States and International Courts: The Politics of Prosecution in Sierra Leone

Abstract

We examine the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) from the perspective of a principal-agent analysis. How much control did states exercise over the Court's prosecutor and what strategies did the prosecutor use to expand the Court's discretion? Although states generally delegate substantial discretion to international courts in order to maintain credibility, we find that states still exercised important influence over the SCSL by controlling resources vital to the Court's success. At the same time, the SCSL prosecutor implemented some strategies that enabled him to indict Charles Taylor against the wishes of the United States. The case suggests that states have figured out ways to achieve both credibility and influence, but that savvy international agents can have some success in circumventing the controls of state principals.

Notes

Given the nature of the conflict, these estimates vary (see United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2002; Cruvellier and Wierda 2004; Smith et al. 2004).

Several Congressional leaders wrote a letter on June 13, 2003, just 11 days after Crane unsealed the Taylor indictment, urging administration officials to release the $10 million (House Committee on International Relations 2003). Crane confirmed in the 2007 interview with the authors that the $10 million was withheld by the Bush administration as a punitive measure for the Taylor indictment.

Additionally, one senior Bush administration official reportedly told Crane after the Taylor indictment, “You know, you are doing great work there Dave, but we think you are succeeding there a little too well” (Crane 2006b: n.p.).

For example, in a joint resolution adopted May 10, 2005, Congress urged the Government of Nigeria to “expeditiously transfer” Charles Taylor to the jurisdiction of the Special Court (United States Congress, House 2005; see also House Committee on International Relations 2005).

All understood Charles Taylor was the indictee referred to (see, inter alia, United States Department of State 2003).

The indictment against Charles Taylor reads that “In the late 1980's CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR received military training in Libya from representatives of the Government of MU’AMMAR AL-QADHAFI,” (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2003: para. 17, emphasis in original).

After the normalization of relations with Libya, major American, British, and Dutch oil companies were allowed to resume commercial activities in the country (see BBC News 2004; Associated Press 2006; Khalaf and Catan 2006).

Indeed, even before SCSL began to function officially, Belgium's courts heard cases against US officials for their handling of the War on Terror, and the United States opposed the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).