A fox in the henhouse: China, normative change, and the UN Human Rights Council

Abstract

Decades of social science research on human rights has mapped the conditions under which states sign and ratify treaties, abide by their conditions, and promote or criticize human rights in other states. Some norms contained in the core human rights treaties, particularly civil and political rights, are seen by authoritarian states as politically threatening. Autocracies can reshape human rights through international institutions and seek to change their content over time. This article investigates China’s engagement in the UN Human Rights Council, focusing on both the content and practices of the People’s Republic of China’s approach. In terms of content, it examines China’s voting record to determine the issues it prioritizes. In terms of practices, it identifies four modes of pursuing normative change: mobilizing like-mindedness, implied coercion, tactical deception, and repression of critical voices. These modes capture a range of activity in and around multilateral institutions, some of which usually does not draw scholarly attention in studies of normative change. The findings provide insights into the future of human rights norms in the United Nations and beyond.

Introduction

The international human rights system is characterized by commitment and adherence to norms that are not directly enforceable. The content of norms ultimately relies on a degree of consensus to be effective in improving rights protections. However, that consensus is malleable. States, activist groups, or other actors can advance new norms, elevate some norms over others, or reconfigure existing understandings of norms. Early literature on human rights in international relations focused on techniques of persuasion or norm activism on the assumption that rights-violating states were in a defensive crouch (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999). However, with rising levels of authoritarianism globally (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), newly powerful and assertive authoritarian states can work to counter human rights norms, particularly those that pertain to democracy, or even advance alternative authoritarian-friendly norms (Ambrosio, 2010; Cooley, 2015; Flonk, 2021).

Formal international organizations like the United Nations are important venues in which states pursue their preferred versions of human rights in part because they help codify and inculcate international norms (Greenhill, 2010; Hafner-Burton, 2012; Hug, 2016). Their imprimatur can help legitimate human rights among the wider public (Anjum et al., 2021; Gruffydd-Jones, 2019). China’s engagement with the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) provides a useful case to understand the “what” and “how” of promoting human rights counter-norms from within an international organization. China (or the People’s Republic of China, PRC) is the most powerful authoritarian state in the world and has taken a renewed interest in reshaping the global human rights architecture in recent years (Chen & Hsu, 2021). While China’s actions at the HRC are an example of how “autocratic leaders have exploited international organizations as cover for human rights violations” (Vreeland, 2019, p. 217), the case reveals even more by showing the methods autocracies can use to seek change and dilute the content of “human rights.” Persuasion is not the only tool available to norm entrepreneurs, as they also have co-optation, coercion, deception, repression, and other tactics available to them.

This article first situates its analysis in the broader social science literature on human rights and international organizations. After discussing China’s engagement with the UN system, it then outlines what norms China advances at the HRC and how it does so. In terms of the “what,” the article finds that the PRC keeps its own record out of the spotlight, is hesitant to vote for resolutions that target one country, advances norms associated with development and multilateralism, and works to downplay certain norms associated with democracy. In terms of the “how,” the findings outline four modes the PRC uses at the HRC to advance its vision: mobilizing like-minded states, implied coercion against states that may disagree, tactical deception involving laundering PRC viewpoints through NGO submissions, and repression of critical voices.

Human rights change and international organizations

The global human rights system is built around norms, understood as “standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). In the case of international human rights, the “actors” are generally states whereas the standards usually focus on how the state engages with its citizens. In the second half of the 20th century, states committed to human rights norms at high rates, as measured by ratifying relevant treaties, and these norms spread globally (Wotipka & Tsutsui, 2008). States also adopted human rights norms that were prevalent in the international system into their domestic constitutions, suggesting that the ideas were viewed as appropriate by a wide swathe of states (Elkins et al., 2013). At the local level, ideas about human rights were filtered through NGOs, civil society organizations, and other intermediaries to help shape popular consciousness (Davis et al., 2012; Engle Merry, 2006), with international organizations playing a particularly important legitimating role (Anjum et al., 2021).

There is some evidence that human rights norms do sometimes have the capacity to encourage changes in state behavior. This is remarkable given that there is no supranational authority that can enforce compliance with them. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), for example, has been shown to improve women’s rights in ratifying states under certain conditions (Englehart & Miller, 2014; Hill, 2010; Simmons, 2009, pp. 202–255). From a macro-perspective, there is encouraging evidence that human rights performance has improved globally since the advent of its international normative architecture (Fariss, 2014).

However, alongside these findings, there is abundant skepticism that human rights norms have the power influence behavior in “difficult” cases. In consolidated authoritarian states, ratifying human rights treaties does not usually result in compliance, even after many years during which human rights “socialization” has had time to do its work (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). It is likely that authoritarian states know they face little prospect of domestic enforcement or civil society mobilization after ratifying a human rights treaty (Hathaway, 2007). Ratifying the treaty thus becomes a cheap commitment perhaps designed to improve the state’s image without changing the substance of its rule. Out of an abundance of caution, states may commit to a human rights treaty but stipulate expansive reservations that circumscribe its applicability (Zvobgo et al., 2020).

Beyond not complying with certain human rights norms or carving out reservations, states may wish to challenge the content of the human rights system itself. Dissatisfied with the existing normative architecture which they perceive limits their power, authoritarian states in particular may reject large parts of the system and respond to criticism by highlighting the abuses of vocal proponents of human rights so as to undermine the entire system as hypocritical (Fahy, 2019). In tandem with devaluing the status of human rights, they can promote their own sets of norms designed to undermine rights, such as absolutist conceptions of state sovereignty or civilizational relativism that erodes the universality of democratic human rights (Cooley, 2015). The promotion by Russia of “traditional values” in the human rights realm, including a 2012 UN Human Rights Council resolution, is a threat to the civil and political rights of sexual minorities (Cooley, 2015, pp. 52–53). Norms of cooperation against extremism or separatism can be advanced to quash political dissent (Ginsburg, 2020, pp. 251–253). Security-focused norms of internet governance can aid authoritarians in squelching free speech (Flonk, 2021). Understandings and consensus around the content of human rights are malleable and authoritarian states work to shape norms to their advantage. Although there has traditionally been much focus on the diffusion of liberal norms in the human rights literature, illiberal norms and innovations designed to entrench authoritarianism can also spread (Flonk, 2021; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2018; Glasius et al., 2020; Hall & Ambrosio, 2017).

Indeed, recent years have seen a global trend of autocratization (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), which raises questions about the resilience of global human rights as currently understood. Many of the core human rights prioritized in the system, such as civil and political rights, are themselves constitutive of democracy (von Stein, 2016). As autocratization occurs domestically it is likely that authoritarian norms would be reflected in a state’s foreign policy preferences. An upsurge of authoritarianism globally puts human rights in a precarious position, because “the rise of authoritarian powers and the relative decline of their democratic counterparts to set global standards could create conditions in which the relative appropriateness of democracy and autocracy would shift more toward the latter” (Ambrosio, 2010, p. 380; see also Flonk, 2021, pp. 1925–1926). In the human rights realm, this includes downplaying rights associated with political democracy. More maximally, Ginsburg (2020, p. 221) has raised the possibility of “authoritarian international law” in which powerful authoritarian states build an international legal architecture “designed to extend authoritarian rule across time and space.”

The United Nations is the most visible and global venue available to states interested pursuing normative change. Although regional organizations composed of or led by authoritarian states can bolster norms and practices conducive to autocracy (Cottiero & Haggard, 2021, pp. 8–9; Debre, 2021; Kneuer et al., 2019; Obydenkova & Libman, 2019), to achieve change from within the mainstream global human rights system, the United Nations is the primary venue (Alston & Mégret, 2020; Forsythe, 2018, pp. 77–116). The UN human rights system works on an intergovernmental basis, producing a tension between states pursuing their political interests in the system and the professed commitment to universal values of human rights (Alston & Mégret, 2020, p. 36). States are selective in which norms they prioritize and which actors they target for criticism in the UN system (Terman & Byun, 2022; Terman & Voeten, 2018). Although the organization promotes democratic human rights norms, this sits uneasily with the heterogeneity of its members’ regime types, some of which view democracy as a threat (Joyner, 1999; Rushton, 2008). As UN membership comprises states governed by all regime types, the organization is a vehicle available to authoritarian states to promote norms conducive to authoritarianism (Flonk, 2021). This strategy sees them work within the existing system in specific issue areas (in this case, human rights) to move the system closer to their preferences (see Flonk, 2021; Fung, 2020).

China and human rights at the United Nations

China is the contemporary nondemocratic state with the most power to erode existing human rights norms and advance alternative ones. It is the world’s second-largest economy, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and is growing by most measures of relative power. In addition to its capability to do so, the PRC has displayed a willingness to influence the content of the international human rights system (Chen & Hsu, 2021; Inboden, 2021a; Kent, 1995). When it comes to international order, the party-state “has opposed the elevation of individual political rights and has regarded civil society organizations and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists with suspicion, fearing that they might challenge the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party] domestic rule” (Weiss & Wallace, 2021, p. 640).

The PRC has increased its focus on shaping the international human rights system in recent years (Chen & Hsu, 2021; Economy, 2022, pp. 189–191). In ad hoc coalitions and in more formalized fora that it has set up in several regions of the world, such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, it seeks consensus for its objectives by including relativistic language about human rights and justification for its relevant policies (Doshi, 2021, pp. 283–284). It finds followers for these views in other states that may themselves have been the subject of criticism for their human rights records (Martin, 2021, pp. 160–161).

The United Nations is a particularly important institution for China when it comes to normative issues and changing patterns of global governance (Foot, 2014; 2020, pp. 40–43; Fung & Lam, 2021, p. 1153). Because of the United Nations’ institutional structure, the PRC can use its permanent seat on the Security Council to fulfill its leadership role as a great power and the General Assembly to highlight its credentials as a developing country (Foot, 2020, p. 42). The former can be used to veto resolutions that condemn states’ actions and shield its own record from condemnation (Foot, 2020, pp. 113–114). The latter can be used as a venue for China’s leadership of the developing world, the “natural base” of the PRC’s global leadership (Doshi, 2021, 291; Eisenman & Heginbotham, 2019; on the UN General Assembly (UNGA), in particular, see also Primiano and Xiang, 2016; on human rights, China, and on the developing world, see Inboden, 2021a, pp. 67–69). Evidence on UNGA voting suggests that China is using its increased economic and diplomatic leverage to win over votes for its normative positions in this forum (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2017; Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013) In sum, when it comes to human rights in the UN system, “over time, Beijing has become less reticent and more confident in putting forward its world view about what best promotes human rights” (Foot, 2020, p. 192).

The UN HRC is a key venue for this purpose. China was involved in the debates about the establishment of the HRC, which began its work in 2006, and sought to advance institutional designs that would shield it from criticism (Foot, 2020, pp. 192, 202–204; Foot & Inboden, 2014). It drafts HRC resolutions with its preferred formulations (Foot, 2020, p. 193). It has used the HRC to proffer rights that it views as more appropriate for developing countries, and to attempt to shield aligned or strategically important states for the PRC, such as North Korea, from censure (Freedman, 2020, pp. 208, 233; He, 2021).

Although there is scholarship on the institutional and normative changes the PRC has pursued at the HRC (e.g., Foot & Inboden, 2014; He, 2021; Renouard, 2020), there has been less attention to the tactics by which it is aiming to reshape human rights in this venue (for notable exceptions, see Inboden, 2021a, pp. 67–75; Inboden, 2021b). Attention to the content of resolutions and voting patterns is a good first step, but it does not speak to the practices China uses to advance its viewpoints. The “what” of counter-norm advocacy can be mapped in examining the content of key resolutions and voting patterns. The “how” can be accessed more completely by also analyzing what happens outside official voting records. This can be characterized not only by persuasion or coercion of other states but also by tactical deception and repression of critical voices. Both the “what” and the “how” are important, and the next section aims to discuss China’s multidimensional approach to pursuing normative change at the UN HRC.

The “what” and “how” of pursuing normative change in the UN HRC

This section will first discuss the content of normative change China is pursuing in the HRC. It will do so primarily by examining China’s voting patterns and key resolutions that it supports. Second, it will examine the tactics the PRC uses to advance its agenda. In so doing it identifies four modes of pursuing normative change: mobilizing like-mindedness, implied coercion, tactical deception, and repression of critical voices. These tactics are not necessarily unique to the workings of international organizations, but they do apply in ways that are sometimes underappreciated in the workings of international organizations.

The “what”: The PRC’s preferred vision of human rights

This section discusses patterns in China’s record at the HRC (see also Ahl, 2015; Kinzelbach, 2012). The Council’s 47 seats are distributed among global regions to secure broad representation of UN membership and states are selected by a secret ballot vote in the General Assembly. There are no human rights performance standards required to become a member (Freedman, 2020). The PRC has been an active member of the Council and has been in the membership several times: 2006–2009, 2010–2012, 2014–2016, 2017–2019, and 2021–2023.

The PRC works to advance the norms that are important to it in the HRC. By analyzing the official voting record from 2006 to 2021, one can establish broad patterns of China’s approach, and by zooming in on select resolutions that China has sponsored or supported, one can better understand details of the PRC’s preferred normative vision for global human rights. The analysis includes 159 resolutions passed by the Council during the period under study. China voted yes 91 times, no 55 times, and abstained 13 times. Materials were gathered from the UN HRC’s official website (https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/home) in February 2022.

Based on this data, at least four patterns related to China’s human rights approach in the HRC emerge: China’s own record is elided, it generally opposes country-specific resolutions, formulations pertinent to development and multilateralism are supported, and resolutions supporting rights that would oppose PRC policies even though China is not mentioned specifically are opposed or abstained from. These constitute the preferred normative output from the PRC’s standpoint. This is the “what” that China would like to advance: a vision in which China is immune from criticism, individual rights protections do not trump sovereignty, the international order has a diminished role for liberal democratic powers and scrutiny of human rights conduct, and China’s policies are seen as consistent with human rights law. Although avoiding scrutiny of one’s own record (and the records of like-minded states) does not create new normative text or resolutions, it is nonetheless important when considering normative change insofar as it suggests that obfuscation, avoidance, and undermining transparency are appropriate behaviors for actors in the human rights realm.

First, and most obviously, China’s own human rights record is kept off the agenda of resolutions (this was the case in the previous UN HRC also, see Forsythe, 2018, p. 102; and, more generally, Inboden, 2021a, pp. 225–228). In resolutions passed during HRC sessions, the PRC is able to keep criticism of China’s policies or practices from being voted on directly. In some cases, resolutions that sit at odds with China’s policies, such as resolutions on the death penalty, are on the agenda, but these do not target China or any other country by name.

The PRC prevents resolutions on its own behavior before they are drafted and put to a vote. For example, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet pushed for a visit to Xinjiang in her statements before the Council in June 2021 (Bachelet, 2021). The visit, which took place in May 2022, was widely criticized internationally because Bachelet did not gain full access and in her public statements echoed PRC formulations, which were in turn instrumentalized by China’s domestic propaganda system (Ramzy, 2022). Her office ultimately released a report only minutes before her term as High Commissioner was due to end and, echoing themes discussed in the next section, after a concerted pressure campaign by China to shelve the report (Farge, 2022; Yang, 2022). In October 2022, the HRC rejected a motion to discuss the report, with 19 voting against, 17 in favor, and 11 abstaining (Yang, 2022). Xinhua, China’s main news agency, portrayed the vote as a victory against the United States (Xinhua, 2022a).

Second, China generally votes no on resolutions that specifically target the human rights situation in a particular country. Of the 63 country-specific resolutions that have been adopted during all of HRC sessions in which the PRC was a member, China abstained twice, voted no 44 times, and voted yes 15 times. Nearly all of those yes votes were about resolutions on human rights in Palestine or other areas occupied by Israel. China’s opposition to country-specific resolutions is well documented and likely stems from a combination of its own professed preference for the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, wariness of supporting the norm of scrutiny of domestic human rights practices, and fear of its own human rights being the subject of a resolution.

Third, China prefers to advance rights that revolve around development and multilateralism (on China and development norms in the HRC, see Terman & Búzás, 2021). This is consistent with the PRC’s identity as a leader of the developing world/Global South (Doshi, 2021, p. 291; Eisenman & Heginbotham, 2019; Foot, 2020, p. 42; Inboden, 2021a, pp. 67–69). For example, a 2021 resolution entitled “Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development” (Human Rights Council, 2021a), drafts of which were sponsored by China with others, argues for the need “for a comprehensive approach to the promotion and protection of all human rights and the importance of integrating a right to development perspective in a more systemic way into all relevant aspects of the work of the United Nations system.” It then stresses “the primary responsibility of States for the creation of national and international conditions favorable to the realization of the right to development.” Development as a collective, state-led right from this point of view can be read as reducing the focus on individual civil and political rights and elevating state-led development. Indeed, the PRC’s 2016 White Paper on The Right to Development is explicit that the state is a rights-bearer: “The right to development is a human right owned by each individual as well as by the country, the nation and the entire population” (State Council Information Office, 2016).

Formulations like this give the state primary control over realizing and steering that right. As a result of PRC and like-minded states’ efforts to advance the right to development as a foundational human right, the United Nations has hosted workshops, organized regional seminars, and commissioned research studies on the “contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights” (Office of the High Commissioner, 2022).

In terms of promoting norms of multilateralism, the PRC has consistently voted in favor of repeated resolutions in the General Assembly and in the HRC on the “Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order” (Human Rights Council, 2021b; on this resolution in the UNGA, see Brazys & Dukalskis, 2017). It voted yes in the HRC in 2012, 2016, 2019, and 2021. The most recent text advances a case for the interconnectedness of social and economic rights with democratic rights, emphasizing that “democracy is not only a political concept, but that it also has economic and social dimensions.” It advances a strong conception of national sovereignty, noting China’s preferred formulations of nonintervention and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and underlining explicitly “that attempts to overthrow legitimate Governments by force or other illegal means disrupt the democratic and constitutional order, the legitimate exercise of power and the full enjoyment of human rights.” The resolution calls for “renewed multilateralism” and states “that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social issues and threats to international peace and security must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally.” Rudyak (2021a, p. 39) notes that China’s conception of multilateralism implies opposition to binding rules for cooperation, stressing, in Xi Jinping’s words “dialogue without confrontation,” which in the human rights field implies relativism and not publicizing human rights abuses.

A further successful resolution that was sponsored by China called “Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights” goes further (Human Rights Council, 2021c). It advances a conception of human rights that is built around “dialogue” instead of standards and calls on “all States to uphold multilateralism and to work together to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights.” In its submission to the HRC’s Advisory Committee on the issue, the PRC made clear its view that human rights criticism constituted internal interference and that instead “mutually beneficial cooperation” and “dialogue” should prevail:

The trend of politicization of human rights is rising and double standards prevail. Some countries engage in open confrontation and “name calling and shaming.” They use human rights issues to attack others and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, thus poisoning the global atmosphere of human rights governance. … The international community should stand at the height of all mankind, firmly establish the concept of mutually beneficial cooperation, strengthen dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and jointly promote the cause of international human rights. (Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 2019).

Many of the terms that appear in the resolution and submission are common Chinese foreign policy concepts. Key terms like “mutual benefit” and “cooperation” have particular meanings for Chinese foreign policymakers. “Cooperation” and “mutual benefit” connote finding shared interests and political reciprocity (Rudyak, 2021b, p. 11). In the human rights area it is easy to see how it is mutually beneficial for two states to ignore or downplay one another’s human rights abuses. “Mutual respect” implies acceptance of China’s nondemocratic political system as legitimate. A “multilateral” world of “mutual respect” and “cooperation” in the human rights realm is thus one with few binding standards or mechanisms of scrutiny, legitimacy for nondemocratic political systems, and human rights more relative and dealt with in the context of state-to-state reciprocity.

Fourth, the PRC tends to vote no or abstain on certain categories of resolutions that have been adopted by the Council. In addition to country-specific resolutions, the PRC has voted no on resolutions that relate to protecting human rights defenders, the death penalty, civil society space, and gender identity and sexual orientation. These are rights that the Chinese authorities domestically generally do not recognize as legitimate. Civil society, for example, is generally not politically independent in the PRC, the death penalty is frequently used, and so on. China has voted abstain on resolutions addressing torture and inhuman punishment, human rights and the internet, digital technology, climate change, HIV and AIDS, and human rights when countering terrorism.

In sum, the normative vision the PRC pursues at the HRC is characterized most obviously by keeping China above reproach and avoiding country-specific resolutions except in certain cases. It advances a norm in which “internal” state repression is not subject to independent scrutiny by outside observers. Digging deeper, the PRC advances the right to development and an approach to human rights that is less standards-based and more relativistic. Finally, it objects to or abstains from resolutions that advance rights more closely associated with liberal democracy, opposing the death penalty, and some gender rights, all issues on which Beijing is vulnerable to criticism.

The “how”: Four modes of pursuing normative change

Whereas the previous section mapped out the content that the PRC prefers to advance in the HRC, this section turns to the tactics that it uses to do so. Two of these are familiar and are well noted in the literature on normative change: like-mindedness and (implied) coercion. Two are far less studied by those trying to understand how norms are advanced or impeded: tactical deception and repression to silence critics. Each of these four modalities will be discussed in turn as they pertain to China at the HRC.

Mobilizing like-minded states

Perhaps the most straightforward way in which China advances its preferred norms and deflects criticism of its own human rights record in the HRC is through mobilizing like-minded states. This tactic sees the PRC mobilize and amplify support from states, often those from among the “Like Minded Group” of about 50 states, most of which are nondemocratic, on issues important to Beijing (see Inboden, 2021a, pp. 73–75; 2021b, pp. 128–129). Persuasion has long been identified as a mechanism of human rights commitment, as arguments articulated in acceptable terms are more likely to appeal to states (Hawkins, 2004; Risse, 1999). But persuasion also can be used to oppose human nights norms, mobilizing at the international level what Cardenas (2004, p. 221) called at the domestic level “pro-violation constituencies.” Dueling letters before the HRC about China’s repression of ethnic minorities in its Xinjiang region are illustrative of these dynamics.

On July 8, 2019, 22 permanent representatives to the United Nations signed a letter to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and HRC President. The letter expressed the signatories’ concern about “credible reports of arbitrary detention in large-scale places of detention, as well as widespread surveillance and restrictions, particularly targeting Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang, China” (Joint Statement on Xinjiang, 2019). The letter called on China to uphold its commitments to fundamental rights and freedoms. The signatories represented 18 European states plus Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

Four days later, on July 12, 2019, the permanent representatives of 37 countries sent a response letter to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. This letter opposed “relevant countries’ practice of politicizing human rights issues, by naming and shaming, and publicly exerting pressures on other countries” (Human Rights Council, 2019a). The letter commended “China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights by adhering to the people-centered development philosophy and protecting and promoting human rights through development.” It claimed that the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang were successful counter-terrorism operations and that “human rights are respected and protected in China in the process of counter-terrorism and deradicalization.” In fact, there is by now abundant evidence of severe human rights abuses in Xinjiang after the start of the government’s 2014 “Strike Hard” campaign (see, among many others, Byler, 2021; Tobin, 2020; Smith-Finley, 2019; Zenz, 2019). Regardless, the 37 states that signed came from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, along with Russia, Belarus, and Serbia. Of the 37 states, only one (Nepal) was above the median score on the Liberal Democracy Index of the V-Dem project for 2019 (Lührmann et al., 2020). Indeed, of the bottom 10 countries in that index (excluding China), nine were signatories of the letter. The only country in the bottom 10 (excluding China) that was not was Nicaragua, which did not have diplomatic ties with the PRC at that time. As noted above, these tactics have contributed to China being successful in keeping its Xinjiang repression off the UN HRC’s agenda, thereby avoiding scrutiny and attention.

Although it is likely there was behind-the-scenes pressure to secure signatures for the letter, given how many staunchly nondemocratic states feature in group it is possible that aggressive persuasion or coercion were not necessary in all cases. These are states with consolidated authoritarian political systems, skepticism of the human rights system in general, and self-interest in keeping criticisms of states’ human rights record off the international agenda. The group was largely constituted ready to be mobilized and organized (see Inboden, 2021b, pp. 128–129). Doing so allows China to argue that more countries support its Xinjiang policies than oppose them, thus reinforcing its criticism of the existing human rights regime as not being universal and as being too Western-centric. The Xinjiang letter is just one example of this tactic. For example, Worden (2020, p. 45) noted that “during China’s UPR [Universal Periodic Review] in November 2018, the party-state engaged in procedural maneuvers to flood the list of speakers with representatives from friendly countries.”

Implied coercion

The line between mobilizing like-mindedness and implied coercion is difficult to identify (Kastner & Pearson, 2021, p. 26; Fung et al., 2022). It is possible that some of the signatories to China’s Xinjiang counter-letter or who support it in the UPR were motivated by avoiding trade or aid penalties from China, but without access to off-stage discussions, it is not possible to discern motivations because the behavioral outcome is the same (Kastner & Pearson, 2021, p. 24). When it comes to PRC foreign policy, cross-national evidence suggests that as states move closer to China in trade and diplomatic terms, normative convergence often results (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2017; Flores-Macías & Kreps, 2013), but behind-the-scenes pressure is difficult to observe given that China’s political system does not allow a free press that might investigate its foreign policy or critically interview decision makers.

Nonetheless, some voting patterns are likely attributable to general outputs associated with PRC economic statecraft. Norris (2016, p. 61) observed that “as China’s economic clout has grown, it is increasingly finding itself able to leverage its economic power to pursue its foreign policy goals.” This includes arranging the incentives of commercial-oriented Chinese companies to advance PRC foreign policy priorities (Reilly 2021, p. 36). Economic statecraft strategies can, over the long term, generate pro-PRC constituencies in the partner state or shift public opinion to be more amenable to China’s interests (Kastner & Pearson, 2021, pp. 28–30).

Sometimes evidence of real and implied coercion is publicly available. Yang and Liang (2019, p. 382) argued that “China’s growing confidence in economic statecraft is also seen in its more frequent and blatant use of negative sanction tools such as boycott and trade barriers against countries with whom it had political or territorial disputes, mostly in Asia.” Beyond Asia, China has leveraged market access to penalize or threaten penalties on states for, among other offenses, awards given (by nonstate entities) to Liu Xiaobo (Norway; Reilly, 2021, p. 50) and Gui Minhai (Sweden; Olsson, 2019), meetings with the Dalai Lama (Baltic states; Reilly, 2021, pp. 106–108), sister city agreements with Taipei (Czech Republic; Nuttall, 2020), elevating ties with Taiwan but stopping short of recognition (Lithuania; Bermingham, 2022), and calling for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 (Australia; Hurst, 2020). Public examples like this are perhaps meant to demonstrate to other actors that stepping out of line will incur consequences, while behind-the-scenes engagement is meant to ensure preemptive compliance.

China has threatened coercion in relation to HRC proceedings (Worden 2020, p. 44). The most public example came in March 2019. In response to a side event about repression in Xinjiang, China’s permanent representative sent a letter to other delegations that opposed the event. It stipulated:

In the interest of our bilateral relations and continued multilateral cooperation, I hereby kindly request your delegation, bearing in mind the political motivation behind the above-mentioned side event, not to co-sponsor, participate in or be present at this side event (Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, 2019).

The event itself went ahead, as it was a side-event organized by the United States and thus relatively immune to pressure of this sort. The attendance list is not publicized on the US Mission to Geneva’s website (US Mission Geneva, 2019). However, the subsequent HRC meeting was characterized by other implied coercion by China. Human Rights Watch (2019) found evidence of the PRC “approaching delegations that criticized China’s rights record to warn of negative consequences to their bilateral relationship” and “urging delegations to sign up for the UPR to praise China’s rights record.” In 2022 the PRC mounted a pressure campaign to bury the High Commissioner’s report on Xinjiang and prevent the Council from debating its findings (Farge, 2022). Interestingly, pressure “outside the conference room” is not new, as PRC diplomats as far back as 1989 threatened trade relations in connection with UN votes on human rights, physically intimidated other delegates, and approached delegates in their hotel rooms (Kent, 1995, pp. 14–15).

Tactical deception

The HRC gives NGOs opportunities to comment on resolutions or situations. NGOs can register to attend and observe HRC meetings and are able to make written submissions to the Council. For the Council, NGOs are conceived of as independent of the government, as part of “civil society.” Indeed, the introduction of the organization’s own Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil Society stresses the difference, noting:

A strong and autonomous civil society, able to operate freely, and knowledgeable and skilled with regard to human rights, is a key element in securing sustainable human rights protection at the national level. Civil society actors are therefore essential partners in the United Nations human rights system. (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008, p. viii).

The Chinese NGO that most frequently engages with the HRC is the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS). It is listed as a “non-governmental organization in special consultative status.” However, the CSHRS is not meaningfully nongovernmental. Indeed, Chen and Hsu (2021, p. 232) called it an “integral component of the party-state’s external propaganda system.” The organization’s website (http://www.chinahumanrights.org) features no content that is critical of China’s own human rights record and links to only official PRC outlets like China Daily and Xinhua. The “In Focus—Politics” section features state-produced content laudatory of China’s human rights record, reports critical of the United States, and justifications for the PRC’s repressive policies of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities groups in Xinjiang. It even features a link to a hagiographic subsite called “Xi’s Time,” housed at Xinhua.

The reason for this congruence between CSHRS and the official Chinese government line is because of the close links between the two and the apparent lack of autonomy of the former from the latter. The leadership of the organization has always been in the hands of current or former party-state officials. The current president (since 2022) is Padma Choling, CCP member and vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The previous president (2016–2022) was Qiangba Puncog. He is a CCP member who long served on the powerful party Central Committee, and was vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region Government. The CSHRS president from 2007 to 2016 was Luo Haocai, formerly vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. The founding president, Zhu Muzhi, who headed the CSHRS from 1993 to 2007 was formerly the deputy head of the CCP Propaganda Department and head of Xinhua and the State Council Information Office (SCIO), both key parts of China’s official propaganda system overseen by the CCP Propaganda Department (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2020; Tsai, 2017). Chen (2019, p. 11) observes that the CSHRS can be seen as a direct front for the Human Rights Bureau of SCIO, given that they share the same staff and office space.

Xi Jinping himself acknowledged the connection and importance of the CSHRS in China’s global human rights strategy in 2022, saying, “It is necessary to give full play to the roles of the China Society for Human Rights Studies and the China Human Rights Development Foundation, and to increase its influence on multilateral human rights institutions such as the United Nations” (QS Theory, 2022). Notably, in light of the tactical deception argument being advanced here, this directive appeared only in the Chinese-language remarks, not in the English-language summary (Xinhua, 2022b).

Predictably given this set-up, the content the CSHRS submits to the HRC faithfully reflects the PRC’s preferred line, which counters liberal democratic human rights norms (Chen, 2019; Chen & Hsu, 2021). Between 2018 and March 2022, the CSHRS submitted 19 reports to the Council. All 19 advanced the PRC’s view on key issues. More than half of the submissions were about how there were no human rights abuses in Xinjiang (six) or Tibet (four) and that PRC policies in those places were appropriate. Some submissions tout China’s human rights generally. A 2021 submission called “Realize Human Rights Through Unity and Struggle” lauded the wisdom of Xi Jinping and the PRC’s experience in realizing human rights (Human Rights Council, 2021d). A 2019 piece called “China Is a Normative Power in International Human Rights Regime” telegraphed the PRC’s interest in acting as a human rights model (Human Rights Council, 2019b). The piece is worth quoting at length:

2. We notice China is a backbone power of the development of international human rights cause. China’s great achievements in domestic human rights protection and tremendous contributions to the international human rights are increasingly showing strong positive externalities. …

5. We notice China is a driving power for the development of international human rights norms. China has been a model of rule-abiding and a contributor to the development of rules in international human rights system. …

9. We notice China is a leading power for reform of the international human rights system. Since the reform and opening up, while actively promoting the improvement of international human rights mechanisms, China has also actively put forward ideas and propositions that reflect the voice of developing countries, leading the new direction of the international human rights system.

The upshot of CSHRS contributions like this is that tactical deception can be used to support state-led normative change via an international organization. The CSHRS is effectively a cheerleader for the PRC’s causes on the Council and China’s human rights record, meaning that government viewpoints are laundered via the CSHRS’s NGO status into HRC deliberations. At a minimum, interventions like this provide political cover for like-minded partners. Tactical deception is not well-accounted for in existing theories of normative change, which tend to see states doing things and NGOs doing things but often miss the deception of the former laundering content through the latter.

Repression to silence critics

Finally, China works to keep critical voices off the agenda at Council meetings. As discussed, this can apply to side events as well. Theories of human rights and normative change sometimes account for censorship domestically (e.g., Gruffydd-Jones, 2019), but extraterritorial censorship or transnational repression is usually not mentioned. Transnational repression is a common tactic to keep critics who might damage the reputation of authoritarian states out of the public eye (Dukalskis, 2021). Raising the costs of criticizing the government abroad means that fewer will do so and those who do will have to use more time and energy for each intervention or appearance.

The UN Secretary General files a report annually documenting cases in which reprisals were brought on people for engaging with the UN system. The 2021 report documents cases in which PRC nationals were detained domestically for writing open letters to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and for participating in a webinar with experts from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (p. 10). Hong Kong activists received formal police inquiries for writing to the High Commissioner, while other groups reported that they were halting their engagement with the UN human rights machinery for fear of repression (p. 10). The report also documents 14 long-running or repeat cases in which Chinese nationals were punished for or prevented from contributing to human rights work at the UN (2021, pp. 51–53).

One way in which activists can contribute their views to the HRC’s proceedings is to travel to Geneva to give testimony. In the first instance, the PRC attempts to prevent domestic critics from doing so by not allowing them to leave the country (Wee & Nebehay, 2015). If they are able to leave and make the journey, they are surveilled and intimidated (Wee & Nebehay, 2015). UN staff have allegedly leaked names of Chinese nationals due to appear at the committee to PRC officials, which facilitates transnational repression (MacCormaic, 2021). UN officials have told journalists that the PRC regularly tries to block activists or officials like the Dalai Lama and Uyghur leaders like Dolkun Isa from speaking with the HRC, alleging that they are terrorists or criminals (Wee & Nebehay, 2015). In 2014, PRC representatives used procedural maneuvers at the HRC to prevent an NGO from using its speaking time to offer a moment of silence to commemorate Chinese human rights activist Cao Shunli, who died in detention after having been prevented from leaving China to participate in the PRC’s Universal Period Review (Freedman, 2020, p. 200).

A less violent and more subtle institutionalized form of silencing comes with the PRC’s efforts to keep critical NGOs from gaining accreditation status at the United Nations. Inboden (2021b; see also Worden, 2018) documented how the PRC uses its frequent seat on the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to block applications from NGOs that focus on human rights of China or some of its authoritarian allies. Consultative status, like that which the CSSHR possesses, allows NGOs to inject their viewpoints and priorities into the United Nations, so being blocked from this status keeps particular issues and cases off the agenda of the HRC. In addition to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang issues, human rights NGOs draw particular scrutiny from the PRC (Inboden, 2021b, p. 127). NGOs in the PRC’s crosshairs face procedural hurdles that can drag on for years, with some interview evidence suggesting that China pressures other states to oppose particular NGOs (Inboden, 2021b, p. 131). The upshot is that whereas the CSHRS can contribute PRC viewpoints on China’s human rights into proceedings, many more critical NGOs cannot, or can only do so after long delays and procedural hurdles.

Conclusion

Focusing on the UN Human Rights Council, this article has outlined what norms China advances at the Council and how it does so. It found that the PRC keeps its own record out of the spotlight, is hesitant to vote for resolutions that target one country, advances norms associated with its conceptions of development and multilateralism, and works against norms associated with liberal democracy. It argued that the “how” is characterized by four modes of action: mobilizing like-minded states, real or implied coercion, tactical deception, and repression of critical voices.

Understanding these modes is important because they illustrate underappreciated ways in which China is working to change collective understandings of human rights. The PRC has worked to make human rights less standards-based and more subject to behind-closed-doors “dialogue,” in the process downplaying rights associated with democracy and advancing more collective, state-led rights. To do so it relies not only on familiar modes of normative change like persuasion and mobilizing like-minded actors but also on less-discussed methods like transnational repression and tactical deception. To be sure, the PRC does not always achieve its aims or sometimes does so only modestly (Fung & Lam, 2021), but the intention and methods to alter the human rights system are clearly present, and as the Xinjiang episode discussed throughout suggests it is sometimes quite successful. The normative landscape around human rights is changing as a result.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank a research assistant who asked to remain anonymous. You know who you are. For reading the manuscript and providing helpful comments at various stages, I am grateful to Courtney Fung, Andrea Ghiselli, Andrea Worden, Lindsay Morgan, and Stephan Haggard.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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Notes on contributors

Alexander Dukalskis

Alexander Dukalskis is an associate professor in the School of Politics & International Relations at University College Dublin and director of the UCD Center for Asia-Pacific Research. His research and teaching cover authoritarian politics, human rights, and Asian politics. His most recent book is Making the World Safe for Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 2021).