Maximizing Human Security: A Utilitarian Argument for Humanitarian Intervention

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Notes

1. I have elsewhere (Heinze 2005) explored the underlying consequentialist ethics of humanitarian intervention. Other writers have similarly acknowledged in passing the inherently consequentialist or utilitarian nature of the ethics of humanitarian intervention. See Holzgrefe (2003), Doyle (2001), and Fixdal and Smith (1998).

2. This point draws generally from the critique of rights put forth by Burke (1790/1999). See also Waldron (1987).

3. This line of reasoning is analogous to the common understanding of rights as social inventions that are means to achieve a certain state of human dignity or well-being (Donnelly 2003: ch. 1).

4. There are many definitions of consequentialism, usually in reference to utilitarianism, which is a version of consequentialist reasoning. For a definition similar to the one provided, see (Hardin 1988: xv).

5. Others have used utilitarianism in a similar way by positing values other than “happiness.” See, for example, (1999: 25) and Elfstrom (1990).

6. A simplistic utilitarian example of this is when the human rights of one person are violated in order to bring about the human rights enjoyment of five others. In this case, human rights are promoted but not honored (Jones 1999: 25).

7. The former figure is the estimate of Human Rights Watch, whereas the latter is the estimate of the Yugoslav government. See Human Rights Watch (2000).

8. With respect to liberty, (Shue 1996: 20–29, 78–82) includes political participation as a basic right under the rubric of liberty, though I do not consider political participation a basic good here. Shue's inclusion of this right is curious given that his arguments for security and subsistence as basic rights are in no small part premised on the assertion that no right, not even the right to meaningfully participate in one's government, can exist in the absence of these rights. The “basicness” of this aspect of liberty is also challenged by (Goodin 1988: 308): “If you care about liberty, you must also care about those elements that make liberty practically meaningful.”

9. This characterization is an integral component for what many observers have considered as “gross” human rights violations. See (Quiroga 1988: 12, 16), (Ermacora 1974: 678–679), and Tardu (1980: 582–584).

10. The United States, for example, does not guarantee a right to food, even though most Americans have access to adequate food. By contrast, in some states that have ratified the ICESCR there are many people who do not have access to adequate food, even though it is a guaranteed right. Thus, failure to guarantee subsistence rights is not the same as actually starving people, whereas having a right to food does not necessarily preclude starvation—intentional or otherwise.

11. Compare the same statistics for United States (1,430,690), United Kingdom (754,589), Canada (291,330), and France (215,968) (Barclay et al., 2001, Interpol 2002).