Making or breaking the cycle of corruption: Exploring the impact of transitional justice on corruption in postconflict countries

Abstract

Does the implementation of transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions, and institutional reforms reduce corruption by enhancing accountability, building trust, and creating a culture of deterrence? Although prior work has studied whether economic crimes should be included in TJ agendas, TJ’s potential to address corruption has been mostly overlooked. On the one hand, theory suggests that TJ could reduce corruption; yet, on the other, it indicates that TJ mechanisms are not effective enough at solving deep-rooted corruption. Testing these opposing arguments using data from 106 postconflict countries that experienced conflict between 1946 and 2006, I find that the implementation of TJ and corruption are not statistically associated. However, when I further investigate this relationship with only “well-implemented” TJ mechanisms, purges are found to be negatively associated with political corruption and amnesties are positively associated with regime corruption.

Introduction

Corruption costs five percent of global GDP, and individuals or businesses pay around $1 trillion in bribes each year (United Nations, 2018). Corruption not only reduces economic growth and investment, it also causes the misfunctioning of state institutions, especially the organs ensuring the rule of law and administration of justice (Mauro, 1997). Corruption is an important problem to tackle in transitional countries because it robs societies of resources that could be used to fulfill basic needs in education, infrastructure, public health, or security.

Corruption—considered a form of economic violence and a criminal act—has been extensively discussed in academic debates (Andrieu, 2012; Carranza, 2008; Robinson, 2015) and featured in trials (e.g., in Egypt and Tunisian) and truth commissions (e.g., in Chad, Kenya, and Sierra Leone). It is perceived as an important obstacle to positive peace (Sharp, 2012). Advocates of transitional justice (TJ) support incorporating corruption into its framework due to its links to human rights (Carranza, 2008) and international criminal law (McAuliffe, 2016), as well as the importance of rebuilding citizens’ trust and solidifying democratic values (Andrieu, 2012). Addressing corruption is considered a crucial aspect of including the missing socioeconomic element in the TJ framework, as it is linked to violations of socioeconomic rights (Maguchu, 2019). Therefore, some have argued that TJ mechanisms should be used to help rebuild trust and address economic crimes¹—especially trials, truth commissions, reparations, and vetting/lustration (Hecht & Michalowski, 2012; Pesek, 2014). Yet, despite considerable academic interest and real-world experience, we still do not know whether (or how) TJ affects corruption.

This article explores two opposing arguments regarding the effects of TJ on corruption in postconflict countries. The first builds on prior work that advocates including economic crimes in the TJ agenda and the potential ability of TJ to rebuild trust, hold perpetrators accountable, and create a culture of deterrence. According to this argument, countries that implement TJ may experience a reduction in corruption. The second (rival) argument asserts that TJ cannot solve a deeply rooted problem such as corruption, especially when the relevant actors are in power during and/or after the transition. Therefore, implementation of TJ does not have an impact on corruption.

To test these two opposing arguments, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models on a comprehensive dataset that includes postconflict countries that experienced a conflict between 1946 and 2006 from the Postconflict Justice (PCJ) Dataset (Binningsbø et al., 2012) and political and regime corruption averages (V-Dem Project, Coppedge et al., 2021) until 2016, depending on when the conflict ended. I find that the implementation of TJ mechanisms is not associated with corruption. This finding supports the “pessimist” arguments in the literature, as it suggests that there is neither a powerful nor a statistically significant effect of TJ on corruption. This is important not only for understanding the relationship between TJ and corruption, but also for generating more realistic expectations about its ability to achieve certain outcomes. A further analysis of the same models using a TJ dataset that accounts for poor implementation yields the same outcome—that presence of TJ has no meaningful impact on corruption. However, when analyzed by individual mechanisms, purges seem to be negatively associated with political corruption, and amnesties positively associated with regime corruption.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on corruption and TJ. Second, I introduce a theoretical framework on the TJ–corruption relationship, presenting two opposing arguments: One suggests that TJ reduces corruption, and the other argues that TJ has no impact on corruption. Third, I present my research design, which provides detailed information on the methods of investigation and variables of interest. Fourth, I review the empirical results and present robustness checks. Finally, I discuss the results and conclude by presenting future research prospects.

Background and literature review

TJ and corruption in the context of postconflict environment

The history of TJ—dating back to the twentieth century and, specifically, the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials (Elster, 2004; Teitel, 2003)—saw the term gaining prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s during transitions from authoritarian regimes in Central America and Eastern Europe (Bell, 2008). As per the United Nations, TJ encompasses processes and mechanisms addressing large-scale past abuses, aiming for accountability, serving justice, and achieving reconciliation (United Nations, 2004). Corruption, rooted in ancient times with various definitions by Aristotle and Republican theorists (Mistree & Dibley, 2018), underwent an academic evolution in the 1970s. Sherman’s (1980) definition described corruption as the misuse of public authority for private gain. By the mid-1990s, it was simplified as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997). Scholars and practitioners recognize a complex connection between TJ and corruption. Corruption can challenge TJ efforts, but these endeavors also offer opportunities to address corruption and promote accountability.

To provide an overview of corruption in postconflict contexts, I summarize the extensive literature in the field. Postconflict countries often exhibit widespread corruption, low state capacity, weak rule of law, low state legitimacy, high levels of insecurity, and volatile levels of political will (Chene, 2012). The causes and effects of corruption in these settings closely resemble those in other nations but are intensified due to the simultaneous challenges of ending armed conflicts and initiating reconstruction (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014).

In the postconflict environment—marked by conflicting interests, tensions, and dilemmas (Ramsbotham et al, 2016)—establishing a fair justice system can contradict the interests of powerful elites (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). This presents postconflict countries with a profound dilemma: Corruption can serve the interests of elites by enabling the accumulation of wealth and power through government positions or business deals, including evading taxes or exporting valuable resources (OECD, 2012). Corruption can also be a means for elites to maintain political control through bribes, ensuring loyalty, and eliminating competition to establish monopolies.

Conversely, the “corruption buys peace” argument (Le Billon, 2003) posits that corruption can facilitate political stability and conflict prevention by accommodating opposing factions. Some countries have tolerated corruption to sustain peace, as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where prioritizing stability in peacebuilding efforts empowered corrupt leaders and undermined good governance (Belloni and Strazzari, 2014). Additionally, corruption can expose systematic flaws, triggering demands for institutional reforms and providing opportunities for rebuilding. In the following, I provide background information on corruption within the TJ agenda.

Background on how TJ and corruption are related

Most research on corruption and TJ has focused on the debate over whether TJ addresses corruption and whether it should include corruption in its agenda. Some practitioners believe the traditional definition of TJ should be expanded to include socioeconomic concerns, poverty, and victims’ needs aiming to bring justice for these matters (Carranza, 2008). Sharp (2012) suggested that TJ should involve a “broader transition to positive peace, in which justice for both physical and economic violence receives equal pride of place” (p. 784). Excluding economic violence in TJ leads to a one-dimensional narrative of conflict (Miller, 2008). Albin-Lackey (2013) asserted that advocates of anticorruption efforts believe the relationship between human rights and corruption constitutes a strong way to conceptualize the effect of corruption in human terms. Those scholars further argued that corruption is an essential aspect that needs to be addressed because it causes structural violence (Carranza, 2008). According to this view, the concept of TJ should broaden; the primary argument against this belief is that TJ processes are functionally incapable of addressing structural dilemmas (Robinson, 2015). On the one hand, as Waldorf (2012) argued, “transitional justice is inherently short-term, legalistic and corrective” and therefore does not suit functionally and practically to address “historically constructed socioeconomic inequalities” (p. 171). On the other hand, many transition contexts may present an opportunity to address economic crimes and corruption; the embezzlement of state funds, confiscation of property, and exploitation of resources can be judicable as war crimes (Pesek, 2014).

Advocates of including corruption in the TJ agenda cite the links to international criminal law (McAuliffe, 2016), human rights (Carranza, 2008), and the need to restore trust within society and consolidate democratic norms (Andrieu, 2012). Because corruption relates to violations of socioeconomic rights, anticorruption efforts are needed to incorporate the lacking socioeconomic dimension into the TJ agenda (Maguchu, 2019). However, the most worrisome challenges associated with expanding the scope of TJ are the efficacy of TJ mechanisms (de Greiff, 2009) and the potential collaboration between TJ and corruption (Andrieu, 2012; Robinson, 2015). Michalakea (2022) concluded that TJ and anticorruption efforts share similar assumptions and cannot alter each other’s approach but instead reinforce each other. It is evident that TJ does not necessarily aim to address corruption, and the debate on including socioeconomic rights is ongoing. However, some mechanisms might have an impact on exposing corruption in a given country, which may lead to further efforts to combat the practice. In the next section, I present all relevant studies that have tackled the connections between TJ and corruption.

Previous studies on TJ-corruption

Despite the fact that there are theoretical and case studies that focus on anticorruption efforts and topics such as TJ, peacebuilding, and democracy, the empirical literature examining TJ’s impact on corruption is either indirect or limited. This literature is exemplary of a broader literature in which we have conflicting findings. Some studies found that individual TJ mechanisms have positive impacts on reduction of corruption and aspects of corruption. For instance, Ang et al. (2021), in their unpublished conference paper, investigated how truth commissions influence the quality of democracy and found that they contribute to reduction in political corruption. Similarly, Rožič and Nisnevich (2016), analyzing panel data from postcommunist states, concluded that lustrations decrease corruption. Another study on lustrations by David (2003) compared the lustration laws in Czech Republic and Poland and revealed that Czech lustration law swiftly reduced the influence of former elites on politics; economics; and, consequently, corrupt practices.

Conversely, others have demonstrated a rather ineffectual relationship between TJ mechanisms and indirect aspects of corruption. Horne (2012b) examined how lustrations affect public trust in institutions and the government in Central and Eastern Europe. Although lustrations increase trust in public institutions, its impact on trust in the national government is weaker. Stromseth et al. (2006) found that trials do not contribute to legal accountability or enhance domestic judicial capacity, potentially allowing for the persistence of corruption. Dancy and Thoms (2021) observed that truth commissions are associated with greater democratic participation but have no effect on institutions like fair elections, judicial independence, or the rules of political associations. In the next section, I outline these optimist and pessimist approaches more systematically.

Apart from having conflicting findings, this literature has several other limitations. First, there are limited numbers of quantitative studies that directly investigate the relationship between TJ and corruption. Second, the focus is on individual TJ mechanisms such as lustrations rather than on examining the broader influence of TJ. Third, the studies mostly focus only on selected countries or a group of them (e.g., postcommunist states).

In this article, I address all of these limitations by attempting to analyze the TJ–corruption relationship across many countries (i.e., all postconflict countries) and testing the impact of multiple TJ mechanisms rather than only focusing on one. Yet exploring TJ’s holistic impact and having a larger case of countries contribute to the literature in several ways.

First, recognizing that TJ mechanisms are interrelated and mutually reinforcing (EEAS, 2015) allows for a more comprehensive understanding of TJ’s ability to achieve goals like seeking justice, addressing conflict causes, promoting reconciliation, and sustaining peace. Second, assessing the cumulative impact of TJ efforts over time provides a more nuanced perspective than examining individual mechanisms in isolation. Third, the existing literature tends to concentrate on corruption dynamics in postauthoritarian countries within specific regions, overlooking postconflict countries. This gap limits our comprehension of potential relationships. Finally, this article is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to employ the PCJ dataset (Binningsbø et al., 2012) for testing the impacts of TJ; others have used the Lustration Index (Rožič, 2012; Rozic 2014) or the Global Transitional Justice Dataset (GTJD; see Bates et al., 2019). The theory section outlines opposing arguments regarding the TJ–corruption relationship, followed by an empirical examination of them in the subsequent section.

Theory

Corruption occurs for many reasons, but it flourishes in postconflict environments, which feature a combination of high opportunities and low punitive risks for corrupt activity (Chene, 2012; Harvey, 2012). Weak economic systems, government institutions, and social structures make postconflict countries vulnerable to corruption. Conflict can undermine the social capital required for transparent governance by eroding trust in governments and institutions, which can facilitate corruption as individuals may exploit their access to public office for their personal benefit (Giraldo, 2006). Le Billon (2008) showed that war veterans and exiles are prone to engage in corruption as a form of “payback” for their sacrifices during the conflict. Lack of political will is another issue in postconflict countries that contributes to creating a setting in which corruption can flourish (Harvey, 2012). Almost half of postconflict countries return to conflict within five years (Giraldo, 2006). Short-lived peace and the risk of the recurrence of violence make private gains attractive; elites take advantage of this fragile situation (Spector, 2011). In sum, weak social and economic structures and government institutions, the risk of conflict recurrence, and the lack of trust in the postconflict environment cause or deepen corruption.

TJ aims to help achieve several sustainable development goals, one of which is fighting corruption (ICTJ, 2019). Yet there is an ongoing debate in TJ studies over whether TJ should attempt to address economic crimes including corruption as well as civil and political rights; there is no consensus regarding whether TJ is effective at combating corruption. In theory, corruption can be examined through TJ mechanisms that address illegal economic activities that occurred during periods of conflict, such as market distortions, money laundering, rent seeking, and exploitation of natural resources (Addison 2009; De Greiff & Duthie 2009). However, due to limited TJ efforts to address corruption and limited empirical knowledge, the relationship between the two is not well understood. The causal links depend on a range of factors, including the nature of the TJ process, broader economic and political contexts, and the level of implementation and enforcement. The existing literature proposes two competing hypotheses on the TJ–corruption relationship (optimist and pessimist); I lay out these arguments below, and then test them empirically in the next section.

Optimist theories

Optimistic views of the TJ–corruption link are based on arguments in the literature suggesting that there is a positive relationship between TJ and reducing corruption. One of the fundamental ways in which TJ can influence corruption is through its impact on accountability. By establishing a legal framework for addressing human rights violations and holding perpetrators responsible, TJ can help create a culture of legal and institutional accountability. This can help reduce impunity and deter future abuses of power, including corruption (Carranza, 2008). Trials or prosecutions—when carried out in a fair, impartial, and transparent manner, with respect for due process and defendants’ rights—can play an important role in reducing corruption. Such legal TJ mechanisms can hold individuals accountable for their actions, including corrupt acts during armed conflict that may have triggered human rights violations. This can send a message that the government will not tolerate such behaviors. Trials can further require individuals who engaged in corruption to pay restitution for their actions such as by returning stolen assets and compensating victims (Carranza, 2020; Pesek, 2014). For instance, Sierra Leone declared that earnings from diamonds should be put toward paying reparations to victims (Mani, 2008). These actions will help restore public trust by demonstrating that corrupt acts will be investigated and punished, and that no one is above the law. Additionally, trials may help deter future corruption.

The literature also suggests that institutional reforms help establish accountability and therefore reduce corruption. Mechanisms such as purges, lustrations, and vetting²—described as “removing politicians, armed forces members, judiciary or other members of society for their (alleged) collaboration with or participation in a conflict and limiting their influence accordingly” (Binningsbø et al. 2012, p. 736)—can prevent personnel who have been involved in past violations from holding positions of influence. Rožič and Nisnevich (2016) found that lustrations interrupt the continuity of corrupt networks and counter corruption by removing corrupt individuals. Furthermore, by restricting their influence on the new system, lustrations address the state’s legislative and judicial functioning to combat corruption. By reducing corrupt traditions and opportunities for former corrupt actors, lustrations have been found to help reduce corruption (Rožič & Nisnevich, 2016).

TJ may play a role in reducing corruption by contributing to the restoration of public trust. A postwar country or authoritarian regime addressing justice concerns demonstrates a commitment to transparency and fairness to its citizens. In turn, government responsiveness increases citizens’ trust and confidence in government institutions (Mihr, 2013). High trust in institutions might extend to anticorruption efforts, resulting in higher corruption reports from the public and effective implementation of policies (Xiao et al., 2022). Building trust is important when combating corruption because countries with high levels of trust tend to have low levels of corruption, and people are more confident in political leaders’ integrity (Wike & Holzwart, 2008). It should be noted that trust and corruption are mutually reinforcing when trust reduces corruption and reduced corruption enhances trust (Xiao et al., 2022). However, in the context of TJ’s potential impact, I focus on the first part.

As mentioned, holding perpetrators accountable for their crimes through trials or purges demonstrates the new system’s departure from the previous regime and signals its commitment to operating based on the principles of the rule of law, indicating trustworthiness (Horne, 2012a). Vetting also signifies a bureaucratic departure from the past, which can be significant in negotiated settlements with limited visible power shifts (Horne, 2012b). Personnel reform mechanisms (purges, vetting, lustration) remove untrustworthy individuals from institutions that could exploit privileges inherited from the prior regime (David, 2003). These TJ mechanisms signal trustworthy government institutions that tend to have a deterrent effect on corruption. Public officials may be less inclined to engage in corrupt practices when they know they are being closely scrutinized and held accountable.

In addition to promoting transparency and accountability and contributing to public trust, the literature suggests that, when effectively implemented, TJ mechanisms can create a culture of deterrence and potentially reduce corruption in three ways. First, trials can deter corrupt officials and others from engaging in corrupt practices in the future. Trials serve multiple functions, including deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, which may be effective at addressing past violations and economic crimes (Chene, 2019). Kim and Sikkink (2010) argued that human rights prosecutions deter future violations even if a conviction is not achieved. For instance, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic died before being convicted of war crimes and Pinochet was never convicted, but the trial process sends a message to other leaders and helps deter future human rights abuses. Kim and Sikkink (2010) maintained that trials are not only about punishing the guilty; they are also symbolic events that disclose and emphasize norms. Therefore, holding individuals accountable for their past actions sends a strong message that crimes, including economic crimes, that violate human rights will not be tolerated.

The second way in which TJ mechanisms can reduce corruption by deterrence is through truth commissions—temporary bodies that investigate past violations (Hayner, 2002); these reveal the extent of past abuses and corruption and provide a platform for victims to tell their stories. Individuals may receive immunity from prosecution if they self-report or confess their wrongdoing, akin to “effective regret,” in which perpetrators report the crime shortly after committing it (Chene, 2019). This can reveal hidden corruption cases and ensure accountability by publicly confessing, leading to humiliation and stigmatization. Such commissions can help reduce opportunities for authoritarian legacies and create transparency (Ang et al., 2021). The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a renowned example of this approach (Kushleyko, 2015), and the truth commissions in Kenya and Tunisia contributed to the process of highlighting how corruption impacted human rights (Robinson, 2015).

Third, institutional reforms—particularly removing human rights abusers from public office (Binningsbø et al., 2012)—can have a deterrent as well as a punitive effect (Mayer-Rieckh, 2007). Such mechanisms can subject individuals to public shaming (de Greiff, 2007), which can generate public contempt (Czarnota, 2007). The deterrent use of TJ mechanisms can therefore reduce further violations, which can deter economic crimes that are judicable as war crimes (Pesek, 2014). Based on the arguments derived from the literature that TJ mechanisms can promote transparency and accountability, restore public trust, and create a culture of deterrence, they can also combat corruption in postconflict countries.

H1 (Optimist Hypothesis): Implementing transitional justice mechanisms can reduce corruption in postconflict countries.

Pessimist theories

Whereas some studies have argued that TJ mechanisms can address and reduce corruption, others maintain that such mechanisms are usually ineffective at tackling such deeply rooted problems. In a sense, postconflict countries have an existing level of corruption and introduction of TJ enables that to continue, not necessarily changing it for the better or worse. Pessimist theories are therefore based on ineffectual arguments in the literature suggesting that implementation of TJ makes no change in corruption. Most renderings of this pessimist approach imply stability or a little impact, but some arguments might imply negative impact of TJ on corruption if elites can manipulate TJ to open new opportunities for their corrupt acts.

One of the main arguments in the pessimist theory is that TJ might increase expectations and lead to disappointment, anger, and grievances and exacerbate divisions (Haidar, 2016). Some transitional countries likely implement TJ under international pressure and end up using it as window dressing or simply pay lip service to the undertaking (Sarkin, 2021), such as Nepal³ and Serbia. Additionally, political elites may manipulate TJ mechanisms to profit from them or to advance their personal agendas (Horne, 2017).

Powerful political and economic actors can impede the implementation of TJ (Robinson, 2015). Elite corruption must be addressed during transitions to prevent it from undermining the success of the new regime (Ghione, 2012). The involvement of corrupt individuals in justice efforts will likely weaken mechanisms designed to discourage the practice. Many former leaders of transitional countries such as Pinochet in Chile, Marcos in the Philippines, and Suharto in Indonesia used their ill-gotten assets to escape accountability for their mass human rights violations, delay trials, finance destabilization, and sponsor political agents (Carranza, 2008; Pesek, 2014). Corrupt elites have also allowed corrupt leaders such as Taylor of Liberia and Fujimori of Peru to escape prosecution. Likewise, the failure to target corrupt individuals and businesses in Milosevic’s regime limited the impact of TJ in Serbia (Pesek 2014). In terms of institutional reforms, the process of removing political elites, in cases like Hungary, who were involved in past abuses did not proceed properly; many ended up in leading positions (Kiss, 2006). New elites have often employed lustrations to consolidate their control over opponents (Rozic & Grodsky, 2015). The possibility that TJ mechanisms will be ineffective in addressing corruption, or that slight chance of corrupt elites manipulating them, makes TJ less likely change the state of corruption.

Contrary to the “TJ could increase trust” narrative in the literature, there is also the narrative that “TJ undermines trust,” for example, if there are problems with the design or implementation of the mechanisms (Horne, 2012a). When a government is willing to violate the rule of law to pursue justice in an unfair way, such as by prosecuting individuals for crimes retrospectively, it signals its untrustworthiness. Certain legal concessions related to lustration involve accusations of applying justice retroactively, violating due process, and displaying selective biases (Horne, 2012b). As noted, when political actors manipulate TJ mechanisms for personal gain or revenge, it impacts citizens’ perceptions and incites distrust. Furthermore, if lustration is perceived as a political tool used by parties to remove opponents or tarnish their image, it can undermine trust in public institutions, posing a threat to good governance objectives (Horne, 2012b; Kiss, 2006).

TJ entails a cluster of mechanisms⁴; countries tend to implement multiple TJ mechanisms during the postconflict period. Optimist theories focus more on mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions, and institutional reforms (e.g., lustrations), whereas pessimists concentrate on amnesties—a process by which states acknowledge that crimes were committed but remove the possibility of prosecution (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012). Addressing past offenses to promote accountability and deter future wrongdoing in anticorruption efforts may clash with leniency measures like corruption-related amnesties (UNODC, 2004), potentially fostering a culture of impunity (Chene, 2019).

Powerful figures can manipulate TJ mechanisms, which may lead to their misuse. Actions political elites take to further their personal agendas may jeopardize TJ’s capacity to rebuild trust or promote accountability. The inadequate design and/or implementation of TJ mechanisms might increase grievances, dash victims’ hopes, and destroy citizens’ trust in the efforts.⁵ Thus the general consensus in the pessimist literature is that TJ does not change corruption.

H2 (Pessimist Hypothesis): The implementation of transitional justice mechanisms has no effect on corruption in postconflict countries.

Research design

This article tests the optimist and pessimist arguments on the TJ–corruption relationship. I investigate whether the implementation of TJ mechanisms can reduce corruption or has no impact on it. I identify the dependent variable as corruption and the independent variable as the implementation of TJ. To measure both variables, I rely on two widely used datasets, the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) and PCJ, respectively. The PCJ dataset covers conflicts from 1946 to 2006 and V-Dem offers corruption data from 1900, although the legal definition of corruption only emerged around 1970s. Although the dataset includes TJ mechanisms and conflicts predating this definition, I included all postconflict episodes due to corruption’s historical presence before the 1970s. Most of the conflict episodes started and ended between 1980s and 1990s, thus minimizing timing discrepancies between the legal definitions of both concepts. The final dataset includes 106 countries and 348 conflicts without accounting for missing data. Table 1 reports details about the variables.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Conflict ID	348	114.454	66.313	1	251
COW code	348	557.966	218.87	2	910
Political corruption index (PCI)	347	.632	.235	.04	.964
Conflict PCI	341	.616	.241	.033	.968
Regime corruption index (RCI)	347	.619	.256	.019	.967
Conflict RCI	341	.609	.268	.019	.977
TJ_dummy	317	.527	.5	0	1
Conflict duration	348	4.014	7.165	0	44
Battle-related deaths	317	17919.473	82648.411	25	1200000
Battle-related deaths (log)	317	6.582	2.607	3.219	13.998
Termination_victory	317	.334	.473	0	1
Democracy	340	.332	.472	0	1

Dependent variable: Corruption

To improve the reliability of my analysis, I use two different measures of government corruption—the Political Corruption Index (PCI) and the Regime Corruption Index (RCI).⁶ The PCI is measured by the V-Dem Project (Coppedge et al., 2021) and includes measures of six types of corruption covering levels and areas of the polity sphere, recognizing legislative, executive, and judicial corruption. The index differentiates between corruption at the level of rulers and the cabinet and in the public sector. It uses several types of corruption including “both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aiming and influencing law making and that affecting implementation” (McMann et al., 2016; Coppedge et al., 2021). The PCI variable includes indexes of public sector corruption and executive corruption, and indicators for judicial corruption and legislative corruption.

The PCI variable incorporates many aspects of corruption, but it does not include regime corruption. In the theory, I argued that political elites might use their positions for private or personal gain. To account for the extent to which political actors are corrupt, I also employ the RCI. Although the two indices are related, the RCI focuses on actors who occupy political offices and engage in a specific set of corrupt acts. The overall index combines indicators such as executive bribes and executive embezzlement as well as judicial and legislative corruption (Coppedge et al., 2021).

To accommodate the five-year postconflict window for the implementation of TJ mechanisms⁷ (Binningsbø, et al., 2012) and allow sufficient time to observe the possible impacts of TJ (Skaar & Dahl, 2012), I use snapshot-based analysis, which allows researchers to gain a detailed understanding of complex phenomena such as corruption by focusing on a specific moment in time.⁸ I measure the snapshot of postconflict corruption as the five-year average of corruption values following the five-year window in which TJ was implemented.⁹ Because corruption is a sticky variable and does not change frequently, I use the average over the five-year period rather than counting the number of changes.

Explanatory variable: TJ

I use the implementation of TJ mechanisms as the independent variable. Past research has indicated that TJ mechanisms such as trials, institutional reforms (here, purges), truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties may have either a positive or a negative influence on a country’s level of corruption. Despite having slightly different areas of impact, the implementation of one or more TJ mechanisms could pave the way to combat corruption by building trust, enhancing accountability, and creating a culture of deterrence, and it may have few observable associations. Therefore, I created a dummy variable for TJ implementation using the PCJ dataset (Binningsbø et al., 2012). Adopting a holistic approach to explore if there is a relationship between TJ and corruption, I use a dummy variable coded 1 if at least one of the five TJ mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, and purges) is implemented within the first five years after conflict, and 0 otherwise. Even though my main theoretical interest is to test the impact of the presence or absence of TJ in the postconflict period on the average level of corruption, I also take the potential individual impacts of these mechanisms into account. Therefore, I disaggregate the TJ mechanisms and test them separately following the main analysis. For this, I use dummy variables for each TJ mechanism, coded 1 if implemented and 0 otherwise.

Control variables

Prior work has demonstrated that postconflict countries usually struggle with corruption (Chene, 2012). Although corruption can fuel grievances and trigger renewed conflict, it can also “buy peace” (Le Billon, 2003, p, 413). Drawing on previous studies of corruption and TJ, I control for five factors that might cause the implementation of TJ and be associated with corruption: conflict termination, democracy, battle-related deaths, conflict duration, and conflict PCI/RCI. In the remainder of this section, I discuss each in turn.

Conflict termination

Conflict termination can have important implications for the implementation of TJ and government corruption. Government victory after a conflict creates a power imbalance, potentially reducing the incentive for TJ, resulting in impunity for the perpetrators of human rights abuses and a lack of closure and healing for victims. Furthermore, with victory, governments may be more likely to engage in corruption and abuses of power. This might lead to a lack of accountability and transparency in institutions and can undermine efforts to promote good governance and combat corruption. However, negotiated settlements may offer better prospects for implementing TJ and anticorruption measures, as both parties may have a stake in accountability and may cooperate to achieve these goals. However, in some cases—such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia—“accepting a settlement where power is organized around corrupt relationships and opportunities for rent-seeking is often a way of literally buying support for reaching a settlement” (Pyman et al., 2014, p. 18). To account for the possible impact of conflict termination, I created a dummy variable for each possible termination type (victory, bargained, and other) from the PCJ Dataset (Binningsbø et al., 2012). Termination with victory indicates that the government defeated the opposition (Kreutz, 2010). A bargained solution includes peace agreements and ceasefire agreements that indicate an agreement signed and accepted by all parties active in the last year of conflict, and other includes no or low activity (Binningsbø et al., 2012; Kreutz, 2010).

Democracy

When exploring the effects of TJ on corruption, I also control for regime type. Because democracy reinforces good governance (Rožič & Nisnevich, 2016), democracies feature greater transparency and accountability, and civil society plays an essential role in holding the government accountable. Independently, democracies generally have lower levels of corruption (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011). This might put greater pressure on democratic governments to implement TJ mechanisms to address past abuses and combat corruption. By contrast, authoritarian regimes often lack transparency and accountability, and suppress civil society. Such regimes may be less inclined to implement TJ or combat corruption, as doing so might undermine their hold on power. For democracy, I use the V-Dem electoral democracy index (Coppedge et al., 2021), which is based on indices measuring clean elections, freedom of association and of expression, elected officials, and suffrage (Coppedge et al., 2021, p. 43). I code the variable democracy based on the democracy values in the first year after the end of the conflict.

Battle-related deaths

Another control variable relevant to the TJ–corruption relationship is whether the conflict has reached the level of civil war. Corruption and conflict are intertwined when corruption is likely to affect the state’s capacity to manage or prevent conflict (Chene, 2012). Corruption can also be among the causes of armed conflicts (Carranza, 2008). Additionally, conflict may increase corruption, and insecurity may exacerbate bribery and extortion (Andvig, 2007). I control for battle-related deaths, and I expect more battle deaths in a conflict to negatively affect both the TJ implementation process and the reduction of corruption. The variable reports the number of battle-related deaths during the conflict using data from the PCJ dataset (Binningsbø et al., 2012).

Conflict duration

Conflict duration matters when exploring the TJ–corruption relationship. Short conflicts may have less time and resources available to implement TJ and combat corruption. The immediate focus may be on achieving a peace agreement or ceasefire; less attention may be devoted to addressing the root causes of the conflict or promoting good governance. In long conflicts there may be more time and resources available to implement TJ and combat corruption. However, prolonged conflicts can also lead to a breakdown of governance structures and an increase in corruption because those in power seek to maintain their hold on resources and control over the population. Long conflicts might also generate a sense of impunity for human rights violations, as perpetrators may believe they will never be held accountable. Therefore, I control for conflict duration, a variable that counts the time from the beginning to the end of the conflict.

Conflict PCI and conflict RCI

Finally, I control for the initial level of corruption, measured a year before the conflict ended, to determine whether TJ affects corruption once it is implemented. Although assessing corruption in the year the conflict ended would also be an option, in some cases TJ was implemented in the same year the conflict ended (e.g., in Croatia, Indonesia, and Ghana), which might obscure its impact on corruption. Because TJ mechanisms do not directly address corruption, there may be deep-rooted corruption networks that are resistant to change. In cases such as Colombia, Liberia, and Nepal, corruption was more detrimental to stability due to corrupt networks that were used to eliminate opponents or benefit a small group of people (Dix et al., 2012). Especially long conflicts, such as those in Colombia and Myanmar, might strengthen these corrupt networks. Therefore, I control both for conflict PCI and RCI using the corruption levels a year before the end of the conflict.¹⁰

Results

To explore how implementing TJ mechanisms affects corruption, I use OLS to estimate four models based on the different sets of control variables for each outcome variable, PCI and RCI. First, I estimate an equation using only the TJ dummy variable. Next, I estimate a model with only conflict-related controls such as duration, termination, and civil war. I then do the same for other control variables such as democracy and preconflict corruption. Finally, I estimate a full model that includes all control variables. To improve the accuracy and reliability of the results, I use a clustering function in all regressions. Conflict episodes sometimes arise in the same or different postconflict countries. Thus, some observations in the data may be more similar to each other than to other observations, and these similarities could bias the estimates if they are not taken into account. Therefore, I cluster my observations by country.¹¹

The theory has two arguments: The optimist theory suggests that implementing TJ might reduce corruption, and the pessimist theory maintains that TJ has no impact on corruption. Across all eight models for both dependent variables, I find no precisely estimated association between the presence of TJ and either PCI (Table 2) or RCI (Table 3) in postconflict countries. This finding holds when I estimate the models with the level of corruption variable instead of average corruption (see Table A in the Supplementary Material). According to Tables 2 and 3, implementing TJ mechanisms is positively yet insignificantly associated with political and regime corruption. TJ is believed to be a remedy according to optimist theories; however, data from real-world conflicts support the pessimist theory, which suggests that TJ may be ineffective at changing deeply rooted problems such as corruption, as there is no statistically meaningful impact of TJ on corruption.

Table 2. Relationship between TJ and PCI.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	PCI	PCI	PCI	PCI
TJ_dummy	.0242	.0286	.0116	.0206
	(.0493)	(.0444)	(.0147)	(.0177)
Duration		.00418		.00281
		(.00346)		(.00164)
Termination_victory		.0362		.00444
		(.0416)		(.0168)
Battle-related deaths (log)		−.0112		−.00854
		(.00983)		(.00570)
Democracy			−.123*	−.141***
			(.0497)	(.0400)
Conflict PCI			.786***	.775***
			(.0368)	(.0350)
Constant	.619***	.663***	.183***	.235***
	(.0501)	(.0806)	(.0418)	(.0390)
N	316	316	307	307
R^2	.003	.019	.725	.731

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Bold values denote statistical significance.

Table 3. Relationship between TJ and RCI.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	RCI	RCI	RCI	RCI
TJ_dummy	.0272	.0275	.00732	.0138
	(.0592)	(.0506)	(.0181)	(.0199)
Duration		.00409		.00260
		(.00400)		(.00173)
Termination_ victory		.0509		.0120
		(.0455)		(.0195)
Battle-related deaths (log)		−.0110		−.00814
		(.0109)		(.00626)
Democracy			−.162**	−.177***
			(.0602)	(.0484)
Conflict RCI			.738***	.728***
			(.0424)	(.0390)
Constant	.608***	.648***	.220***	.266***
	(.0614)	(.0970)	(.0486)	(.0424)
N	316	316	307	307
R^2	.003	.020	.705	.710

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Bold values denote statistical significance.

The conflict-related control variables in Model 2 illustrate that there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, TJ has no significant impact on corruption and is not effective at lowering corruption. Model 3 includes additional control variables, such as democracy and conflict-era corruption, which are statistically significant. Model 4 includes all control variables, and the findings show that TJ has no impact on corruption.

As noted, I test two contradictory arguments from prior studies by disaggregating TJ mechanisms. Table 4 shows the models for each individual TJ mechanism—purges, trials, truth commissions, reparations, and amnesties—and its relationship with political corruption. The table reports the models with control variables; none of the TJ mechanisms individually has an estimated association with corruption. I estimate the same models with other outcome variable of interest, regime corruption (RCI), and the results are mostly similar to the PCI models (see Table B in the Supplementary Material).

Table 4. Relationship between individual TJ mechanisms and PCI (with control variables).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	PCI	PCI	PCI	PCI	PCI	PCI
TJ_dummy	.0206
	(.0177)
Duration	.00281	.00225	.00249	.00248	0.00251	0.00271
	(.00164)	(.00135)	(.00151)	(.00149)	(0.00149)	(0.00153)
Termination_victory	.00444	.0157	.00928	.00973	0.0112	0.00760
	(.0168)	(.0142)	(.0171)	(.0154)	(0.0152)	(0.0159)
Battle-deaths(log)	−.00854	−.00659	−.00736	−.00689	−0.00762	−0.00865
	(.00570)	(.00476)	(.00516)	(.00529)	(0.00534)	(0.00553)
Democracy	−.141***	−.134**	−.137***	−.130**	−0.138**	−0.144***
	(.0400)	(.0417)	(.0400)	(.0421)	(0.0414)	(0.0393)
Conflict PCI	.775***	.782***	.778***	.785***	0.777***	0.774***
	(.0350)	(.0362)	(.0352)	(.0369)	(0.0359)	(0.0347)
Purge		−.0551
		(.0465)
Trial			.00447
			(.0205)
Truth commission				−.0413
				(.0288)
Reparation					.0124
					(.0267)
Amnesty						.0301
						(.0178)
Constant	.235***	.227***	.233***	.226***	.235***	.238***
	(.0390)	(.0375)	(.0385)	(.0402)	(.0397)	(.0392)
N	307	307	307	307	307	307
R^2	.731	.732	.730	.730	.730	.733

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Bold values denote statistical significance.

Discussion

This article explores the relationship between TJ and corruption by testing opposing arguments in the theory. The optimist hypothesis maintains that TJ can reduce corruption by promoting transparency, rebuilding trust, and creating a culture of deterrence. According to the pessimist hypothesis, TJ is ineffective at addressing deep-rooted problems such as corruption, and therefore TJ has no impact on it. This is one of the first systematic empirical study that tests these two arguments in postconflict countries. The findings mostly support the pessimist theory, suggesting that there is no clear relationship between these two phenomena. The results also indicate that corruption during armed conflict is a strong indicator of corruption after conflict. Thus, corruption is a deeply rooted problem that is challenging to address by implementing TJ mechanisms.

These results should be interpreted with caution, as additional factors may explain why the findings indicate an ineffectual relationship between TJ and corruption. At least three alternative explanations should be considered. The first is possible reverse causality. The optimist hypothesis suggests that TJ helps decrease corruption; however, noncorrupt regimes that have democratic values tend to use TJ in a relatively noncorrupt way. The findings indicate that democracy is negatively associated with political corruption, which likely explains most of the variation in corruption levels; the democracy variable likely masks or explains away the impact of TJ. In addition, the conflict-era corruption and preconflict corruption variables used in an earlier version of the article show that corruption is sticky after conflicts. More corrupt regimes can be assumed to be more likely to use TJ in a more corrupt way. It is evident that conflict-era corruption explains most of the positive variation in corruption. Therefore, the effect of the TJ variable may be confounded by democracy and corruption during the conflict.

The second alternative explanation is related to the dataset. The sample size and data used in the analysis might not adequately capture the true relationship between the variables. The PCJ dataset includes all TJ mechanisms that have been implemented within five years after each conflict. The trial, truth commissions, amnesty, reparation, and purge variables provide no information about the involvement of corruption. For example, Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission mentioned corruption as one factor that fueled the conflict and provided recommendations to fight corruption in its final report (Sesay and Suma, 2009). However, the dataset does not contain a separate variable that indicates whether corruption was included in the TJ agenda. The dataset has a “breach of justice” variable for trials and truth commissions, which signifies the existence of intentional violations of justice during the process or the application of weak legal standards (Binningsbø et al., 2012, p. 11). For example, summary¹² or show trials¹³ are coded as a breach of justice in the dataset. The concept of breach of justice in truth commissions refers to the deliberate violation of justice within the truth commission process or a purposeful failure to fully implement the objectives of it (Binningsbø et al., 2012, p. 12). Although not yet certain, this breach could include possible corrupt acts during the implementation of TJ for personal gain. Because the TJ data does not provide any information about whether the mechanisms addressed corruption or whether corruption interrupted justice, it is more likely to generate null findings. Significant associations between TJ mechanisms and reducing corruption have been detected using alternative datasets. Ang et al. (2021) used the Global Transitional Justice Dataset (GTJD) (Bates et al., 2019), which has panel data from truth commissions for countries that transitioned to democracy between 1946 and 2016. Rožič and Nisnevich (2016) used the Lustration Index (Rozic, 2012; 2014), which covers 34 postcommunist countries from 1990 to 2012. Although these datasets code selected TJ mechanisms in more detail, they are limited to postauthoritarian or postcommunist countries, and do not provide information about different kinds of TJ mechanisms.

A third alternative explanation of the results is the lack of full implementation of TJ mechanisms. In some cases, such as Burundi, even though countries sign a peace agreement with provisions for TJ, they might not implement those mechanisms for decades. This may lead to arguments that government leaders lack the political will to implement TJ mechanisms. The underlying assumption is that some political actors tend to oppose TJ principles due to the fear of being held accountable for past crimes (Rubli, 2013). Trials may therefore directly threaten political actors’ reputations or their political position or power (Rubli, 2013). According to global TJ policy advocates (Nagy, 2008), actors who do not benefit from TJ or who may be held accountable by it are likely to manipulate or prevent its implementation out of their own personal interest (Rubli, 2013; Subotic, 2009). This might also be the case for the postconflict countries included in the dataset. Unfortunately, apart from the breach of justice variables for trials and truth commissions, there is no information about the process, progress, or results of TJ mechanisms in the dataset. Thus, there might be poor implementation of mechanisms due to insufficient resources or a lack of political will. To use these variables, I rerun the models using only TJ mechanisms that did not experience a breach of justice. The findings show that once we consider only “well-implemented” TJ, there is still no association between TJ and corruption. However, purges are negatively associated with political corruption and amnesties are positively associated with regime corruption (see Tables C, D, E, and F in the Supplementary Material). This finding can motivate scholars to further unpack TJ’s effectiveness on different outcomes by considering only “well-implemented” mechanisms.

The relationship between TJ and corruption is complex and multifaceted. Therefore, multiple political and economic factors, such as transparency in the government or the private sector, might impact corruption rather than the lack of TJ. Additionally, TJ may be more effective at reducing corruption in some contexts than in others, depending on factors such as the level of trust in government, the degree of public support for TJ implementation, and the strength of civil society. Nevertheless, exploring TJ’s direct and general impacts on corruption is important for highlighting the need to carefully incorporate corruption into the TJ agenda if the end goal is to combat corruption.

Conclusion

Armed conflicts lead to violations of civil and political rights as well as economic crimes and violations. Postconflict countries usually have widespread corruption, lack political will and trust in the government, and a weak ability to enforce laws. In such circumstances, corrupt practices are common due to a combination of ineffective institutions and governing systems and a low capacity to use resources effectively. TJ advocates debate whether TJ should address economic crimes such as corruption, and whether they are capable of combating corruption. Optimists argue that TJ can reduce corruption, whereas pessimists maintain that it is ineffective at combating such a multifaceted phenomenon and therefore has no impact on corruption. This study offers a systematic empirical assessment of these contradicting arguments. Focusing on postconflict countries and several different TJ mechanisms, I present two main findings. First, the implementation of TJ mechanisms is not associated with corruption. Second, only when I run the analysis with a dataset that eliminates the potential breach of justice cases do I find that purges are negatively associated with political corruption whereas amnesties are positively associated with regime corruption. These findings suggest interesting avenues for future research. The main findings support the pessimistic hypothesis that, in its current form and design, TJ does not seem to have a statistically meaningful effect on corruption.

The limitations and alternative explanations discussed in this article suggest potential avenues for further research. Future efforts can conduct comparative case studies based on different mechanisms that might be easier to identify the areas in which TJ has included corruption in its agenda or to determine whether it has been fully implemented. Rather than investigating the TJ–corruption relationship, researchers can examine how implementing TJ changes citizens’ perceptions of corruption. In transitional countries, citizens’ opinions of the regime are crucial for maintaining political stability and preventing the recurrence of conflict or authoritarianism. Studies need to investigate the TJ–corruption link not only at the national level but also at the societal level. A good way of assessing TJ’s impacts on corruption could therefore be through its influence on public opinion.

Acknowledgments

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to the author.

Declaration of interest

The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dilan Nenningsland

Dilan Nenningsland holds a PhD in political science at the Department of Sociology and Political Science at Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), in Norway. She earned her MA degree in International Relations and Regional Studies from University of Tartu in Estonia. Prior to that she obtained a BA degree in Economics from Bilkent University in Türkiye. She has presented her work widely at the Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference, the ECPR General Conference, the European Political Science Association, and the Workshop on Conflict Dynamics in Oxford University.

Notes

1 Economic crimes defined as “fraud in its various manifestations,” as well as including money laundering, bribery and corruption (Grabosky, 1998, p. 44). Henceforth, refer to economic crimes as corruption-related crimes.

2 I use the terms purges, lustration, and vetting mechanisms interchangeably. See Horne (2017) for a detailed discussion of their differences.

3 See Advocacy Forum-Nepal (2014) at https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/TRC_Act_UN_Submission_AF_TRIAL_REDRESS_June2014_.pdf

4 According to the holistic approach, individual TJ mechanisms alone cannot address postviolation societal and governmental issues. Thus, the International Center for Transitional Justice emphasizes the effectiveness of combining multiple measures.

5 Wendy Lambourne (2014) presented what victims and survivors think about TJ mechanisms based on her field work in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor.

6 I use the PCI instead of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, as the latter spans from 1995 to 2022, leaving gaps in the years between 1946 and 2006 covered by the PCJ Dataset.

7 The unit of analysis in the PCJ dataset is the postconflict peace period, which lasts up to five years after the end of an armed conflict. The dataset also codes TJ processes that are implemented within the first five years after the end of a given conflict (Binningsbø et al., 2012).

8 As a robustness check, I conduct analysis based on yearly observations. I code the corruption values in the sixth year after the end of conflict (i.e., five years after the end of the conflict). Then considering the leads of corruption, I measure corruption one, five, 10, and 15 years into the future.

9 For instance, Azerbaijan had a conflict between 1992 and 1994. The PCJ dataset codes all the TJ mechanisms implemented within the following five years (1994–1999). In some cases, countries implemented TJ mechanisms immediately following the conflict, and sometimes in the second, third or the fourth year. To avoid including years without TJ mechanisms, I take the five-year average of corruption values from the end of the five-year postconflict period. For Azerbaijan, I measure corruption as a five-year average between 2000 and 2005.

10 In an earlier version, I controlled for preconflict corruption by coding the corruption level one year before the conflict’s onset. The results for both types of variables were similar, as I elaborate in the Results section.

11 To sort out any region-specific issues, I included regional fixed effects in the models. This barely changed my results.

12 Summary trials swiftly resolve matters, expedite procedures, and document proceedings. In human rights violation cases, their use might indicate potential corruption, such as elites attempting to protect allies from accountability.

13 Show trials are public trials conducted to appease or influence public sentiment, rather than to ensure justice. For the TJ–corruption relationship, this could be characterized as window dressing.