The Right to Democracy and the Human Right to Vote: The Instrumental Argument Rejected

Abstract

The human right to democracy is often justified instrumentally: Democratic rights are human rights because they contribute to the preservation of basic human rights. In this article, this approach is put to test with regard to the right to vote, which is fundamental to democracy and is recognized by human rights law. The question is whether there is evidence to conclude that the right to vote serves the required instrumental purposes? The answer will depend on how the human right to vote is understood, which in turn depends on how it is interpreted by the relevant human rights bodies. The answer also depends on the empirical evidence available. This article shows that the human right to vote is not vindicated by instrumental considerations and explains why this follows from both empirical and conceptual reasons. The conclusion is that instrumental considerations are unable to fully account for the norms currently recognized by human rights law.

Notes

¹A related reason for denying human rights status to political rights is that human rights are basic requirements for admittance into the circles of peaceful international cooperation (e.g., Bernstein 2009, 289). In case democratic rights are accepted as human rights there would in other words be no reason to respect either the territorial or political integrity of nondemocratic regimes with potentially disastrous consequences for international peace.

²This view is reflected in the preparatory work of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the ICCPR. While these documents include rights to participate in government (Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR), few delegates at the time envisaged these provisions as equal to a human right to democracy (Rosas 1992; Lardy 2003; Beitz 2009: 174).

³The objections could be avoided by conceptualizing democratic rights as universal requirements of justice rather than as human rights. Although such “universal justice-based moral rights” should be promoted everywhere, they would not to be government obligations as a matter of international law (Reidy 2012: 201).

⁴It is debatable whether voting is indeed a “new” human right. Already the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen includes the right, of all citizens, to “take part, personally or through their representatives, in its making [of the law]” (Article 6). Consistent with this observation is the fact that “political rights” are regularly located within the “first generation” of human rights. For a discussion, see Waldron (1987: 299).

⁵Also, “soft” instruments of human rights law, published by for example the Venice Commission and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, provide that restrictions on the right to vote must comply with the proportionality principle. See Davis-Roberts and Carroll (2010: 429) for an overview.

⁶To be fair, Sen also emphasizes the “intrinsic” and “constructive” importance of democracy (Sen 1999: 157).

⁷To illustrate, following the Polity index, Switzerland is maximally democratic already by the year 1848—a mere 123 years before women were granted voting rights in national elections.

⁸As pointed out by Wenar (2005: 227) privileges leave the rights-holder with a choice only if they are “paired.” Privileges are paired when they entail both no duty not to do X and no duty to do X. Accordingly, voting rights are paired privileges only where voting is neither prohibited nor compulsory.

⁹The human right to participation is sometimes depicted as a “liberty” (e.g., Nickel, 2010: 3; Shue, 1996: 71, 87). It is not clear, however, if this merely reflects a choice of words or if it indicates the view that participation is but a liberty right.

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Notes on contributors

Ludvig Beckman

Ludvig Beckman is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University (Sweden). His recent books include The Territories of Citizenship (2012) (edited with Eva Erman) and The Frontiers of Democracy: The Right to Vote and its Limits (2009). He has published widely on democratic theory, intergenerational justice, integration and migration, children's rights, privacy, and genetics.