Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace? Reflections on the Realist Critique of Kant's Project

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Notes

1. I have used H.B. Nisbet's translation of Kant's political writings (Reiss 1991). Whenever possible, I cite Kant's works through the date of the first publication followed by the page of the English translation. If no translation is available or if I opt for my own translation, after the year of publication I indicate the page in the Kants gesammelte Schriften.

2. For this brief history of peace theory I am largely indebted to Alberto Burgio (1991: 87–131).

3. Kant had defined the civil state quite differently in the 1793 essay On the Common Saying. We find there that the following three features are essential: “1. The freedom of every member of society as a human being, 2. The equality of each with all the others as a subject, 3. The independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen.” (Kant 1793: 74). In 1793 Kant claimed that we are equal merely as subjects, whereas in 1795 we are equal as citizens. This difference has led some commentators (Marini 2002: 1540) to conclude that Kant opens to the universal suffrage in Perpetual Peace.

4. (Kant 1795: 101) says, “of the three forms of sovereignty, democracy, in its truest sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent, so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not by all the people; and this means that the general will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with freedom.” This passage suggests rather clearly that Kant's aversion is based on the possibility of a majority's dictatorship. It is not clear why the constitutional guarantees, typical of a liberal state, that are meant, among other things, to avoid such risk by setting principles that no qualified majority can legitimately change would not be sufficient to solve the problem. More importantly, it is not clear why the risk of despotism would diminish if the government is in the hand of few (or of one) instead of all.

5. It is interesting to notice that Kant does not say that it is impossible that citizens chose to embark on the enterprise but simply that they will be very hesitant. This could be taken as a sign that he was well aware that the mere democratic principle is not sufficient for guaranteeing perpetual peace, because, as the nationalistic wars of the 1990s have shown, sometimes the people (or the majority) desire to go to war for their interest. This point is acknowledged by (Doyle 1995: 101). In a recent reformulation of Doyle's theory he conceded that a democratic regime only guarantees that the average preference of the electors are respected, no matter what they are.

6. The republican nature of governments takes care of the internal constitutional organization of each state. In addition, Kant introduces two further conditions that pertain to the international right (ius publicum civitatum or Wölkerrecht) and to the cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum or Weltbürgerrecht). These further conditions, discussed respectively in the second and third article of Perpetual Peace, refer to the necessity to enter into a foedus pacificum (i.e., a federation of states based on voluntary participation) and the duty of Universal Hospitality (i.e., not to treat strangers with hostility when they arrive on someone else's territory) (especially for bringing about the peaceful side effects of commerce among states). It is an interesting but to my knowledge rather neglected question whether Kant considered the three conditions as jointly sufficient for perpetual peace.

7. This criticism has been advanced, among others, by Archibugi and Butham (1998: 84–86).

8. Neoconservative thinkers such as Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, William Bennett, and Peter Rodman are obviously an exception to this rule.

9. Kant assumes here that a despotic regime, by not allowing internal opposition (not even that freedom of speech that confines itself to an intellectual criticism), is in the short run more united and, hence, stronger than a republic. In a republic, internal criticism is in long run beneficial for the improvement and stability of the state but could undermine its unity and strength. This is particularly dangerous when the republic faces with a current threat (e.g., if attacked by an external enemy that attempts to “engulf” it).

10. My translation.

11. In a preparatory note, (Kant 1955: 155) writes, “the order of nature requires that violence (Gewalt) and constriction precede justice (Recht).”

12. In another preparatory note, Kant ([no date]: 155) calls them “metaphysicians” and attributes to them a “bloody hope to improve the world.”

13. See, respectively, (Kant 1786: 120); (1793b: 34 n.); (1793a: 90). On this point see also Cederman (2001). All points listed here to show that Kant was relatively favorable to certain episodes of violence for the sake of justice are borrowed from A. Burgio (1991: 87–131).

14. A. Lamette is the author of a refutation in Latin of Perpetual Peace(1796); H. Heynich writes the Kants philosophischer Entwurf zum Ewigen Frieden (appeared anonymously in 1797); M. V. Emser writes the Widerlegung des ewigen-Frieden Project's (1797); and above all the Apologie des Krieges. Besonders gegen Kant (1813) by J.J.O. A. Rühle von Lilienstern. The celebration of war becomes particularly popular in the years around the restoration. For Jacobi, war is “a necessary component of existence” (Jacobi 1825: 231). See also Archibugi (1997). De Maistre (1821: 22) believes it is nothing but “a chapter of the general law that rules the universe.”

15. André Tosel (1999) defended this reading of To Perpetual Peace.

16. This is similar to what Kant (1797: 137) says in the Metaphysics of Morals where he describes the state of nature as a “state devoid of justice (status iustitia vacuus), for if a dispute over rights (ius controversum) occurs in it, there is no competent judge to pronounce legally valid decisions.”

17. (Kant 1795: 108).

18. Probably the most serious attempt to read Kant's thought about revolution as a coherent position is to be found in (Losurdo 1983).

19. The Evans Commission on the Right to Humanitarian Intervention, created with the initiative of the Canadian government, also embraces these criteria. Michael Ignatieff (2001: 40) adds an extra condition: the HR violations “have to be a threat to international peace and security in the surrounding region.” I find this condition difficult to accept. Our intuitions would forbid a passive attitude toward gross violations of HR (say genocide) simply because this genocide does not endanger international peace or even the stability of the surrounding area.

20. (Kant 1795: 102).

21. Unless one holds that the country had lost political authority during the massacres.

22. Kant (1793a: 85).

23. M. Ignatieff (2001: 35–40), for example, recognizes that different cultures legitimately interpret HR according to their own moral values but draws a line in correspondence with the principle of individualism. A right is for him always attributed to an individual, not to a higher entity. If we talk about group rights, we are always talking about the right of individuals to be a part of a certain group and therefore to continue the practices and morals of that group. This is very different from assuming that the holder of the right in question is the group itself.