Shame, guilt and Martha Nussbaum’s immaturing process: alethic truth and human flourishing

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that it is possible to have an account of shame and guilt as mature concepts in moral psychology that sit alongside immature ones. In arguing for this, I adopt the critical realist method of immanent critique, taking as my focus Martha Nussbaum’s accounts of shame and guilt in two key texts. Starting from a nuanced psychoanalytic foundation in Hiding from Humanity, Nussbaum undoes this grounding in favour of an elementary position (the ‘Transition’) in Anger and Forgiveness. In tracing what I call an ‘immaturing process’ in Nussbaum, I show how mature concepts can be identified by contrasting them with immature concepts, and how the mature concepts represent a deeper understanding of shame and guilt – their alethic truth – which is critical to human flourishing. I conclude by considering what can be rescued from Nussbaum’s immaturing process and its broader implications for criminal law and justice.

KEYWORDS:

• Shame
• guilt
• Martha Nussbaum
• moral psychology
• alethic truth
• human flourishing

Acknowledgements

An early version of this paper was presented at the International Association for Critical Realism’s 22nd Annual Conference in Southampton (August, 2019). My thanks to fellow panellists Carl Auerbach, Nick Hostettler, Alan Norrie and Craig Reeves and the participants who attended the ‘Ethics, Moral Psychology and Critical Realism’ sessions for their valuable feedback. I am especially grateful to Alan Norrie for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their constructive comments, and the editors for the invitation to submit a paper to this Special Issue.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Amanda Wilson has been empirically researching and writing about alternative justice mechanisms for over a decade. Her longstanding interest in applying a critical realist lens to criminal justice thinking and practices has most recently taken her to the fertile depths of moral psychology and psychoanalysis. This work will culminate in a book on the ethics of restorative justice.

Notes

1 The critical realist method of immanent critique involves starting with the position or premise of your opponent/discussant and working out from under it. See Mervyn Hartwig (2007, 105–108) for a more expansive definition of immanent critique and how it relates to other forms.

2 This point chimes with Helen Merrell Lynd’s (1958, 49) account of shame as ‘an experience that affects and is affected by the whole self’.

3 Given the previous allusion to ideals, I suggest that the partial overcoming of primitive shame might have something to do with the embodiment of ideals that comes at a later stage of development because in order to have ideals one must have a conception of themselves in relation to others. This seems to fit with what Nussbaum says later on about narcissism being ‘overcome in the direction of a relationship of mutuality’ (Nussbaum 2004, 187).

4 In a footnote, Nussbaum refers to Gabrielle Taylor’s account of the difference between guilt and shame as offering a helpful distinction: ‘If feelings of guilt concentrate on the deed or omission then the thought that some repayment is due is in place here as it is not in the case of shame. If I have done wrong then there is some way in which I can ‘make up’ for it, if only by suffering punishment. But how can I possibly make up for what I now see I am? There are no steps that suggest themselves here. There is nothing more to be done, and it is best to withdraw and not to be seen. This is the typical reaction when feeling shame. Neither punishment not forgiveness here perform a function’ (Taylor 1985, 90). Leaving aside Taylor’s narrow conception of restoration, Taylor ignores the fact that there are primitive and mature forms of shame and guilt which, if acknowledged, would undermine this distinction. I also question Taylor’s assertion that shame offers nothing in terms of forward-looking activity. On a mature understanding, shame may in fact prompt a person to substantially rethink who they are and who they want to be which could lead to transformative change and a betterment of the self (and others in return).

5 While these contradictory justifications are discussed in the context of intimate relationships, in particular, that of spouses, I see no reason why it should not also apply to that of strangers even though Nussbaum wants to force a separation between these relational realms.

6 There is a third kind of control which Nussbaum does not allow: control that can arise from moral transactions. For example, creating a space for a victim to regain control by confronting their perpetrator. This example is not about down-ranking the perpetrator, it is about communicating a rupture in love and opening up to a moral dialogue about it.

7 This is not a balanced reading of Morris. What he actually describes is what it means to feel guilty and where that feeling comes from. It is not an “ought” but a moral psychological account of the feeling of guilt in psychosomatic terms. While Nussbaum is right in saying that guilt furnishes pain, she is wrong to claim that this is inflicted on oneself. It is a psychosomatic reaction to feeling bad and the source of that pain is a lack of wholeness – not being at one with oneself and others. The pain is not owed and suffering is not intrinsic to what Morris calls ‘atonement, being at one with’ (Morris 1976, 100).

8 Earlier in the book, her use of the term, coined by Williams, is appropriate because it arises in the context of what she calls ‘tragic choice’ or non-culpable harm (Nussbaum 2016, 134–135).

9 In further work, it would be interesting to explore the relationship between mature psychological states, what an alethic sense of truth means, and how that relates to a conception of a person’s ground state.