The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity

Abstract

The first part of this article examines some of the legal, ethical, and political dimensions of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine by engaging with cosmopolitan proposals for its application to Libya before the international military action to enforce it was initiated in March 2011. It presents reflections of a historical kind on state sovereignty, international community, and the political theology of humanitarian intervention while assessing the nature of the moral imperative underpinning cosmopolitan assertions of responsibility to save lives in Libya. Considering the official recognition of the Transitional National Council by the enforcers of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as the sole legitimate authority on Libyan territory, the second part of the article situates this act of recognition within a history of colonial practices that include the legal mechanism of “the protectorate.” It also discusses the prominence of imperial affects in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The third part of the article evaluates disagreements among certain anti-imperialist commentators over the desirability of a military intervention in Libya in order to reflect on the politics of transnational solidarity from an angle that may present itself as an alternative to the Responsibility to Protect framework. While calling for a renewed critique of violence, the article concludes with an examination of telling difficulties that afflict attempts to differentiate acts of “foreign intervention” from acts of “transnational solidarity.”

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Talal Asad, Roger Berkowitz, Kerry Bystrom, Partha Chatterjee, Nicholas De Genova, Stephen Hopgood, Mehmet Barış Kuymulu, Glenn Mitoma, Anne Orford, Neil Smith, the editors of Jadaliyya, and former students of my Human Rights and International Law seminar at Harvard University for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to audiences at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and the Humanities at Bard College, the Cultural Studies Seminar at Sabancı University, the International Institute for Global Law and Policy workshop at the Harvard Law School, and the Authority and Legitimation workshop organized by the Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University for their challenging questions and helpful feedback. I am particularly indebted to Anthony Alessandrini and Anjali Kamat for the inspiration to commit these thoughts to writing.

Notes

1. For “neo-conservative” calls for intervention in Libya issued from the United States, see Lobe (2011). For an early and sober response to demands for international intervention, see Bali and Abu-Rish (2011).

2. These challenges may prove particularly significant if the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as implemented in Libya were to set a model for military action in the future. For two opposing views on the precedent the intervention in Libya should and should not serve, observe the jurist Richard Falk (2011b) in contradistinction to Kenneth Roth (2011), the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch.

3. Parts of this section appeared as two different pieces in Jadaliyya on February 28, 2011 and March 11, 2001.

4. Some liberals further argue that beyond its coercive capacity and responsibility to protect its population, a state must be democratic to “earn” the recognition and affirmation of its sovereignty by the international community (see Marks 2000).

5. See BBC News (2002).

6. The Arab League's call on March 12 for the imposition of a no-fly zone was also cited by France, Britain, and the United States when legitimating their bombing campaign.

7. For an exemplary NGO petition, see the one organized by Avaaz (2011).

8. For biographical information about the members of the Transitional Council, see Dreyfuss (2011).

9. Reacting to news of the French recognition, a representative of the Transitional National Council reportedly thanked the French government, claiming that the Libyan people were “very grateful” to the French (Sitbon and Jacinto 2011). Such gratitude is not exceptional in France's imperial history, of course, punctuated as it is by the revolutionary violence, guidance, and occupation offered as “liberation” and fraternal assistance to oppressed peoples. Haitians may testify to the nature of France's universal values and their proper application (see Buck-Morss 2009).

10. Reflecting on imperialism, Hannah Arendt once observed that “what imperialists actually wanted was expansion of political power without the foundation of a body politic” (Arendt 1951: 135). There is no reason to suspect otherwise today.

11. On the articulation of sympathy for the natives as a persistent feature of empires, see Stoler (2006).

12. See, for example, Obama (2011) and Sarkozy (2011).

13. In his latest piece on Libya (at the time of writing), while he appears to be critical of NATO's “conspiracy” against the Libyan revolution (Achcar 2011b), Achcar manages not to mention once his initial defense of the NATO intervention.

14. Effectively, “the Libyan revolt [was] condemned by the ‘anti-imperialists' as ex post facto counter-revolutionary because of Western intervention” (Proyect 2011: para. 29).

15. For a brief introduction to contrasting views on the goals of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla according to activists onboard and the state of Israel, see the Q & A published by The Guardian (Black and Siddique 2010).

16. To give a few more examples, consider the American volunteers of the Lincoln Brigades who participated in the Spanish Civil War or the political practices of the Amnesty International.

17. For an extraordinary critique of violence, see the inspirational source of my comments here: Benjamin (1921/1986).