Safeguarding truth: Supporting children’s participation at truth commissions

Abstract

Children are among the most vulnerable groups during periods of repression and conflict, and their exposure to violence can have long-term effects on their development, including how they manage and express feelings of fear, anger, and shame. Children’s engagement in subsequent transitional justice processes, such as truth commissions, can also shape their development and that of their nations, but for the better. Surprisingly, little scholarship has considered how commissions have been designed to effectively and responsibly secure children’s involvement, notably their testimonies. This article develops a design-based theory of children’s participation in commissions. Then it probes, through case studies of the commissions in South Africa, Timor-Leste, and Sierra Leone, the influence of three institutional features on children’s participation: (1) provisions for children in the mandate, (2) targeted outreach, and (3) measures for protection and psychosocial support. We find broad support for the theory and conclude by discussing the implications of the evidence for scholars and practitioners.

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments on previous drafts, we thank Pamela Bromley, Pierre Englebert, Heidi Nichols Haddad, and editors and reviewers at The Journal of Human Rights. We also wish to thank Alexandra Byrne, Gabrielle DeBelen, and Bilen Zerie for excellent research assistance. Earlier versions of this article were presented at Pomona College and the 2019 International Studies Association Midwest Annual Conference.

Notes

1 Notable exceptions include Baines and Stewart (2011), Fisher (2013), McEvoy and McConnachie (2012, 2013), Mollica (2017), Parmar, Roseman, Siegrist, and Sowa (2010), and Sowa (2010).

2 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) defines a child as a “human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier” (Article 1). The Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends in General Comment 20 that eighteen years old be the standard, underscoring that the purpose of an age of majority is protection. Nonetheless, the Committee recognizes the flexibility the treaty allows.

3 While this article focuses on children as victims and witnesses of violence, they can also be agents of violence.

4 See Depuy and Peters (2010) for an analysis of long-term psychological consequences of child wartime exposure. See Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) for an analysis of labor-market consequences of child wartime exposure.

5 See Ellis (2016) on the effect of adolescent wartime trauma on leader’s decisions to use force.

6 Consider such emblematic cases as Bleier v. Uruguay in the UN Human Rights Committee in 1982, Velazquez Rodríguez v. Honduras in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988, and McCann v. United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights in 1995. For a lengthier treatment of the subject, see, for example, Ariav (2012).

7 UN Commission on Human Rights (1997).

8 Besides, the best interests of the child are intended to be assessed on an individual basis, not implemented as a blanket policy. A case would have to be made each and every time a child wishes to participate as to why he or she should not be allowed to do so.

9 In an ICTJ-commissioned study of Colombia, Cécile Aptel and Virginie Ladisch conveyed, “children often identify a need to tell their own stories, to put their voices in the public sphere.” They also reported how child victims “are often keen to disclose the information they have about mass grave sites where friends and family members were buried by an armed group” (2011: 25). In a similar vein, a Sierra Leonean youth leader affirmed, “One thing was clear amongst the children of Sierra Leone: that they wanted to make something of themselves, and did not want to be left out of the TRC process. They wanted to tell their stories to the TRC. … Discussions after discussions were enunciated by children themselves and eventually succeeded to attract the attention of stakeholders to get them involved” (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre and ICTJ 2010: 25).

10 Years after the Sierra Leonean commission, many children shared that participating was “helpful in addressing unresolved emotions or experiences and [they] expressed pride in their contributions” (UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre and ICTJ 2010: 26).

11 We note that “victimhood” represents a complex identity (see Denov 2012; Brocklehurst and Peters 2017). In some postconflict or transitional contexts, affected individuals and communities embrace the victim identity. Here, it is empowering; it validates their experiences and provides a means to assert their rights and entitlements, notably to truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of nonrecurrence. In other contexts, however, affected populations spurn the victim label. Here, it is disempowering and invites stigma, ostracism, and, potentially, more trauma. In still other contexts, victimhood as a notion is complicated if a victim or group of victims was also complicit in or responsible for abuses. Here, the complex identity may be empowering or disempowering, empowering because the victim identity may be considered a mitigating factor vis-à-vis the perpetrator identity yet potentially disempowering because the perpetrator identity may be considered disqualifying for the victim identity. In a general sense, we might expect children who claim the victim identity (whether “pure” victims or complex victims) to be more likely to participate in truth commissions. Shepler (2005) shows how children mobilize the international discourse of victims to make rights claims and access benefits. That said, we might expect children who reject the victim identity to be less likely to participate. If one does not see oneself as a victim, there is little reason for one to participate in a victim-centered TJ institution like a truth commission. We acknowledge that children’s self-identification as victims—or not—can influence if, how, and why they participate in commissions; however, a more in-depth discussion is outside the scope of our article. We focus on the institutional design of commissions and its effect on children’s participation. We leave normative and sociological exploration of child or youth victimhood in truth-seeking processes to future work.

12 A brief mention of the victim identity through the lens of international law and TJ is merited here. Different types of TJ are designed to offer different types of justice. The difference between trials (domestic or international) and truth commissions is, perhaps, the starkest. Trials are adversarial by nature and are intended to establish guilt or nonguilt of accused individuals for specific allegations and to impose appropriate sanctions in cases of guilt (retributive justice). The judicial process is closed off to all except those who have an immediate stake in the outcome—plaintiffs, defendants, legal counsel, direct witnesses, the jury, and the judge. Meanwhile, truth commissions are collaborative by nature and intended to establish a comprehensive account of past events, even reconciliation (restorative justice). Here, the process is more open; it involves engaging the community at large. Part of the goal is to explore and to better understand complex events and identities, victim-perpetrators for example. To the extent that commissions (can) have a more flexible approach to complex victims than courts, commissions may be better suited to address them. This latter point is important because commissions can address victimhood through context-specific institutional choices and goals rather than via a simple checklist of best practices.

13 Other avenues by which commissions may capture children’s experiences include plays, poems, paintings, and drawings.

14 Truth commission designers, leaders, and staff should take into consideration the complex identities of the individuals and communities of concern, including children. Commissions should be adaptable to the context, not rigid or fixed. This will not be an easy task; in fact, it will likely be difficult. However, it is of utmost importance if commissions, among a range of TJ mechanisms, are to best serve affected populations. Building on this, participation may not be a good thing for all children. Commission leadership and staff, in partnership with parents and guardians and children’s rights advocates and practitioners, should engage seriously the CRC’s criteria on determining the best interests of each prospective child participant.

15 Child victims’ participation rationales should, for the most part, correspond to adult victims’ participation rationales. For example, victims’ support units and private hearings likely matter for both adult and child victims.

16 A truth commission’s legal mandate outlines numerous matters that are essential to its functioning. This usually includes the period of operation, the period of time under investigation, the types of violations to be investigated, questions surrounding special attention to specific victim populations, key activities, powers that will determine overall strength and reach, and the selection procedures for commissioners.

17 We recognize that not all children have access to institutions such as schools, community houses, and sports and activity clubs that are potential sites of child-focused truth commission outreach. Some children’s lack of access is structural: They may live in far-off rural areas without these institutions. Other children’s lack of access is socioeconomic: They or their families may simply not be able to afford access. Other children’s lack of access still is sociocultural: They may be prohibited by their families from attending these institutions. Human rights education is important for overcoming longstanding, unhelpful attitudes, behaviors, and institutions, and this should be part of commissions’ mandates. Already, commissions sometimes dispatch mobile units to undertake community sensitization and education initiatives, to address limiting attitudes, behaviors, and institutions that could affect future commissions' efforts. Nonetheless, we recognize the limits of what commissions, among other TJ institutions, can accomplish in their limited operational windows. Structural, socioeconomic, and sociocultural barriers are difficult to break down, even over a long period of time. Nonetheless, commission designers, leaders, and staff would do well to strategize how to overcome them, even if only in small ways.

18 It is important to clarify that taking care of children by implementing special measures does not mean hiding information from them. Although children must be protected, a truth commission must nonetheless “recognize the changing, growing capacities of children to understand facts, make decisions, and participate in the truth-seeking process” (González and Varney 2013: 59).

19 Special measures for children’s protection and psychosocial support should be localized as much as possible, both for the sake of legitimacy during a commission’s operational window and for the sake of the commission’s long-term legacy, including implementation of a commission’s recommendations. Although we emphasize professionals, such as social workers, child psychologists, and representatives of child protection agencies, there may be other trusted social and community members that commissions could also engage to provide protection and support.

20 See Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre and ICTJ (2010).

21 We acknowledge variation in who is a “child” and what “childhood” means across cultures. For example, in Timor-Leste, a child is culturally understood as someone who has not yet married (CAVR 2005: chap 7). In Sierra Leone, under customary law, the definition of a child varies depending upon the purpose for which he or she is being considered, and from one ethnic group to another (SLTRC 2004: vol. 3B). Nonetheless, international law recognizes children as persons under the age of 18, and countries which are party to a range of international legal instruments and institutions, including each of our case study countries, generally use 18 as the legal benchmark for adulthood.

22 Although not our focus, we recognize alternative modes of participation and discuss them in the case analysis.

23 The dependent variable is not the choice to seek or to not seek children’s participation in a commission (which would result in selecting on the dependent variable). Instead, the dependent variable is the level of children’s participation.

24 Based on Zvobgo (2019).

Additional information

Funding

This work is supported by fellowships from the University of Southern California (Provost Fellowship in the Social Sciences) and William & Mary (Global Research Institute Pre-doctoral Fellowship). In addition, this material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under Grant No. DGE-1418060. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Sameer S. J. B. Rana

Sameer S. J. B. Rana is an MPA candidate at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Previously, he was a research and program intern at the International Center for Transitional Justice’s program in Nepal.

Kelebogile Zvobgo

Kelebogile Zvobgo is an assistant professor of government at William & Mary and founder and director of the International Justice Lab. Previously, she was Provost’s Fellow in the Social Sciences at the University of Southern California, where she earned her Ph.D.