R2P³: Protecting, Prosecuting, or Palliating in Mass Atrocity Situations?

Abstract

Much focus has been put on the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians from genocide and other mass atrocities. However, the so-called responsibility to protect is only one of three human-rights-related responsibilities the international community has taken on in such situations. The other two—prosecuting those who commit mass atrocity crimes and providing humanitarian assistance to those affected by these situations—also address key human rights and humanitarian issues. Yet, these three sets of norms and practices are not necessarily mutually supportive. They may at times undermine each other or, at the very least, pose significant conundrums for policymakers and practitioners.

Acknowledgments

The research for this article was supported by the British Academy and the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. Some of the information comes from interviews with UN and NGO officials in New York and Geneva that were conducted during the Fall of 2009, while I was on study leave from the University of Glasgow, and in the Spring of 2011. Given the sensitive nature of the issues discussed, the identity of the interviewees has been hidden; instead, all such information is cited as “Author interviews.” I would also like to acknowledge helpful comments on a previous version of this article from the members of the Global and Regional Governance Research Cluster at the University of Glasgow, as well as the comments of the two anonymous reviewers. Pervious versions of this article were also presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1–4, 2012 and the conference on Protecting Human Rights: Duties and Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors, University of Glasgow, June 18–19, 2012. It has also benefitted from comments at presentations at Addis Ababa University, University of Birmingham, University College London, and the School of Advanced Study, University of London.

Notes

1. Nicholas Berry (1997) argues that the ICRC actually works to undermine the institution of war itself, although David Forsythe (2005) denies that there is any evidence of such a policy on the part of the ICRC.

2. The French government asserts that “emergency humanitarian aid is a new duty encumbent upon the international community. … It obeys the principle that it is a moral duty to help civilians in distress wherever they may be” (cited in Barnett and Snyder 2008: 43).

3. For more on the creation of the ICC, see Schiff (2008), Schabas (2011), Leonard (2005), and Roach (2009).

4. While the crime of aggression was included in the Rome Statute, the Court's jurisdiction was suspended until the States Parties agreed to a definition and the scope of application of the crime. The States Parties agreed to a definition at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in June 2010, but its actual application has been suspended until at least 2017 (International Criminal Court 2010).

5. For an overview, see Mills and O’Driscoll (2010). See also Bass (2008) and Weiss (2007).

6. Frequently humanitarian practitioners will label their activities as interventions. However, for conceptual clarity, it is necessary to separate out forceful actions from nonforceful ones. The former can only be undertaken by states and state-based entities, while the latter can be undertaken by a much wider variety of entities. Further, the former usually indicates a violation of sovereignty, while the latter frequently (although not always) does not. See Mills (1998a: 128–130). A commonly cited definition of humanitarian intervention comes from Holzgrefe (2003: 18): “the threat or use of force across borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”

7. There is concern, however, that legal protection has been undermined as UNHCR has expanded its operational capacity to provide humanitarian assistance (Loescher 2001: 28–30).

8. By observers, I mean the UN Security Council.

9. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 31, 2000); UN Security Council Resolution 18 20 (June 19, 2008).

10. UN Security Council Resolution 1261 (August 25, 1999); UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (July 26, 2005); UN Security Council Resolution 1998 (July 12, 2011).

11. Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Burundi (ONUB), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Sudan (UNMIS), Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID), Chad and Central African Republic (MINURCAT), and Lebanon (UNIFIL).

12. The Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, Operation Artemis, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire; ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI); the African Union in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS); Eufor R. D. Congo in the DRC; and the 2007 European Union operation in Chad (EUFOR).

13. See Holt and Taylor (2009: 42–47, 371–384) for an in-depth look at the PoC mandate language.

14. One hundred and twenty-one as of December 4, 2012.

15. Although some will deny that they have any specific knowledge that prosecutors may not already have access to (Author interviews).

16. Some of the biggest supporters of the ICC were humanitarian organizations.

17. Such as was the case with the United States in Somalia, or Belgium in Rwanda.

18. Although the goal for the allied forces became the overthrow of the regime by the rebels, mission creep thus also becomes a concern.