Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran–EU Relations

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Notes

As Fred Halliday suggests, International Relations theory has neglected revolution as a subject of enquiry: see his Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994), in particular ‘The Sixth Power: Revolutions and the International System’, pp. 124–43. On the implications of revolution see also Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973); James Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Peter Calvert, Revolution and International Politics (London: Francis Pinter, 1984).

Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4 and introduction.

Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, p. 130.

Quoted in Ali Mohammadi and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran and Eurasia (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000), pp. 60–61.

Ibid.

Article 154 of the Constitution reads: ‘[Iran] supports the rightful struggle of the oppressed people against their oppressors anywhere in the world’.

UN Security Council Resolution 598 demanded a ceasefire that effectively required nothing other than a return to the pre-war status quo – understandably long seen as one sided by Iranians given that they viewed Iraq as the original invader.

See R.K. Ramazani, ‘Iran's Foreign Policy: both North and South’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992).

Kaveh Ehsani, ‘“Tilt but don't spill”: Iran's Development and Reconstruction Dilemma’, Middle East Report, Nov.–Dec. 1994.

The US under the Clinton administration allowed some minor trade concessions such as import of Iranian pistachio nuts and carpets, and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright acknowledged US involvement in the 1953 US inspired military coup in Iran to topple the democratically elected nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.

For this Islamic model see Farhang Rajaee, ‘Iranian ideology and worldview: the cultural export of revolution’, in John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990).

This fear was one of the main reasons behind the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. See Anoushiravan and Gerd Nonneman, War and Peace in the Gulf (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), Chapter 3.

On the financial and trade factor see Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Iran and the European Community’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 60–72.

Some state institutions identified as supporting terrorist groups, that are not entirely under the control of the executive branch, include the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). See US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports for 1999, 2000, and 2001 (also on < http://www.usis.usemb.se/ terror/ >).

For a detailed examination of US sanctions on Iran, see Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran (London and New York: IB Tauris, 2000).

See V. Matthias Struwe, The Policy of ‘Critical Dialogue’ (Durham Middle East Papers no. 60, Durham University, Nov. 1998).

Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati announced, for instance, that ‘our government is not going to dispatch anybody, any commandos, to kill anybody in Europe’, although the Speaker of Parliament said that the it was an ‘irrevocable edict’. Quoted in Mohammadi and Ehteshami, Iran and Eurasia, p. 71.

Total has won many large oil and gas development contracts since then. But since early January 2002, the Iranian government has complained about France's breach of the oil contract by not providing investment funds.

‘Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 7.2.2001, COM (2001) 71.’

Al Hayat, Feb. 20, 1999.

‘EU–Iran: Commission proposes mandate for negotiating Trade and Cooperation Agreement, IP/01/1611’ (Brussels, Nov. 19, 2001), p. 1. Iranian–European relations were discussed in a conference in Tehran organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See monthly bulletin no. 125, Political and International Research Office (Tehran: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), pp. 61–4.

‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: EU relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Brussels, 7.2.2001, COM, (2001) 71.’

Ibid.

See INOGATE's website on < http://www.inogate.org/ >. This was part of the Commission's framework of Producer–Consumer Dialogue to create closer relations with energy-producing countries in order to increase market transparency and price stability.

Iran is not a member of the EU–Mediterranean Partnership, or Barcelona Initiative, where these issues are discussed collectively. For an overview of that initiative see Richard Gillespie (ed.), The Europe–Mediterranean Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1997) and Gerd Nonneman, ‘The Three Environments of Middle Eastern Foreign Policy Making and Relations with Europe’, in this volume.

Iran Trade Yellow Pages 2001–2002, ‘The New Millennium: the Dialogue among Civilizations’, (available from iranecommerce.net, or email [email protected]).

Ibid.

‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 7.2.2001, COM (2001) 71.’

On the phenomenon of the rentier state, see Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (London: Routledge, 1990). The term was, in fact, first suggested for the case of Iran (under the Shah) itself: Hossein Mahdavi, ‘The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran’, in M. Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Iranian voters expressed their support for Khatami and the reform project through the ballot box on several occasions: first in the 1997 presidential election, giving Khatami nearly 70 percent of the popular vote; second in the 1998 municipal elections by overwhelming participation (63.4 percent) that resulted in the election of predominantly reformist candidates; third, in the 1999 parliamentary elections where reformers won most seats; and fourth, in the June 2001 presidential election, when they reelected Khatami with an even larger majority.

The CNN World News, Jan.2, 2002.

RFE/RL Iran Report, Dec. 31, 2001.

RFE/RL Iran Report, Sept. 30, 2002.

Quoted in Iran Trade Yellow Pages 2001–2002, ‘The New Millennium: the Dialogue among Civilizations’, part 1.

In this election on Feb. 28, the turnout was as low as 12 percent according to official sources and as low as 5 percent in the capital Tehran. This is compared with over 63 percent in the 1999 municipal election. Not only was the turnout was low but, with most of the reformists' supporters staying at home in disillusionment, conservatives won most seats – indeed in Tehran all council seats went to conservatives.

The regime relies heavily on interests such as the Bonyads (foundations) that control over a quarter of the economy, the traditional Bazaari merchants, the informal networks sometimes referred to as ‘the Islamic mafia’, and so on.

‘Iran's Nuclear Diplomacy’, The Economist, Dec. 20, 2003, p. 73.

Financial Times, Nov. 19, 2003.

The EU's limited ability to influence reform has been illustrated even in matters of principle that are at the heart of stated EU values. For example in an EU–Iran meeting on Dec. 16, 2002 to discuss human rights, delegates from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were excluded despite having prepared the expert documents for that occasion. These documents outline many of the key problems and make specific suggestions (information from Gulf2000 website, Dec. 14, 2002). Another example came in the understanding reached between the EU and Iran's reformist executive, over the issue of stoning as a form of punishment. Although this understanding indicated that the implementation of stoning punishments would be suspended, a member of the Council of Guardians, the body responsible for confirming constitutional and religious compatibility commented that Islamic rulings do not depend on societal tastes: ‘stoning is a sanction for ethical problems … no other punishment could be suggested as a replacement for stoning’. Report by William Samii, Gulf2000, Jan. 2, 2003.

Foreign Minister Kharrazi stressed the common EU and Iranian concern over US policies in the region, in a meeting in London on Dec. 10, 2002.

The powerful head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, expressed this view in a low-key interview published in Rahbar, the formal journal of Strategic Research Center of the Council. This Center, headed by the former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, advises the Council on foreign affairs. < http://www.csr.ir/pr/index.htm >.