qasim was published by the Baghdad daily newspaper Al-Thawra on Nov. 16, 1959 and it is quoted in the Telegram 1633 from Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British ambassador in Baghdad, to Foreign Office, Nov. 17, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140933, EQ1021/25. See also Benjamin Shwadran, The Power Struggle in Iraq, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1960), p. 50.

Daily Telegraph, Nov. 19, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140933, EQ1021/26B. The tension between the two countries lowered at the beginning of 1960: Cairo press and radio stopped their propaganda campaign and many Iraqi broadcasts about the UAR had been left unanswered. Nasser told the Pakistani President that he had accepted that Qasim was the only alternative to Communism in Iraq and that he had no intention of meddling further. According to some British officials, the Egyptians did not want to see Qasim overthrown in that phase: the time was not ripe for Iraq federation or union with UAR, because of the chaotic situation in Iraq. If the Iraqis were left alone – observed some close collaborators of Nasser – they might come to their senses in the long run and some stable relationship with UAR might emerge. Letter 1035/60 from Trevelyan, British diplomatic mission in Cairo, to Foreign Office, May 4, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149863, EQ10316/1.

Letter 10319/1/61 from Mr Robey, British Embassy in Baghdad, to Foreign Office, Nov. 20, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157676, EQ1022/10.

Telegram 2192 from Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Baghdad, unsigned, Dec. 11, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157676, EQ1022/11.

Telegram 1245 from Sir Harold Beeley, Cairo, to Foreign Office, Dec. 27, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157677, EQ103116/7.

Letter 1031/18/60 from Trevelyan to Foreign Office, Oct. 18, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149873, EQ10380/2.

Letter 10717/1/60 from Mr Hayman, British Embassy in Baghdad, to Foreign Office, July 5, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149861, EQ1021/3.

Tripp, A History of Modern Iraq, p. 164.

Letter 10717/1/60 from Mr Hayman, British Embassy in Baghdad, to Foreign Office, July 5, 1960, in PRO, London, FO371/149861, EQ1021/3.

Amongst the first pilgrims to Iraq there was Mrs Amini, the wife of the Iranian Prime Minister. Letter 10310/61 from the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Dec. 20, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157678, EQ103134/7.

Letter 10313/6/61 from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157678, EQ103134/5.

Letter 10313/9/61 from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Dec. 20, 1961, in PRO, London, FO371/157678, EQ103134/6.

Letter 10310 from Hiller, British ambassador in Tehran, to Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1959, in PRO, London, FO371/140945, EQ10334/5.

Leonard Mosley, Power Play: Oil in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 289.

Aramco of Saudi Arabia was divided between Standard of California, Standard of New Jersey, Texaco and Mobil. Kuwait Oil Company was a condominium of British Petroleum and Gulf. IPC of Iraq belong to BP, Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, and Shell. The Iranian consortium was owned by BP, CPF, Shell, and a quintet of American oil giants (Standard of California, Standard of New Jersey, Mobil, Gulf and Texaco).

As chief supplier of oil to the US domestic market, Venezuela had a vested interest in persuading the Middle East to maintain high prices for its oil. Venezuela charged the US companies operating inside its territories a 60 percent tax on their profits, and could not afford to be undercut by exports from the Persian Gulf. Leonard Mosley, Power Play: Oil in the Middle East, p. 292.

David Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East (London, 1966), pp. 105–6.

Middle East Economic Survey, Sept. 16, 1960.

A contribution from a business man from Lebanon sought to grapple with the problem of oil wealth's maldistribution: his proposal, supported by the Lebanese government, was an Arab Development Bank, to which governments and oil companies in Arab producing countries should each contributing, as capital, 5 percent of their oil revenues or profits. The Bank would lend its funds, at 2.5 percent, for development projects, initially in the transit countries, Jordan, Lebanon, and the UAR. This would give them a real stake in continuance of the flow of the oil to the West. About 35 million pounds a year would be available in the early years, but this would gradually rise. As a corollary, this project would induce the transit countries to enter into international treaties with the oil-producing states, to guarantee the use of the pipelines crossing their territories. A project of this kind clearly postulated a high degree of Arab unity to be achieved, the champion of which was the Congress organizer. The Congress took note of the scheme at its final session and recognized the advisability of referring it to the Arab League. Petroleum Press Service, May 1959, pp. 168–70.

B. Shwadran, ‘The Kuwait Incident’, Middle Eastern Affairs, Jan. 2, 1962.

A year after the break-up of the crisis, Iraq had asked for and obtained the departure from Baghdad of the ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Iran, Japan and the US (and, from long past, the UAR). Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

Financial Times, July 7, 1961; The New York Times, July 8, 1961; Corriere della Sera, July 9, 1961; Financial Times, July 10 and July 26, 1961.

Charles Tripp, A History of Modern Iraq, p. 167.

G. Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, p. 251.

Qasim's speech at the reception on the anniversary of the Iraqi Army's creation, quoted in ibid., p. 252.

David Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East, p. 98.

Middle East Economic Survey, Oct. 5, 1962. It would fall to the Ba'th government in June 1972 to nationalize the IPC, removing the last element of Western control from Iraq's national life. To secure the continued flow of oil from its wells, Iraq had signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in July 1969, whereby the USSR would help Iraq to exploit its oil fields, while in April 1972 a new trade agreement guaranteed that the USSR would purchase Iraq's oil.