Deterrence, Norm Socialization, and the Empirical Reach of Kathryn Sikkink's The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size

Acknowledgments

David Mendeloff is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

Notes

1. One of the leading legal scholars and practitioners of international criminal law, David Scheffer, rejoices in a recent review of The Justice Cascade, “I have long awaited the day when empirical research would help make the case for why the pursuit of international justice over the last two decades has been a worthy instrument not only of punishment, but also of deterrence. Now that day has arrived with Kathryn Sikkink's important book” (Scheffer 2011: para. 3). This is a rather telling, and disturbing, acknowledgment of how the practice of international justice has been driven largely by belief rather than evidence.

2. With some exceptions: Wippman (1999) and Rodman (2008) are both excellent, thoughtful article-length treatments of the deterrence claim.

3. They vary widely in terms of their mandate, size, scope of investigation, timing, funding, participation, ability to impose sanctions, relative openness, and publicity surrounding them, and whether they are accompanied by other transitional justice mechanisms, such as amnesty, vetting, apologies, reparations, or prosecutions. In part because of this variation, other large-N analyses of truth commission impact on peace, democracy, and human rights have found no (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010) or, in some cases, harmful effects (Olsen, Payne, Reiter, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010).

4. Indeed, the same case can be made about a truth commission that exposes state complicity in horrible crimes yet offers no real accountability. Indeed, Wiebelhaus-Brahm has raised a similar argument with respect to the significant rise of violent criminal activity in El Salvador, South Africa, and other countries that undertook truth commissions (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). One could also see evidence of this in James Gibson's work on South Africa (Gibson 2004: 176–212).

5. It is also logically flawed: It assumes the two are equally effective at promoting human rights, but at different costs, when it may be that neither is particularly effective, regardless of costs. Further, a threat of military intervention, if credible, might be a far more potent deterrent than a threat of prosecution. But this depends entirely on context: Military interventions are generally considered under conditions of ongoing conflict and war where abuses are currently taking place and would not be considered in most of the cases that Sikkink examines—post-transition prosecutions against former regime officials for abuses that took place years earlier.