French secularism as a ‘guarantor’ of women's rights? Muslim women and gender politics in a Parisian banlieue

Abstract

This paper considers contemporary discourse in France that positions secularism (laïcité) as a guarantor of Muslim women's rights. In the first section I sketch a socio-historical genealogy of this discourse focusing on key shifts in its articulation. I suggest that the current identification between secularism and Muslim women's rights has its main expressions in recent public policy commissions and, as an example on the ground, in the positions taken by France's largest feminist organisation, Femmes Solidaires. Informed by one another, these commissions and this organisation (a) conceptualise Islam as overtly political and patriarchal and (b) define secularism as the primary way to ‘liberate’ Muslim women. The second section examines the impact of this discourse on Muslim communities in Petit Nanterre, a Parisian suburb where I conducted extensive anthropological fieldwork. Significantly, Muslim women in this suburb are uninterested in headscarf-related debates on secularism and more vividly engaged in the 2005 Pork Affair, a locally oriented controversy in a public school. I conclude that the religious concerns of the Muslim women positioned at the centre of the secular debate are expressed in certain forms of activism, efforts ignored by commissions and women's advocacy groups.

Keywords:

• Laïcité
• France
• secularism
• women's rights
• Parisian banlieues
• Muslim women

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges the financial support for research of this paper from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Fulbright Foundation, and the helpful advice of John Bowen, Jocelyne Cesari, Ellen Badone, Oscar Moro Abadía and anonymous reviewers of Culture and Religion. Invaluable thanks goes to community members in Petit Nanterre who made this research possible. A version of this paper was presented and benefited from a co-sponsored Islam in the West and Center for European Studies lecture as a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University in March 2008.

Notes

 1. While the French state does not gather statistical information regarding religious affiliation, data available on the nationality of the residents suggest that between 6% and 18% of the French population is Muslim (Couvreur 1998; Tribalat 1996; Hargreaves 2007, 11; Silverman 1992, 37; Simon 2008, 8). Following Cesari (1998, 17), Guénif-Souilamas (2000) and Roy (2005), I hesitate to characterise Islam in France as a tradition of immigrants. Islam in the République is, however, more than a religious identifier; it also characterises ethnic and cultural identities.

 2. During the 22 months of fieldwork in this suburb of 8100 inhabitants, 15 kilometres northwest of Paris, I lived with a family of Algerian-origin in a housing project and conducted interviews among largely first-generation Maghrebian women (see Selby 2009). I also undertook fieldwork, interviews and discussion groups with a local chapter of Femmes Solidaires who were active in the neighbourhood lobbying for women's legal rights, particularly in assisting Muslim women in forced marriages and in divorce. All translations from French are my own.

 3. Since 2002, the French government has focused a great deal of attention on analysis of laïcité. The Debré Commission was formed in May 2003 to examine the place of religious symbols in public schools. It concluded that French secularism must be consistently monitored, and, like the Stasi Commission, warns of the forced hand (by their social context or families) behind headscarves. Other religion-related government commissions include: the Debray Report (2002) requested by then-minister of education Jack Lang on the teaching of secularism in public schools; the Rossinot Report (2006) examining secularism in the workplace and public services and the Machelon Report (2006) treating the relationship between religious traditions and ‘public powers,’ particularly emphasizing issues related to the construction of religious buildings and cemeteries. More recently, a sixth commission and report led by André Gerin was released on 26 January 2010 on the voile intégral (full-face headcoverings), recommending they be banned in public spaces. The Gerin Report (2010) followed a now-common six-month commission led by 32-multi-party-members. The Gerin commission similarly interviewed Femmes Solidaires and other women's rights organisations (2010, 276–93). FS president Sabine Salmon stresses the importance of secularism and notes that ‘the full-face veil is a conspicuous sign of gender inequality’ and that ‘liberal consent [of women choosing to wear it] is unacceptable’ (2010, 278; see also Selby 2011). A law banning full-face veils (niqabs and burqas) in the public sphere was subsequently put into practice 11 April 2011.

 4. The Debré Report echoes this rhetoric, and goes further in pointing to laïcité à la française (French secularism) as an important model in the promotion of a common national project (2003, 35) and, more broadly, to the promotion of worldwide stability (2003, 34). Refuting ethnic ghettoism, it espouses French secularism as key to a vivre ensemble (living together) as opposed to a vivre à côté (living alongside) (Debré Report 2003, 42).

 5. For a short history of the term ‘Islamism’, see Winter (2001) and Kramer (2003).

 6. Recent scholarship has examined how these Western representations of Muslim women can be an effective weapon in contemporary ‘culture wars’, as well (for instance, Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002; Abu-Lughod 2002; Mahmood 2008).

 7. The remaining proposals within the Stasi Commission have been debated to a lesser extent. Political and definitional issues not addressed in the document are notable. For one, its recommendations call for a blanket secular treatment. While there is mention of the eastern Alsace-Moselle region that at the time of the 1905 law on secularism was part of Germany, the Indian Ocean islands of La Réunion and Mayotte, both with large Muslim populations, received no special consideration. Also absent from the Report is mention of France's 5000 turban-wearing Sikhs – which is significant because the majority of ‘problematic’ cases resulting in school expulsions involved Sikhs (see Sciolino 2004; Scott 2007, 107) – and defining and negotiating ‘public’ space (see complication of these categories described by Asad (2003); Gal 2004).

 8. In late 2003, sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar claimed, ‘It is common knowledge that what is aimed at [in the Stasi Commission] is Islam, especially the headscarf. The rest is trivia’ (New York Times 2003). Jean Baubérot, a historian and an outspoken member of the commission, noted that ‘large crosses [which along with Jewish skullcaps and hijabs were included as “conspicuous signs”], let's face it, have nothing to do with this kind of report’ (New York Times 2003).

 9. In 1998, the Union des Femmes Françaises changed its name to Femmes Solidaires under pressure from members in the banlieue of Seine-Saint-Denis who felt that foreign women were excluded by the former appellation.

10. The ‘French French’ or Français de souche is an ethno-nationalist designation referring to the ‘indigenous’ French.

11. The petition letter written by Sabine Salmon and circulated by members at a demonstration of about 500 people in front of the Canadian Embassy noted that ‘Our experience as an Association has shown us the importance of secularism for the respect of women, their rights, and their citizenship… The Canadian Sharia court must be outlawed’ (my translation of the Petition Letter dated 7 September 2005).

12. The disappearance of two French journalists and their Syrian driver in Iraq also explains the mobilization of a very different response to the 2004 law on conspicuous religious symbols than was anticipated. With their capture on 20 August 2004, members of the Islamic Army of Iraq demanded that the French government retract the law in exchange for their release. The French government refused to negotiate, and, far from dividing the Muslim community, many rallied in support of the law and the journalists, a response that was ‘highly improbable only a short time ago’ (Le Monde 2004, 22). All three men were later freed.

13. The dominant discourse on laïcité and gender politics was especially evident in coverage by the print media of International Women's Day. In 2005, representatives of the Ligue du Droit des Femmes (Women's Rights League) wrote an editorial piece appearing in Le Monde which denounced so-called misogynist practices justified by religion, calling for the complete banning of the headscarf (Vigerie and Zelensky 2003). Another article by Michèle Vianès described laïcité as a ‘necessary shield’ for women (2005), equating efforts to weaken women's rights with attacks against secularism. Other feminists also used the occasion to rhetorically ask how the equality of the sexes could evolve in a country (France) that supports religion in the private sphere and therein tolerates practices such as genital mutilation, forced marriages and polygamy – all equated here with Islam (see Le Monde 8 March 2005, 15; Minces 2006; Bowen 2009a, 3–4).

14. The song lyrics in the original French: ‘Allons femmes de toutes origines/Le jour de croire est arrivé/Contre nous de l'ignorance/Le savoir pour nous est sacré (bis)/Écoutez-nous dans nos cités/Nous battre et defender nos droits/Pour vaincre l'indifférence/Et enfin se sentir intégrées.’

15. A 2010 study by the French Haut Conseil à l'intégration (High Council for Integration) suggests that Muslim students and parents are increasingly requesting religious accommodations in public schools. Les défis de l'intégration à l'école (The Challenges of Integration at School) states that the state could allow for alternatives to pork but should not make halal or kosher meats available because of their cost. The 197-page report does not include any figures on the frequency of these demands.

16. When I asked the school principal whether La Fontaine would be interested in serving halal meat as part of their menu, he claimed this alternative was not an option in the French educational system, because as a laïque school they cannot cater to the needs of particular groups, whether they be Hindu (who often do not eat beef) or vegetarians. The canteen serves one meal.